2026:HHC:39210 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1597 of 2026 Reserved on: 09.09.2026. Decided on: 15.09.2026 Devender Kumar @ Batta …. Petitioner Versus State of H.P. …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Ms Kanta Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 110 of 2026 dated 05.05.2026 registered at Police Station Sadar, Solan, District Solan, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act). 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police had received secret information on 05.05.2026 that the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:39210 petitioner, co-accused Tej Singh and Shubham Thakur were selling heroin to the local youth in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP- 64B-7475. The police searched the vehicle and recovered 7.07 grams of heroin and ₹29,000/-. The police arrested the occupants of the vehicle and seized the heroin. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The police have completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner is a permanent resident of District Solan. He has roots in the society, and there is no chance of his absconding. He would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police had received secret information on 05.05.2026 at about 01:00 p.m. that a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-64B-7475 was parked in the car parking of Vivanta Mall. Devender Kumar Batta, the present petitioner, Tej Singh and Shubham Thakur were selling heroin from the car. A huge quantity of heroin could be recovered by searching the car. The information was credible, and the delay in procuring the search warrant would 3 2026:HHC:39210 have led to the destruction of the heroin. Hence, the information was reduced to writing, and it was sent to the supervisory officer. The police joined Mohit Bhanta and Kamal Kant with them and went to the car parking. A car bearing registration No. HP-64B- 7475 was found parked in the car park. The driver of the car revealed his name as Devinder Kumar Batta, the present petitioner and the persons sitting on the rear seats revealed their names as Tej Singh and Shubham Thakur. The police checked the car and recovered one polythene packet and ₹29,000/-. The police checked the polythene packet and found 9 small packets containing 7.07 grams of heroin. The police seized the heroin and arrested the occupants of the car. The police interrogated the petitioner, and he revealed that he had purchased 18 grams of heroin from a person whom he could identify. He led the police to the person, and the police apprehended him. The person was found in possession of 5.41 grams of heroin. The police also arrested that person, who revealed his name as Mandeep. The result of analysis confirmed the heroin to be diacetylmorphine. The charge sheet was filed before the Court, and the matter is listed for service on the accused. FIR No. 171 of 21 and FIR No. 136 of 2023 have been registered against the petitioner. Hence, the status report. 4 2026:HHC:39210 4. I have heard Ms Kanta Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Ms Kanta Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered by the police is less than commercial quantity, and rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. She relied upon Aman Kumar vs. State of H.P. 2026:HHC:27515 and Vishal Chandel vs. State of H.P. 2025:HHC:19530 in support of her submissions. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of 7.07 grams of heroin and currency notes of ₹29,000/-, which prima facie corroborate the prosecution version that the petitioner is a drug peddler. He has criminal antecedents, 5 2026:HHC:39210 and he would indulge in the commission of the crime if released on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in 6 2026:HHC:39210 this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In 7 2026:HHC:39210 highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting 8 2026:HHC:39210 or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) 9 2026:HHC:39210 “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing on the case, particularly when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The status report mentions that the petitioner was found in the car from which 7.07 grams of heroin was recovered. The petitioner made a disclosure statement; the police arrested Mandeep and recovered 5.41 grams of heroin from him. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 14 SCC 640: (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 412: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1043, that the information given by the accused, leading to the discovery of another accused from whom forged currency notes 10 2026:HHC:39210 were recovered, is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed at page 646: - “15. It is apparent that on the basis of the information furnished by accused Mehboob Ali and Firoz, and other accused, Anju Ali was arrested. The fact that Anju Ali was dealing with forged currency notes was not known to the police. The statements of both the accused have led to the discovery of the fact and arrest of the co-accused, not known to the police. They identified him, and ultimately, the statements have led to unearthing the racket of the use of fake currency notes. Thus, the information furnished by the aforesaid accused persons vide information memos is clearly admissible, which has led to the identification and arrest of accused Anju Ali, and as already stated, possession of Anju Ali's fake currency notes had been recovered. As per information furnished by the accused Mehboob and Firoz vide memos Exts. P-41 and P-42, the fact has been discovered by the police as to the involvement of the accused Anju Ali, which was not known to the knowledge of the police. The police were not aware of the accused Anju Ali, as well as the fact that he was dealing with fake currency notes, which were recovered from him. Thus, the statement of the aforesaid accused Mehboob and Firoz is clearly saved by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The embargo put by Section 27 of the Evidence Act was clearly lifted in the instant case. The statement of the accused persons has led to the discovery of facts proving the complicity of the other accused persons, and the entire chain of circumstances clearly makes out that the accused acted in conspiracy, as found by the trial court as well as the High Court. xxxxxxx 20. Considering the aforesaid dicta, it is apparent that there was a discovery of a fact as per the statement of Mehmood Ali and Mohd. Firoz. The co-accused was nabbed on the basis of an identification made by the accused Mehboob and Firoz. That he was dealing with fake currency notes came to the 11 2026:HHC:39210 knowledge of the police through them. Recovery of forged currency notes was also made from Anju Ali. Thus, the aforesaid accused had knowledge about co-accused Anju Ali, who was nabbed at their instance and based on their identification. These facts were not to the knowledge of the police; hence the statements of the accused persons leading to the discovery of the fact are clearly admissible as per the provisions contained in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, which carves out an exception to the general provisions about inadmissibility of confession made under police custody contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.” 11. Therefore, the statement made by the petitioner leading to the discovery of Mandeep and recovery of heroin would prima facie connect him to the commission of the crime. 12. It was submitted that the quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioner is less than commercial quantity and the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by this Court in Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, that the menace of drug addiction has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, and the release of an accused on bail in NDPS Act cases will send a negative signal to society. It was observed: “8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril. 12 2026:HHC:39210 9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is clueless in respect of evidence against the petitioner. Though allegations against the petitioner are yet to be proved in accordance with the law, it cannot be taken singly as a factor to grant bail to the petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record on behalf of the petitioner to divulge as to how and in what manner he came in contact with the persons who were residents of the State of Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is sufficient prima facie material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the crime. In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will send a negative signal in society, which will definitely be detrimental to its interests. 10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. It cannot be guaranteed that there will be re-indulgence by the petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released on bail.” 13. Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996, that bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right even though the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was observed: “6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not technically fall under the category of commercial quantity; nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed to be less by any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts of each and every case. 13 2026:HHC:39210 7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.” 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025, that there is a concerning increase in drug abuse amongst the youth. It was observed: - 8. This Court is of the view that the issue of substance abuse has emerged as a global public health crisis in the twenty- first century, affecting every country worldwide, as drug trafficking and addiction have become pervasive. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in its 2025 World Drug Report that “As at 2023, some 316 million people worldwide had used drugs in the past year, representing an increase over the past decade that outpaces population growth, which indicates a higher prevalence of drug use.” 9. In India, there has been a concerning increase in drug abuse among the youth. Substance abuse not only affects individuals, families, and communities but also undermines various aspects of health, including physical, social, political, and cultural foundations, and mental well-being. (See: “Bhattacharya S, Menon GS, Garg S, Grover A, Saleem SM, Kushwaha P. The lingering menace of drug abuse among the Indian youth–it’s time for action. Indian J Community Med 2025;50:S9-12, published on 17th April, 2025”) 10. According to many news reports, India faces a clear dilemma between tackling the narcotics crisis systematically or sacrificing its most valuable resource, i.e. its young people. The extent of the menace of drug abuse has also been highlighted by this Court in the case of Ankush Vipan Kapoor v. National Investigation Agency, (2025) 5 SCC 155, wherein this Court has observed as under: 14 2026:HHC:39210 “9.1 The ills of drug abuse seem to be shadowing the length and breadth of our country, with the Central and every State Government fighting against the menace of substance abuse. The debilitating impact of the drug trade and drug abuse is an immediate and serious concern for India. As the globe grapples with the menace of escalating Substance Use Disorders (“SUD”) and an ever accessible drug market, the consequences leave a generational Page 75 of 84 imprint on public health and even national security. Article 47 of the Constitution makes it a duty of the State to regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties, and in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about the prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. The State has a responsibility to address the root causes of this predicament and develop effective intervention strategies to ensure that India’s younger population, which is particularly vulnerable to substance abuse, is protected and saved from such a menace. This is particularly because substance abuse is linked to social problems and can contribute to child maltreatment, spousal violence, and even property crime in a family.” 15. Hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail simply because the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to his case. 16. The status report mentions that FIR No. 171 of 2021 and FIR No. 136 of 2023 have been registered against the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents while granting bail in 15 2026:HHC:39210 Champa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899 and held that the criminal antecedents would disentitle an accused from the concession of bail. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi vs State of H.P., decided on 27.11.2025. Therefore, the relevance of criminal antecedents cannot be ignored. 17. It was submitted that the co-accused has been released on bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. This submission cannot be accepted. The principle of parity demands that the circumstances between the petitioner and the co- accused should be similar. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230; (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 722; 2021 SCC OnLine SC 335 that while determining the parity, the role of the accused has to be considered. It was observed at page 246 “Parity, while granting bail, must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail based on parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident, and the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law.” 16 2026:HHC:39210 18. This position was reiterated in Tarun Kumar v. Enforcement Directorate, AIR 2024 SC 169: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486, wherein it was observed: “18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co- accused, who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration.” 19. The petitioner has criminal antecedents, and it is not shown that the co-accused had also criminal antecedents. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim parity with the co-accused, and he cannot be held entitled to bail on the principle of parity. 20. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of trial and the petitioner is entitled to bail. This submission cannot be accepted. The status report mentions that the police have filed the charge sheet before the Court. The petitioner was arrested on 05.05.2026, and the status report does not demonstrate any delay. 21. The judgment of Vishal Chandel (supra) cannot be followed in view of the judgment of this Court in Champa Devi (supra), which has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. There was no material to prima facie connect the petitioner to the 17 2026:HHC:39210 commission of the crime in Aman Kumar (supra). Hence, he was held entitled to bail. In the present case, the police have collected sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime; hence, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 22. No other point was urged. 23. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and is dismissed. 24. The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 15th September, 2026 (Nikita)