2026:HHC:39403 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 123 of 2015 Reserved on: 07.09.2026 Date of Decision: 16.09.2026. Inder Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Arhant Mahajan, Advocate vice Mr Rahul Mahajan Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 12.03.2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge Mandi, District Mandi (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.08.2010 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:39403 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Jai Parkash (PW8) and Vijender Pal (since deceased) had got down at Jhiri bus stand on 05.05.2004. A jeep bearing registration No. HP-34A- 1326, being driven by the accused Inder Singh, hit Vijender Pal, who sustained multiple injuries. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused and the high speed of the jeep. The injured was taken to the hospital, and intimation was given to the police. The police recorded an entry No. 11 in the daily diary and sent HC Balak Ram (PW3) for verification. He recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW3/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW3/B) was registered. HC Balak Ram (PW3) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW3/D) and seized the jeep bearing registration No. HP- 34A-1326 along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW3/E). He filed an application for the medical examination of Vijender Pal 3 2026:HHC:39403 and obtained the MLC (Ext. PX). Vijender Pal succumbed to his injuries. His post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr Om Pal (PW6), who found that the cause of death was head injury leading to shock and haemorrhage. He issued the post-mortem report (Ext.PW6/A). Hira Singh (PW1) examined the jeep and found that there was no mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW1/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Hira Singh (PW1) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. HHC Munshi Ram (PW2) brought the rukka to the Police Station. HC Balak Ram (PW3) investigated the matter. HC Raj Kumar (PW4) signed the FIR. ASI Madan Lal (PW5) prepared 4 2026:HHC:39403 the challan. Dr Om Pal (PW6) medically examined the victim Vijender Pal. ASI Madan Lal (PW7) prepared the challan. Jai Parkash (PW8) is the informant and eyewitness. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), admitted that he was driving the jeep bearing registration No. HP-34A-1326. He stated that he was stopped by the people. He was asked to carry the injured to the hospital, and he carried the injured to the hospital. A false case was made against him. He examined Ramu Yadav (DW1) and Chander Mohan (DW2) in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant's testimony was credible and inspired confidence. There was no reason as to why he would falsely implicate the accused. His testimony proved that the jeep being driven by the accused had hit Vijender Pal, who sustained multiple injuries. The defence evidence was not sufficient to show that the vehicle being driven by the accused was not involved in the accident. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: 5 2026:HHC:39403 Sections Sentence Section 279 of Indian Penal Code To undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code To undergo simple imprisonment for one year. Both the sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court that the informant's testimony was sufficient to prove that the accused was driving the jeep on the date of the accident and his negligence led to the accident. Vijender Pal died in the accident, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The sentence imposed upon the accused was adequate, and no interference was required with it. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 6 2026:HHC:39403 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The accident had taken place on a public place where many shops and houses were located. The Investigating Officer failed to join any independent person. The defence version that the accused was asked to carry the injured to the hospital and his vehicle was not involved in the accident was highly probable, and learned Courts below erred in rejecting such version. The informant is an interested person, and his testimony should not have been relied upon. No blood was found on the tyre or any other part of the vehicle to show that the vehicle being driven by the accused was involved in the accident. Learned Courts below failed to appreciate these aspects. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Arhant Mahajan, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 7 2026:HHC:39403 10. Mr Arhant Mahajan, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The informant is an interested person because he was residing with the deceased. The incident had taken place in a public place. However, no person from the locality was associated. The defence version that the accused was asked to transport the injured to the hospital was highly probable, and learned Courts below erred in rejecting it. Mere use of high speed is not sufficient to infer negligence. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the judgments in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998(8) SCC 493, Braham Dass vs. State of H.P. 2009(7) SCC 353, Ram Chander vs. State 2017 SCC Online Del 11763 and State vs. Sanjay 2026:DHC:7267 in support of his submissions. 11. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below had accepted the informant's testimony as credible and this Court should not interfere with the pure finding of fact while deciding the revision. There is no evidence that the incident was witnessed by any independent person, and the failure to join 8 2026:HHC:39403 an independent person was not material in the present case. The accident had taken place on the kaccha portion of the road, and the accused has not provided any justification for taking the vehicle towards the unmetalled portion of the road. The learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence and no interference is required with the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: 9 2026:HHC:39403 “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, 10 2026:HHC:39403 sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. 11 2026:HHC:39403 In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: 12 2026:HHC:39403 “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The informant, Jai Parkash (PW8) stated that he and Vijender Pal got down the bus on 05.05.2004 at about 09:00 a.m. 13 2026:HHC:39403 at Jhiri. They were walking towards their left side. A jeep hit Vijender Pal at high speed who sustained injuries. He was taken to the hospital in the same jeep that had caused the accident. The accused was driving the jeep on the date of the accident. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused and the high speed of the jeep. He stated in his cross-examination that he was working as a mason with Ram Chander. He had taken a room on rent at Bhuntar. Jhiri was a small bazaar. The buses stopped at Jhiri for picking up and dropping off passengers. He admitted that 15-20 people were present at Jhiri on the date of the accident. 5-7 shops are located at Jhiri, which were open, and 10-12 persons were inside the shops. He denied that Vijender Pal ran and hit the vehicle towards the wrong side. Many people had gathered on the spot. He and Vijender Pal belonged to the same area, and they were residing in the same room. He had a cordial relationship with Vijender. The blood had spilt on the road. He denied that the accused was driving the jeep on the date of the accident and that he was making a false statement. 16. It was submitted that he is an interested person because he used to reside with Vijender. He belonged to the same area as Vijender, and his testimony should not have been relied 14 2026:HHC:39403 upon by the learned Courts below. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadayappan v. State, (2019) 9 SCC 257: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 843: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 610 that a related witness is not interested, and the interested witness is the one who wants to secure the conviction of the accused. It was observed at page 260: “13. Criminal law jurisprudence makes a clear distinction between a related and interested witness. A witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. The witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. [See: Sudhakar v. State [Sudhakar v. State, (2018) 5 SCC 435: (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 777].]” 17. Therefore, the testimony of Jai Parkash (PW8) could not have been rejected on the ground that he is interested. There is nothing in the cross-examination of informant Jai Parkash (PW8) to suggest that he is interested in securing the conviction of the accused, and learned Courts below had rightly relied upon his testimony. 18. It was submitted that the place of incident was a public place. Many people were present on the spot. However, the Investigating Officer had failed to join any independent person, 15 2026:HHC:39403 and this is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission cannot be accepted. In Appabhai and another Vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 696, the incident had taken place at the bus stand. It was contended that independent witnesses were not examined and the prosecution case was doubtful. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the prosecution case cannot be doubted due to the non-examination of the independent persons. It was observed: “11. In light of these principles, we may now consider the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. The contention relates to the failure of the prosecution to examine independent witnesses. The High Court has examined this contention but did not find any infirmity in the investigation. It is no doubt true that the prosecution has not been able to produce any independent witness to the incident that took place at the bus stand. There must have been several such witnesses. But the prosecution case cannot be thrown out or doubted on that ground alone. The experience reminds us that civilised people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that a crime, like a civil dispute, is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere, whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witness, must consider the broad 16 2026:HHC:39403 spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability, if any, suggested by the accused." 19. Therefore, the prosecution case cannot be doubted because of the non-examination of the persons present on the spot. 20. Informant Jai Parkash (PW8) specifically stated that he and Vijender were walking towards the left side of the road. This is duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW3/D) in which the place of accident is shown at place A. The total width of the road was found to be 14 feet, and the width of the unmetalled portion of the road was 3 feet each on both sides. The skid marks of the jeep were present for a distance of 15 feet. The place of the accident is shown on the unmetalled portion of the road measuring 3 feet. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused had no justification to take the jeep towards the unmetalled portion of the road and hit Vijender Pal walking on the unmetalled portion of the road. 21. It was submitted that the statement of the informant that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed does not amount to any negligence. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satish (supra). 17 2026:HHC:39403 However, this judgment will not help the accused because the precise negligence against the accused is that he had taken the jeep towards the unmetalled portion of the road located on the extreme left side of the road and not that he was driving the jeep at a high speed. Thus, the judgment in Satish (supra) will not apply to the facts of the case. 22. In Braham Dass (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the prosecution is required to prove the negligence of the accused before he can be convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. In Ram Chander (supra) and Sanjay (supra), it was held that the accused cannot be convicted merely because a death had taken place. There is no dispute with these propositions of law; however, it has been proved in the present case that the accused was negligent because he had taken the jeep towards the unmetalled portion of the road for which no justification has been provided. Therefore, the cited judgment will not help the accused. 23. Learned Courts below had rightly pointed out that there is nothing in the cross-examination of the informant to 18 2026:HHC:39403 show that he has an interest to depose falsely against the accused. His presence on the spot cannot be doubted because he was the first person who had narrated the incident to the police. Even otherwise, it was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision and once the Courts below have found him present on the spot and his testimony credible, it is impermissible to re- appreciate the evidence and arrive at a contrary finding. 24. Dr Om Pal (PW6) conducted the post-mortem examination of Vijender and found that the cause of death was due to the head injury leading to the shock and death, which was possible in a roadside accident. He was not cross- examined at all. Therefore, it was duly proved that Vijender had died in a roadside accident. 25. Ramu Yadav (DW1) stated that Vijender was lying on the road and people were saying that some unknown vehicle had hit him. A vehicle was stopped, and the injured was taken to the hospital. The vehicle in which the injured was taken had not caused the accident. He admitted in his cross-examination that the accident had not taken place in his presence and he was not 19 2026:HHC:39403 accompanying Vijender at the time of the accident. Therefore, he is not an eyewitness. Further, his name was not suggested to the informant Jai Prakash or any other person. Therefore, his presence on the spot is highly doubtful and learned Courts below had rightly discarded his testimony. 26. Chander Mohan (DW2) stated that he saw that a vehicle had hit Vijender. The accused came to the spot after 5-7 minutes, and he was requested to take Vijender to the hospital. The accused had not caused any accident. He stated in his cross- examination that he had seen the accident from a distance. Ramu Yadav (DW1) was with Vijender. He denied that he was not present on the spot. He admitted that he knew the accused for 6- 7 years because the accused was employed in NHPC. 27. His testimony in the cross-examination that Ramu Yadav was with Vijender is contrary to the statement of Ramu Yadav, who has specifically stated that he was not with Vijender and the accident had not taken place in his presence. Further, the name of Chander Mohan was not suggested to the informant or the Investigating Officer as an eyewitness, and his presence on 20 2026:HHC:39403 the spot is highly doubtful. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly rejected the statements of the defence witnesses. 28. Hira Singh (PW1) examined the vehicle and did not find any defect in it that could have led to the accident. It was submitted that he had not mentioned in his report the presence of blood on the body of the vehicle, which falsifies the prosecution version that the accident was caused by the vehicle being driven by the accused. The submission cannot be accepted. He was employed as a mechanic in the PWD workshop, and he had only mechanically examined the vehicle. He had not forensically examined the vehicle, and the fact that he had not noticed the blood stains in the vehicle will not falsify the prosecution version that the vehicle being driven by the accused was involved in the accident. 29. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. 30. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused and the learned courts below erred in not extending such benefit to the 21 2026:HHC:39403 accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C., to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the 22 2026:HHC:39403 sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences for the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 31. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, 23 2026:HHC:39403 has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 32. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 33. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and a deterrent view was to be taken. 34. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and simple 24 2026:HHC:39403 imprisonment for 1 year for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC. Considering that a precious life was lost due to the negligence of the accused, the sentence of 1 year cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference from this Court. 35. No other point was urged. 36. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed. All the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 37. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th September, 2026 (Nikita)