TARIK YUNUS SHAHA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THR PSO., PS PARDI DIST. NAGPUR
BA/1310/2026 · 2026-11-03
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 22535 (BOM) · dailylaw.ai ]
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 22535 (BOM) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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1 32 BA 1310.26.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR CRIMINAL APPLICATION (BA) NO. 1310/2026 (Tarik Yunus Shaha Vs. State of Maharashtra) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ms. Priyanka V. Dubey, Advocate for applicant. Mr. H. D. Marathe, APP for non-applicant/State. Mr. Amol Hunge, Advocate for assistance to prosecution.
CORAM: M. M. NERLIKAR,
J . DATED : 03/11/2026. Heard. 2. By this application, the applicant is seeking bail in connection with Crime No. 385/2024 registered with Police Station Pardi, Dist. Nagpur for the offences punishable under Sections 103, 109, 115(2), 296, 352, 3(5), 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act. 3. The First Information Report came to be lodged on 21/07/2024 by the informant, who is the father of the deceased. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that the deceased and a girl, namely, Mamata (accused No. 1), were having a love affair for the last two years prior to the alleged incident. It is further alleged that, on 20/07/2024, accused No. 2, namely, Abhishek, along with two of his
2 32 BA 1310.26.odt friends, came to the house of the deceased carrying liquor bottles in their hands, and all four of them, including the deceased, consumed alcohol while sitting in the informant's house. Thereafter, the deceased and accused No. 2 started quarrelling over who would marry accused No. 1 and, in that regard, accused No. 2, along with the deceased, went to the house of accused No. 1. The informant received a phone call at around 7:00 p.m. informing him that his son, i.e., the deceased, had sustained injuries and was admitted to Radhakrishna Hospital. Accordingly, the informant reached the hospital, where, in the presence of three friends, the deceased informed him, before being taken to the operation theatre, that accused No. 1 had instigated accused No. 2 to kill him, stating that she would marry accused No. 2 thereafter. It is further alleged that accused Nos. 2 and 3, along with the present applicant, started assaulting the deceased and that accused No. 2 attacked him with a knife outside the house of accused No. 1. The deceased, therefore, fled from there and reached near Pardi Square. However, at Pardi Square, the deceased was again intercepted by accused Nos. 2 and 3, and accused No. 2 assaulted him with a knife on his head, stomach and back. At that time, PSI Karmore intervened and took the
3 32 BA 1310.26.odt knife from accused No. 2 to save the life of the deceased. On the basis of these allegations, the First Information Report came to be registered. 4.
The learned counsel for the applicant submits that, at no point of time, were the grounds of arrest communicated to the applicant. The learned Magistrate, while remanding the applicant to police custody, did not satisfy himself as to whether the grounds of arrest had been communicated to the applicant or not. However, she also fairly admits that, at no point of time during the period of remand or even thereafter, did the applicant raise the ground that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him. However, she submits that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India is mandatory in nature and that, even after filing of the charge-sheet or taking of cognizance by the Trial Court, the accused has a right to seek bail on the ground that the arrest is vitiated, illegal or unconstitutional. In support of her submissions, she places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vihan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799 and Jaskaran Jeet Singh Vs. State of Punjab [Criminal Appeal No.4234/2026 deiced on 21/09/2026], therefore,
4 32 BA 1310.26.odt she prays for grant of bail on the ground that the arrest of the applicant is illegal since no grounds of arrest had ever been communicated to the applicant. 5. On the other hand, the learned APP and the
learned counsel assisting the prosecution vehemently oppose the application and place reliance on the latest
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Jabra Singh [Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 13374/2026, decided on 28/10/2026]. They submit that, while considering an application for bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), it is the duty of every Court to consider the nature and gravity of the accusation, the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction, the possibility of the accused absconding or tampering with evidence, and the overarching impact on public interest and national security. A hyper-technical ground, they submit, cannot be considered in isolation for the purpose of granting bail to the applicant. They further submit that, though the applicant was arrested on 21/07/2024, the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him, the applicant had never raised this ground, even though, on two earlier occasions, this Court had expressed its disinclination to grant him bail. Even at the stage of
5 32 BA 1310.26.odt remand, when his advocate was present, no such ground was raised. Under such circumstances, at this belated stage, the said ground cannot be raised for the purpose of seeking bail. The learned APP further relies on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Meghalaya v. Sonam Raghuvanshi [arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 11944/2026, decided on 23/07/2026], wherein, the Supreme Court according to learned APP has observed that unless and until the prejudice is shown, the applicant would not be entitled for bail. They further submit that once the accused persons warranted a finding on merits on the earlier occasions, it is not open for him to go back and raise the plea on the issue pertaining to the grounds of arrest thereafter. Therefore, relying on Sonam Raghuvanshi (supra), they submit that the Supreme Court has clearly observed that, once the Court has passed orders on merits, the clock cannot be turned back. On these grounds, they submit that the application is devoid of merit and deserves to be rejected. 6. I have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of both sides and perused the entire record. Apparently, the learned APP fairly admits that, at no point of time, were the grounds of arrest communicated to the
6 32 BA 1310.26.odt applicant. However, according to his submissions, the applicant was represented by an advocate and, therefore, the very object of incorporating Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), now Section 47 of the BNSS, stands satisfied. He, therefore, submits that, at this belated stage, particularly when the applicant was arrested on 21/07/2024 and has raised the plea of non- communication of the grounds of arrest only in the year 2026, the said plea deserves no consideration. It is a settled principle of law that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India serves as a protective safeguard for accused persons and cannot be flouted in any manner. As observed by the Supreme Court in Vihan Kumar (supra), particularly in paragraphs 19, 21 and 26, which read as under:
“19. Thus, the requirement of informing the person arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in Part III of the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person arrested and detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as possible.
If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed
7 32 BA 1310.26.odt under Article 22(1). It will also amount to depriving the arrestee of his liberty. The reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no person can be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The procedure established by law also includes what is provided in Article 22(1). Therefore, when a person is arrested without a warrant, and the grounds of arrest are not informed to him, as soon as may be, after the arrest, it will amount to a violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 as well. In a given case, if the mandate of Article 22 is not followed while arresting a person or after arresting a person, it will also violate fundamental right to liberty guaranteed the arrest, the arrest is vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second. 20…. 21. An attempt was made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent to argue that after his arrest, the appellant was repeatedly remanded to custody, and now a charge-sheet has been filed. His submission is that now, the custody of the appellant is pursuant to the order taking cognizance passed on the charge-sheet Accepting such arguments, with great respect to the learned Senior Counsel, will amount to completely nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once it is held that arrest is unconstitutional due to violation of
8 32 BA 1310.26.odt Article 22(1), the arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore, continued custody of such a person based on orders of remand is also vitiated. Filing a charge-sheet and order of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per se unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India.
We cannot tinker with the most important safeguards provided under Article 22. 26.1. The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);
26.2. The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic
facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which-he-understands The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;
26.3. When arrested accused alleges non- compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the investigating officer/agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1),
26.4. Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the
9 32 BA 1310.26.odt requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge-sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of charge-sheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);
26.5. When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made, and
26.6. When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.” Further the Supreme Court in the case of Jaskaran Jeet Singh (supra), while considering the grounds of arrest has observed in paragraph 23, 24 and 37 as under:-
“23. Having discussed the judgments, it would be apposite to sum up the core principles qua Article 22(1). The grounds of arrest must be in writing and in a language which is understood
10 32 BA 1310.26.odt by the accused. A copy of such written grounds of arrest has to be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception.
An accused has a fundamental and statutory right to be informed about the grounds of his arrest in writing and a copy of such written grounds of arrest has to be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception at the earliest. Any attempt to encroach upon the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution has to be frowned upon by the courts and dealt with strictly. It would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Such a fundamental right being sacrosanct, cannot be breached under any situation. Any breach or non-compliance would entail immediate release of the arrested person because such arrest is unconstitutional. We cannot tinker with the most important safeguards provided under Article 22. Subsequent filing of chargesheet and order of cognizance will not validate such an arrest. Article 22(1) applies across the spectrum including offences under the IPC or under special enactments. It is not statute specific. It is not a mere formality or a matter of procedure. It is a mandatory binding constitutional safeguard. When there is violation of the Constitution, question of prejudice or demonstrable prejudice does not arise. The safeguards adumbrated in Article 22(1) are not mere procedural safeguards; these are fundamental principles which are required to be followed in the event
11 32 BA 1310.26.odt liberty of a person is sought to be curtailed. Therefore, it is not correct at all to say that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitles the accused to bail. When an accused is released for violation of his fundamental rights under Article 22 (1), he is not enlarged on bail. He is released from illegal and unconstitutional detention. 24. While we are bound by the ratio laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah with the conclusions summarized in paragraph 66 of the said
judgment and endorse the course of action declared in paragraph 65 thereof, we would like to further stress upon and strengthen the safeguards introduced by way of the said
judgment when it comes to re-arrest of an accused who is released from custody for breach of Article 22(1). If upon release of such an accused, the investigating agency is still of the opinion that for furthering the course of investigation, it is necessary to have custodial interrogation of the accused, then as directed in paragraph 65 of Mihir Rajesh Shah, the investigating agency has to file an application before the concerned Magistrate for custody mentioning therein the reasons for re-arrest of the accused and the necessity for the same. The application should also contain the explanation for non-supply of the grounds of arrest to the accused at the first instance. However, this application can only be moved after furnishing the grounds of arrest to the accused. To rule out
12 32 BA 1310.26.odt any foul play or collusion, such an application must have the endorsement of the immediate superior authority. This is because the immediate superior authority should know that the concerned officer has committed an unbecoming act of violating a constitutional provision for which necessary remedial steps will have to be taken. On receipt of such application with the endorsement, the concerned Magistrate shall decide the same expeditiously and as directed in Mihir Rajesh Shah preferably within a week of its submission by adhering to the principles of natural justice. 37. Before we wind up, we need to remind ourselves that the Constitution or a constitutional provision cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. Interpretation of the Constitution cannot also be left to imponderables in the form of ifs and buts. The Constitution is based on certain basic principles, much above the statutory threshold. Therefore, violation of the Constitution or a constitutional provision cannot be countenanced. It has to be dealt with strictly. It is not dependent on the nature or gravity of the offence, encompassing within its sweep all offences. It cannot be interpreted in a restrictive manner. Though observed in the backdrop of an order of preventive detention, nonetheless, it is worth mentioning and reiterating what a three-Judge Bench of this Court held in Prabhu Dayal Deorah Vs. District Magistrate, Kamrup 23.
This (1974) 1 SCC 103 Court observed in no uncertain terms that the gravity of the evil to the community
13 32 BA 1310.26.odt resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. When a certain procedure is prescribed by the Constitution or the laws for depriving a citizen of his personal liberty. It is the duty of the court to ensure that such procedure is rigorously observed, howsoever, strange this might sound to some ears.”
7. From perusal of the above observations of the Supreme Court, it could be said that merely filing of the charge-sheet, raising a plea at a belated stage, or even the Court taking cognizance of the offence will not validate such an arrest. It is further noticed that Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India is not an empty formality. It is, however, a protective umbrella in the nature of a mandatory and binding constitutional safeguard. The said constitutional safeguard has also been introduced by way of statutory provisions by incorporating the same in the CrPC, which has been continued under the BNSS as well, i.e., under Section 47, which specifically provides that a person who is arrested should be informed about the grounds of arrest as well as his
14 32 BA 1310.26.odt right to bail. In all the above judgments, the said provisions, including Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, have been interpreted by the Supreme Court, which has ultimately held that the mandatory provisions dealing with the arrest of a person require that such person be informed of the grounds of arrest. Upon failure to inform the same, the arrest itself would stand vitiated or could be regarded as an illegal or unconstitutional arrest. 8.
Be that as it may, so far as the present case is concerned, it is a case where, at no point of time, the grounds of arrest communicated to the applicant. Under such circumstances, in my opinion, the test of prejudice would not be applicable, though the applicant was represented by an advocate on the first date of his remand. Needless to mention that, upon perusal of the remand order, it could be gathered that even the Magistrate has not applied his mind while remanding the accused to police custody. If the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Vihan Kumar (supra) are considered, specifically paragraph 25, which reads as under: -
15 32 BA 1310.26.odt
“25. When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) has been made. The reason is that due to non- compliance, the arrest is rendered illegal; therefore, the arrestee cannot be remanded after the arrest is rendered illegal. It is the obligation of all the courts to uphold the fundamental rights.” A high degree of responsibility and duty is cast upon the Magistrate to safeguard the rights of accused persons guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Informing the grounds of arrest is not an empty formality. The same is evident from the provisions relating to constitutional guarantees. If the grounds of arrest have not been communicated to the accused persons at any point of time, then, in such a contingency, it cannot be said that the accused persons have waived their rights. There can be no waiver of a fundamental right. 9. So far as the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Sonam Raghuvanshi (supra) and State of Rajasthan (supra), as well as the judgment of this Court in the case of Omkar Talmale v. State of Maharashtra [Cri. Appl.
(BA) No. 199/2025], are concerned, in all these cases, the Supreme Court was dealing with a different
16 32 BA 1310.26.odt situation, wherein there was no issue that the grounds of arrest had never been communicated to the accused persons. However, there was material on record to demonstrate that the grounds of arrest had been orally communicated and that there was a station diary entry on record to show that the grounds of arrest had been communicated to the accused therein. Further, the arrest register was also on record, showing compliance with Section 47 of the BNSS, i.e., Section 50 of the CrPC. Under such circumstances, those cases cannot be equated with the present case, wherein the grounds of arrest had never been communicated. Considering the observations of the Supreme Court in the cases of Vihan Kumar (supra) and Jaskaran Jeet Singh (supra), which unequivocally mandate that, in the absence of communication of the grounds of arrest, the arrest stands vitiated, and as fairly submitted by the learned APP that, at no point of time, were the grounds of arrest communicated to the applicant, I have no hesitation in observing that the arrest of the applicant stands vitiated. Needless to mention that Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India is not dependent upon the nature or gravity of the offence and encompasses within its sweep all offences, as observed in Jaskaran Jeet Singh (supra). 17 32 BA 1310.26.odt This means that the nature of the offence committed is immaterial when the accused seeks bail on the ground that his fundamental right or the protection guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India has been violated. It is further to be noted that the applicant is behind bars since 21/07/2024. Therefore, I am inclined to allow the application and grant bail to the applicant. Hence, the following order: -
ORDER (i) Criminal application is allowed and disposed of. (ii) The applicant/accused Tarik Yunus Shaha, be released on bail in connection with Crime No. 385/2024 registered with Police Station Pardi, Dist. Nagpur for the offences punishable under Sections 103, 109, 115(2), 296, 352, 3(5), 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Section 135 of Maharashtra Police Act on his furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs. 50,000/- with two sureties in the like amount. (iii) The accused shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case, as also shall not tamper with the evidence. (iv) The accused shall provide his residential address and cell number to concerned Police Station and shall not change his place of residence without prior intimation to the concerned Investigating Officer. (v) The applicant/accused shall attend each and every
18 32 BA 1310.26.odt date of trial regularly. If he fails to attend the trial on even a single date or fails to comply with the aforesaid conditions, his default would entail the State to ask for cancellation of bail.
10. Pending application (s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.
( M. M. NERLIKAR
, J.)
Gohane Signed by: Mr. J. B. Gohane Designation: PS To Honourable Judge Date: 05/11/2026 16:37:42