2026:HHC:39172 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No.  : 344 of 2025 Decided on    : 10.09.2026 Vishal Kumar Sood & Anr. …Petitioners Versus Vijay Kumar Sood …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioners : Mr.   Dheeraj   K.   Verma, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge (Oral) Petitioners   have   filed   the   present   petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 16.05.2025, passed by the Court of learned District Judge, Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the first appellate Court’), in Civil Misc. Petition No. 232­S/6 of 2021, titled as ‘Vijay Kumar Sood Vs Vishal Kumar Sood & Anr.’. 2. By way of order dated 16.05.2025, the learned first   appellate   Court   has   allowed   the   application   under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, moved by respondent Vijay 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:39172 Kumar   Sood   and   the   delay   in   filing   the   appeal,   was condoned and the appeal was ordered to be entertained for adjudication, on merits. 3. Respondent   Vijay   Kumar   Sood   has   filed   the appeal, against the order dated 17.12.2019, passed by the Court   of   learned   Senior   Civil   Judge,   Shimla,   District Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in CMA No. 192­6 of 2013, titled as ‘Vishal Kumar Sood & Anr. Vs Vijay Kumar Sood’. 4. By way of order dated, 17.12.2019, the learned trial Court has allowed the Civil Misc. Application, under Order 39 Rule 2­A CPC and ordered to attach the property of   respondent   Vijay   Kumar   Sood,   for   a   period   of   six months. 5. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petition, before this Court, as borne out from the record, may be summed up as under:­ 5.1 Petitioners Vishal Kumar Sood & Raj Kumari Sood,   have  filed  the  petition,  under  Order  39  Rule  2­A CPC, against respondent Vijay Kumar Sood, for willful and intentional violation of the order dated 16.11.2001, passed by the learned trial Court, in application under Order 39 3 2026:HHC:39172 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, whereby the parties to the lis were directed   to   maintain   status   quo,   qua   nature   of   suit property, till the disposal of the suit. 5.2 In   the   said   petition,   after   culmination   of   the proceedings,   the   learned   trial   Court   vide   order   dated 17.12.2019,   has   ordered   to   attach   the   property   of   the respondent for six months. 5.3 Being aggrieved by the said order, respondent Vijay   Kumar   Sood,   has   filed   appeal   before   the   first appellate Court. 5.4 Since, the said appeal was barred by limitation, as   such,   respondent   has   moved   the   application,   under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, on the grounds that although, the learned trial   Court   has   passed   the   order   dated   17.12.2019, however, he was not aware about the same, as he was proceeded ex­parte. 5.5 Thereafter, on 24.09.2021, when the son of the respondent, visited the office of Tehsildar, then, he was apprised that some orders have been passed against the landed   property   of   the   respondent.     Thereafter,   the respondent made inquiries and came to know about the 4 2026:HHC:39172 order dated 17.12.2019, only on 25.09.2021.  He has also sought the benefit of the restrictions as imposed in view of the   ongoing   COVID­19   Pandemic,   as   well   as   the   order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this regard. 5.6 The said application has been contested by the petitioners,   by   denying   the   factual   position.     As   such, prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 5.7 The   learned   first   appellate   Court,   vide   order dated   16.05.2025,   has   allowed   the   application   and condoned the delay in filing the appeal. 6. Aggrieved from the said order, the petitioners are before this Court, by way of the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. This   Court, is   having   the   supervisory jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and   can   only   interfere   with   the   order,   if   the   findings recorded by the learned first appellate Court are ‘perverse’ or by recording the findings, that while passing the order impugned, the learned first appellate Court has exceeded its jurisdiction or wrongly exercised the jurisdiction, vested in it 5 2026:HHC:39172 8. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in  (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:­ “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court.   The  trial  court  very  minutely  examined   the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record.   The   trial   court's   analysis   of   evidence   also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no   evidence   or   evidence   which   is   thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well   settled   that,   in   an   appeal   against   acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others,   this   Court   observed   that   the   expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the 6 2026:HHC:39172 evidence   itself. In Triveni   Rubber   &   Plastics   v. Collector   of   Central   Excise,   Cochin,   the   Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence   or   that   they   are   so   perverse   that   no reasonable   person   would   have   arrived   at   those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against   the   evidence. In   Godfrey   v.   Godfrey,   the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman   Dictionary   of   Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English ­ 1998 Edition Perverse:   Law   (of   a   verdict)   against   the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse:   Purposely   deviating   from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked   or   wayward;   stubborn;   cross   or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the   weight   of   evidence   but   is   altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: 7 2026:HHC:39172 "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal  unless  the same is found to be perverse. In   the   present   case,   the   High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained   between   the   decisions   which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision   is   arrived   at   on   no   evidence   or evidence   which   is   thoroughly   unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is   some   evidence   on   record   which   is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever   compendious   it   may   be,   the conclusions   would   not   be   treated   as perverse   and   the   findings   would   not   be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer­cum­ Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath &   Sons   &   Others   1992,   this   Court   observed   as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points   on   which   the   challenge   to   the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion,   the   High   Court   was   in   error   in 8 2026:HHC:39172 constituting   itself   into   a   court   of   appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re­appreciate the primary or perceptive   facts   which   were   otherwise within   the   domain   of   the   fact­finding authority   under   the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise   in   recording   secondary   or inferential   facts   based   on   primary   facts found   by   the   statutory   authorities. But what   was   assailed   in   review   was,   in substance,   the   correctness   ­   as distinguished from the legal permissibility ­ of   the   primary   or   perceptive   facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding   relevant   material   or   by   taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to   suffer   from   the   vice   of   irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 9. Similar   view   has   again   been   taken   by   the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:­ “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking   into   consideration   irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if  it is “against  the weight  of evidence”,  or  if  the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the   basis   of   no   evidence   or   thoroughly   unreliable 9 2026:HHC:39172 evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered   with. (Vide: Rajinder   Kumar   Kindra   v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala).” 10. Being guided by the above decisions, now this Court would proceed further to ascertain the fact, whether the learned trial Court, properly exercised the jurisdiction, vested in it, or exceeded in its jurisdiction, while allowing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 11. Before the learned trial Court, respondent was proceeded   against   ex­parte,   as   on   29.10.2013,   despite service,   he   could   not   put   appearance. Thereafter,   his property was attached by the learned trial Court, vide order dated 17.12.2019. 12. Respondent Vijay Kumar Sood, is not going to achieve any object, in not preferring the appeal, within the prescribed period of limitation, had he not been prevented to do, on account of his ignorance of the order, passed by the learned trial Court. 10 2026:HHC:39172 13. Even otherwise, matter should be decided on merits   and   not   on   the   basis   of   technicalities,   such   as, Limitation Act. 14. The learned first appellate Court, in the present case has elaborately discussed the stand taken by both the parties   and   thereafter,   considered   that   the   explanation, which,   has   been   submitted   by   respondent   Vijay   Kumar Sood, for the delay in filing the appeal is neither deliberate nor   intentional,   but,   due   to   the   reasons,   pleaded   and proved by the respondent Vijay Kumar Sood. The reasons, which have been put forth for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, according to this Court, fall within the definition of sufficient cause. The above term ‘sufficient cause’ has nowhere been defined in the Limitation Act. However, a situation beyond the ordinary control of the litigant falls within the purview of “sufficient cause”. As   such,   this   Court   is   of   the   view   that   the impugned order does not require any interference. 15. In  view   of   above,   this  Court   cannot  interfere with the well reasoned order, passed by the learned first appellate   Court. Consequently,   the   present   petition   is dismissed. 11 2026:HHC:39172 16. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed of. 17. The   parties   to   the   lis   are   directed   to   appear before the learned first appellate Court on 24.09.2026 at 10:00 am. 18. Send down the record. (Virender Singh) Judge 10th September, 2026 (Pramod Kumar)