2026:HHC:39036 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 48 of 2015 Reserved on: 7.9.2026 Date of Decision: 14.9.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Desh Raj @ Billa and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr Sunny Dhatwalia, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.07.2014 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. II, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323, and 325 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323, and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Suresh Kumar (PW- 2) was parking his vehicle at his home on 29.04.2010. Accused Billa and Subhash came to the spot in their vehicle and started beating the informant. The informant’s brother, Sohan Singh (PW-6), also came to the spot, and the accused also gave him beatings. The informant's tooth was broken in the incident. He filed an application (Ex. PW-2/A). The police recorded an entry (Ex.PW-10/A) in the daily diary. The police filed an application (Ex.PW-1/A) for conducting the medical examination of the informant. Dr Sandeep Kumar (PW-1) examined the informant and found an injury on the forehead on the right side. He advised an X-ray and an opinion by the Dental Surgeon. No fracture was detected in the part X-rayed. Dr Tanmay (PW-4) examined the informant and found a grievous injury due to the dislocation of the tooth. Dr. Sandeep Kumar issued the MLC (Ex. PW-1/B) 3 stating that the nature of the injury was grievous. FIR (Ex. PW- 11/A) was registered at the Police Station. HC Raj Kumar (PW-14) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW-14/A). He picked up the sticks (Ex. P-1 and P-2) lying at the spot and seized them vide memo (Ex.PW-2/B). Desh Raj produced the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-23B-2862, which was seized vide memo (Ex. PW-7/A) along with the documents. The statements of the witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323, and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Dr Sandeep Kumar (PW-1) examined the informant. Suresh Kumar (PW-2) is the informant. Gopal Singh (PW-3) took the X- rays. Dr Tanmay (PW-4) is the Dental Surgeon who issued the 4 opinion that there was dislocation of the tooth. Pritam Chand (PW-5) and Hoshiar Singh (PW-7) did not support the prosecution case. Sohan Singh (PW-6) is the informant’s brother and the victim. Naresh Kumar (PW-8) and Constable Raj Kumar (PW-12) witnessed the recovery. Desh Raj (PW-9) is the owner of the vehicle. LC Saraswati (PW-10) proved the entry in the daily diary. ASI Balbir Singh signed the FIR. ASI Sukhdev Raj (PW-13) filed the application for the informant’s medical examination. HC Raj Kumar (PW-14) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They tendered a copy of entry No. 27 in their defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the Medical Officer found a superficial injury over the right side of the forehead and tenderness on the right shoulder. The informant had nowhere stated that an injury was caused to his forehead. The informant’s brother was also not medically examined to corroborate his version that the accused had given beatings to him. The FIR did not mention the date or time of the incident. The prosecution had 5 failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence. Minor contradictions were blown out of proportion to record the acquittal. The informant’s statement was corroborated by the Medical Officer. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, and Mr Sunny Dhatwalia, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The informant’s statement was corroborated by the testimony of his brother and the medical evidence. The learned Trial Court had acquitted the accused because of minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be 6 allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Sunny Dhatwalia, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the medical officer found a laceration on the forehead. The informants never stated about injury to his forehead. No corresponding injury was found on the tooth, and the prosecution version that the tooth was dislocated because of a stick blow inflicted by the accused was not proved on record. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is 7 impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also 8 does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 9 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10 14. The informant made a complaint (Ex. PW-2/A) stating that while he was parking his vehicle, Billa and Subhash came in their vehicle and started beating him. His brother also came to the spot, and he was beaten with a stick. The informant's teeth were broken. The police filed an application (Ex. PW-1/A) in which it was mentioned that Billa had given beatings to the informant by means of a stick, due to which the informant sustained an injury above his right eye and other parts of the body, and one tooth was dislocated in the incident. 15. It is apparent from the application made to the Medical Officer that it is in variance with the application (Ex. PW-2/A), because the application (Ex. PW-2/A) mentioned Billa and Subhash as the assailants, whereas the application (Ex. PW- 1/A) mentioned Billa as the assailant. Further, the application (Ex. PW-2/A) mentioned that the informant's teeth were broken, whereas the application (Ex. PW-1/A) mentions that the injury was caused near the right eye and other parts of the body, and one tooth of the lower jaw was dislocated. Therefore, it is apparent that the application (Ex. PW-1/A) mentions the incident differently from what was recorded in the application (Ex. PW- 11 2/A). This would make it doubtful that the application (Ex. PW- 2/A) was written before filing the application (Ex. PW-1/A). 16. Dr Sandeep Kumar (PW-1) noticed a laceration over the forehead on the right side. He categorically stated that no other visible injury was detected. The medical evidence does not show any injury on the face to establish that the accused had inflicted a blow by means of a stick on the informant's face. 17. Informant Suresh Kumar stated in his cross- examination that his house is located in Village Seu. Sohan Singh (PW-6) stated in his cross-examination that his house is located at a distance of 2 km from Seu at Deotsidh. The statements of these two witnesses make it difficult to believe that Sohan Singh could have reached the spot after hearing the noise. 18. Informant Suresh Kumar (PW-1) admitted in his cross-examination that he was not on talking terms with Desh Raj. He admitted that Desh Raj alias Billa had sustained an injury on his head on the day before the incident. This is duly corroborated by entry (Ext. DX), in which accused Desh Raj had reported to the police that he was beaten by Suresh Kumar on 12 29.4.2010, which shows that the relationship between the parties was strained. 19. Learned Trial Court had rightly noticed that the application (Ext. PW-2/A) was happily vague. It does not mention the date or time of the incident, and there was no independent means to verify its contents. 20. Informant Suresh Kumar (PW-1) stated in his cross- examination that his father was sleeping on the date of the incident. He came to the spot after the accused had left. However, he was not examined to at least corroborate the version that the accused had visited the informant’s house. 21. There was no corroboration from independent sources. The medical evidence does not corroborate the informant’s version. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before it, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 22. No other point was urged. 13 23. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. The appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 24. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 25. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th September, 2026 (Chander)