2026:HHC:38619 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 73 of 2014 Reserved on: 01.09.2026 Date of Decision: 10.09.2026 State of H.P. .... Petitioner Versus Rakesh Kumar & Anr. .... Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the appellant/ State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr Vijay Chaudhary, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 01.11.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dalhousie, District Chamba, H.P. (learned trial Court), vide which the respondents (accused before the learned trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2026:HHC:38619 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the informant Meena Kumari (PW1) had gone to the water tank on 18.11.2008 at about 07.00 a.m. to wash the utensils. Accused Rajesh Kumar spat on her. She enquired the reason, and the accused became infuriated. He picked up a stick and beat the informant. The informant sustained injury to her right leg. She shouted for help. Mehar Singh (PW4) and accused Lajja Devi also reached the spot. They gave beatings to the informant. Lajja Devi bit the informant's finger. Mehar Singh and Lajja Devi threatened to burn the informant. The informant's jewellery was lost in the incident. The informant's husband, Surinder Singh (PW-2), rescued her. Swarna Devi and Bishan Singh (PW3) also reached the spot after hearing the noise. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW-8/A) was recorded in the police station. An application (Ext.PW-7/A) was filed for the medical examination of the informant. Dr Dineshwar Singh (PW5) examined the informant and found that she had sustained 3 2026:HHC:38619 simple injuries. He issued an MLC (Ext.PW-5/A). An entry (Ext.PW-8/B) was recorded in the police station, and FIR (Ext.PW-6/A) was registered. HC Subhash (PW-7) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-7/B). Accused Rajesh Kumar produced the stick (Ext.P1), which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 8 witnesses to prove its case. Informant Meena Kumari (PW-1) and Surinder Singh (PW-2) narrated the incident. Bishan Singh (PW-3) and Mehar Singh (PW-4) did not support the prosecution case. Dr Dineshwar Singh (PW-5) examined the informant. HC Ashok Kumar (PW-6) was working as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. HC Subhash (PW-7) investigated the 4 2026:HHC:38619 matter. LC Nirupama (PW-8) proved the entry in the daily diary. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They claimed that witnesses had deposed against them falsely because of enmity. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. The Learned Trial Court held that the relationship between the accused and the informant was strained and the prosecution case was required to be seen with due care and caution. Bishan Singh and Mehar Singh had not supported the prosecution case. There were material contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Hence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. Enmity is a double-edged weapon, and it can furnish a motive for the commission of the crime. The 5 2026:HHC:38619 statements of the informant and her husband proved that the accused had caused injuries to the informant. Minor contradictions are not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. The prosecution case could not have been rejected because some of the witnesses had turned hostile. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr Vijay Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State submitted that the learned trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of the informant and her husband proved the prosecution’s version. The Medical Officer found that the informant's finger was bitten, which corroborates her statement that accused Lajja Devi had bitten her finger. The minor contradictions in the statements were not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. The enmity can furnish a motive for the commission of the crime. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and judgment passed by learned trial Court be set aside. 6 2026:HHC:38619 10. Mr Vijay Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that Bishan Singh and Mehar Singh had not supported the prosecution case. The statements of witnesses materially contradicted each other, which made the prosecution case doubtful. The informant had changed her version in the Court, and she cannot be called to be a reliable witness. The learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: 7 2026:HHC:38619 Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by 8 2026:HHC:38619 us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double 9 2026:HHC:38619 presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. The informant stated in her statement (Ext.PW- 8/A) that she had sustained injury on her right leg. She stated in the Court while appearing as PW1 that the accused had 10 2026:HHC:38619 inflicted a blow on her left leg. The Medical Officer had also found an injury on her left leg. 14. The informant stated that accused Lajja Devi and Mehar Singh came to the spot, and they gave her a beating. However, the informant Meena Kumari (PW1) stated on oath that Laja Devi had bitten her finger and threatened to burn her. Thus, she has exonerated Mehar Singh as one of the assailants. 15. The informant stated in the statement (Ext.PW8/A) that her jewellery was found missing; however, nothing was said about the missing jewellery on oath. 16. The informant stated in her cross-examination that she was residing in the house of Shamsher Singh because she was turned out of her matrimonial home. Her husband Surender Singh (PW2), also stated in his cross-examination that he was dispossessed from the house in June 2008 and they were residing in the house of Shamsher Singh. The site plan (Ext.PW7/B) does not show the house of Shamsher Singh. The statement made by the informant and her husband that they were dispossessed in June 2008 would make the prosecution case highly suspect, because, then the informant would have 11 2026:HHC:38619 no reason to go to the house of the accused at 07.30 a.m. to wash the utensils. 17. The informant admitted in her cross-examination that she had made repeated complaints against the accused and the matters were reconciled. She admitted that she had also undertaken before Panchayat that she would not harass the accused. These admissions show that the relationship between the accused and the informant was strained and the prosecution version is required to be seen with due care and caution. 18. Surinder Singh (PW2) admitted in his cross- examination that he had not seen the accused Rajesh beating the informant or Lajja Devi, biting the finger of the informant, which shows that he is not an eyewitness to the incident. 19. Bishan Singh (PW3) did not support the prosecution case. He denied that he had heard the noise and went to the spot and was told about the incident. He denied his previous statement recorded by the police. 20. Mehar Singh (PW-4) also did not support the prosecution case. He stated that he had not seen any quarrel. 12 2026:HHC:38619 He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that he had heard a noise and went to the spot. He denied that he saw the accused beating the informant, and the informant revealed the incident to him. He denied his previous statement recorded by the police. Therefore, his testimony also does not support the prosecution case. 21. Thus, the statements of the prosecution witnesses were not satisfactory, and the learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned trial Court even if another view is possible. 22. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 23. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition 13 2026:HHC:38619 being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 25. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any 26. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th September,2026 (Ravinder)