2026:HHC:38622 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4187 of 2013 Reserved on: 27.08.2026 Date of Decision: 10.09.2026 State of H.P. .... Petitioner Versus Balbir Singh & another .... Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the appellant/ State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Vijender Katoch, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19.06.2013. passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.07.2008, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class (I), Palampur, 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2026:HHC:38622 District Kangra, H.P. (learned trial Court), were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61 (1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, as applicable to the State of H.P. It was asserted that SI Beant Singh (PW-5), HHC Prem Chand (PW-4), Constable Jaimel Singh and Constable Prakash Chand had set up a Nakka at Malnoo Bridge on 20.03.2005. Maruti Van bearing registration No. HP-39A-6117 and a Maruti car bearing registration No.CH-01-2945 came to the spot. The police signalled the drivers to stop; however, the drivers did not stop the vehicles and fled away. The police followed the vehicles. Maruti van and a Maruti car met with an accident after some distance. The driver of the Maruti car identified himself as Gurdev Singh. Two other persons present in the car ran away. Gurdev Singh named the persons who had run away from the spot as Vinod Kumar and Niku Ram. The driver of the Maruti Van disclosed his name as Aman. The police searched the Maruti car and recovered 16 boxes of 3 2026:HHC:38622 country liquor bearing the mark Lal Quila. The police searched the van and recovered 19 boxes of country liquor bearing the mark Lal Quila, and three boxes of Indian-Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) bearing the mark Josh XXX Rum. The police retained three bottles of Josh XXX Rum and three bottles of Lal Quila as samples. The sample bottles were sealed with seal ‘B’. Seal impression (Ext.PW-5/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The boxes and the vehicles were seized vide memo (Ext. PW-4/A). The seal was handed over to witness Jaimal after use. Rukka (Ext.PW-5/B) was prepared and was sent to the police station where FIR (Ext.PW-2/A) was registered. SI Basant Singh (PW-5) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-5/C) and deposited the case property with Sanjeev (PW3), who deposited it in Malakhana and sent the bottles to CTL, Kandaghat on 26.04.2005, vide RC No. 67/21 through Constable Ravi Kumar (PW-1), who deposited the bottles at CTL, Kandaghat and handed over the receipt to the MHC on his return. The result of analysis (Ext. PX-1 and Ext. PX-2) was issued, in which it was mentioned that samples of country liquor contained 49.7%, 50.0% and 49.7% proof alcohol in them and samples of IMFL contained 65.0% proof 4 2026:HHC:38622 alcohol in them. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the Challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Section 61 (1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, as applicable to the State of H.P., to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Ravi Kumar (PW-1) carried the samples to CTL Kandaghat. Tameshwar Singh (PW-2) signed the FIR and prepared the challan. Sanjeev Chand (PW-3) was working as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. Prem Chand (PW-4) witnessed the recovery. Beant Singh (PW-5) investigated the matter. 5. The accused Balbir Singh, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that he was the driver of a Maruti Car bearing registration No. CH-01-2945 and Aman Kumar was the driver 5 2026:HHC:38622 of a Maruti Van bearing registration HP-39A-6116. He stated that the police apprehended him and Aman at Palampur. Accused Nikku and Vinod Kumar were not occupying their vehicle. A false case was made against him. His vehicle was intercepted by the police for issuing a challan under the Motor Vehicle Act. The other accused denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They claimed that they were innocent and were falsely implicated. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. Learned trial Court held that the testimonies of the police officials corroborated each other on material aspects. There was nothing in their testimonies to make the prosecution case doubtful. The incident had taken place in the middle of the night, and no independent person could have been joined by the Investigating Officer during the recovery. The accused could not produce any permit for transporting the liquor. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted both the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of Punjab Excise Act, as applicable to the State of H.P. and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years each, pay a fine of ₹10,000/- each and in default 6 2026:HHC:38622 of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months each. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by Learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (learned appellate Court). The learned appellate Court held that no case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC was registered against the accused for driving the vehicle in a negligent manner and causing the accident. No independent witness was associated, and no explanation was provided for it. The samples were sent to the laboratory on 26.04.2005. No explanation was provided for the delay. Constable Jaimal, to whom the seal was handed over, was not examined, and the integrity of the case property was not established. All these circumstances were not noticed by the learned trial Court. Hence, the learned appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court and acquitted the accused of the charged offence. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal 7 2026:HHC:38622 asserting that the learned appellate Court has failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The learned trial Court had rightly held that it was not possible to associate any independent witness as the incident had taken place during the night. This aspect was ignored by the learned appellate Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Vijender Katoch, learned Counsel for the respondent accused. 10. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The incident had taken place in the middle of the night, and it was not possible to associate any independent person. The learned trial Court had rightly noticed this aspect, and the learned appellate Court ignored it conveniently. The statements of police officials corroborated each other, and there was no reason to disbelieve their testimonies. The statements of the official witnesses cannot be discarded because of their official position, and the 8 2026:HHC:38622 learned appellate Court erred in holding that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appellate Court had taken a view that could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the integrity of the case property was not proved. The Investigating Officer has not provided any explanation for not registering the case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC, and this made the prosecution’s case suspect. The learned appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while appreciating the evidence on record, and this Court should not interfere with a reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records. 9 2026:HHC:38622 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the 10 2026:HHC:38622 accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the 11 2026:HHC:38622 limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 12 2026:HHC:38622 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 14. Prem Chand (PW-4) and Beant Singh (PW-5) stated that the police had signalled the drivers of the vehicles to stop them; however, the drivers sped away. The police followed the vehicles, and the vehicles hit the hills. Their window panes were broken, and the injured and the driver had sustained injuries in the incident. The learned Appellate Court had rightly noticed that there was no corroboration to this part of the prosecution case. The MLCs of the accused were not produced to show that the accused had sustained injuries. The vehicles were not mechanically examined to prove that they had suffered damage in the accident. SI Beant Singh (PW-5) admitted in his cross-examination that he had not registered any FIR for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC. He had not taken the photographs, and he had not seized the broken window panes of the vehicles. He had not annexed the MLCs of the drivers to the record, and he could not provide any explanation for the same. Thus, the prosecution version that the accused had sped 13 2026:HHC:38622 away from the spot after getting a signal from the police and their vehicles met with an accident is not corroborated by any material on record. Since the recovery was effected after the accident, any doubt regarding the vehicle having met with an accident would adversely affect the recovery. 15. SI Beant Singh (PW-5) stated in his cross- examination that the police had hired a private vehicle for visiting the spot; however, he had not associated the driver of the vehicle as a witness. No reason was assigned for not doing so. Similarly, Prem Chand (PW-4) stated that they had visited the spot in a private vehicle, but he could not describe the vehicle. Thus, the presence of the driver of the private vehicle on the spot is asserted by both the witnesses, and the failure to join him will cast a doubt upon the prosecution version, especially when the statements of official witnesses regarding the accident are not corroborated by independent evidence. 16. Prem Chand (PW-4) stated in his cross- examination that the boxes shown to him were not sealed and they did not bear any identification slip. Beant Singh (PW-5) stated in his cross-examination that no seal or identification slip was affixed to the boxes shown to him; therefore, the 14 2026:HHC:38622 identification of the case property was highly suspect. It was laid down by this Court in Amandeep Singh & Ors. Vs State of HP, 2010 (3) Shim LC 39, that when the case property was not produced before the Court, the conviction of the accused cannot be recorded. It was observed:- 9…So far as the statement of PW1 Chaman Lal is concerned, no sample of liquor or any seal of the seized liquor has been produced and proved in Court. The bottles from which the samples were taken have also not been proved in Court. Learned trial Court, as also the Appellate Court, had presumed as a matter of fact that what the witnesses had stated was the correct state of affairs without considering that facts were to be proved from documents which admittedly existed but were not produced in Court. There is no presumption in law that oral evidence can override documentary proof. The existence of a seal can be proved by its production. The Court cannot presume that the sample was kept in safe custody, more especially when such a fact is established by a written document, namely register (s) and certificate in Register No. 21, which is not produced. What the prosecution tried to prove remains unclear. Merely saying that liquor was seized is insufficient without establishing its quantity and safekeeping.” 17. While dealing with the case of non-production of case property in forest case, It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2019) 4 SCC 182: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 39: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 359 that when the seized wood and the vehicle were not produced, and only one sample was produced, the accused could not have been 15 2026:HHC:38622 convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 379 of the IPC and Section 42 of the Forest Act. It was observed at page 183: - “4. We have heard the learned counsel for the respondent in opposition to the appeal and considered the nature of the evidence available. Non-production of the seized wood and the vehicle, the primary evidence of the offence, renders the prosecution's case fragile and unsustainable. Mere production of the seizure memo does not tantamount to the production of the seized wood and the lorry. Unless the seized wood was produced, mere production of a sample, and there is no material in support that the sample was out of the same 22 logs, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellants.” 18. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case due to the non-production of the case property. 19. Sanjeev Chand (PW-3) stated that ASI Beant Singh deposited the case property with him on 21.03.2005, and he sent the samples to CTL Kandaghat on 26.04.2005. He admitted that the case properly remained in the police station, and he has not explained the delay in sending the samples to CTL Kandaghat. 16 2026:HHC:38622 20. Ravi Kumar (PW-1) stated that H.C Sanjeev Chand had handed over 3 bottles of country liquor and 3 bottles of XXX Rum sealed with seal ‘B’ with a direction to carry them to CTL Kandaghat. He has nowhere stated that any sample seal was handed over to him or that he had deposited any sample seal at Kandaghat. Therefore, the endorsement on the reports (Ext.PX1 and Ext PX2) that the samples were compared with a sample seal sent separately will not help the prosecution, and the learned appellate Court had rightly held that integrity of case property was not established. 21. It has been stated in Analysis of Evidence (Second edition Terence Anderson, David Schum, and William Twining Cambridge University Press) that before the reliance can be placed on the tangible evidence, the link evidence has to be led to establish that there was no tampering with the same. It has been stated on page 64: “There are three major sources of ancillary evidence that may call into question the authenticity of tangible evidence. The first involves evidence that has been deliberately contrived in order to mislead others, such as a forged document. Errors in recording, transmitting, or processing evidence are the second source. Tangible evidence may pass through many hands before it is offered at trial. The opportunities for processing or handling errors of various kinds increase with the 17 2026:HHC:38622 number of hands a tangible item passes through. Blood samples may be mislabeled or even substituted one for another. That is the reason for the requirement that there should be evidence establishing the chain of custody from the time the evidence was discovered (the bloody glove) or generated (an entry into a business record) until the time the evidence is presented at trial. If we do not know all of the links in a chain of custody, we cannot vouch for the authenticity of a tangible item. Finally, the witness whose testimony is offered to establish the authenticity of an item may be mistaken or untruthful.” 22. It was laid down by this Court in Kishan Chand & Another Vs. State 2009 (2) HLJ 925 that where the person carrying the case property did not say anything about the carrying of sample seal, link evidence is missing. The endorsement made by CTL Kandaghat in these circumstances that seal impressions were compared with the sample seal will lose their significance. It was observed:- “6. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the accused were in possession of an incriminating article or an offensive material before they are convicted for keeping in possession the contraband or the offensive material. From its recovery and taking samples, the chain of evidence until the samples are analysed in the laboratory should be complete. In case of breach of the chain of evidence, it gives rise to a reasonable doubt that the samples were tampered with, to the benefit of which goes to the accused. 7. In the instant case, PW-6 A.S.I. Churamani, however, did not state about the deposit of the case property in the Malkhana. But PW-5 MHC Hukam Singh stated that on 19.6.2000 A.S.I. Churamani had deposited the case 18 2026:HHC:38622 property sealed with seal impression 'N' in the Malkhana with him. But he nowhere stated that the sample of the seal was also deposited with him in the Malkhana. Even the extract of the Malkhana Register was not placed and proved on record. Thus, it cannot be said that the sample of the seal was also deposited in the Malkhana with him along with the case property. Even PW-2 constable Rajinder Kumar also did not say about handing over the sample of the seal to him when he had taken the samples for examination to C.T.L. Kandaghat. The copy of R.C. No.55/2000, vide which he took the sample for analysis, has also not been placed and proved on record. Had it been there, it could have thrown some light on this aspect of the matter, whether the sample of the seal was also entrusted to him, which was further handed over by him to the person who received the samples in the laboratory, for its comparison with the seal found on samples sent for analysis. 8. The lithographic impression on the report Ext. PW- 4/A, of course, shows that seals on the samples were found intact and unbroken and tallied with the impression seal sent separately, but it loses its importance in view of the fact that no witness has stated to have either deposited the sample seal along with case property in the Malkhana or sent it separately to the Laboratory when the samples were taken for analysis. Then how the sample of the seal could be available in the Laboratory for its comparison? The lithographic stamp is mechanically put on the report. 9. Further, the case of the prosecution is that the seal, after its use, was given to PW-1 Ravinder Kumar, but he did not say that the seal was ever entrusted to him. Thus, where the seal used on the samples is not known, in these circumstances a substantial doubt has arisen, and the prosecution could not exclude the possibility of tampering with the samples. 19 2026:HHC:38622 Thus, the link evidence in the instant case is found missing. There is no evidence on record regarding the entrustment of seal and no entry in the R.C. and Malkhana register; therefore, reasonable doubt is cast on the probity of the prosecution case, which fact was lost sight of by the courts below. Therefore, in these circumstances, the benefit of the doubt should have been given to the petitioners.” 23. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Rakesh Kumar 2018 (1) HLJ 73 wherein it was held:- “7. Interestingly, there is no mention, if any, regarding the handing over of the seal by this witness to CTL Kandaghat, for comparison. It has come in his statement that he had taken samples, but he has not stated that a specimen seal was also given to him for depositing in CTL Kandaghat. Samples were sent to CTL Kandaghat through Jai Singh (PW- 6), who simply deposed that he had sent samples through PW-5 DurgaDutt. Interestingly, he nowhere stated that the specimen seal impression was also sent separately for chemical analysis. 18. True it is that reports of CTL, Ext. PW-7/G to Ext. PW-7/K show that the specimen seal impression allegedly separately sent, tallied with the seal impressions on the samples; however, link evidence is missing as to how the specimen seal impression reached the chemical analyst. Similarly, it emerges from the record that there is no mention, if any, in the Challan with regard to sending of specimen seal to CTL Kandaghat. This certainly creates doubt with regard to the genuineness of the prosecution case. 19. This Court, in a case titled State of H.P. vs. Pankaj Sood, Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 727, has held that in such a case, by no stretch of the imagination, it can be presumed that the samples were sent along with the sample seal for comparison, and it was held that the prosecution case was doubtful on this count. It was 20 2026:HHC:38622 further held by this Court in the aforesaid case that the prosecution is obliged to prove that the article recovered from the possession of the accused is contraband within the meaning of the Act. For that, from the time of recovery till the examination of the samples, the link is required to be completely proved. Seals used on the samples must be intact and unbroken, and the said seals should tally with the sample of the seal taken separately at the time of sampling by the Investigating Officer to overrule every possibility of tampering with the contents of the samples.” 24. Similar is the judgment in Jagdev Singh v. State of H.P., 2015 SCC OnLine HP 2520 wherein it was observed: 36. Thus, there is no link evidence establishing the factum of receipt of the sample from the doctor till such time it was handed over to the police official who got it deposited in the laboratory. Whether it was kept in safe custody and not tampered with remains unproven on record. 37. The SHO/Investigating Officer has not deposed that the sample was deposited in the police station. Where the sample was kept between the 13th and 17th June 2009 remains unexplained on record. Also, seal-H with which the alleged sample was sealed has not been produced in Court. Crucially and significantly, even the Road Certificate has not been produced on record, which would have only thrown light as to with whom and where the sample was kept at the police station. 38. No doubt MLC (Ext.PW-6/G) records the sample to be that of Jagdev (accused), but then the Doctor does not specifically state that the sample was sealed. All that he states is that the sample was handed over to the police in a sealed bag. But then who sealed the same and with which seal, he does not state, and Constable Roshan Lal (PW-5) is also silent about the same. In fact, he is silent about the seal impression. As already observed, ASI Om Prakash and HC Nup Ram are silent 21 2026:HHC:38622 with regard to the sample, much less sealing thereof. It is in this backdrop that it was necessary for the prosecution to have produced the original seal or impression thereof, with which the sample was sealed, for it cannot be said with certainty that the sample was not tampered with. 25. Thus, the learned trial Court has rightly discarded the report of the analysis. 26. In view of these infirmities, the learned appellate Court was justified in holding that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and this was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned trial Court. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the appellate Court acquitting the accused, even if another view is possible. 27. No other point was urged. 28. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. 29. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the 22 2026:HHC:38622 learned trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court 30. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 31. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Court below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th September, 2026 (Ravinder)