2026:HHC:38618 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 288 of 2014 Reserved on: 01.09.2026 Date of Decision: 10.09.2026 State of H.P. .... Petitioner Versus Sunil Kumar .... Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the appellant/ State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate, with Mr Karan Sadyal, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31.12.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2026:HHC:38618 offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 & 304A of IPC and Sections 184 and 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act (M.V Act). It was asserted that the informant Balwant Singh (PW-1) was in his courtyard on 29.04.2006, at about 06.25 p.m. His grandson Sahil (since deceased) was crossing the road. A truck bearing registration No. HP-06-2735 came from Rakkar at high speed and hit Sahil, who was crushed under the tyres. The driver sped away from the spot. The incident was witnessed by Narender Singh (PW-9). The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the truck. An intimation to this effect was given to the police. ASI Sansar Chand (PW-8) went to the spot for verification. He recorded the informant's statement (Ext. PW-1/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext. PW-7/A) was registered. Sansar Chand (PW-8) 3 2026:HHC:38618 investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW- 8/A), seized the truck bearing registration No. HP 06-2735 along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW4/A), conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared the reports (Ext. PW8/B to Ext.PW8/C). Avinash (PW5) took the photographs (Ext.PW5/A to Ext. PW5/F), whose negatives are Ext.PW5/G and Ext.PW5/L. Kuldeep Singh (PW6) examined the truck and found that there was no mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW7/A). The post-mortem examination of Sahil was conducted, and the report (Ext.PW-8/D) was obtained. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court. 3. Learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC and Section 187 of M.V. Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4 2026:HHC:38618 4. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to prove its case. Balwant Singh (PW-1), Sunil Kumar (PW-2) and Narender Singh (PW-9) are the eyewitnesses. Pushpa Devi (PW-3) is the owner of the truck. Prem Chand (PW4) witnessed the recovery. Avinash (PW5) took the photographs. Kuldeep Singh (PW6) conducted the mechanical examination of the truck. ASI Thakaran Ram (PW-7) signed the F.I.R. SI Sansar Chand (PW-8) investigated the matter. Varun Kumar (PW-10) is the son of the owner, who was managing the truck. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that he was driving the truck bearing registration No. HP-06- 2735, on the date of the incident. He also admitted that the police had registered an FIR. He claimed that the incident had occurred because of the negligence of the child. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned trial Court held that as per the statements of Balwant Singh (PW1) and Narender Singh (PW9), the child was crossing the road. The accident had occurred in the middle of the road, and the defence presented by the accused that the child was crossing the road and there was no fault of the 5 2026:HHC:38618 accused was highly probable. However, the accused had failed to stop the vehicle and sped away from the spot. Hence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 and 304A of IPC, but convicted him of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the M.V. Act. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded without any cogent reasons. Sunil Kumar and Narender Singh proved that the accused was driving the truck at a high speed and his negligence led to the accident. The inference drawn by the learned trial Court that the child was at fault is not supported by any material on record. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr N.K. Thakur, 6 2026:HHC:38618 learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Karan Sadyal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution witnesses consistently stated that the accused was negligently driving the truck at a high speed, which led to the accident. The learned Trial Court held that the victim was at fault, but there was no evidence to this effect. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, for the respondent/accused submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses proved that the deceased was crossing the road. The accused could not have prevented the accident in case of sudden crossing, however careful he might have been. Learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:38618 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the 8 2026:HHC:38618 accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal 9 2026:HHC:38618 justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with 10 2026:HHC:38618 only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. Varun Kumar (PW-10) stated that he was managing the truck bearing registration No. HP-06-2735 and he had engaged the accused as the driver of the vehicle. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. His statement is duly corroborated by the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, wherein the accused had admitted that he was driving the truck on the date of accident. Hence, it was duly proved on record that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 14. It was specifically stated in the statement (Ext.PW- 1/A) that the child was crossing the road. Balvant Singh (PW1) stated in his chief examination that the child was standing on the side of the road. He denied in his cross-examination that the child was trying to cross the road. However, he was duly confronted with his previous statement (Ext.PW-1/A), wherein 11 2026:HHC:38618 it was mentioned that the child was crossing the road, and he denied it. This witness is shown to have made two inconsistent statements: one before the police, that the child was crossing the road, and another before the Court that the child was standing on the roadside. Therefore, his credibility has been adversely affected, and no reliance can be placed upon his testimony. 15. Sunil Kumar (PW2) stated in his examination-in- chief that the child was standing on the roadside when he was hit by a truck. He denied in his cross-examination that the child was trying to cross the road. This witness has also changed the prosecution version by saying that the child was on the side of the road and no reliance can be placed on his testimony. 16. Narender (PW-9) stated that the child was crossing the road when a truck hit him at a high speed. He stated in his cross-examination that he could not say that the accident occurred because the child got perplexed and came to the middle of the road. The statement of this witness shows that the child was crossing the road at the time of the accident. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahadeo Hari 12 2026:HHC:38618 Lokre v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 4 SCC 758, that if a person suddenly crosses the road, the driver may not be able to avoid the accident, and he cannot be held liable for negligence. It was observed at page 759: - “4... But the case assumes a different complexion if we agree with the sole eyewitness in the case, Dayanand PW 1, that at the time of the impact, Ravikant was actually crossing the road from West to East. That would mean that if Ravikant suddenly crossed the road from West to East without taking note of the approaching bus, there was every possibility of his dashing against the bus without the driver becoming aware of his crossing till it was too late. If a person suddenly crosses the road, the bus driver, even if he is driving slowly, may not be in a position to avoid the accident. Therefore, it will not be possible to hold that the bus driver was negligent.” 17. This Court also took a similar view in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 SCC OnLine HP 18: 1990 ACJ 598 and observed at page 600: - “14. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving at high speed, but it has not been said what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving at a high speed is neither proper nor legal evidence of high speed, nor does it in any way indicate rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect, as the speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under section 304-A of the Penal Code, 1860. Further, there are no skid marks, which eliminates the evidence of the high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of the accident. This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking at the two points, viz., the first 13 2026:HHC:38618 impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near the place of the curve, which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW 7, Chander Kanta, PW 8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather, the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane that joined the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than their parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. A minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why, in their deposition, they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that the child got frightened by the blowing of the horn by him and started crossing the road, which could not be seen by him, and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slowly he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident actually took place has not been clearly 14 2026:HHC:38618 and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the driver’s act. Their versions are, therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. A similar view was taken in State of H.P. vs. Manpreet Singh, Latest HLJ 2008(1) 538, wherein it was observed as under: “7…The respondent, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has explained that on seeing the deceased, he had blown the horn, and the deceased stopped on the road. As soon as he reached near him, he immediately tried to cross the road and got hit. His version has been duly corroborated by Hardeep Singh (DW1), who was a pillion rider with him. Ajay Kumar (PW1) has admitted that this version is that the respondent had blown the horn, and Daya Ram, on hearing it, had stopped for a while. In these circumstances, if a person suddenly crosses the road, without taking note of the approaching vehicle, and its Driver may not be in a position to save the accident, it will not be possible to hold the Driver guilty of the offence. In the instant case, the deceased, knowing fully well that at least the approaching vehicle had stopped on hearing the horn while crossing the road, but when the motorcycle reached near him, he darted before it, and the accident took place. Thus, in my opinion, the prosecution could not prove the offence charged against the respondent beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving rashly or negligently. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned trial Court had rightly acquitted the respondent of the charges framed against him...” (Emphasis supplied) 15 2026:HHC:38618 19. A similar principle would apply to the present case, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the accused was not liable. 20. The prosecution witnesses stated that the accused was driving the truck at a high speed. This is not sufficient. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that the mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to convict the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 16 2026:HHC:38618 21. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 22. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal, 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 23. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which 17 2026:HHC:38618 cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 24. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable because witnesses stated that he was driving the vehicle at high speed without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care. 25. It was submitted that witnesses have deposed about the negligence of the accused and learned trial Court erred in ignoring the statements of the prosecution witnesses. This submission will not help the prosecution. A witness can only depose about the facts that had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he 18 2026:HHC:38618 may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 26. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn based on evidence led before the Court.” 27. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused. 28. Therefore, the learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence laid before it and no interference is required with the judgment of the learned trial Court. 29. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 30. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish 19 2026:HHC:38618 personal bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court 31. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any 32. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th September,2026 (Ravinder)