1 2026:CGHC:24554 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 2901 of 2026 1 - Chunnilal Dewangan S/o Chetan Singh Aged About 46 Years R/o Kondagaon, Tahsil And District Kondagaon Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, District Kondagaon Chhattisgarh 2 - The Tahsildar, Kondagaon District Kondagaon Chhattisgarh 3 - The Additional Tahsildar And Assistant Land Measurement Officer Kondagaon, District Kondagaon Chhattisgarh. 4 - Hemant Dewangan S/o Late Laxman Dewangan R/o Kondagaon, Tahsil And District Kondagaon Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Shri Kamlesh Kumar Pandey, Advocate. For State : Shri Soumitra Kesharwani, PL. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 18/06/2026 1. This Writ Petition has been filed against the impugned order dated 30.04.1994 passed in Revenue Case No.30/A-6/92-93 whereby, Respondent No.3 has directed to include the name of father of Respondent No.4 namely Laxman Dewangan in revenue records in AVINASH SHARMA Digitally signed by AVINASH SHARMA Date: 2026.06.22 18:02:57 +0530 2 respect of land bearing Sheet No.1, Plot No.366/5, area 13.556 sq. ft. situated at village Kondagaon, Tahsil Kondagaon, District Kondagaon C.G. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the land bearing Sheet No. 1 Plot No. 366/5 area 13556 sq.ft. situated at Village-Kondagaon, Tahsil- Kondagaon, District-Kondagaon (C.G.) was recorded in the name of petitioner's father namely Chetanram Dewangan in revenue records, in which, the father of petitioner has constructed house. Father of petitioner was in possession over the subject house & land. The father of petitioner died on 13.11.1998 and after the death of his father, the petitioner and his family members are in possession over the said land & house. Father of respondent no. 4 filed an application before the respondent no. 3 for recording of his name in revenue records in respect of aforesaid land. Father of respondent no. 4 has impersonated himself as relative of petitioner's father. Thereafter, without affording proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner's father, Respondent no. 3 has passed ex-parte order dated 30.04.1994 against the father of petitioner, whereby directed to include the name of father of respondent no. 4 namely Laxman Dewangan in revenue records in respect of land bearing Sheet No. 1 Plot No. 366/5 area 13556 sq.ft. situated at Village-Kondagaon, Tahsil-Kondagaon, District-Kondagaon (C.G.). At the time of passing aforesaid order, the petitioner was minor and he was not aware about the said proceedings. The present 3 petitioner was not the party in the proceedings and father of respondent no. 4 filed an application against father of petitioner before the respondent no. 3 on 05.05.1993 and without affording opportunity of hearing, Respondent no. 3 passed the impugned ex-parte order against the father of petitioner. It is submitted that in the month of November, 1998, the father of petitioner died, therefore, the petitioner was never aware about the impugned order dated 30.04.1994, therefore, the petitioner did not challenge the said order till now. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the petitioner is in possession over the subject land, but in the year 2026, respondent no. 4 has tried to enter over the subject land by saying that the subject land is recorded in the name of his father. Thereafter, the petitioner enquired about the revenue records and then he came to know about the impugned order dated 30.04.1994. The petitioner applied for providing certified copy of records and on 02.02.2026, the petitioner has received the impugned order dated 30.04.1994 along with records of the said case, therefore the petitioner is filing the instant writ petition at this stage. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Respondent No.3 has passed illegal order, without any authority under the law, that too without affording opportunity of hearing to the father of the petitioner, as such, the ex parte order passed against the father of the petitioner may kindly be set aside. 4 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of gross delay and laches. It is submitted that the impugned order was passed on 30.04.1994 and the present writ petition has been filed only in the year 2026, after an unexplained delay of about 32 years. Even according to the petitioner, his father against whom the order was passed expired in the year 1998. However, no steps were taken by the petitioner or any other legal representative to ascertain the status of the revenue records or challenge the order for nearly three decades. It is further submitted that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked for entertaining stale claims and settled matters. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available with the petition carefully. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and Others {(2024) 15 SCC 215}, held in paragraphs Nos.12, 13 and 14, which reads as under:- 12. This Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. [Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] has held to the following effect: (SCC p. 784, paras 56-58) “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is 5 discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, (1964) 15 STC 450 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 10 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 : AIR 1964 SC 1006] , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 136] ). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110 : (1970) 25 STC 289] , Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports [Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84] ). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 13. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan [Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791] whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: (SCC pp. 325-26, paras 6-9) “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In 6 an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports [Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (LR PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 54 : (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated: (Lindsay Petroleum case [Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] , LR pp. 239-40) ‘Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.’ 7 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 14. Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] has held: (SCC p. 117, para 16) “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The 8 court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 8. The impugned order was passed on 30.04.1994. Admittedly, the petitioner has approached this Court in the year 2026. Thus, there is a delay of about 32 years in challenging the said order. The explanation offered by the petitioner is that he was a minor at the relevant time and came to know about the impugned order only in the year 2026 when respondent No.4 allegedly attempted to interfere with his possession. However, the petitioner's father, against whom the order was passed, remained alive till 13.11.1998. There is no material on record to show that either the petitioner's father during his lifetime or the petitioner thereafter took any steps to challenge the order or verify the revenue entries. The explanation furnished does not satisfactorily account for the enormous delay. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity (supra) has reiterated that delay and laches constitute a valid ground for refusing relief under 9 Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court has held that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and stale claims ought not to be entertained, particularly when rights may have accrued in favour of other parties over a long period of time. 10. At present, the petitioner is aged about 46 years. When the mutation proceedings was initiated, a proclamation was made on 05.05.1993 upon which, father of Respondent No.4 namely Laxman Dewangan as well as father of the petitioner namely Chetan Singh appeared before the Additional Tehsildar. A copy of the application was also served upon the father of the petitioner, however, he did not file any reply and as such, his opportunity to file reply was closed on 14.03.1994 and the matter was fixed for evidence, as father of the petitioner, despite notice remained absent, as such, ex parte proceedings were initiated. It is further evident that father of the petitioner as well as father of Respondent No.4 namely Laxman Dewangan are cousin brothers and the property in dispute is ancestral property, as such, name of father of Respondent No.4 was mutated along with father of the petitioner. The fact that the property is a joint property has never been challenged either by father of the petitioner or petitioner after attaining majority before any competent court of law. Moreover, there is no plausible explanation offered by the petitioner for considering the inordinate delay and laches which has been committed by the petitioner, as such, considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and 10 further considering the well settled principle that extraordinary jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a case where injustice would be caused to the third party wherein rights have already been accrued in favour of the party and the matter cannot be interfered for a petitioner who has slept over for many years and now seeking interference under writ jurisdiction which is not all permissible. 11. In the present case, the petitioner seeks to challenge an order passed more than three decades ago. Entertaining such a belated challenge would defeat the very principles underlying the doctrine of delay and laches. The petitioner has failed to furnish a cogent and satisfactory explanation for approaching this Court after such an inordinate lapse of time. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Avinash