2026:HHC:3318 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 2690 of 2025 Reserved on: 16.1.2026 Date of Decision: 23.1.2026. Lakhwinder Singh @ Lucky ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Karan Kapoor, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 150 of 2022, dated 27.10.2022, registered at Police Station, Manpura, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:3318 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, Harbhajan Singh alias Bunty left his home on 26.10.2022 at 8.45 pm on his motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-12E-2721. He did not return. The informant, Balvinder Singh, and other villagers went to search for him. His dead body, having multiple injuries, was found in the bushes. The police investigated the matter and found that the deceased had a friendly relationship with Bhupinder Kaur. She developed a relationship with the co- accused, Inderpreet Singh, but the deceased continued to call her. This led to enmity between the deceased and Inderpreet Singh. Inderpreet Singh killed the deceased with the help of his friends. The police filed a charge sheet after the completion of the investigation. As per the prosecution, the petitioner was an accomplice. The petitioner had sought bail from the Court earlier, but his petitions were dismissed. The petitioner has been in custody since 28.10.2022. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence. The witnesses to the recovery have not supported the prosecution's case. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3 2026:HHC:3318 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police received information that the dead body of Harbhajan Singh @ Bunty was lying in the bushes. The police reached the spot. The informant, Balwinder Singh, made a statement that Harbhajan Singh @ Bunty had gone towards the main road on his motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-12E- 2721 on 26.10.2022 at 08:45 pm. He did not return to his home. Attempts were made to contact him on his mobile phone, but his mobile phone was switched off. A search was made for him, and his dead body was recovered. He was stabbed with a sharp-edged weapon. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. Police also checked the CCTV footage and found that the deceased was talking to Amandeep Singh and Inderpreet Singh. The police arrested them. Petitioner Lucky @ Harry @ Lakhwinder Singh was also arrested. He made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of Gandasi. The police also recovered the petitioner’s clothes, which were sent to FSL. The blood was found on the gandasi, but it did not yield any DNA for analysis. The petitioner had murdered Harbhajan Singh @ Bunty with a gandasi. Ten witnesses have been examined, and the matter is listed on 1.4.2026, 4.4.2026 and 24.4.2026 for the 4 2026:HHC:3318 prosecution’s evidence before the learned Trial Court. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Karan Kapoor, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr Karan Kapoor, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The police have relied upon the recovery of gandasi at the petitioner’s instance. The witness to the recovery of Gandasi has not supported the prosecution's case. The blood of the deceased was not found on the gandasi, and the gandasi is not related to the commission of a crime. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, and the petitioners' right to a speedy trial is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adya Prasad Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. Cr. Appeal No. 195/2026, decided on 12.1.2026 in support of his submission. 6. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner had 5 2026:HHC:3318 earlier filed a bail petition which was dismissed by the Court. The subsequent bail petition only lies if there is a change in the circumstances. The petitioner has not pleaded any change in the circumstances, and the present petition is not maintainable. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed two bail petitions, which were registered as Cr.MP(M) Nos. 52 of 2025 and 1684 of 2025 and were dismissed by the Court on 25.3.2025 and 5.8.2025. It was held in the State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic 6 2026:HHC:3318 changes had taken place, necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.” 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 7 2026:HHC:3318 “9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.” 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: “30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.” 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: “7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine 8 2026:HHC:3318 qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court. 9 2026:HHC:3318 14. It was submitted that the witness to the recovery of gandasi has not supported the prosecution's case, and the petitioner is not entitled to bail because of this fact. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some discrepancy in the testimony. It was observed: - “14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath to entertain the bail application of the Accused. 15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim. 16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or the acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and 10 2026:HHC:3318 orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.” 15. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be released on bail because the witness to the recovery of Gandasi has not supported the prosecution's case. 16. It was submitted that the prosecution had not produced the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial was violated. This submission will not help the petitioner. The petition and the status report mention that the prosecution has examined ten witnesses cited by it. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail. It was observed at page 141: “24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by 11 2026:HHC:3318 itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688” 17. Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek bail on the ground of delay in the progress of the trial. 18. Therefore, in view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 19. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever, on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Vacation Judge 23rd January, 2026 (Chander)