( 2026:JHHC:24706-DB ) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI C.M.P. No. 1117 of 2025 M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd., a Govt. Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having one of its units at Bokaro Steel City, P.O. & P.S. Bokaro Steel City, District Bokaro, through its General Manager (Law) John Tapan Kongari, son of P. L. Kongari, aged about 57 years, resident of Quarter No. 1021, Sector 5-A, Bokaro Steel City, P.O. & P.S. Bokaro Steel City, Sector VI, Bokaro, Jharkhand. …. … Petitioner Versus Hindustan Malleables and Forging Limited, having its registered office at Jalan Nagar, P.O.- Buli, P.S.- Bank More, District- Dhanbad, Jharkhand. …. … Respondent ------ CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ------ For the Petitioner : Mr Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr Shrestha Gautam, Advocate Mr Himanshu Harsh, Advocate ----- 04 /Dated: 17.08.2026 1. Heard Mr Indrajit Sinha, who appears with Mr Shrestha Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This petition is an abuse of the judicial process intended only to delay the proceedings in Execution Case No. 40 of 2013. 3. The petitioner, who has suffered an award, without challenging the rejection of its application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, raised several objections in Execution Case No. 40 of 2013 to resist execution of the award. Significantly, no objection was raised that the Civil Judge, Sr Division at Bokaro, had lacked jurisdiction to entertain the execution proceedings. 4. By a detailed order dated 11.09.2025, the Executing Court has dismissed the objections. There is nothing wrong in the dismissal of such objections because the petitioner’s attempt was to virtually challenge the award dated 01.11.2003 in the execution proceedings. All kinds of arguments ( 2026:JHHC:24706-DB ) 2 touching the merits of the award were advanced before the Executing Court. Objections, which would even transcend the scope of Section 34 or 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, were raised in the execution proceedings. This was clearly to create hurdles in the progress of the execution proceedings, even though the present petitioner took no steps to challenge the order dismissing its application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 5. The matter was pending because an issue arose whether this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution should be heard by a Single Judge or the Division Bench. This arose from conflicting views expressed by two learned Single Judges of this Court. In Civil Revision No. 24 of 2020, the learned Single Judge, by order dated 05.07.2022, held that such matter should be considered by the Division Bench. In C.M.P. No. 23 of 2022, the learned Single Judge, by order dated 22.8.2022, held that the order in Civil Revision No. 24 of 2022 might be required to be reconsidered and therefore proposed the reference to a Larger Bench. The matter was referred to a Larger Bench. By order dated 08.11.2022 in C.M.P. No. 23 of 2022, the Larger Bench by adverting to the roster arrangement directed that the matter should be heard by a Division Bench. 6. Mr Indrajit Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that this order does not answer the reference proposed by the order dated 22.08.2022 in C.M.P. No. 23 of 2022. 7. For the present, we do not propose to address the question of whether such matter should be heard by the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench. The issue is therefore left open for decision in an appropriate case. However, in the present case, we are satisfied that the impugned order dated ( 2026:JHHC:24706-DB ) 3 11.09.2025 warrants no interference whatsoever. The contention now raised before us that the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bokaro, has no jurisdiction to entertain the execution petition also cannot be considered, particularly since no such objection was raised before the Executing Court. 8. Besides, it is well settled that jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution is discretionary. It need not be exercised merely on the basis of a legal point. Aspects such as the conduct of the petitioner are relevant and must be considered. 9. In this case, as noted earlier, the petitioner resists the execution of an award dated 01.11.2003. After the petitioner’s appeal under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was dismissed, it did not file any appeal under section 37, and the award dated 01.11.2003 attained finality. Instead, grounds that would not even be available on appeal were raised and pressed before the Executing Court. After the Executing Court passed an adverse order, this petition has been filed to challenge that order, inter alia, on the ground that the Executing Court lacked jurisdiction. There is nothing to indicate any ex facie ouster of the Executing Court’s jurisdiction. In the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to exercise any discretion in favour of such a petitioner or interfere with the impugned order. 10. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed without any order for costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) August 17, 2026 Ranjeet/R.Kr./Cp.2 NAFR Uploaded on 20.08.2026