1 2026:CGHC:24513 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 620 of 2023 Makaram S/o Ramsai Jaiswal Aged About 50 Years Caste Kalar, Occupation- Cultivator And Business, Resident Of Bawakuti Sarangarh, Tahsil Sarangarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - Lala Prasad S/o Jagdish Prasad Kesharwani Aged About 62 Years Caste Baniya, Resident Of Sarangarh, Tahsil Sarangarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Shivendra Kumar, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Atul Kumar Kesharwani, Advocate For Respondent No.2/State : Mr. Ashutosh Trivedi, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board 17/06/2026 Heard. 1. The present writ petition has been taken up for hearing on a mention being made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.06.23 11:07:23 +0530 2 2. Present is a writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against impugned order dated 21/06/2023 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sarangarh, District Raigarh in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 1/2023, whereby, the miscellaneous appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 12/12/2022 passed by learned Additional Judge to the Court of 1st Civil Judge, Class-2, Raigarh, place Sarangarh, District Raigarh, in Civil Suit No. 44-A/2022 has been affirmed. 3. The brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner is the plaintiff before the learned trial court. He filed a suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and permanent injunction over the suit property of the land bearing Khasra No. 104/2, area 0.020 hectare out of total area 0.162 hectare, which is the Abadi land situated at village Sahaspur, Patwari Halka No. 51, Tehsil Sarangarh, District Raigarh. It is the claim of the plaintiff in the suit that he is in possession of the suit land since more than 35 years and after construction of his house and Badi, he is in possession of the same. A lease was also granted in the year 1992 with respect to the suit land and he is paying all the taxes of the said land. In the month of March 2022, when the plaintiff was renovating his house and raising necessary construction to keep his house safe, the defendant No. 1 raising dispute and started quarrel with him and threatened him not to raise any construction over there. In the month of May 2022, the defendant No. 1 get his land Khasra No. 105/1A and 106 demarcated by the Tehsildar, Sarangarh, and with the collusion of the revenue authorities, the land which is in possession of the plaintiff get shown within the possession of the defendant No. 1. 3 Since the plaintiff is possession holder of the suit land on the basis of lease granted to him in the year 1992, he is entitled to protect his possession over suit land, yet, the defendant No. 1 is interfering and claiming his title, hence, the present suit has been filed. ******* In the suit, an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of CPC has also been filed by the plaintiff for temporary injunction. The said application of the plaintiff under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 has been rejected by the learned trial court by its order dated 12/12/2022 holding that the plaintiff has no prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss in his favor. The order dated 12/12/2022 passed by learned trial court is challenged by the petitioner before the learned Appellate Court by filing the miscellaneous appeal, which has also been dismissed vide order dated 21/06/2023, against which the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is in possession of the subject land by virtue of the lease granted in his favour in the year 1992. The defendant No. 1 has no right to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff until the case has been decided in his favour or he is shown his deed of title over the suit land. The suit land is a government Abadi land in which the petitioner is in possession since more than 35 years. When the dispute arose between the parties and the defendant No. 1 demolished the construction of the petitioner, he made a report to the police, in which the fine sentence have also been imposed upon the respondent No. 1. He would also submit that the respondent No. 1 with the collusion 4 of the revenue authorities get his land mutated in the revenue records and obtained the demarcation report, the land in which the petitioner is in possession. He would further submit that the learned Additional Collector, Raigarh, vide order dated 08.12.2021, had rightly allowed the revision preferred by the petitioner with a direction to demarcate the petitioner's land vis-à-vis the government land. Both the courts below completely failed to appreciate the material documents on record showing the long-standing settled possession of the petitioner since 1990. If the temporary injunction is not granted, the respondent No. 1 will forcefully dispossess the petitioner and dismantle the house constructed over the suit property, causing irreparable loss to him. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by both the courts below are arbitrary, bad in law, and liable to be set aside. 5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 would submit that both the courts below have passed well-reasoned orders strictly in accordance with law, which do not warrant any interference. He would submit that though the petitioner claims right over the disputed land on the basis of a patta allegedly granted by the revenue authority in the year 1990/1992, the said patta was already cancelled by the Tehsildar, Sarangarh, vide order dated 08.05.2001. Consequently, the petitioner's name was deleted from the revenue records, rendering him a mere encroacher on the suit land with no prima facie case or title in his favor. He would further submit that consecutive demarcation proceedings conducted on 08.04.2001 and 19.05.2022 have concurrently established that the petitioner has encroached upon the land belonging to respondent 5 No. 1, bearing Khasra Nos. 105/1- क and 106. This fact of encroachment is even implicitly apparent from paragraph 3 of the petitioner's own application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. He argues that respondent No. 1 has been litigating for a very long time to protect his own property, and if a temporary injunction is granted in favour of the plaintiff, it would cause immense hardship to the answering respondent. Since the petitioner has completely failed to satisfy the legal requirement of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, the present petition invoking the limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record, and carefully examined the orders passed by learned trial Court as well as learned Appellate Court. 7. The core issue before this Court is whether the petitioner has satisfied a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury to warrant the grant of a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether the trial court and appellate court committed any patent illegality or jurisdictional error in refusing the same. 8. The petitioner bases his entire claim of title and settled possession over the suit land (Khasra No. 104/2, area 0.020 hectare) on a lease (patta) allegedly granted by the revenue authority in the year 1990/1992. However, a perusal of the revenue records submitted by the respondents reveals that the said patta was subsequently cancelled by the Tehsildar, Sarangarh, vide order dated 08.05.2001, 6 and the petitioner's name was deleted from the revenue records. Furthermore, demarcation proceedings conducted by the revenue authorities on 08.04.2001 and 19.05.2022 demonstrate that the petitioner has encroached upon the land belonging to respondent No. 1, bearing Khasra Nos. 105/1- क and 106. 9. Although the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon an order dated 08.12.2021 passed by the Additional Collector, Raigarh, to argue that a fresh demarcation was directed, the fact remains that the petitioner has not been able to produce any valid, subsisting document of title or an order restoring his cancelled patta. A person who continues to occupy a piece of land after the cancellation of their allotment/lease holds the status of an encroacher. It is a settled principle of law that a temporary injunction cannot be claimed as a matter of right by an encroacher against the true owner of the property. Both the trial court and the first appellate court have meticulously analyzed these revenue documents and concurrently found that for granting a temporary injunction specifically the existence of a prima facie case does not lean in favor of the petitioner. 10. With respect to the scope of interference under the jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil” 2010 (8) SCC 329 held that: “40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala @ Bharucha (deceased) through Lrs. & others vs. Phiroz N. Bhatena and others etc. reported in 7 (1991) 3 SCC 141, wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior Court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this `limited extent' the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see para 18, page 149-150). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447. The decision in Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh (supra) and Nagendra Nath (supra) discussed above. 41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another vs. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576. In paragraph 9, page 579 of the report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law and justice. 42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in the case of Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and another, reported in AIR 1968 SC 222, (see para 5 page 222-234 of the report) and the decision of this 8 Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan and others reported in (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh (supra) about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand and others reported in (1972) 1 SCC 898. 43. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (para 19, page 668 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi Nath and others [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In paragraph 38, sub-paragraph (4) at page 695 of the report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out: "38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has 9 failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) xxx xxx (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the 10 conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power 11 of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. 12 (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure 13 Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised 14 just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 11. In the case of “Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel” 2022 (4) SCC 181, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or 15 justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.” 12. Applying the legal parameters settled by the Apex Court in the decisions cited above to the facts of the instant case, it is evident that this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot act as a court of appeal to re-appreciate or re-weigh the factual matrix determined by the trial court as well as appellate court. 13. Both the trial court and the appellate court have concurrently found that the petitioner has failed to satisfy the necessary legal requirements for the grant of a temporary injunction, as no prima facie case exists in his favor on account of the cancellation of his patta in 2001 and subsequent demarcation reports showing encroachment on respondent No. 1's land. There is no manifest error, patent perversity or flagrant abuse of the principles of law apparent on the face of the record which would cause a miscarriage of justice. No ground for exercising the extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is made out by the petitioner. 14. Accordingly, the present petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved