2026:HHC:39037-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 180 of 2014 Reserved on: 7.9.2026 Date of Decision: 14.9.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Bhup Chand ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Ashok Kumar Verma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19.12.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 5, Shimla (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:39037-DB manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC and Section 187 of the MV Act. It was asserted that the informant, Krishan Singh (PW-1), was present near Shiv Temple on 22.3.2011, at about 02:40 PM. A cyclist was going towards Dhalli Tunnel. A truck bearing registration No. HP-12D-6194 tried to overtake the cyclist and hit him. The cyclist fell on the road. His head started bleeding. The driver of the truck sped away from the spot. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ext. PW-3/A) was recorded at the Police Station. ASI Surjeet Singh (PW-8) went to the spot for verification. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ext. PW-1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext. PW-8/A) was registered. 3. ASI Surjeet Singh investigated the matter. The victim succumbed to his injuries. The photographs of the dead body (Ext. PW-8/B1 to Ext. PW-8/B4) were taken. ASI Surjeet Singh 3 2026:HHC:39037-DB conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared the report (Ext. PW-8/C). He seized the cycle vide memo (Ext. PW-1/B). Dr Manoj Sharma (PW-7) conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim and found that he had sustained multiple injuries and the cause of death was a head injury, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He issued the report (Ext. PW-7/A). ASI Surjeet Singh seized the truck along with the documents vide memo (Ext. PW-5/A). He prepared the site plan (Ext. PW-8/F) of the place of incident and the site plan (Ext. PW- 8/H) of the place of recovery. Sanjeev Kumar (PW-4) mechanically examined the truck and the cycle. He found that they had no defect that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext. PW-4/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 4. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of the IPC and Section 187 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4 2026:HHC:39037-DB 5. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Constable Krishan Singh (PW-1) is an eyewitness. Surat Ram (PW-2) and Constable Deepak (PW-5) witnessed the recovery. LC Sarla Devi (PW-3) proved the entry in the daily diary. Sanjeev Kumar (PW-4) examined the cycle and the truck. Prem Chand (PW-6) is the owner of the truck. Dr Manoj Sharma (PW-7) conducted the post-mortem examination. Surjeet Singh (PW-8) investigated the matter. HC Shiv Kumar (PW-9) signed the FIR. 6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He stated that he was not aware of this case and came to know about it subsequently. The witnesses deposed against him falsely. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 7. The learned Trial Court held that the informant had not identified the driver of the truck. The prosecution examined Prem Chand (PW-6), but he was not cross-examined, and his testimony cannot be used against the accused. There was no evidence to show that the accused was driving the truck at the 5 2026:HHC:39037-DB time of the accident. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant, Krishan Singh, narrated the incident and proved the negligence of the driver of the truck. Prem Chand (PW-6) proved that he had employed the accused as the driver of the truck. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that the accused was not proved to be the driver of the truck. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, and Mr Ashok Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statement of Prem Chand (PW-6) proved that he had employed the accused as the 6 2026:HHC:39037-DB driver. The statement of Prem Chand was wrongly discarded by the learned Trial Court because he was not cross-examined. He prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satnam Singh v. Sadhu Singh, 2001 STPL 4920 SC, in support of his submission. 11. Mr Ashok Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view of the matter while acquitting the accused and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: 7 2026:HHC:39037-DB Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein 8 2026:HHC:39037-DB one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the 9 2026:HHC:39037-DB power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Constable Krishan Singh (PW-1) stated that the truck had sped away from the spot. Therefore, he had no opportunity to see the driver of the truck, and his testimony does not establish that the accused was driving the truck on the date of the incident. 10 2026:HHC:39037-DB 16. Prem Chand (PW-6) stated that he had employed the accused as the driver of the truck. His cross-examination could not be conducted and was deferred. However, subsequently, he was not produced for the cross-examination. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that his testimony could not be read against the accused. 17. In Satnam Singh (supra), the witness had died after recording his examination-in-chief, and it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that his testimony cannot be discarded. In the present case, there is no evidence that the witness had died, and the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 18. There is no other evidence to show that the accused was driving the truck on the date of the incident. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 19. No other point was urged. 20. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. The appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 11 2026:HHC:39037-DB 21. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 22. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th September, 2026 (Chander)