1 2026:CGHC:23746 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6470 of 2021 R.P. Gupta S/o Late Shri S.P. Gupta Aged About 67 Years Deputy Commissioner (Retd.) Sc And St Development Department, R/o -80 Floral City Old Dhamtari Road Dunda, Near Kamal Vihar Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1- State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2- The Secretary, Sc And St Development Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3- The Commissioner, SC & ST Development Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Prafull Bharat, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Keshav Dewangan, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Kawaljeet Singh Saini, Deputy Government Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 15/06/2026 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2 “10.1 To call for the records of the case for kind perusal of this Hon'ble court. 10.2 To issue an appropriate writ or order and declare that the order dated 15.03.2022 (Annexure P- 7) is bad in law, without jurisdiction, illegal, arbitrary and suffers from malice. 10.3 To issue an appropriate writ or order and quash the order dated 15.03.2022 (Annexure P-7). 10.4 To issue an appropriate writ or order and direct the respondents to make payment of all the retiral dues illegally withheld by them along with interest @ 18%. 10.5 To issue an appropriate writ or order and direct the respondents to reimburse the entire medical expenses borne by the petitioner from the date of his superannuation which roughly amounts to Rs. 4,00,000/- along with interest @ 18%. 10.6 To issue an appropriate writ or order and direct the respondents to pay compensation @ Rs.50,000/- for the harassment suffered by the petitioner on the hands of respondents for their omission and actions along with cost of this petition. 10.7 Any other relief deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted. ” 2. Facts in brief are that the petitioner was appointed to the post of District Organizer in the year 1981. The petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Commissioner. In the year 2012, the petitioner was again promoted to the post of Deputy Commissioner with effect from June, 1996. The petitioner worked on the post of Project Administrator, Integrated Tribal Development Project, Rajnandgaon, from July, 1998 to September, 2005. 3. On 02.05.2006, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner with respect to the allegations of financial irregularities regarding sanction 3 of an amount for the purpose of a Bee Hive Training Programme at Rajnandgaon. It was alleged that the petitioner sanctioned Rs. 8.14 lakhs instead of Rs. 4.02 lakhs. The petitioner replied to the article of charge, and thereafter, a departmental enquiry was initiated against him. The Enquiry Officer completed the enquiry and submitted his report on 30.07.2016, wherein allegations made against the petitioner were not found proved. 4. The petitioner retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.07.2013. The department did not finalize the retiral dues of the petitioner; therefore, he filed WPS No. 4887/2020 and, vide order dated 19.01.2021, a direction was issued to the respondents to take a decision regarding release of the balance retiral dues payable to the petitioner within a period of 90 days. 5. When the order dated 19.01.2021 was not complied with, a contempt Case No. 510/2021 was filed and thereafter, the order (Annexure P/1) was passed inflicting a penalty of recovery of Rs. 4.12 lakhs. 6. Mr. Prafull Bharat, learned Senior Advocate, would submit that the disciplinary authority failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 15 of the CCA Rules, 1966. He would contend that the disciplinary authority never recorded its disagreement on the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer. 7. The disciplinary authority, contrary to the provisions of Rule 15 of the CCA Rules, 1966, constituted a committee to conduct an internal audit and, at the same time, obtained approval from the (General Administration Department, for short, GAD). He would submit that the Internal Audit Committee conducted the audit behind the back of the petitioner and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him. The disciplinary authority failed to assign reasons while recording its disagreement regarding the enquiry report; therefore, Annexure P/7 is 4 bad in law. He has placed reliance on the matter of Sunil Sharma v. Registrar, High Court of M.P., Jabalpur and Others, reported in ILR 2024 Chhattisgarh 1874. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Saini, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State would submit that a sum of Rs. 4.02 lakhs was sufficient for completion of the training programme, but the petitioner sanctioned Rs. 8.14 lakhs. When this discrepancy was detected by the department, a show-cause notice was issued and a departmental enquiry was conducted. He would contend that though the Enquiry Officer recorded findings in favour of the petitioner, but the disciplinary authority, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short, CCA Rules, 1966), referred the matter to the General Administration Department and thereafter, an Internal Audit Committee was constituted. He would contend that approval of the Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission (for short, CGPSC) was also obtained and thereafter, an order of recovery to the tune of Rs. 4.14 lakhs was passed. He would further submit that the petitioner has not challenged the enquiry proceedings on the ground of denial of opportunity and there is no allegation of violation of the principles of natural justice. He would submit that it is a well-settled principle of law that the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority can be interfered warranted only when the authority passing the impugned order is not competent, the principles of natural justice have not been followed, or the punishment imposed upon the employee is shockingly disproportionate; thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 10.Admittedly, in the present case, a departmental enquiry was initiated and an enquiry report was submitted wherein the allegations levelled 5 against the petitioner were not found proved. The disciplinary authority did not pass any order immediately; rather, the matter remained pending for a considerable period. The petitioner, after retirement, approached this Court for disbursement of his retiral dues and an order was passed in his favour; thereafter, a representation was made by the petitioner for disbursement of his retiral dues. Respondent No. 1 referred the matter to the GAD and thereafter, an Internal Audit Committee was constituted, which conducted an enquiry behind the back of the petitioner. 11.It is also the case of the petitioner that the said audit report was never communicated to him and it was prepared behind his back. The GAD recorded its disagreement to the enquiry report and approval was obtained from the CGPSC to inflict the penalty. 12.However, as per the CCA Rules, 1966, the disciplinary authority alone can record its disagreement and assign reasons with respect to the enquiry report. 13.In the present case, the power of the disciplinary authority has been exercised by the GAD, which is arbitrary and per se illegal. 14.Admittedly, the Internal Audit Committee conducted an enquiry pursuant to the order passed by the disciplinary authority and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner; therefore, respondent No. 1 committed illegality in placing reliance upon such a document. 15.Rule 15 of the Rules, 1966 is reproduced as under:- “15. Action on the inquiry report. (1) The disciplinary authority if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold 6 the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 14 as far as may be. (2)The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (3)If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in [x x x] Rule 10 should be imposed on the Government servants, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 16, make an order imposing such penalty [but in doing so it shall record reasons in writing] [Omitted by Notification No. C-6-5-83-3-I, dated 23- 7-1984.] : Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the disciplinary authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into consideration before making any order imposing any penalty on the Government servant.[x x x] [Omitted by Notification No. C-6-5-83-3-I, dated 23-7-1984.].” 16. In the matter of Sunil Sharma (supra), this Court held that where the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, it is mandatory to record reasons for such disagreement. The disciplinary authority cannot abdicate its statutory function in favour of another authority or committee. The requirement of recording reasons is a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power. The relevant paragraphs 16 to 18 are reproduced as under:- “16. It is, however, to be seen that the aforesaid disagreement of the disciplinary authority pertaining to the charge no.8 appears to have been made in violation of the provisions prescribed under sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 of the Rules, 1966. The said provision is relevant for the purpose which provides as under:- 15. Action on the inquiry report (1) ……xxxx…. 7 (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, records its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (3) ……xxxx ……” 17. From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that if the disciplinary authority is disagreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on any article of charge, he then, in such an eventuality, has to record its own reasonings and findings on such charge and before recording its findings of such disagreement, an opportunity was required to be given to the delinquent officer. The said observation is fortified by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Punjab National Bank (supra), wherein the pari materia provision prescribed under Rule 7(2) of the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 was fell into consideration and it was observed at paragraphs 18 and 19 as under:- “18. ……….. When the inquiry is conducted by the inquiry officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the inquiry officer's report and, while recording of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as 8 a part of the first stage of inquiry as explained in Karunakar's case (supra). 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer. 18. In the light of the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the above referred matter, it is, thus, clear that an opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the delinquent employee, if the disciplinary authority is not satisfied with the finding of the Enquiry Officer which is recorded in his favour on any article of charge, before recording its own reasonings and findings. The finding of the disciplinary authority with regard to charge no.8 while disagreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer, therefore, cannot be held to be sustainable in the eye of law. Consequently, the finding of the disciplinary authority in relation to charge no.8 is hereby set aside. Although, the finding of the disciplinary authority pertaining to charge no.8 has not been upheld, but, we are not inclined to remand the matter for its fresh decision on the said charge as other charges (except charges no.3 and 8), which are serious in nature, have duly been found to be proved by the disciplinary authority based upon the due enquiry which are, therefore, not required to be interferred in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 9 17.From bare reading of the above quoted judgment, it is apparent that when a disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of an Inquiry Officer on any charge, Rule 15(2) of the Rules, 1966 requires it to record reasons for such disagreement and, before recording its own adverse finding, provide the delinquent employee an opportunity to represent against the proposed disagreement. 18.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra reported in 1998 (7) SCC 84, held that principles of natural justice mandate that the disciplinary authority must communicate its tentative reasons for disagreement and hear the employee before arriving at a contrary conclusion. 19.Taking into consideration the above discussed facts and the law, the impugned order (Annexure P/7) is not sustainable and same is hereby quashed. 20.The respondents are directed to finalize the claim of the retiral dues of the petitioner expeditiously, preferably within a period of 90 days. 21.The amount, if any, recovered from the petitioner shall be refunded forthwith. 22.The petition is allowed. Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE Nadim