2026:HHC:38617 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 29 of 2015 Reserved on: 01.09.2026 Date of Decision: 10.09.2026 Gurpreet Singh .... Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh .... Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the petitioner : Mr Tarun K. Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent/ State : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 01.12.2014, passed by Learned Sessions Judge, Una, H.P. (learned appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.05.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class Court No. 2, HP. 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2026:HHC:38617 (learned trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the informant Anju Jaswal (PW-1), Bindu Jaswal (PW-2) and Kartik Jaswal (since deceased) were returning from the Jai Deva temple on 26.08.2007 at about 07.30 p.m. A car bearing registration No. DL-1CG-1443 came from Hoshiarpur at high speed and hit Kartik Jaswal, who fell. The driver stopped the car after the accident but sped away from the spot. Vinod Kumar (PW4) also witnessed the incident. The injured was taken to the hospital, where he was declared dead. An intimation was given to the police, and the police recorded an entry (Ext. PW5/A) in the police station. HC Ravinder Singh (PW9) was sent to the hospital, where he recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW-1/A), and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW-9/A) was registered. The car was intercepted at Red Light Chowk, Una, H.P. It was seized along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). HC Ravinder Singh (PW-9) prepared the site plan (Ext.PW9/D). Dr Sunil Kumar (PW-6) conducted the post-mortem 3 2026:HHC:38617 examination of the deceased and issued the report (Ext.PW6/A1 to Ext.PW6/A4) stating that the cause of death was head injury. Swaroop Lal (PW7) mechanically examined the car, but did not find any defect in it that could have led to the accident. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Learned trial Court. 3 The Learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304A and 201 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Informant Anju Jaswal (PW1) and Bindu Jaswal (PW-2) are the eyewitnesses. Constable Rajinder Kumar (PW-3), Vinod Kumar (PW-4), and Ashwani Kumar (PW-11) witnessed the recoveries. Constable Rajesh Kumar (PW-5) proved the entry in the daily diary. Dr Sunil Kumar (PW-6) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. Swaroop Lal (PW- 7) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. 4 2026:HHC:38617 Parveen Kumar (PW-8) did not support the prosecution case. HC Ravinder Singh (PW-9) investigated the matter. Onkar Nath (PW-10) carried the injured to the hospital. 6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that an F.I.R. was registered by the police, and that the car was seized along with the documents. He claimed that the boy suddenly came on the road, he was innocent and was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 7. Learned trial Court held that the statements of the witnesses proved that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The accident had occurred at about 07.30 p.m. during August. There was sufficient light available on the spot. The road was wide at the place of the accident, and the child was visible from a distance. The accident had occurred on the extreme left side of the road, which showed the negligence of the accused. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: Section(s) Sentence(s) 5 2026:HHC:38617 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and, in default of payment of fine amount, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 304-A The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and, in default of payment of the fine amount, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 201 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and, in default of payment of the fine amount, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Session Judge, Una, District Una, H.P. (learned appellate Court). Learned appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by learned trial Court that statements of witnesses proved that the accused was driving the vehicle. He could have avoided the accident, but failed to do so. The defence taken by the accused that the child suddenly came in the middle of the road was not probable. The accused fled away from the spot, and his car was intercepted 6 2026:HHC:38617 at the Red-Light Chowk, Una, H.P. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record. The statements of witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. There was no evidence to show the negligence of the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 10. I have heard Mr Tarun K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 11. Mr Tarun K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that there was no evidence of the negligence of the accused. The statements of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. Learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence on 7 2026:HHC:38617 record. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not granted. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 12. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent, submitted that the accident had occurred on the Kachha portion of the road. The accused had sufficient opportunity to see the people walking on the road, and he should have slowed down the vehicle to prevent any accident. The plea taken by the accused that the child suddenly came in the middle of the road is not supported by any material on record. This Court should not re- appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision petition. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the 8 2026:HHC:38617 findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: - “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate upon the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub- section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. 9 2026:HHC:38617 (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in- depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 10 2026:HHC:38617 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court 11 2026:HHC:38617 wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well- established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or 12 2026:HHC:38617 material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 15. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Anju Jaswal (PW-1) stated that she, Bindu Jaswal and Kartik were returning from the temple on 26.08.2007 at about 07.30 p.m. when a car hit the child. The car stopped for some distance and thereafter sped away. The child succumbed to the injuries. The accused was driving the car at the time of the accident. She stated in her cross-examination that they had started from their home at about 07.10 p.m. She admitted that there was a road separating the temple and the house. The distance between the road and the temple could be covered in about two minutes. She admitted that there were many trees on the roadside. Kartik had held Bindu's hand. All of them were walking together. She denied that the child 13 2026:HHC:38617 suddenly ran across the road or that there was no negligence on the part of the accused. 17. Her testimony is corroborated by Bindu Jaswal (PW2), who stated that she, Anju Jaswal and Kartik Jaswal were returning from the temple on 26.08.2007, at about 05.30 p.m., when a car came and hit Kartik, who fell. The accused was driving the car, and he sped away from the spot. The injured was taken to the hospital. She stated in her cross- examination that the distance between the place of the accident and the temple could be covered within five minutes. They started from the home at about 05.15 p.m. The car came from Hoshiarpur, and the accident occurred on the left side of the road. The temple and her house are located on the roadside. She admitted that the accident occurred when they had come from the temple on the road. They were walking on the unmetalled portion of the road. There were 1-2 persons in the temple, but they had not seen the accident. She admitted that the traffic moves on the highway. She denied that the child had suddenly crossed the road. 18. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. Anju Jaswal (PW1) stated that 14 2026:HHC:38617 the accident had occurred at 7:30 p.m., whereas Bindu Jaswal PW2 stated that the accident had occurred at 05.30 p.m. This submission is not acceptable. The contradiction regarding the time is not significant because no person remembers the time by looking at the watch, and when anyone is asked about the time, he gives a different time, which may or may not be correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 that people make their estimates by guesswork regarding the time on the spur of the moment, and one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. It was observed:- “(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person.” 19. Therefore, the discrepancy in the time is not sufficient to discard the statements of the witnesses. 20. Both these witnesses consistently stated that they were walking on the unmetalled portion of the road. This is 15 2026:HHC:38617 also evident from the site plan (Ext. PW9/D) in which the place of accident is shown on the unmetalled portion of the road. Learned Courts below have rightly held that the road was straight and wide and the accused had no justification to drive the car on the unmetalled portion of the road. 21. It was suggested to both these witnesses that the child had suddenly crossed the road, but they denied the same. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof and cannot be used to discard the prosecution version. 22. Onkar Nath (PW-10) stated that he was going to Una in a car bearing registration number HP-20C-5555. A black car overtook his car. When he reached at Ghaluwal, he found two ladies and one gentleman, who revealed that a black car had hit the child. He carried the child to the hospital. He admitted in his cross-examination that he had not seen the accident. His testimony of this witness proves that a black Lancer car had overtaken his car and corroborates the presence of the car on the road on the date of the incident. 23. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the witnesses to show that they were making false statements or that they had any motive to depose against the accused. 16 2026:HHC:38617 Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly relied upon the testimonies of these witnesses. 24. Parveen Kumar (PW-8) did not support the prosecution case. He stated that the accused was driving the car bearing registration No. DL-1CG-1443. A child suddenly crossed the road. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He admitted in his cross-examination by the learned APP that the child was hit by the car. He admitted that the car was stopped after some distance. He admitted that the car was stopped by the police. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He stated in his cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that there were trees and bushes and it was difficult to see the road. 25. The statement of this witness clearly proves that the accused was driving the car at the time of the accident and that the child was hit by the car. His testimony in the Court that the child had suddenly run across the road is contradicted by his previous statement (Ext.PW9/C), and it is difficult to rely upon his version in the Court. 26. Thus, it was duly proved on record that the accused was driving the car at the time of the accident and the car had 17 2026:HHC:38617 hit the child on the unmetalled portion of the road. The accused had not provided any explanation for driving the car on the unmetalled portion of the road and Learned Courts below had rightly held him to be negligent. 27. Dr Sunil Kumar (PW-6) conducted the cross- examination of the child and found that the multiple injuries led to his death, which could have been caused in a roadside accident. He was not cross-examined, which means that his testimony was accepted by the defence. Therefore, it was proved that the negligence of the accused led to the death of the child. 28. The accused had fled away from the spot and was apprehended at Red Light Chowk, Una, District Una, H.P. Thus, the trial Court had rightly held him guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304A. 201 of IPC. 29. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been extended to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders 18 2026:HHC:38617 Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences for the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of 19 2026:HHC:38617 the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 30. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this 20 2026:HHC:38617 Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 31. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 32. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and a deterrent view was to be taken. 33. Learned trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1,000/- with default clause, for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC, simple imprisonment for 6 months, pay a fine of ₹1,00/- with default clause, for the offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC, 21 2026:HHC:38617 and simple imprisonment for 3 months, pay a fine of ₹ 1,000/- with default clause for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC. Considering that the life of a child was lost, the sentences of imprisonment awarded by the learned Court are not excessive, and no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court. 34. No other point was urged. 35. In view of the above, the present revision fails and is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 36. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th September 2026. (Ravinder)