1 2026:CGHC:25322-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 36 of 2016 Pawan Chandravanshi S/o Shri Keshav Ram Chandravanshi Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Getra, P.S. Kharora, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Khamtarai, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. C.R. Sahu, Advocate For Respondent/ State : Mr. H.A.P.S. Bhatia and Mr. Sharad Mishra, Panel Lawyers Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 22.06.2026 1. Notice was issued to the father of the victim (PW-2) in compliance to this Court’s order dated 17/04/2026 and he is present virtually through DLSA, Raipur. Upon being asked, he submits that he has HARNEET KAUR Digitally signed by HARNEET KAUR Date: 2026.06.24 13:36:32 +0530 2 no objection if the appeal of the appellant is allowed. Hence, the Court proceeds to hear the matter finally. 2. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the impugned judgment dated 07/12/2015 passed by the Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raipur, District – Raipur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 42/14 whereby learned Special Judge has convicted the appellant as under :- Conviction under Section Sentence Fine Additional Imprisonment in default of payment of fine Section 363 of the IPC R.I. for 3 years Rs. 500/- 3 months Section 366 of the IPC R.I. for 4 years Rs. 1000/- 6 months Section 376(2)(j) of the IPC R.I. for 10 years Rs. 1000/- 6 months Section 3(1)(xii) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act R.I. for 5 years Rs. 1000/- 6 months Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Life imprisonment Rs. 1000/- 6 months Section 6 of the POCSO Act R.I. for 10 years Rs. 1000/- 6 months All sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 3 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the victim was residing with her family at New Anand Nagar, Bhanpuri and the accused/appellant, resided in the adjoining house along with his wife and two kids, and he was known to the victim and her family. According to the prosecution, the victim, who was a minor aged about 16 years at the time of the incident, belonged to a Scheduled Caste community, was acquainted with the accused due to their close neighbourhood and from the last one year prior to the date of the incident i.e. 15/09/2014, the accused/appellant enticed and lured the victim and called her at his house and established physical relations with her against her will and under threats while his wife was not at home, as a result of which, the victim became pregnant. It is further the case of the prosecution that on 04/09/2014, the accused/appellant took the victim to Mumbai without the knowledge or consent of her parents on the assurance that he would marry her. Thereafter, the victim remained away from her home for some time and was subsequently brought back by the accused. Upon her return, the victim disclosed the alleged incident to her family members. On receiving such information, father of the victim (PW-2), lodged a First Information Report (Ex. P/12) at Police Station Khamtarai. During investigation, the victim as well as the accused were medically examined. The investigating agency prepared the spot map, seized relevant documents including the caste certificate and educational records of the victim, recorded statements of 4 witnesses and collected other material evidence. The seized samples were forwarded for forensic examination. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC, Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(1)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 4. The learned trial Court framed charges against the accused under the aforesaid provisions. The accused abjured the guilt and claimed to be tried. In his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him and pleaded false implication. The prosecution has recorded the statements of 9 witnesses and a total of 18 documents have been marked as exhibits. 5. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated and that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are contrary to the evidence available on record. It has been contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and that the evidence adduced is insufficient to sustain the conviction. Learned 5 counsel further argues that the prosecution has failed to satisfactorily prove the age of the victim, inasmuch as neither the birth certificate nor any primary evidence relating to her date of birth was produced, and the prosecution relied only upon a copy of the marksheet which was seized belatedly during investigation. It was also submitted that no ossification test was conducted to determine the age of the victim and, therefore, the finding regarding her minority is not free from doubt. 7. It has further been contended that no independent witness has been examined by the prosecution and that the case rests substantially upon the testimony of interested witnesses. Learned counsel pointed out that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of the victim recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in her deposition before the Court. It was also argued that the medical and forensic evidence do not lend assurance to the prosecution case, as no injury was found on the person of the victim and the FSL report did not detect human spermatozoa in the samples examined. Referring to the evidence of the medical expert, it was submitted that the victim had not disclosed the paternity of the foetus during medical examination. It was thus urged that the prosecution has failed to prove the offences alleged against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and that the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court deserve to be set aside. 6 8. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned trial Court and submitted that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was argued that the testimony of the victim is cogent, trustworthy and duly corroborated by the evidence of her father as well as the medical evidence on record. Learned State counsel further submitted that the material available on record clearly establishes that the victim was below eighteen years of age at the time of the incident and, therefore, her consent, if any, is of no consequence. It was contended that minor discrepancies or omissions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses do not affect the core of the prosecution case. The learned trial Court, after proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, has rightly recorded the conviction of the appellant under the relevant provisions of the IPC, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. It was, therefore, prayed that the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 7 10. The first question which arises for consideration is, “whether the prosecution has been able to establish that the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged incident” ? 11. The victim (PW-1) stated that her date of birth is 21.06.1998. Father of the victim (PW-2), also deposed that the victim was about 16 years of age at the relevant time. In support of the age of the victim, the prosecution has relied upon a copy of the marksheet seized during the course of investigation, wherein her date of birth is recorded as 21.06.1998. 12. However, it is pertinent to note that neither the original school admission register nor the testimony of any competent school authority was brought on record to prove the entry relating to the date of birth of the victim. Father of the victim (PW-2), in his cross- examination, admitted that the birth certificate of the victim was available. Despite availability of such primary evidence, the prosecution did not produce the birth certificate before the trial Court. No explanation has been offered for withholding the best available evidence regarding the age of the victim. 13. It is also noticeable that the marksheet was seized during investigation at a subsequent stage and no witness from the concerned educational institution was examined to establish the basis on which the date of birth recorded therein came to be entered. Further, no ossification test or any other medical age determination test was conducted during investigation. 8 14. It is true that a school record may constitute relevant evidence regarding age, however, where the foundational records and primary evidence are not produced and the entry remains unproved in accordance with law, the Court is required to examine such evidence with caution. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to adduce the best evidence available regarding the age of the victim. The birth certificate, admittedly available with the family, was not produced, nor was any school authority examined to prove the date of birth recorded in the educational records. 15. In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has not established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged occurrence. Consequently, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court regarding the age of the victim cannot be said to be free from doubt. 16. The prosecution case principally rests upon the testimony of the victim (PW-1). It is well settled that conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim if it inspires confidence and is found to be wholly reliable. However, where the testimony suffers from material inconsistencies, omissions or circumstances creating doubt regarding its veracity, the Court is required to seek corroboration from other evidence on record. 9 17. In the present case, the victim (PW-1) stated that she was acquainted with the appellant for a considerable period as he was residing in the neighbourhood and that she used to frequently visit his house. According to her, the appellant had established physical relations with her on several occasions and subsequently took her to Mumbai, where he continued to subject her to sexual intercourse. She further stated that she became pregnant as a consequence of such relations. 18. A careful scrutiny of her testimony, however, reveals certain circumstances which require closer examination. The victim admitted that she was acquainted with the appellant and his family for several years and used to visit their house regularly. She further admitted that while travelling to Mumbai she did not raise any alarm before any co-passenger, railway official or police personnel, despite having opportunities to do so. The record further indicates that she remained with the appellant for several days before returning home. These circumstances, though not by themselves decisive, assume significance while assessing the overall probabilities of the prosecution case. 19. It is also noticeable that certain facts deposed to by the victim before the trial Court do not find place in her earlier statements recorded during investigation. Material omissions and improvements have been brought on record during her cross- examination. The Court is conscious that every omission may not 10 amount to a contradiction, nevertheless, where the omissions relate to material aspects of the prosecution story, they become relevant while evaluating the reliability of the witness. 20. The testimony of father of the victim (PW-2), is essentially based upon what was disclosed to him by the victim after her return. He is not an eyewitness to any of the alleged incidents. His evidence, therefore, is corroborative in nature and cannot by itself establish the prosecution case. 21. The prosecution has not examined any independent witness, though according to the evidence on record the houses of several persons were situated in the vicinity of the place where the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred. No witness from Mumbai or from the locality where the victim allegedly stayed with the appellant was examined during trial. Though non-examination of independent witnesses is not always fatal, the same assumes significance in the facts and circumstances of the present case where the prosecution version requires independent corroboration. 22. Thus, upon an overall appreciation of the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, this Court finds that the testimony of the victim is not of such sterling quality as would justify sustaining the conviction solely on its basis without seeking substantial corroboration from independent, medical or scientific evidence. Moreover, it is appropriate to notice that the father of the victim (PW-2) is present 11 virtually in the Court and he has clearly submitted that he has no objection from the acquittal of the appellant. 23. The next aspect which requires consideration is the medical and forensic evidence adduced by the prosecution. 24. Dr. Santoshi Nagare (PW-9), who medically examined the victim on 15.09.2014, stated that the victim was found to be approximately 24 to 26 weeks pregnant. However, the doctor did not notice any external injury on her body. The genital examination also did not reveal any injury, abrasion, laceration, bleeding or tenderness. Vaginal slides were prepared and forwarded for forensic examination. 25. The Forensic Science Laboratory report (Ex.P-10) assumes significance. The report reveals that no human spermatozoa was detected in the samples forwarded for examination. Though the absence of spermatozoa is not by itself conclusive, it nevertheless constitutes a relevant circumstance while evaluating the prosecution case in its entirety. 26. It is also pertinent to note that while Dr. Santoshi Nagare (PW-9) found the victim to be pregnant, no scientific evidence was collected or produced by the prosecution to establish the paternity of the foetus. The doctor did not depose that the victim had disclosed the identity of the person responsible for the pregnancy at the time of medical examination. Thus, the medical evidence merely establishes that the victim was pregnant at the relevant 12 time, it does not establish that the appellant was responsible for the said pregnancy. 27. Dr. P.K. Gupta (PW-5), who medically examined the appellant, opined that the appellant was capable of performing sexual intercourse. However, such evidence is only of a formal nature and does not connect the appellant with the alleged offence. 28. It is settled law that medical evidence is ordinarily corroborative in nature. While absence of injuries may not by itself discredit the testimony of the victim, where the prosecution case suffers from other infirmities and inconsistencies, the medical and scientific evidence assumes greater importance. In the present case, the medical evidence does not furnish any material corroboration connecting the appellant with the alleged acts. On the contrary, the absence of injuries, the negative FSL report and the lack of evidence regarding paternity constitute circumstances which weaken the prosecution case. 29. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the medical and forensic evidence does not provide the degree of assurance necessary to sustain the conviction of the appellant. 30. In Alamelu & Another (supra), where the facts and circumstances were similar to that of this case, the Supreme Court observed as under: “51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan {AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not the 13 sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge, ... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand." 52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence. xxx xxx xxx 54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house and told him that he had married her. They had come to see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This witness categorically stated that he thought that they were newly married couple. He had made them stay in Door No. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according to the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She did not even complain to this witness or any other residents in the locality. Her behavior of not complaining to 14 anybody at any of the stages after being allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural. 55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to complain or to run away, but she made no such effort. It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing some known persons near the car, after her alleged abduction. She did not make any complaint at the residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti. Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck by Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a car was available. She made no complaint when she was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at the Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been married. The above behaviour would not be natural for a girl who had been compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual intercourse. 56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story has been concocted for reasons best known to the prosecution.” 31. In the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The State Of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 15 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has 16 stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub-Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 17 18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.” 32. Having given our anxious consideration to the entire evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has not been able to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 33. As discussed herein-above, the prosecution has failed to adduce cogent and reliable evidence to conclusively establish that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. Though reliance has been placed upon a copy of the marksheet, neither the foundational records nor the testimony of any competent authority from the concerned educational institution has been brought on record. Admittedly, the birth certificate of the victim was available, yet the same was not produced before the trial Court. In the absence of the best available evidence regarding age and in the absence of any medical age determination examination, the finding regarding minority of the victim cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 18 34. This Court further finds that the testimony of the victim, though entitled to due weight and consideration, is not of such sterling and unimpeachable character as would justify sustaining the conviction solely on its basis without seeking corroboration. The evidence on record reveals material omissions and improvements touching important aspects of the prosecution case. The surrounding circumstances emerging from the evidence also create doubts which remain insufficiently explained by the prosecution. 35. The testimony of father of the victim (PW-2) is admittedly not based upon personal knowledge of the alleged occurrence and is essentially founded upon what was disclosed to him subsequently. The prosecution has also not examined any independent witness capable of lending assurance to the prosecution version, despite such witnesses being available according to the case set up by the prosecution. 36. It is also relevant to notice that pursuant to the order of this Court, father of the victim (PW-2) appeared virtually before this Court through the District Legal Services Authority, Raipur. Upon being specifically queried, he stated that he has no objection if the appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted. Though such a statement cannot by itself determine the outcome of the present appeal, particularly having regard to the nature of the offences involved, the same has been noticed as a circumstance appearing 19 on record. The present appeal, however, has been examined and decided on its own merits on the basis of the evidence and material available on record. 37. The medical and forensic evidence also does not furnish material corroboration connecting the appellant with the alleged offences. Though the victim was found pregnant at the time of her medical examination, no scientific evidence was collected or produced to establish the paternity of the foetus. The forensic report did not detect human spermatozoa in the samples examined. The medical evidence, therefore, falls short of providing the degree of assurance necessary to sustain the conviction in the facts of the present case. 38. It is trite law that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. The burden always lies upon the prosecution to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt and where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence available on record, the view favourable to the accused must ordinarily prevail. The presumption of innocence available to an accused continues throughout the trial and stands reinforced when serious deficiencies appear in the prosecution evidence. 39. In view of the cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellant beyond 20 reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 40. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 07.12.2015 passed by the learned Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.42/2014 are hereby set aside. The accused / appellant is acquitted of the said charges levelled against him. 41. The appellant is reported to be on bail. He need not surrender, however, keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of BNSS), his bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and shall remain effective for a period of six months from today along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 42. The trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Harneet