2026:HHC:38476 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 348 of 2014 Reserved on: 31.8.2026 Date of Decision: 10.9.2026. Surjeet Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of HP ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Amir Khan, Advocate, vice Mr Vasu Sood, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 27.10.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Solan, District Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 17.3.2010, and order of sentence dated 18.3.2010, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan, District Solan (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:38476 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police filed a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant, Baldev Singh (PW-1) and Rajiv Thakur (since deceased) were travelling in the Jeep bearing registration No. HR-61(T)-4589, being driven by the accused Surjeet Singh, on 30.6.2004, to Rohru. The accused could not control the Jeep because of its high speed, and it fell near Salogra. Surjeet and Rajiv Thakur sustained grievous injuries, and the informant sustained minor injuries. The injured were taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, and the police recorded an entry in the daily diary (Ext. PW-4/A). 3. HC Ranjeet Singh (PW-6) went to the hospital. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ext. PW-1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext. PW-6/A) was registered. Dr R.K. Verma (PW-3) examined Baldev Singh, Surjeet Singh, and Rajiv Thakur and found that they had sustained multiple injuries 3 2026:HHC:38476 which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He issued MLCs (Ext.PW-3/A to Ext.PW-3/C). Ranjeet Singh visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW-6/C). The photographs of the spot (Ext. P-1 to Ext. P-8), whose negatives are Ext. P-9 to Ext. P-16, were taken. The vehicle bearing registration No. HR-61(T)-4589 was seized vide memo Ext. PW- 1/B. Yogender Kumar (PW-4) examined the vehicle and found no mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW-4/A). Rajiv Kumar subsequently succumbed to his injuries. An inquest on the dead body was conducted, and a report (Ext. PW-6/D) was prepared. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 4. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304A of the IPC and Section 181 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4 2026:HHC:38476 5. The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. The informant Baldev Singh (PW-1) narrated the incident. Ram Swaroop Sharma (PW-2) is the owner of the house on the roof of which the vehicle had fallen. Dr R.K. Verma (PW-3) examined the injured. Yogender Kumar (PW-4) examined the vehicle. HC Hari Ram (PW-4) proved the entry in the daily diary. HC Chander Mohan (PW-5) and HC Ranjeet Singh (PW-6) investigated the matter. 6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), claimed that Rajiv Thakur was driving the vehicle and a false case was made against him. He admitted that he had sustained grievous injuries in the accident. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 7. The learned Trial Court held that the informant’s statement proved that the accused was driving the vehicle. The medical evidence proved that the accused had sustained injuries, and the accused also admitted this fact in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC. The vehicle had fallen off the road, which proved negligence of the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: 5 2026:HHC:38476 Conviction Sentence Section 279 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 337 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 338 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 304A of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 181 of MV Act To pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Solan, District Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the 6 2026:HHC:38476 learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, that he had failed to control the vehicle, and that his negligence led to the accident. Rajiv Thakur died in the accident. The informant and the accused had sustained multiple injuries. The Medical Officer proved the nature of the injuries. There was no mechanical defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused, and no interference was required with the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The accused had specifically denied that he was driving the vehicle. The learned Courts below erred in relying upon the informant’s testimony to conclude that the accused was driving the vehicle. The owner of the vehicle was not examined, and an adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution. The accused was merely travelling as a passenger. There was no proof of negligence. Hence, it was 7 2026:HHC:38476 prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 10. I have heard Mr Aamir Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State. 11. Mr Aamir Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The accused specifically denied that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The learned Courts below erred in relying upon the informant’s testimony to conclude that the accused was driving the vehicle. Mere high speed does not amount to any negligence. The informant stated that Surjeet Singh had died in the accident, which shows that he is not a reliable witness. There is no corroboration to his testimony. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 12. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that there is nothing in the informant’s cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. His testimony cannot be ignored simply because 8 2026:HHC:38476 he stated that Surjeet Singh had died in the accident, which can be a clerical error as well. The vehicle had fallen off the road from the right side of the road, which proved the negligence of the accused. This Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or 9 2026:HHC:38476 his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the 10 2026:HHC:38476 ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court 11 2026:HHC:38476 nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional 12 2026:HHC:38476 Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 15. The present revision has to be decided as per the judgment. 16. Baldev Singh (PW-1) stated that he was travelling from Manimajra to Rohru in the vehicle bearing registration No. HR-61T-4589 on 30.6.2004. Surjeet Singh was driving the vehicle. Chunnu Thakur was also travelling in the vehicle. The 13 2026:HHC:38476 vehicle was being driven at a high speed. The vehicle could not negotiate the curve and fell off the road onto the lintel of a house. Surjeet and Chunnu Thakur died in the accident. He sustained minor injuries. The injured were taken to the hospital. The accident occurred because the accused had lost control of the vehicle. He identified the accused as the driver of the vehicle. 17. He stated in his cross-examination that he knew the accused and Chunnu Thakur because he was travelling in the vehicle. He was going to Rohru to work as a mechanic. He never travelled to Rohru before or after this incident. He denied that the accused was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident or that Rajiv Thakur was driving it. He denied that he was making a false statement. 18. The learned Courts below had rightly pointed out that there was nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. No suggestion was given to him that he had any motive to depose against the accused. It was suggested to him that he was not travelling in the vehicle, but this suggestion is not acceptable because he had sustained injuries in the accident. Ram Swaroop Sharma (PW-2) also found him on the spot in an injured condition and carried him to the hospital. 14 2026:HHC:38476 Thus, the informant’s presence in the vehicle was duly established. 19. It was submitted that he had seen the accused for the first time on the date of the accident, and his identification should not have been relied upon. This submission is only stated to be rejected. He had travelled in the vehicle from Manimajra to Solan; therefore, he had ample opportunity to see the accused and remember him. An accident is a traumatic event and leaves deep impressions upon a person. Therefore, his identification cannot be doubted when he had remained with the accused for a sufficient time in the vehicle. 20. It was submitted that his testimony shows that Surjeet and Chunnu Thakur had died in the accident, which is not correct, and he cannot be called to be a sterling witness. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2012 SC 3157. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that his statement about the death of Surjeet is a clerical error, because Surjeet is admittedly alive and faced trial before the Court. Further, it is not the case of the prosecution that Chunnu Thakur alias Rajiv Thakur had died 15 2026:HHC:38476 on the spot. He subsequently succumbed to his injuries at PGIMER, Chandigarh. This witness never stated that he had accompanied the accused or Rajiv Thakur to Chandigarh. Therefore, he would have no means of knowing the name of the person who had died in the accident, and the statement regarding the death of the person would be based upon the information received from some person, which may or may not be correct, and it cannot be used to discard his testimony regarding the incident which was witnessed by him. Hence, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 21. The site plan (Ext.PW-6/C) shows that the vehicle had left the road and fallen onto the lintel of the house located towards the right side of the road for a vehicle coming from Manimajra. It was laid down in Keshav Murti vs. State, 2002 Criminal Law 103 (Karnataka) that where the accident had taken place on a wide road, and the vehicle had left the road, the maxim of res ipsa loquitur applied and the burden would shift upon the accused to explain as to how the accident had taken place. It was observed: 2. “Here is a car proceeding from Bangalore to Shimoga. At the place concerned, there are no other vehicles on the road. There is no obstruction. The road is of a width of 19 16 2026:HHC:38476 ft. of cement and tar road, with 6 ft. kacha road on either side. Still, the vehicle hits a roadside tree. Added to that, there is a report of the IMV Inspector at Ex. P. 5 to the effect that the accident is not due to any mechanical defect in the vehicle. In such a situation, an accident of this nature would prima facie show that the same could not be accounted for by anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle, i.e., the petitioner. A presumption in that regard thus arises. In such a case, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, it is for the petitioner-driver to explain how the accident occurred without negligence on his part. What the petitioner has done in the course of his examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code is simply denying everything. He does not say anything, and even to the general question that is asked at the end as to whether he has got anything to say, he did not choose to say anything, nor did he care to explain the manner in which the accident occurred, i.e., in order to rebut the above said presumption as regards the accident occurring due to his negligence, and in order to show that accident occurred for a particular reason not attributable to his negligence. This was, therefore, an appropriate case wherein, on the basis of a presumption that the Supreme Court was speaking about, that conviction could be based.” 22. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thakur Singh Vs. State of Punjab 2003(9) SCC 208 that where the accident speaks for itself, it is sufficient for the prosecution to establish the accident and the burden will shift upon the accused to explain the same. Thus, where the accused admits that he was driving the vehicle which fell into a canal, the burden was upon him to establish that the accident had taken 17 2026:HHC:38476 place due to some circumstances other than his negligence. It was observed: 3. “It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into the canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part.” 23. This principle was discussed in detail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 607 and it was held that where the accident by its nature is more consistent its being caused by negligence than by any other cause mere happening of the accident is per se sufficient to invoke the principle of res ipsa loquitor and in absence of any explanation by the driver of the vehicle, he is liable to be convicted for rash and negligent driving. It was observed at page 295: - “(A) Rash and negligent driving 12. Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or seen in isolation. It must be examined in light of the attendant circumstances. A person who drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held responsible for the act as well as for the result. It may not always be possible to determine with reference to the 18 2026:HHC:38476 speed of a vehicle whether a person was driving rashly or negligently. Both these acts presuppose abnormal conduct. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to “rash and negligent driving” within the meaning of the language of Section 279 IPC. That is why the legislature, in its wisdom, has used the words “manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life”. The preliminary conditions, thus, are that (a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven; (b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated under Section 279 IPC is attracted. 13. “Negligence” means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the court. In a given case, even not doing what one ought to do can constitute negligence. 14. The court has to adopt another parameter, i.e. “reasonable care” in determining the question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for example, a driver) to care for the pedestrian on the road, and this duty attains a higher degree when the pedestrians happen to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that 19 2026:HHC:38476 their driving does not endanger the life of the right users of the road, maybe either vehicular users or pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others. 15. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the courts in such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine serves two purposes — one that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. The Act itself contains a provision that concerns the consequences of driving dangerously, such as the provision in the IPC that the vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to public life. Where a person commits such an offence, he is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act. The courts have also taken the concepts of “culpable rashness” and “culpable negligence” into consideration in cases of road accidents. “Culpable rashness” is acting with the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria). “Culpable negligence” is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of the civic duty of circumspection. In such a case the mere fact of accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. This maxim suggests that in the circumstances of a given case, the res speaks and is 20 2026:HHC:38476 eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some person's negligent conduct. [Ref. Justice Rajesh Tandon's An Exhaustive Commentary on Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (1st Edn., 2010).] 16. We have noticed these principles in order to examine the questions raised in the present case in their correct perspective. We may notice that certain doctrines falling in the realm of accidental civil or tortious jurisprudence are quite applicable to the cases falling under criminal jurisprudence like the present one. 17. Now, we may refer to some judgments of this Court which would provide guidance for determinatively answering such questions. In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra [(2012) 2 SCC 648: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848] where the driver of a vehicle was driving the vehicle at a high speed at late hours of the night in a drunken state and killed seven labourers sleeping on the pavement, injuring other eight, this Court dismissing the appeal, laid down the tests to determine criminal culpability on the basis of “knowledge”, as follows: (SCC pp. 663-64, para 41) “41. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with the knowledge of the dangerous character and the likely effect of the act and resulting in death may fall in the category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A person, doing an act of rash or negligent driving, if aware of a risk that a particular consequence is likely to result and that result occurs, may be held guilty not only of the act but also of the result. As a matter of law—in view of the provisions of IPC—the cases which fall within the last clause of Section 299 but not within clause ‘Fourthly’ of Section 300 may cover the cases of rash or negligent acts done with the knowledge of the likelihood of its dangerous consequences and may entail punishment under Section 304 Part II IPC. Section 304-A IPC takes out of its ambit the cases of 21 2026:HHC:38476 death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act amounting to culpable homicide of either description.” (emphasis supplied) 18. Again, in Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. [(2008) 1 SCC 791: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 324], where a train had hit a bus being driven by the appellant at the railway crossing and the bus was badly damaged and two persons died, this Court, while altering the charges from Section 302 IPC to Section 304-A IPC, observed: (SCC pp. 794-97, paras 7-9 & 13) “7. Section 304-A IPC applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. Section 304-A applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly the cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A. 8. Section 304-A carves out a specific offence where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act, and that act does not amount to culpable homicide under Section 299 or murder under Section 300. If a person wilfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving, and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing an act was likely to cause a person's death is culpable homicide. When intent or knowledge is the direct motivating force of the act, Section 304-A has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide. The provision of this section is not limited to rash or negligent driving. Any rash or negligent act whereby the death of any person is caused becomes punishable. Two elements, either of which or both of which may be proved to establish the guilt of an accused, are rashness/negligence; a person may cause death by a rash or negligent act which may have nothing to do with driving at all. Negligence and 22 2026:HHC:38476 rashness to be punishable in terms of Section 304-A must be attributable to a state of mind wherein the criminality arises not because of an error in judgment but of deliberation in the mind, risking the crime as well as the life of the person who may lose his life as a result of the crime. Section 304-A discloses that criminality may be that, apart from any mens rea, there may be no motive or intention; still a person may venture or practise such rashness or negligence which may cause the death of others. The death so caused is not the determining factor. 9. What constitutes negligence has been analysed in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. 34, Para 1 (p. 3), as follows: 4. ‘1. General principles of the law of negligence. — Negligence is a specific tort and in any given circumstance is the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances demand. What amounts to negligence depends on the facts of each particular case. It may consist in omitting to do something which ought to be done or doing something which ought to be done either in a different manner or not at all. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which can be reasonably foreseen to be likely to cause physical injury to persons or property. The degree of care required in the particular case depends on the surrounding circumstances and may vary according to the amount of risk to be encountered and to the magnitude of the prospective injury. The duty of care is owed only to those persons who are in the area of foreseeable danger; the fact that the act of the defendant violated his duty of care to a third person does not enable the plaintiff who is also injured by the same act to claim unless he is also 23 2026:HHC:38476 within the area of foreseeable danger. The same act or omission may accordingly in some circumstances involve liability as being negligent, although in other circumstances it will not do so. The material considerations are the absence of care which is on the part of the defendant owed to the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case and damage suffered by the plaintiff, together with a demonstrable relation of cause and effect between the two.’ 5. *** 13. According to the dictionary meaning, ‘reckless’ means ‘careless’, regardless or heedless of the possible harmful consequences of one's acts. It presupposes that if thought was given to the matter by the doer before the act was done, it would have been apparent to him that there was a real risk of its having the relevant harmful consequences; but, granted this, recklessness covers a whole range of states of mind from failing to give any thought at all to whether or not there is any risk of those harmful consequences, to recognising the existence of the risk and nevertheless deciding to ignore it.” 19. In Mohd. Aynuddin v. State of A.P. [(2000) 7 SCC 72: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1281], the appellant was driving a bus, and while a passenger was boarding the bus, the bus was driven, which resulted in the fall of the passenger and the rear wheel of the bus ran over the passenger. This Court, drawing the distinction between a rash act and a negligent act, held that it was culpable rashness and criminal negligence and held as under: (SCC pp. 74-75, paras 7 & 9) “7. It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident negligence of the driver should be presumed. An accident of such a nature as would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted for by anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case the driver has to explain how the accident happened without negligence 24 2026:HHC:38476 on his part. Merely because a passenger fell from the bus while boarding the bus, no presumption of negligence can be drawn against the driver of the bus. 6. *** 9. A rash act is primarily an overhasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still, a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution.” (B) Attendant circumstances and inference of rash and negligent driving 20 [Ed.: Para 20 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./53/2012 dated 5-9-2012.]. In light of the above, now we have to examine if negligence in the case of an accident can be gathered from the attendant circumstances. We have already held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is equally applicable to the cases of accident and not merely to civil jurisprudence. Thus, these principles can equally be extended to criminal cases provided the attendant circumstances and basic facts are proved. It may also be noticed that either the accident must be proved by proper and cogent evidence or it should be an admitted fact before this principle can be applied. This doctrine comes to aid at a subsequent stage where it is not clear as to how and due to whose negligence the accident occurred. The factum of accident having been established, the court, with the aid of proper evidence, may take assistance of the attendant circumstances and apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The mere fact of the occurrence of an accident does not necessarily imply that it must be owed to someone's negligence. In cases where 25 2026:HHC:38476 negligence is the primary cause, it may not always be that direct evidence to prove it exists. In such cases, circumstantial evidence may be adduced to prove negligence. Circumstantial evidence consists of facts that necessarily point to negligence as a logical conclusion rather than providing an outright demonstration thereof. Elements of this doctrine may be stated as: • The event would not have occurred but for someone's negligence. • The evidence on record rules out the possibility that the actions of the victim or some third party could be the reason behind the event. • The accused was negligent and owed a duty of care towards the victim. 21. In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab [(2003) 9 SCC 208: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1183], the petitioner drove a bus rashly and negligently with 41 passengers, and while crossing a bridge, the bus fell into the nearby canal, resulting in the death of all the passengers. The Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur since, admittedly, the petitioner was driving the bus at the relevant time, and it was going over the bridge when it fell down. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 209, para 4) “4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into a canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part.” 22. Still, in Mohd. Aynuddin [(2000) 7 SCC 72: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1281], this Court has also stated the principle: (SCC p. 74, para 8) 26 2026:HHC:38476 “8. The principle of res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The said principle has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the absence of negligence, the accident would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer.” It has also been stated that the effect of this maxim, however, depends upon the cogency of the inferences to be drawn and must, therefore, vary in each case.” 24. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Nagabhushanam v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 5 SCC 730: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 61: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 866 that where the facts speak for themselves, the accused is under an obligation to explain how the accident had occurred. It was observed: - 12. Reliance placed by Mr Kulkarni on Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka [(1980) 1 SCC 30: 1980 SCC (Cri) 59: AIR 1979 SC 1848] is not apposite. It proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case, as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known. In Syad Akbar [(1980) 1 SCC 30: 1980 SCC (Cri) 59: AIR 1979 SC 1848], this Court opined: (SCC p. 41, para 30) “30. Such simplified and pragmatic application of the notion of res ipsa loquitur, as a part of the general mode of inferring a fact in issue from another circumstantial fact, is subject to all the principles, the satisfaction of which is essential before an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. These are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the 27 2026:HHC:38476 accident, from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, the circumstances should make a chain so complete that they cannot reasonably raise any other hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt. That is to say, they should be incompatible with his innocence, and inferentially exclude all reasonable doubt about his guilt.” The maxim was not applied having regard to the facts of the said case and on the finding that it was a case of error of judgment and the accused gave a reasonable, convincing explanation of his conduct. The maxim res ipsa loquitur was not found to be applicable. However, we may notice that the said principle was applied in a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act in State of A.P. v. C. Uma Maheswara Rao [(2004) 4 SCC 399: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1276] in the following terms: (SCC p. 408, para 19) “19. We may note that a three-judge Bench in Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana [(1974) 4 SCC 560: 1974 SCC (Cri) 596] held that the very fact that the accused was in possession of the marked currency notes against an allegation that he demanded and received the amount is ‘res ipsa loquitur’.” 25. Even this Court held in State of H.P. v. Mast Ram, 2009 SCC OnLine HP 808 that in a case under Section 304A of IPC, the driver has a responsibility to show that the accident did not happen on account of his negligence. The judgment of Saiyad Akhtar Ali (supra) was explained and was held to be applicable where the driver had adopted his best course to avoid the accident. It was observed: - 28 2026:HHC:38476 “16. In a case under section 304-A IPC, the driver has some responsibility to show that the accident did not happen on account of his negligence. The principle of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts to the person who was in control of the vehicle at the time of the accident. In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208, the Supreme Court has held as follows: - “It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into a canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part”. Mr Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, has relied on Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 in support of his submission that the principle of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in the present case. In Syad Akbar, the accident took place in spite of the driver adopting the best course to avoid the accident. In the present case, the facts are entirely different. Therefore, Syad Akbar (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The respondent has not discharged his burden as held in the Thakur Singh case and has not succeeded in showing that the accident took place due to reasons other than his negligence. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he has not said anything about the cause of the accident. PW-2 and PW-3 have fully proved that the accident took place due to rash or negligent driving of the respondent at the time of the accident, which ultimately caused the death of Arushi. It is a well-settled principle that what matters is the quality and not the quantity of witnesses. It is thus held that the prosecution has proved the accusation against the 29 2026:HHC:38476 respondent and he is held guilty of committing an offence punishable under Sections 279, 304-A IPC.” 26. The accused has not provided any explanation for the accident. He denied that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The vehicle had left the road and fallen into the gorge by moving to the right side of the road, which is a violation of Rule 2 of the Rules of the Road Regulations. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 30 2026:HHC:38476 27. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were bloodstain marks and a V-shaped slipper of the deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map, Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road. 28. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj, 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured and by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not take a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the 31 2026:HHC:38476 extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 29. In Shakila Khader v. Nausheer Cama, (1975) 4 SCC 122: 1975 SCC OnLine SC 103, the car went to the right side of the road, hit the parapet and turned turtle. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the driver was negligent. It was observed at page 126: “6. The facts in the case speak eloquently about what should have happened. The main criterion for deciding whether the driving that led to the accident was rash and negligent is not only the speed but also the width of the road, the density of the traffic, and the attempt, as in this case, to overtake the other vehicles, resulting in going to the wrong side of the road and being responsible for the accident. Even if the accident took place in the twinkling of an eye, it is not difficult for the eyewitness to notice a car overtaking other vehicles and going to the wrong side of the road and hitting a vehicle travelling on that side of the road. The criterion adopted by the learned Judge for assessing the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and rejecting them is thoroughly unjustifiable. There may be cases where it is difficult to be clear or specific in giving details as to the cause of the accident, but this is not one such case. The reference by the learned Judge about the slight damage to the electric post and the conclusion drawn therefrom that the car could not have been going at a high speed is not correct, as we shall show later. His further observation that the fact that the car travelled another 45 feet and hit against the parapet wall and turned turtle showed that the car must have been travelling at an extremely high speed but there is a little blue paint on the pole and a faint gray stain on the parapet wall is self-contradictory unless we are to infer that the learned Judge implied that the one or the other is not true. He does not so hold. There can be no 32 2026:HHC:38476 doubt about the car having hit the electric post and the parapet wall. That and the fact of its overturning would establish the rash and negligent driving. A car driven normally and travelling behind a bus does not go to the opposite side of the road, hit an electric post and parapet wall, and turn turtle. The car apparently stopped only because it turned turtle. It did not hit the electric post or the parapet wall full tilt; if it did, it would have stopped at one of those points. We should remember that the collision with the scooter and pushing it back would have considerably reduced the speed of the car. Even so, it travelled farther. The slight damage to the electric post and the parapet wall is because the car hit them sideways. Nobody has suggested that they were brought into existence for this case. The car would probably not have stopped but for turning turtle, and it should have been travelling quite fast before it could overturn, as the learned Judge himself realises. There is only one conclusion possible on the facts of this case, and that is that the accused came over to the wrong side of the road and was responsible for the accident, and that is clearly a rash and negligent act in the condition of the road and the condition of the traffic.” 30. Yogender Kumar (PW-4) examined the vehicle, and he did not find any defect in it which could have led to the accident. He specifically denied that the brakes of the vehicle were not functioning. He clarified in the cross-examination that he had checked it by pressing the pedal. Hence, his testimony does not show that any mechanical defect in the vehicle was the cause of the accident. 33 2026:HHC:38476 31. The learned Courts below had rightly held in these circumstances that the negligence of the accused had led to the accident. 32. The injured were taken to the hospital. Dr R.K. Verma (PW-3) examined them and found that they had sustained multiple injuries. The accused also admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC that he had sustained grievous injuries. HC Ranjeet (PW-6) stated that Rajiv Thakur had died in the accident. This part of his testimony was not challenged in the cross-examination. Hence, the learned Courts below had rightly held that Rajiv Thakur had died in the accident, the accused had sustained grievous injuries, and the informant had sustained simple injuries in the accident. 33. The accused failed to produce his driving licence. Therefore, he was rightly held guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 34. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot 34 2026:HHC:38476 be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus : 7. "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences for the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of 35 2026:HHC:38476 automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 35. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 36 2026:HHC:38476 36. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 37. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused. 38. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay a fine of ₹500/- each for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304A of the IPC. Considering that a precious life was lost, the sentence of six months cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference from this Court. 39. No other point was urged. 37 2026:HHC:38476 40. In view of the above, the present revision fails and is dismissed. 41. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th September, 2026 (Chander)