1 2026:CGHC:25196 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2991 of 2023 Daulatram Sahu S/o Sewaram Sahu Aged About 32 Years Posted As Constable, R/o Village Temri, Police Station Komakhan, District Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Home (Police) Department Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - The Commandant Indian Police Service, 20th Battalion, 20th Battalion, Chhattisgarh Arms Force, Parsada, District Mahasamund (C.G.) 3 - The Commandant/inquiry Officer 20th Battalion, Chhattisgarh Arms Force, Parsada, District Mahasamund (C.G.) 4 - The Platoon Commander/representing Officer 20th Battalion, Chhattisgarh Arms Force, Parsada, District Mahasamund (C.G.) … Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Krishna Kumar Dewangan, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Ujjwal Choubey, Panel Lawyer (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board 19.06.2026 1. With the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2. The petitioner has preferred this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking following relief(s):- BINI PRADEEP Digitally signed by BINI PRADEEP Date: 2026.06.23 11:11:31 +0530 2 “10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ/order, thereby setting-aside/quashing the impugned order dated 13.03.2023 and 25.04.2023 (Annexure-P/1) and further be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to keep the departmental enquiry proceedings against the petitioner in abeyance till the conclusion of criminal trial pending against the petitioner. 10.2 That, any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the costs of the petition may be given.” 3. Facts of the case, in brief are that, in the year 2022, the petitioner was posted as a Constable under the respondent authority in the 20th Battalion, Chhattisgarh Armed Forces, Parsada Distt. Mahasamund (CG). During his posting, on 24.11.2022, an FIR was lodged by the victim/prosecutrix at Police Station Arjuni, Distt. Dhmatari (CG) alleging that the petitioner had committed rape upon her on the pretext of marriage. Based on which, Crime No.374/22 was registered against him for the offence under Sections 417, 376 and 506 IPC and after completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against him before competent Court. Subsequently, vide Order dated 13.3.2023 (Annexure-P/1) passed by respondent No.2, departmental enquiry proceedings were initiated against the petitioner on the basis of aforesaid allegations, which led to filing of instant petition by the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in respect of aforesaid FIR, a criminal charge sheet was filed by Police of Police Station Arjuni, Distt. Dhamtari before the concerned Sessions Court, which was registered as Sessions Case No.05/2023. Charges under 3 Section 417, 376 and 506 Part-II IPC were framed against the petitioner and after full trial, the petitioner has been acquitted of the above charges. Learned counsel further submits that the charges in both the cases, i.e. criminal case and departmental enquiry, are based on the same set of facts and same set of evidence. Since the petitioner has already been acquitted after a full trial vide judgment dated 30.06.2023 passed by the learned Upper Sessions Judge (FTC), Dhamtari, it is contended that no departmental enquiry can be continued on the very same allegations. Hence, it is prayed that the Order dated 13.03.2023 (Annexure P/1) initiating departmental proceedings, along with all consequential proceedings, be quashed. 5. During the course of submission, learned counsel for the petitioner produced a copy of the aforesaid judgment passed by the learned Upper Sessions Judge, Dhamtari in Criminal Session Case No.05/2023, but the same has not been filed by the petitioner on record, therefore, copy of the judgment filed by the petitioner is directed to be taken on record and treated as part of the record. 6. The State has filed its reply. Learned counsel appearing for the State, referring to its reply, submits that though the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case, a perusal of the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Court shows that the victim/prosecutrix, her mother, father and sister have categorically deposed that the petitioner had sexually exploited the prosecutrix on several occasions on the pretext of marriage. He further submits that there is no legal bar to conduct departmental enquiry even if the delinquent employee has been acquitted by the Criminal Court, because, standard of proof of evidence is completely different in both the proceedings, therefore, he 4 submits that having considered the submission of the victim/prosecutrix, her mother, father and sister, judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the petitioner, by itself, is not sufficient to set aside/quash the enquiry proceedings initiated against the petitioner, Hence, he prays that instant petition may be rejected. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. Perusal of the record and copy of the judgment of the Sessions Case filed by the petitioner shows that main charge against the petitioner was that he sexually exploited the victim/prosecutrix on the pretext of marriage. Thus, charges levelled against the petitioner in both the cases are substantially found similar. 9. A further perusal of the judgment dated 30.6.2023 passed by learned Upper Sessions Judge in Session Case No.05/2023, shows that the learned Sessions Judge has recorded statement of the victim/prosecutrix, her mother, father and sister. Their statements show that the petitioner had sexually exploited the victim/prosecutrix for many times on the pretext of marriage, but ultimately he did not marry her. 10. The issue that arises for consideration in the instant case is whether, solely on the basis of the petitioner’s acquittal in the Criminal Case, the departmental enquiry proceeding initiated against the petitioner can be quashed? 11. In the case of Shashi Bhushan Prasad vs. Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force and Ors.,[(2019) 7 SCC 797], while considering the similar issue, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 17, 18 and 19 as under:- 5 “17. The scope of departmental enquiry and judicial proceedings and the effect of acquittal by a criminal court has been examined by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya (1997) 2 SCC 699. The relevant paragraph is as under: (SCC pp. 704-05, para 8) "8. ... The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act 6 stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate d efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304-A and 338 IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings.”(emphasis supplied) 18. The exposition has been further affirmed by a three- Judge Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 764) This Court held as under: (SCC p. 776, para 11) "11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly 7 well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside." (emphasis supplied) 19. We are in full agreement with the exposition of law laid down by this Court and it is fairly well settled that two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate 8 punishment on an offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. Even the rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, he cannot be convicted by a court of law whereas in the departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal by the court of competent jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding does not ipso facto absolve the delinquent from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the authority. This what has been considered by the High Court in the impugned judgment in detail and needs no interference by this Court.” 12. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, as has been observed in the preceding paragraphs that, the victim/prosecutrix, her mother, father and sister have categorically supported the charges of sexual exploitation levelled against the petitioner. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments and catena of other judgments, that the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is distinct from that applicable to departmental enquiries. While in a criminal trial the charges are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, in departmental proceedings the charges need only be established on the basis of ‘preponderance of probability’. Therefore, having considered the deposition of the victim/prosecutrix and her family members, and upon considering the judgment passed by the Session Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case, by itself, does not make a 9 valid ground for quashing the departmental enquiry. Hence, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned departmental proceedings. 13. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the interim order dated 08.05.2023 passed by this Court, whereby further departmental proceedings against the petitioner were stayed, stands vacated. The respondents shall be at liberty to proceed with the departmental enquiry in accordance with law. 14. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Bini