1 2026:CGHC:24302 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 215 of 2019 1 - Chhattisgarh Infrastructure Development Corporation, Through Managing Director, Shri P. L. Dhurve, Aged About - 52 Years, S/o Late Shri Sukhal Singh Dhurve, Posted As Traffic Supervisor First, Address - C.G. Rajya Kaushal Vikas Pradhikaran Bhawan, Old Police Headquarter, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - Lakshmi Narayan Pandey S/o G.S. Pandey Aged About 67 Years R/o Shiv Nagar, Changorbhanta, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Controlling Authority Under Payment Of Gratuity Cum Assistant Labour Commissioner, Kuchari Square, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr.Prateek Singh Thakur, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Saket Pandey, Advocate For respondent No.1 : Ms. Kiran Sahu, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Surfaraj Khan, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 17.06.2026 1) By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought following reliefs:- “10.1 That the record pertaining to Respondent No. 1 maybe called for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. 10.2 That the impugned order dated 03.08.2019 passed by the appellate authority kindly be set aside or quashed. 10.3 That any other relief which this Hon'ble court may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2 2) The facts in brief are that respondent No.1 was appointed on the post of driver under erstwhile authority of Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation on 18.09.1986. He retired from services on account of superannuation on 28.02.2010. The petitioner herein failed to make payment of gratuity, therefore, an application was moved according to the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short ‘the Act of 1972’) before the Controlling Authority. The Controlling Authority vide order dated 14.03.2017 directed the petitioner herein to make payment of sum of Rs.1,91,538/- with interest @ 10% to respondent No.1 from the date of his retirement till date of realization. 3) The said order was assailed by filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Act of 1972 on 25.03.2019. The Appellate Authority vide order dated 03.08.2019 dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner on the ground that it was filed after expiry of period of limitation. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Appellate Authority. 4) Mr. Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that a review petition was filed by the petitioner before the Controlling Authority for modification of order dated 14.03.2017 which was dismissed on 03.10.2018 and immediately thereafter, an appeal was preferred. He would further submit that sufficient cause was shown for condonation of delay by the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the Appellate Authority. He would contend that respondent No.1 suppressed the correct facts before the Controlling Authority as amount of gratuity was already paid to respondent No.1 in the year 2014 itself. He would pray to allow this petition. 5) On the other hand,Ms. Sahu, learned appearing for respondent No.1 would oppose the submissions.She would submit that period of limitation to prefer an appeal under section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 is 60 +60=120 days and 3 provisions of Limitation Act do not attract in said proceedings. She would further submit that the petitioner has not challenged the order passed by the Controlling Authority rather he has challenged the order passed by the Appellate Authority. It is argued that as the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed on the ground of delay, this Court should not enter into the merits of the case. She has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the matter of State of Chhattisgarh vs. Chowaram and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Chh 3842. She would submit that the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 6) Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 7) It appears that respondent No.1 after retirement approached the Controlling Authority claiming therein amount of gratuity. The petitioner herein was afforded opportunity and thereafter, order was passed with a direction to the petitioner herein to make payment of gratuity of Rs.1,91,538/- to respondent No.1 vide order dated 14.03.2017. Though the petitioner preferred a review petition but filing of review petition would not extend the period of limitation. The period of limitation with regard to filing of appeal is prescribed in Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 and same reads as under : S.7(7). Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. 4 [Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount.] 8) Bare reading of the above-quoted provision would make it clear that after receipt of order passed by the Controlling Authority, appeal is to be preferred within sixty days from said date. It is further provided that the said period of sixty days may be extended to further period of sixty days, if sufficient cause is shown. In the present case, the provisions contained in Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 were not complied with. 9) The Hon’ble Division Bench in the matter of Chowaram (supra) while dealing with provisions of Section 7(7) of Act of 1972 in para 6 and 7 held as under :- “6. The learned Division Bench, in Kirtan Ram Thakur (supra), observed in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 as follows: “(7) The opening portion of Section 7(7) of the PG Act clearly lays down that any person aggrieved by an order of authority passed under Section 7(4) may prefer appeal to the appropriate Government or authority. The Limitation prescribed for filing such appeal is sixty days starting from the date of receipt of order from which the appeal is preferred. Proviso to this Section lays down that the appellate authority, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause for preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, may extend the period for a further period of sixty days. (8) It is thus clear that the limitation for filing an appeal is sixty days and the limitation starts to run from the date of receipt of the order of the appropriate authority. If the appeal is not filed within 5 sixty days, then appellant shall have to satisfy the Appellate Authority that there was sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal. However, the legislature in its wisdom has clearly laid down in the proviso to Section 7(7) of the PG Act that the appellate authority cannot extend the period beyond another sixty days, which means the outer limitation is 60 + 60 = 120 days. If the appeal is filed on 121st days, then the appellate authority cannot condone the delay. (9) We must remember that the appeal is creation of statute. Law makers lay down the period of limitation. In case there was no outer limitation provided in the proviso, we could have taken recourse to the Limitation Act and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applicable. However, in the PG Act, which is a special piece of legislation, the legislature in its wisdom has clearly laid down that delay can be condoned only up to sixty days and no further delay can be condoned, therefore, the Appellate Authority is powerless to condone the delay when the delay is beyond sixty days.” 7. The learned Single Judge followed the decision in Kirtan Ram Thakur (supra), which is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case and as such, there is no merit in the appeal.” 10) In the present case, the petitioner preferred an appeal after two years i.e. on 15.09.2019 and thus, the appeal preferred by the petitioner was barred by limitation. 11) Taking into consideration the facts discussed-above, findings recorded by the appellate authority and the law laid down in the matter of Chowaram (supra), in my opinion, no case is made out for interference. 12) Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Rekha