Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Jharkhand · body

2026 DAILYLAW 22482 (JHR)

F.C.I. v. UNION OF INDIA And ANR.

WPC/1290/2005 · 2026-07-31

Anubha Rawat Choudhary

Civil Appealbody2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

2026:JHHC:22743 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (L) No. 1290 of 2005 Food Corporation of India constituted under the Food Corporations Act of 1964 through its Senior Regional Manager, Jharkhand Region, 9th Floor, Mahavir Towers, Ranchi Main Road, P.O. & District: Ranchi … … Petitioner Versus 1. The Union of India 2. The Food Corporation of India Executive Staff Union, Arunachal Building, Exhibition Road, Patna … … Respondents --- CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY --- For the Petitioner : Mr. Nipun Bakshi, Advocate Mr. Shubham Sinha, Advocate For the Respondents : Ms. M.M. Pal, Senior Advocate Ms. Manju Sripatra, Advocate --- C.A.V. On 09.04. 2026 Pronounced On 31.07.2026 1. This writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed challenging the award dated 23.09.2004 announced on 30.09.2004 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna in Reference Case No. 5(C) of 2000, whereby the learned Tribunal has directed regularization of services of 28 workmen. Argument of the respondent no.2 on the point of jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this writ petition. 2. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 2, at the threshold, has raised a preliminary objection on the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this writ petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by submitting that the impugned award has been passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Patna and the appropriate High Court to challenge the same would-be Hon’ble Patna High Court. 2026:JHHC:22743 2 3. The learned senior counsel has submitted that as per the petitioner themselves, they had raised certain point of jurisdiction by filing a writ petition before the Hon’ble Patna High Court which was numbered as C.W.J.C. No. 7021 of 2004 but the same was withdrawn vide order dated 03.03.2005. The order of withdrawal passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court is available in the records received from the concerned Tribunal, which is quoted as under: - “03.03.2005 Sri P.K. Verma appearing on behalf of Food Corporation of India states and submits that the present writ petition is directed against the interim order dated 28.2.2004, passed by the presiding officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna in Reference Case No.5(C) of 2000. He further states that during the pendency of the present writ petition Reference Case No.5(C)/2000 has also been disposed off, as such, the present writ petition directed against the interim order has become infructuous as the F.C.E. (petitioner no. 1) has decided to challenge the final order disposing off aforesaid Reference Case by the Industrial Tribunal, Patna. The present writ petition having become infructuous is permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to the F.C.I. to assail the final order passed in the aforesaid reference case.” 4. The learned senior counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Alqpana Bandyopadhyay in Civil Appeal No. 197 of 2022. The learned senior counsel has submitted that the petitioner has also invoked Article 227 of the Constitution of India and this Court may not have the power of superintendence also with respect to the aforesaid Tribunal situated at Patna who has passed the impugned award. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261, paragraph 40 and 91. 2026:JHHC:22743 3 Argument of the petitioner on the point of jurisdiction of this court to entertain this writ petition. 6. In response to the aforesaid objection to the point of jurisdiction of this court, the learned counsel for the petitioner in opposition has submitted that the establishment involved in the present case is situated within the jurisdiction of State of Jharkhand. He has submitted that the entire cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Jharkhand High Court and merely because the Tribunal at Patna had entertained the reference and the impugned award has been passed by the Tribunal at Patna, it cannot be said that this Court does not have the required jurisdiction. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India and has submitted that this High Court has the jurisdiction to deal with the challenge to the award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal at Patna as the cause of action for seeking regularization arose within the State of Jharkhand as the concerned workmen were working in Ranchi, within the State of Jharkhand. 8. He has further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2020) 19 SCC 380 (Calcutta Gujrati Education Society & Anr. vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Other), paragraph 6, 7, 8 and 9 to submit that the judgment passed by the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal stationed at Delhi could have been challenged at Calcutta High Court. He submits that the judgments passed by the Appellate Tribunal of Employees Provident Fund stationed in Delhi are being challenged before this Court also in numerous other cases primarily because of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Argument of the petitioner on the point of jurisdiction of the learned Industrial Tribunal, Patna to decide the reference and to pass the impugned award. 2026:JHHC:22743 4 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Industrial Tribunal at Patna, which is the State Industrial Tribunal, did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the reference, inasmuch as, the reference was made to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Patna which is a different Tribunal altogether, constituted by the Central Government. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the terms of reference and submitted that the terms of reference itself reveal that it was to be adjudicated by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and not by the Industrial Tribunal of the State. He has also submitted that it was primarily on this count and other jurisdictional issue, the writ petition was earlier filed by the petitioner before the Hon’ble Patna High Court challenging the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal at Patna, but ultimately when the case was decided by the Industrial Tribunal at Patna during the pendency of the writ petition, the writ petition was withdrawn. Since the cause of action initially arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court, the writ petition was filed before this Court and was admitted way back as on 08.07.2010 and at the time of admission of the writ petition, the respondents had already appeared, but no objection was raised with regard to the maintainability of the present writ petition. 11. However, during the course of arguments, it transpired that the counter-affidavit was filed subsequently on 28.07.2005 by the respondent no. 2 and the said objection with regard to maintainability of the writ petition before this Court has been raised at paragraph 17 of the counter- affidavit. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent no.2 has given a list of the persons, who have expired during the pendency of this case, which is quoted as under: - Dead name Husband Name Relative Legal 1 Balo Devi Barju Mahto Son & one daughter in law Dilip Kr. Mahto & Sangita 2026:JHHC:22743 5 Devi 2 Lalita Devi Gopal Mahto Son Rajendra Mahto 3. Rajo Devi Jagarnath Mahto Son 4. Rakhi Devi Nageshwar Mahto Daughter in law 5. Maheshwari Devi Bashudev Mahto Son Chander dev Mahto 6. Manju Devi Jerka Kumhar Son Mahendra Kumhar 7. Pato Devi Jagarnath Prajapati Son Bablu Prajapati 8. Koshila Devi Gopal Mirdha Son Manoj Mirdha 13. The learned counsels for the parties have also advanced their arguments on the merits of the case and have filed written submissions. However, the jurisdiction of this court to entertain and decide this writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the award passed by Industrial Tribunal, Patna, has been hotly contested. A. Jurisdiction of this court to entertain this writ petition. 14. During the course of arguments, it is not in dispute that the concerned workmen were said to have been working in Ranchi and were seeking regularization of their services. This court is of the considered view that the learned counsel for the writ petitioner has rightly referred to Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India and has rightly submitted that the entire cause of action leading to claim of regularization arose in the district of Ranchi in the State of Jharkhand and therefore the writ petition challenging the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal Patna is maintainable before this court. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 has held that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls. 2026:JHHC:22743 6 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Alapan andyopadhyay, reported in (2022) 3 SCC 133 has held that once the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court found that the order impugned was passed by the Principal Bench, Delhi, the High Court should have confined its consideration firstly, to decide its own territorial Jurisdiction for exercising power of judicial review of the order passed by the chairman in exercise of powers under section 25 of the Principal Seat of the Tribunal at New Delhi. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court of Calcutta could not have entertained the writ petition. While holding as aforesaid, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken into consideration the judgement passed in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 (supra). 17. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Gujarati Education Society v. Provident Fund Commr., (2020) 19 SCC 380, while deciding the point as to whether Hon’ble Calcutta High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition against the order passed by the appellate tribunal at Delhi under Employees Provident Fund, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Calcutta High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as the original authority, namely, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Calcutta, who had passed the original order, was situated in West Bengal and it was the appeal which was filed in Delhi before the appellate tribunal. While holding as aforesaid, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the judgement passed in the case of Ambica Industries v. CCE, (2007) 6 SCC 769 wherein it has been held that there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India as also clause (2) of Article 226 thereof, the High Court would exercise its discretionary jurisdiction as also power to issue writ of certiorari in respect of the orders passed by the subordinate courts within its territorial jurisdiction or if any cause of action has arisen therewithin but the same tests cannot be applied when the appellate court exercises a jurisdiction over tribunal 2026:JHHC:22743 7 situated in more than one State. It has also been held that in such a situation, the High Court situated in the State where the first court is located should be considered to be the appropriate appellate authority. In the case of Calcutta Gujarati Education Society v. Provident Fund Commr., (2020) 19 SCC 380 (supra) it has been ultimately held as under: - “10. If the said enunciation of law is kept in view, as already taken note, in the instant case the original order passed is by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner situate at Calcutta, West Bengal and the Calcutta High Court can exercise territorial jurisdiction. In that light, we are of the view that the Calcutta High Court was not justified in its decision to decline to entertain the writ petition.” 18. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the concerned workmen was working at Ranchi, within the jurisdiction of this court; the cause of action to seek regularization arose within the jurisdiction of this court; conciliation proceedings before Assistant Labour Commissioner Ranchi failed within the jurisdiction of this court and upon failure of conciliation proceedings, the matter was forwarded by the Assistant Labour Commissioner Ranchi to the Central Government, New Delhi so that reference could be made to Central Government Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute regarding claim for regularization of the concerned workmen. Thus, almost entire bundle of cause of action arose at Ranchi which is within the jurisdiction of this court. In such circumstances, this court is of the considered view that the writ petition was rightly filed before this court when seen in the light of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India as cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court, even though the Industrial Tribunal, who has passed the impugned award is located at Patna, outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court. This court is of the considered view that the writ petition is maintainable before this court. 2026:JHHC:22743 8 19. The fact also remains that this writ petition was admitted for final hearing long back after appearance of the respondent no.2 and the case has remained pending before this court. However, as held above, this court has the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition in view of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. The objection raised by the respondent no.2 with regards to jurisdiction of this High court to entertain the writ petition is hereby rejected. B. The jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal, Patna to entertain and decide the reference. 20. The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, Patna has been challenged on two points, (a) Territorial jurisdiction; (b) The Industrial Tribunal, Patna was not Central Government Industrial Tribunal to whom the reference was made but was Industrial Tribunal constituted by the State Government. The Industrial Tribunal, Patna did not have the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the reference. 21. So far as the point regarding territorial jurisdiction is concerned, the learned Tribunal has rejected this objection by observing that the petitioner has its regional office at Patna and therefore the Tribunal at Patna had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the case. 22. This court does not find any perversity with respect to such finding and the fact remains that the Central Government had made the reference to Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Patna and at that point of time the territories of the State of Jharkhand were part of the undivided State of Bihar. The objection of the petitioner with regards to territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal at Patna is hereby rejected. 23. So far as objection with regards to jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal, Patna to entertain the reference and decide the same with respect to the subject matter of dispute is concerned, it goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, Patna. It is not in dispute that 2026:JHHC:22743 9 reference was made by the Central Government to Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Patna to answer the reference but the reference has been answered by Industrial Tribunal Patna constituted by the State Government who did not have the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the subject reference. The jurisdiction of State Government to make reference and the jurisdiction of the Central Government to make a reference are distinct from each other. The reference by Central Government is made to Central Government Industrial Tribunal constituted by the Central Government and the reference by State Government is made to the Industrial Tribunal constituted by the State Government. The reference made by the Central Government to Central Government Industrial Tribunal cannot be entertained and answered by Industrial Tribunal constituted by the State Government as has happened in this case. The arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 is that the writ petitioner had challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal to entertain and answer the reference but the writ petition was withdrawn as the final award was pronounced during the pendency of the writ petition at Patna but no liberty was taken to agitate the point of jurisdiction while challenging the final award. This court is of the considered view that admittedly the point of jurisdiction was seriously contested and challenged in the High court at the interim stage but the same could not be decided as in the meantime the award was passed and hence the writ petition was withdrawn. The point of jurisdiction was never decided on merits by the High Court. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner is estopped from challenging the point of jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal, Patna to entertain and decide the reference when admittedly the reference was made to Central Government Industrial Tribunal and not to Industrial Tribunal constituted by the State Government. The question to the jurisdiction of the learned Industrial Tribunal, Patna over the subject reference made by the Central Government has a serious bearing in the matter as the tribunal in the 2026:JHHC:22743 10 present case has decided the reference which was never referred to the said tribunal for answering the reference. This Court is of the considered view that the Industrial Tribunal, Patna suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of reference which was referred to Central Government Industrial Tribunal and not to Industrial Tribunal, Patna constituted by the State Government, who has decided the reference. The inherent lack of jurisdiction over subject matter cannot be cured by waiver, estoppel, consent etc. and such objection can be raised at any stage of the including appeal etc. as a court or tribunal cannot act without this foundational authority to decide the subject matter of the dispute. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 22 of the judgment reported in (2012) 4 SCC 307 (Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi), as under: - “22. There can be no dispute regarding the settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes order/decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to a nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any belated stage of the proceedings including in appeal or execution. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Acquiescence of a party equally should not be permitted to defeat the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute.” 24. In view of the aforesaid findings, the Industrial Tribunal, Patna constituted by the State Government completely lacked the jurisdiction to enter into the reference and decide the subject reference which was specifically referred by the Central Government to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and, on this score, alone the impugned 2026:JHHC:22743 11 award is fit to be set aside. However, even on merits as discussed below, the impugned award suffers from perversity. C. On merits of the case 25. One of the most important points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that though reference was made with respect to 28 workmen as to whether they are entitled to regularization but neither the order of reference contained the list of such employees, much less, the details of such employees, that is, their names, age, parentage address etc. nor such details were forwarded by the Central Government to the learned Tribunal in spite of correspondences made by the tribunal with the Central Government to forward the list of employees. On account of this fact, it was the case of the petitioner-management throughout that the reference was vague and was not capable of being answered as the identity of the concerned workmen was not capable of being ascertained from the records. 26. The impugned award at paragraph 5 records that the names of concerned 28 workmen with their particulars and address were not enclosed with the notification by which the reference was made. In this background, the Management had taken a plea that the reference itself was vague and no relief could be granted to a person of undisclosed identity. Paragraph 5 of the impugned award also reveals that the objection raised by the petitioner -Management was referred to the Government of India for disclosures of the names etc. for all 28 workmen. 27. The records of the case reveal that the Regional Secretary, FCI, Executive Staff Union filed a petition before the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna stating that the matter was pending since long in view of the objection of the Management that the list of workers were not on record and by this petition, the Union sought to file a list of workmen, which was said to have been filed before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C), Ranchi along with an authenticated list prepared by the Management with address and other details of the concerned 2026:JHHC:22743 12 workmen. It was this list which was alleged to be prepared by the Assistant Manager of the petitioner and was exhibited by the witness on behalf of the workmen WW-4 and marked as Exhibit W-4. 28. The perusal of Exhibit W-4 reveals that the name and address of 28 persons was mentioned by way of a list without mentioning the purpose for which it was prepared and the said document was allegedly signed by the Assistant Manager of the petitioner in the year 1994. Serious objection was raised with respect to the fact that the said Exhibit W-4 was a fabricated and manufactured document, inasmuch as, in the year 1994, there was no question of mention of State of Jharkhand in the various addresses as the State of Jharkhand was created only on 15.12.2000. With respect to date of signature of the concerned Assistant Manager of the petitioner, it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 2 that the date is not fully legible and hence no adverse inference can be drawn. However, such plea of the respondent no.2 is devoid of any merits as the said document Exhibit W-4 was exhibited by the WW-4 on behalf of the workmen and the concerned workman while exhibiting Exhibit W-4 stated that the list of 28 workmen was prepared by the Management in 1995 which consisted signature of the Assistant Manager which he identified and the document was marked as Exhibit W-4. Thus, even as per the evidence of WW-4, the Exhibit W-4 was prepared under the signature of the Assistant Manager way back in 1995. The evidence in chief of WW-4 in paragraph 2 is quoted as under: - “इन 28 कामगार ों की एक सूची प्रबोंधक ने 1995 ई. में तैयार ककया था। यही वह सूची है ज सहायक प्रबोंधक के हस्ताक्षर में तैयार की गई थी। (पहचानते हैं) (प्रदर्श W/4 अोंककत)।“ 29. This Court is of the considered view that even if the evidence of WW-4 is taken into consideration, by no stretch of imagination there could be mention of Jharkhand in a document which was prepared in the year 1995. Thus, on the fact of exhibit W-4, there can be no doubt that the same is a fabricated and a manufactured document and hence no reliance 2026:JHHC:22743 13 can be placed on exhibit-W-4. Further, the person, Assistant Manager, under which signature, the list is alleged to have prepared i.e. Exhibit W- 4, has not deposed before the Court. 30. The aforesaid aspects of the matter with regards to exhibit- W-4 has not been taken note of by the learned Tribunal while holding that the list of 28 persons were the same persons whose name was mentioned in Exhibit W-4 and direction has been issued to regularize them with back wages. The reliance placed by the learned Tribunal on Exhibit W-4 is ex- facie perverse and apparently the said document was prepared in a fraudulent manner only for the purposes of the case when the respondent no. 2 found that the list of employees, whose cases were to be considered for regularization, neither form a part of the notification of reference nor the same was forwarded by the Central Government in spite of repeated communications undertaken by the Tribunal with the Ministry of Labour. This Court is of the considered view that no reliance could have been placed by the learned Tribunal on Exhibit W-4. Consequently, in view of absence of the list of employees with other details whose claim for regularization was required to be considered by the learned Tribunal, the reference remained vague and could not have been answered. 31. It is important to note that no document from the office of Assistant Labour Commissioner was exhibited before the Tribunal and a list was furnished which the respondent no.2 claimed to have filed before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C) Ranchi but the same has neither been exhibited nor any reliance can be placed on the same as it neither has any covering letter nor signed by any person. The only document containing the list was Exhibit W-4 which as discussed above is a fabricated and manufactured document on which no reliance can be placed. In absence of Exhibit W-4, which certainly could not have been relied upon by the Tribunal, the reference itself became completely vague in absence of list of the employees with other details whose services were to be considered for regularization. 2026:JHHC:22743 14 32. In order to meet the arguments of the petitioner with respect to exhibit W-4 , it has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 that the list of the concerned workmen was to be attached with the terms of reference in the year 2000 itself but may be mistakenly it was not attached for which the matter was referred to the Government of India in Labour Ministry for disclosure of the name/particulars of the concerned 28 workmen and apart from that the list of concerned 28 workmen with their details duly signed by their own officer namely by the Assistant Manager (D), FCI, Tatisilway, Ranchi was submitted in which date is not clearly readable as such it is fit to be verified from the Government of India, Labour Department itself who is respondent no. 1 in this case or otherwise the objection raised by the petitioners regarding the date vis-à- vis Jharkhand State/Place mentioned therein cannot be treated as correct. Admittedly, the list was submitted during the pendency of the reference case, as such it must be after 2004, that is, after creation of State of Jharkhand, as such it is fit to be verified from the concerned authority to clear the doubt. 33. The aforesaid argument of the respondent no. 2 is not acceptable as the WW-4 has himself stated that the under the signature of Assistant Manager the list (exhibit- W-4) was prepared in the year 1995 and as discussed above, if that be so, there can be no doubt that the same was fabricated and manufactured as in the said list the address mentioned State of Jharkhand which was admittedly not in existence in the year 1995. Moreover, at this stage, there is no purpose of calling upon the respondent Union of India to furnish the list of 28 workmen which was never produced before the Tribunal. 34. This is over and above the fact that out of 28 workmen only 3 of them have been examined before the Court and the fourth one claims to have been already regularized earlier, who was examined as WW-4. Out of them, so far as WW-1, namely, Gayatri Devi is concerned, she claimed herself to be one of the concerned workmen and she has declared her age 2026:JHHC:22743 15 to be 35 years on the date of recording of her deposition i.e. 28.01.2004 and that she was working in FCI from 1978. Meaning thereby, she was only 9 years of age in the year 1978. The learned Tribunal has taken note of this objection raised by the Management, but discarded the same by saying that the workmen are rustic villagers and unable to disclose their correct age. The objection with regard to age of WW-1 has been rejected vide paragraph 17 by observing that it cannot be forgotten that WW-1 is a rustic and illiterate lady from labour class and is not expected to give correct age and thus her evidence cannot be discarded on account of her wrong disclosure of age. 35. This Court is of the considered view that such approach of the learned Tribunal by itself is perverse. The age, identity and address of each claimant seeking regularization was required to be proved by the claimant by cogent evidence. The claimants did not prove any document showing their identity before the Court. This is over and above the fact that the list of workmen, whose case for regularization was required to be considered, was never forwarded to the Tribunal and what was relied upon by the learned Tribunal was a list exhibit- W-4 which as discussed above could not have been relied upon as it was apparently a fabricated and manufactured document and was not even exhibited by its alleged signatory. If Exhibit W-4 is excluded from the evidence, the record does not contain the list of the workmen whose claim for regularization was to be considered. Thus, the terms of reference remained vague in absence of the list of workmen, who were to be regularized, much less their basic details like age, parentage, address etc. The reference remained a vague reference and no relief could have been granted to the workmen, who claimed that it was they whose case was referred to the Tribunal for regularization. The learned tribunal was not justified in directing regularization of the workmen whose name appeared in exhibit- W-4. The finding of the learned Tribunal that the concerned workmen were enlisted 2026:JHHC:22743 16 in exhibit- W-4 and were entitled for regularization is perverse and hence the award cannot be sustained in law. 36. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, on the point of jurisdiction as to subject matter and also on merits, the impugned award is not sustainable in law being perverse and the same is hereby set-aside. 37. This writ petition is accordingly allowed. 38. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed. (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Dated: 31.07.2026 Uploaded On: 01.08.2026 Mukul