Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2026:HHC:38628 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1128 of 2026 Reserved on: 7.9.2026 Decided on: 11.9.2026 Vishal Rana …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Onkar Jairath, Senior
Advocate, with Mr Anshul Jairath, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General. For the victim : Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 6 of 2026, dated 03.03.2026, registered at Women Police Station, Una, District Una, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 64, 74, 351(2), 238 read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:38628 (BNS), 2023, Sections 4 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act), and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act (IT Act). 2. It has been asserted that the police have completed the investigation and the petitioner’s custodial interrogation is not required. The petitioner belongs to a respectable section of the society, and there is no chance of his absconding. He would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim (name withheld to protect her identity) had gone outside her home on 01.03.2026 at about 1:00 AM. She shouted for help. Her family members came out. They found that one person had caught hold of the victim and he was behaving indecently with her. He ran after seeing the victim's family members; however, they apprehended him. He revealed his name as Vishal Rana, the present petitioner. The victim revealed that the petitioner was threatening her that he had a private video of the victim and Satnam, and he would make it viral in case the
2026:HHC:38628 victim did not maintain a sexual relationship with him. The victim also revealed that Satnam had raped her after threatening her on 20.02.2026. He had also recorded this incident. The petitioner and Satnam used to threaten the victim to make the video viral. The matter was reported to the police.
The police investigated the matter. The victim was medically examined. The police arrested the petitioner and the co-accused. The victim’s statement was also recorded before the learned Magistrate. As per the result of analysis, one DNA profile matched the DNA profile obtained from Satnam, the co-accused. The photograph of the victim was not provided, and the data retrieved from the mobile phone could not be compared with the photograph. The charge-sheet was filed before the Court after the completion of investigation, and the matter was pending before learned Special Judge, Una on 28.07.2026 for consideration of charge. 4. I have heard Mr Onkar Jairath, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Anshul Jairath, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, and Mr Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the victim. 4 2026:HHC:38628
5. Mr Onkar Jairath, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The allegations against the petitioner are not so serious as to justify his pre-trial detention. The petitioner has roots in society, and he would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. The police have completed the investigation, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon Yogesh Kumar Vs. State of H.P. 2026:HHC:5599 and Mohd. Jaseem Vs. State of H.P. 2025:HHC:16069 in support of his
submissions. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that allegations against the petitioner are heinous. He had caught hold of the victim and threatened her to make her video viral. He was compelling the victim to maintain a sexual relationship with him, but the victim shouted and saved herself. The Court has not framed the charges at this stage, and releasing the petitioner on bail would interfere with the fair trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 2026:HHC:38628
7. Mr Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the victim, submitted that the allegations against the petitioner are heinous. The victim was saved by her family members and the petitioner was unable to fulfil his desire. The petitioner’s family members had intimidated the victim, and he would again intimidate the victim in case of his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 6 2026:HHC:38628
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9.
Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations.
It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
2026:HHC:38628 the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59.
In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 8 2026:HHC:38628
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx
2026:HHC:38628
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35.
While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
10. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
10 2026:HHC:38628
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. The status report shows that the victim was raped by the co-accused Satnam Singh and the incident was recorded. The petitioner threatened the victim to maintain a sexual relationship with him; otherwise, he would make the video viral. He had caught hold of the victim on the date of the incident and had repeated the threat. However, the victim shouted for help, and her family members intervened and saved her. The petitioner was caught red-handed on the spot. These allegations, prima facie, show the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of a crime. 13. It was submitted that the allegations against the petitioner only show the commission of an offence punishable
2026:HHC:38628 under Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. However, this submission cannot be accepted. The allegations in the status report and the statement on oath recorded by the learned Magistrate show that the petitioner was threatening the victim to maintain a sexual relationship with him, or else he would make the video viral.
Therefore, there is force in the submission made on behalf of the State that it is not a case of simple molestation, but the petitioner intended to force the victim to maintain a sexual relationship with him. 14. It was submitted that the allegations contained in the FIR are not supported by the report of the analysis. This is not correct. The DNA of the co-accused was found after the analysis, which corroborates the victim’s version that the co-accused had raped her. The data was retrieved from the mobile phone, but could not be compared because the victim’s photograph was not provided. Therefore, it is not a case of the absence of evidence. The expert of the Forensic Science Laboratory has retrieved the data, and it is for the learned Trial Court to analyse the same. Prima facie, the retrieval of the data from the mobile phone corroborates the victim’s version that the incident was video
12 2026:HHC:38628 recorded and she was being threatened to enter into a sexual relationship with the petitioner by making the video viral. 15. The status report also mentions that the petitioner’s mother and sister had visited the victim and asked her not to report the matter to the police. These allegations show that the petitioner’s family members are trying to influence the victim not to report the matter to the police. Therefore, there is force in the submission made on behalf of the State that the petitioner would interfere with the fair trial in case of his release on bail. 16. In Yogesh Kumar (supra) and Mohd. Jaseem (supra), the Court had found the prosecution version prima facie doubtful and granted bail. In the present case, the victim’s version cannot be said to be doubtful; rather, it is corroborated by the apprehension of the petitioner on the spot. Hence, in these circumstances, the cited judgments do not apply to the present case. 17.
The allegations against the petitioner are heinous and involve threatening a minor victim after recording her rape. The allegations also show that an attempt was made to influence the investigation. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail at this stage. 2026:HHC:38628
18. No other point was urged. 19. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. 20. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge 11th September, 2026 (Chander)