1 2026:CGHC:24820 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 640 of 2026 South Eastern Coalfields Limited ( Secl) Through- Its General Manager Sohagpur Area District Shahdol Madhya Pradesh. ... Petitioner versus Padam Kumar Singhania S/o Shri Shravan Kumar Singhania Aged About 67 Years R/o In Front Of Railaway Station Vikrampur Road Ward No. 15. Budhar District Shahdol Madhya Pradesh. ---Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Pankaj Singh, Advocate Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board 18/06/2026 1. The present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 07.04.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by learned Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Nava Raipur, District Raipur, in Execution Case No. 9 of 2026, whereby the objection raised by the petitioner regarding maintainability of the execution proceeding has been rejected and declined to impound the arbitral award dated 07.07.2004. VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.06.25 19:53:29 +0530 2 2. The facts of the case are that, an arbitral award was passed on 07.07.2004 against the petitioner directing him to pay a sum of Rs. 74,40,000/- along with the interest @ 12% per annum from 01.01.2000 till the date of realization. An amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- was also awarded against the petitioner towards litigation expenses. The respondent, in whose favour the award was passed, initiated execution proceeding of the award bearing Execution Case No. 111/2004. It is the case of the petitioner that pursuant to the interim order dated 28.02.2006, passed in M.A. No. 254/2006, the petitioner deposited 50% of the award amount i.e. Rs. 65,85,000/- on 27.03.2006. The M.A. No. 254/2006 was dismissed on 09.05.2017 and the award dated 07.07.2004 affirmed. The calculation made in the execution proceeding was challenged by the award holder in WP(227) No. 940/2018, which was decided on 01.07.2025, by which remitted the matter back to the learned Executing Court for reconsideration of the calculation afresh in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2013 (1) SCC 243 (Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited v. R.S. Avtar Singh and Company), thereafter the petitioner raised an objection on 14.01.2026 regarding maintainability of the execution proceeding and executability of the award dated 07.07.2004 on the ground of absence of payment of stamp duty in the award and prayed for impounding of the subject award. The learned Commercial Court while deciding the objection raised by the petitioner held that the objection has been raised belatedly and is barred under Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (in short ‘Act of 1899’) and declined to impound the award. Hence this petition. 3 3. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner would submit that, payment of stamp duty in the subject award is a statutory obligation and mandatory in nature. It has no waiver or relaxation on the ground of delay, conduct or equity. Although the learned Commercial Court has found that the award to be an instrument chargeable with stamp duty, but refused to impound the award, by which they relaxed the award holder from payment of stamp duty. Section 33 of the Act of 1899 is mandatory in nature, which speaks about charge of stamp duty on the instrument. The learned Commercial Court should have considered the mandatory requirement of payment of stamp duty before initiating the execution proceeding, even if no objection has been raised by the award debtor. Despite considering the award is liable to be charged with stamp duty and liable to be impounded, if the requisite stamp duty is not paid on it, the learned Commercial Court rejected the objection. The statutory non-compliance makes the award inexecutable. The learned Commercial Court has erroneously considered the operation of Section 36 of the Act of 1899 without considering that the petitioner has not admitted the award. Section 36 of the Act of 1899 operates only when the subject instrument is admitted in evidence and bars subsequent challenge to such admission. The award holder is required to fulfill the obligation under Sections 33 and 35 of the Act of 1899 to ensure the payment of requisite stamp duty in the subject instrument. He would also submit that the order dated 18.04.2018 passed by the learned Executing Court is set aside by the order dated 01.07.2025, passed in WP(227) No. 940/2018 and matter was remitted for fresh computation. The objection raised by the petitioner 4 cannot be rejected on the ground of delay that it was raised belatedly. The arbitral award is an instrument and required to be stamped under the provisions of the Act of 1899 and then only it could be executed under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Until the defect of payment of stamp duty is cured, the execution cannot be proceeded. 4. In support of his submission, he would rely upon the judgment of M. Anusuya Devi v. M. Manik Reddy, 2003 (8) SCC 565, Hindustan Steel Limited v. Dilip Construction Company, 1969 (1) SCC 597 and Jagdamba Transformer v. M/s. Shubham Enterprises, Raipur Private Limited, decided by this Court on 29.04.2023, in WP(227) No. 405 of 2023. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the petition. 6. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner, after allowing the arbitral award dated 07.07.2004 to remain under execution proceedings for nearly two decades and after actively participating in such proceedings, can be permitted to raise an objection regarding insufficiency of stamp duty at this belated stage. 7. The factual matrix of the case would reveal that the arbitral award was passed on 07.07.2004. The award-holder initiated execution proceedings on 26.12.2005. The petitioner entered appearance in the execution proceedings and, pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court in M.A. No. 254/2006, deposited 50% of the award amount. Subsequently, after dismissal of the challenge to the award 5 on 09.05.2017, the petitioner further participated in the execution proceedings and the Executing Court proceeded to determine the amount payable under the award. At no point of time during the long pendency of the execution proceedings did the petitioner raise any objection regarding deficiency of stamp duty on the arbitral award. 8. It is well settled that though an arbitral award is an instrument chargeable with stamp duty, the objection regarding stamping cannot be permitted to be raised at any stage irrespective of the conduct of the parties. The legislative intent behind Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is to confer finality once an instrument has been admitted in evidence or acted upon and no objection has been taken at the appropriate stage. The provision is founded on the principle that a party cannot be permitted to keep silent at the relevant time and thereafter challenge the instrument after the proceedings have substantially progressed. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Javer Chand and Others v. Pukhraj Surana, AIR 1961 SC 1655, while interpreting Section 36 of the Act of 1899, held that once a document has been admitted in evidence, such admission cannot thereafter be questioned on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped except as provided under the Act. The object of the provision is to prevent protracted challenges after the document has already been acted upon by the Court. 10. Likewise, in Shyamal Kumar Roy v. Sushil Kumar Agarwal, (2006) 11 SCC 331, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated in paragraph 16 that “The said decision, therefore, is an authority for the proposition 6 that Section 36 would operate even if a document has been improperly admitted in evidence. It is of little or no consequence as to whether a document has been admitted in evidence on determination of a question as regards admissibility thereof or upon dispensation of formal proof therefore. If a party to the lis intends that an instrument produced by the other party being insufficiently stamped should not be admitted in evidence, he must raise an objection thereto at the appropriate stage. He may not do so only at his peril. 11. In the present case, the conduct of the petitioner clearly demonstrates acquiescence in the execution proceedings. The petitioner not only participated in the proceedings but also deposited substantial amounts pursuant to the award. The execution proceedings continued for several years without any objection regarding stamp duty. Even when the award attained finality upon dismissal of the challenge proceedings, no such objection was raised. The objection came to be raised only after remand of the matter by this Court for the limited purpose of recalculation of the decretal amount. Such conduct disentitles the petitioner from invoking the discretionary and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. The submission of the petitioner that the order dated 18.04.2018 stood set aside by this Court and therefore the entire execution proceedings stood reopened also deserves rejection. A perusal of the order dated 01.07.2025 passed in WP(227) No. 940/2018 would show that the matter was remitted only for reconsideration of the calculation of the amount payable under the award in light of the 7 judgment rendered in Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (supra). The remand was not intended to reopen all issues which had attained finality during the execution proceedings. Therefore, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the limited remand order to raise an entirely new objection which was never urged during the preceding years. 13. Another circumstance which deserves consideration is that during the course of hearing, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that in WP(227) No. 639 of 2026, arising out of the same award, this Court by order dated 16.06.2026 granted interim protection against the attachment warrant dated 01.06.2026. A copy of the said order has been placed on record. Perusal of the order dated 16.06.2026 would reveal that the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, on instructions, made a statement before this Court that the petitioner was ready and willing to deposit an amount of Rs.81,24,601/- before the learned Commercial Court within ten working days and prayed that the attachment warrant be stayed. Taking note of the said undertaking, this Court stayed the execution of the attachment warrant subject to deposit of the aforesaid amount before the learned Commercial Court. Significantly, while seeking such equitable relief in WP(227) No.639 of 2026, the petitioner did not disclose that the present writ petition challenging the executability of the arbitral award had already been instituted on 03.06.2026 and was pending consideration before this Court. Once the petitioner, through counsel and on instructions, undertook before this Court to deposit the amount determined in execution and obtained interim protection on that basis, he cannot be permitted to simultaneously contend that the 8 very award sought to be executed is inexecutable in law. A litigant cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate in the same breath. The conduct of the petitioner in seeking protection against attachment by undertaking to satisfy the execution proceedings clearly amounts to acceptance of the executability of the award and disentitles him from raising a contrary plea at this stage. The said conduct further fortifies the conclusion that the objection regarding executability of the award has been raised belatedly and lacks bona fides. 14. The submission of the petitioner that the order dated 18.04.2018 stood set aside by this Court and therefore the entire execution proceedings stood reopened also deserves rejection. It is also relevant to note that the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not to permit a litigant to revive stale objections after prolonged acquiescence. The impugned order reflects due consideration of the statutory provisions and the conduct of the parties and does not suffer from any jurisdictional error warranting interference. 15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the objection regarding insufficiency of stamp duty has been raised after an inordinate and unexplained delay of almost two decades from the date of the award and nearly twenty years after commencement of the execution proceedings. The petitioner having allowed the award to be acted upon and having participated in the execution proceedings without demur, is precluded 9 from raising such objection at this belated stage. The learned Commercial Court has rightly held that the objection is barred and does not merit consideration. 16. Consequently, no jurisdictional infirmity or patent illegality is found in the impugned order dated 07.04.2026 passed by the learned Commercial Court. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved