2026:HHC:38484 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 228 of 2015 Reserved on: 27.8.2026 Date of Decision: 10.09.2026. PremChand ...Appellant Versus Kuldeep Chand @ Sanju & others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr R.K. Sharma, Senior Advocate with Mr Arun Kumar, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 to 4 : Mr R.K. Gautam, Advocate with Mr Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent No.5/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.03.2015 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 19.08.2011 and order of sentence dated 20.08.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:38484 Class, Court No. 2, Hamirpur HP (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 427, 325, and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that Prem Chand (PW9) was running a shop at Chandruhi Bazar. He was present in his shop on 11.11.2007 at about 05.30 p.m. Accused Sanju, Kaku, Bittu and the younger son of Gian Chand came to the informant's shop and started insisting on taking the liquor in the shop. The informant declined, and the accused gave beatings to him. Kaku inflicted a blow by means of a knife on the informant's head. Sanju inflicted a blow by means of an iron grip on the informant's nose. The accused took away the ₹35,000/- lying in the informant's pocket. The accused also damaged the articles lying inside the shop. The informant was taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, and the police recorded the entry (Ext.PW11/A). ASI Maan Chand (PW11) went 3 2026:HHC:38484 to the hospital for verification. He recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW9/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW11/B) was registered. Dr Ashutosh Sharma (PW5) examined the informant and found multiple injuries on his person. He advised an X-ray and the opinion of the dental surgeon. Dr D.V. Kulkarni (PW7) examined the informant’s X- ray and found a fracture of both nasal bones. He issued the report (Ext.PW7/A). As per the opinion of the dental surgeon, there was a fracture of a tooth. The nature of injury was grievous. Dr Ashutosh Sharma (PW5) issued the MLC (Ext.PW5/A). ASI Maan Chand (PW11) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW11/C). The informant produced his torn pant and T-shirt (Ext.P1 and Ext.P2), which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW4/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to frame charges against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323, 325, and 427 read 4 2026:HHC:38484 with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. Sandhya Devi (PW1) is an eyewitness. Sohan Lal (PW2) and Dalip Ram (PW4) did not support the prosecution case. Rajinder Prasad (PW3) was told about the incident. Dr Ashutosh Sharma (PW5) examined the informant. Jagat Ram (PW6) took the photographs. Dr D.V. Kulkarni (PW7) is the radiologist who went through the X-ray. Manohar Lal (PW8) witnessed the recovery. Prem Chand (PW9) is the informant. Inspector Sohan Lal (PW10) prepared the challan. ASI Maan Chand (PW11) investigated the matter. Des Raj (PW12) signed the FIR. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They stated that the witnesses were related to the informant, and they deposed falsely because of the enmity. The accused claimed that they were innocent. However, they did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s statement was corroborated by Sandhya Devi (PW1) and the 5 2026:HHC:38484 medical evidence. The statement of Sandhya Devi (PW1) could not be doubted simply because she was the sister of the informant. The prosecution case could not be doubted because some witnesses had not supported the same. It was proved that the accused had caused simple and grievous hurt to the informant after entering into the shop. The accused had also damaged the articles lying inside the shop. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: Sections Sentence Section 451 read with Section 34 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for three months each, pay a fine of ₹500/- each and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days each. Section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC. To undergo simple imprisonment for three months each, pay a fine of ₹500/- each and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days each. Section 325 read with Section 34 of IPC. To undergo simple imprisonment for three months each, pay a fine of ₹1000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days each. 6 2026:HHC:38484 Section 427 read with Section 34 of IPCs To undergo simple imprisonment for three months each, pay a fine of ₹500/- each and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days each. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the relationship between the informant and the accused was strained, and the informant’s testimony was required to be seen with due care and caution. The informant's testimony in the Court contradicted the initial version disclosed to the police. The incident had taken place in the bazar, where 20 to 25 shops were located. No independent witness was associated. Sandhya Devi (PW1) stated that she came to the spot after the incident and her presence on the spot was doubtful. She claimed that she carried the informant to the hospital, but the informant stated that he was taken to the police station. All these circumstances made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Hence, the learned Appellate Court 7 2026:HHC:38484 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the informant has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The Learned Appellate Court wrongly disbelieved the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The minor contradictions could not have been used to record the acquittal. The statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other, and there was no reason to disbelieve them. The medical evidence also corroborated the informant's version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant/informant, Mr R.K. Gautam, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Jai Ram Sharma, learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 4/accused and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.5/State. 8 2026:HHC:38484 10. Mr R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/informant, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The statement of Sandhya Devi (PW1) could not have been discarded simply because she was the sister of the informant. The medical evidence also corroborated the informant's version, and it was duly proved that the informant had sustained grievous injury. The learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr R.K. Gautam, learned Senior Counsel for respondents No.1 to 4, submitted that the testimonies of Sandhya Devi (PW1) and the informant contradicted each other. The informant had materially departed from the initial version projected before the police. There was no corroboration from the independent witnesses. The incident had occurred in Chandruhi Bazar in broad daylight, which continued for about 15 minutes as per the informant's version. Therefore, the prosecution was required to examine independent witnesses to establish its 9 2026:HHC:38484 version. However, it failed to do so, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in acquitting the accused. The learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with a reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.5/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court had passed a well-reasoned judgment convicting the accused and the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The learned Appellate Court had taken a view that could not have been taken by a reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submission made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is 10 2026:HHC:38484 impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also 11 2026:HHC:38484 does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 12 2026:HHC:38484 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 15. The informant Prem Chand (PW9) stated that he was present in his shop on 11.11.2007. Accused Sanju, Kamlu, Kaku and Bittu came to his shop at about 05:30 p.m. They insisted on 13 2026:HHC:38484 taking the liquor inside the shop. However, he refused. The accused caught hold of him and gave him kicks and fist blows. He sustained injuries on his face, and his tooth was broken. The articles inside the shop were damaged. Sandhya Devi (PW1) rescued him. He reported the matter to the police, and the police seized his blood-stained clothes. 16. The informant had stated in his statement (Ext.PW9/A) that Kaku had inflicted a blow by means of a knife on his head. Sanju inflicted a blow by means of a grip on his nose. ₹35,000/- kept by the informant was also stolen. However, this version was abandoned in the Court, and there was no whisper in the statement on oath regarding the infliction of injuries by using a knife and the grip. Therefore, the informant had materially departed from his initial version and the learned Appellate Court was justified in doubting his version. 17. The informant asserted that the accused had damaged the articles lying inside the shop. The learned Trial Court also convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 427 of the IPC. The site plan (Ext.PW11/C) does not mention that any articles were damaged 14 2026:HHC:38484 inside the shop. The photographs (Ext.PW6/A2 and Ext.PW6/A3) show that some boxes and articles are lying on the floor, but these photographs do not show any damage to the articles lying inside the shop. 18. The informant had not named Sandhya Devi as a witness in the statement (Ext.PW9/A). She admitted that she is the informant’s sister. She claimed that she had visited the informant's shop at about 05:30 p.m. to take milk and she saw the accused giving beatings to the informant. She tried to rescue the informant, but was unsuccessful. The accused had demanded liquor from the informant, but he refused, and the accused gave beatings to the informant. 19. She stated in her cross-examination that her house is located at a 10-minute distance from the informant's shop. She stated that she had not sustained any injury while rescuing the informant. The fact that her house is located at a distance of 10 minutes from the informant's shop and had not sustained any injury in the incident makes her presence on the spot suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that a 15 2026:HHC:38484 chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of the incident by chance and not by course. His testimony is to be seen with due care and caution. It was observed: Chance witness 29. A chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed, though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect that is to be looked into in a given case by the court. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been clearly laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660: 2005 SCC (Cri) 817]: (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13) “12. Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4 and 9, who are independent witnesses, by labelling them as chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have clearly explained how they happened to be at the spot of occurrence, and the trial court and the High Court have accepted the same. 13. Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9 were “chance witnesses” who have not explained how they happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses. There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they had any animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder trial, by describing the independent witnesses as “chance witnesses”, it cannot be implied thereby that 16 2026:HHC:38484 their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If a murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate, in the matter of explaining their presence.” 30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107]: (SCC p. 725, paras 21-23) “21. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105], this Court, while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and a passer- by had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under: If the offence is committed in a street, only a passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there. The Court further explained that the expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence 17 2026:HHC:38484 elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country like India, where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate, in the matter of explaining their presence. 22. The evidence of a chance witness requires a very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence (Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192: 1997 SCC (Cri) 538], Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28], Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ). 23. Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the incident, may also be taken into consideration, particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284]). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR, and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) and Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue, has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution's case relating to conspiracy. However, in the fact situation of the present case, the acquittal of the said two co-accused 18 2026:HHC:38484 has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned.” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418: (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 503: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1164 that the chance witnesses have a habit of appearing suddenly at the place of the incident and thereafter disappearing. Their testimonies should be seen with due care and caution. It was observed at page 427: 23. The defining attributes of a “chance witness” were explained by Mahajan, J., in Puran v. State of Punjab, (1952) 2 SCC 454: AIR 1953 SC 459: 1953 Cri LJ 1925. It was held that such witnesses have the habit of appearing suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then disappearing after noticing the occurrence about which they are called later on to give evidence. 24. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B., (2003) 12 SCC 377: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 429, this Court discarded the evidence of chance witnesses while observing that certain glaring contradictions/omissions in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 and the absence of their names in the FIR have been very lightly discarded by the courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579 and Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107 are authorities for the proposition that deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the High Court, we hold that PW 5 and PW 6 were chance witnesses and their statements have been rightly discarded. 19 2026:HHC:38484 21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that the evidence of a chance witness requires a cautious and careful scrutiny. It was observed: “26. As regards the testimony of PW-5 (Mahender Khurana), he too is a chance witness. As to when the testimony of a chance witness could be relied upon, the law is settled, which is that the evidence of a chance witness requires very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence. Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful should be discarded (See: Rajesh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 12 SCC 200; and Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 9 SCC 719. 22. She stated in her cross-examination that the accused had damaged the light, table and the chair. This was not corroborated by the photographs in which no damage to the light, table and chair is visible. She claimed that she and her husband had taken the informant to the hospital. The informant, on the other hand, stated that the police had brought him to the police station. His brother-in-law and nephew were with him. He has nowhere stated that Sandhya Devi (PW1) was accompanying him. She stated that the accused demanded liquor from the informant, whereas the informant stated that the accused had insisted upon consuming liquor in the informant’s 20 2026:HHC:38484 shop. All these circumstances made it difficult to rely upon her version. 23. Sohan Lal (PW2) did not support the prosecution case. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied that the accused had given beatings to the informant and that he had rescued the informant from the accused. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Therefore, the statement of this witness does not corroborate the informant’s version. 24. Rajinder Prasad (PW3) stated that he was running Sharma clinic. The informant came to his clinic. He was bleeding from the face. The informant revealed after the enquiries that the villagers had beaten him. The statement of this witness shows that the incident was revealed to him after he had made enquiries from the informant. It was laid down in Pratapsingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1970 SCC OnLine MP 67: ILR 1973 MP 682, that a statement made pursuant to an inquiry does not fall within the purview of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed at page 687: Section 6 of the Evidence Act, and some of the succeeding Sections, embody the rule of admission of evidence 21 2026:HHC:38484 relating to what is commonly known as res gestae. They are in the nature of exceptions to the “hearsay” rule. [Section 6 permits proof of collateral statements which are so connected with the facts in issue as to form part of the same transaction. Whether the statement made by a witness was a part of the same transaction or not is to be considered in the light of the circumstances of each case. The principle is that it should be so intimately connected with the fact in issue as to be a spontaneous utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion or a spontaneous reaction thereof, there being no opportunity for deliberately fabricating the statement. In other words, the statement which is a part of res gestae does not narrate a past event, but it is the event itself speaking through a person, thus excluding the possibility of any design behind it.] In Chhotka v. State, [AIR 1958 Cal 482], it was held that the requirement of Sec. (b) is that the statement must have been made contemporaneously with the act or immediately after it and not at such an interval of time as to make it a narrative of past events or to allow time for fabrication. We agree with this view. In the instant case, the statements of Mst. Mahadevi in question do not at all appear to be spontaneous, and appear to have been made some time after the incident in answer to a query. Sarfraj Beg (PW 1) testified that at about 10 or 10:15 P.M. that night he heard some row from his house, which is at a distance of about 400 yards from the house of appellant Pratap. He says that he went towards the house of Pratap, near which a large crowd had collected. On going inside the house, he found a dead body lying with fresh wounds from a sword. According to him, Mst. Mahadevi (PW 10), wife of the appellant Pratap, was there, and when she was questioned about the murder, she stated that her husband and brother had run away after committing the murder. As the statement was in answer to a query and was made after a lapse of some time after the murder, it cannot be treated either as 22 2026:HHC:38484 spontaneous or as part of the transaction of the murder. If no one had asked her how it happened, perhaps she would not have made any statement at all. We, therefore, hold that the statement made by Mst. Mahadevi to Sarfraj Beg (PW 1) is not admissible in evidence under Sec. 6 and as such has got to be excluded from consideration. 25. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from his testimony. 26. It was submitted that the Medical Officer had noticed the injuries on the informant’s body. The learned Appellate Court had rightly pointed out that mere infliction of the injuries without further evidence that the injuries were caused by the accused was not sufficient to record conviction. 27. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused, even if another view is possible. 28. No other point was urged. 29. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 30. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha 23 2026:HHC:38484 Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 31. A copy of the judgment, along with a record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th September, 2026 (Nikita)