2026:HHC:38852 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 24 of 2026 Reserved on: 01.09.2026 Date of Decision: 11.09.2026 Baldev Thakur .... Appellant Versus Ganga Sagar .... Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant : Ms Deepmala Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr Rajesh Verma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 04.10.2024, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, CBI Court, Shimla (learned appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.04.2024, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court No. 1, Shimla, H.P. (learned trial Court) were 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2026:HHC:38852 set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned trial Court against the accused for commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the parties were known to each other. The accused demanded ₹70,000/- from the complainant and assured to return the amount within six months. The complainant advanced ₹ 70,000/- to the accused on 20.06.2016. The accused failed to return the money as promised by him. The complainant demanded the money, and the accused issued the cheque of ₹70,000/- drawn on Punjab and Sindh Bank, Sanjauli branch, in favour of the complainant to discharge his liability. The complainant presented the cheque at his bank, but it was dishonoured with the endorsement “insufficient funds”. The complainant issued a legal notice to the accused, which was duly served upon him; however, the accused failed to repay the 3 2026:HHC:38852 money. Hence, the complaint was filed before the learned trial Court for taking action against the accused as per the law. 3. The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined himself (CW1) to prove his complaint. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), stated that he had received ₹30,000/- from the complainant, which was duly returned by him. He claimed that he had issued a blank signed cheque in favour of the complainant as security. The complainant misused the cheque. He had not received the notice issued by the complainant. He examined Ms Bhanu (DW1), Mr Yog Raj (DW2), Sushil Kumar (DW3) and Ms Ruchika Chauhan (DW4) to prove his defence. 6. The learned trial Court held that the accused had admitted his signatures on the cheque and issuance of the cheque; therefore, a presumption arose that the cheque was 4 2026:HHC:38852 issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The evidence led by the accused was not sufficient to rebut this presumption. The cheque was dishonoured with endorsement “insufficient funds”. The complainant issued a notice to the accused, and the accused admitted that the notice was sent to the correct address. There is a presumption that the notice was received by the addressee. The accused failed to repay the amount despite the deemed service of the notice. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months and pay compensation of ₹90,000/- to the complainant. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, CBI Court Shimla (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court that the admission of the signature and issuance of the cheque would trigger a presumption that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge debt/liability. Even if the accused had not filled in the amount in the cheque, he would 5 2026:HHC:38852 be liable because he had conferred sufficient authority upon the complainant to fill in the amount and present it before the Court. The evidence of the accused was not sufficient to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. The financial capacity of the complainant cannot be disputed because he had filed four other complaints of dishonour of the cheque. The cheque was dishonoured with endorsement “insufficient funds”. The complainant sent a notice to the accused at the correct address; however, the acknowledgement was not received. Notice would be deemed to be served after the expiry of 30 days, and 15 days period would be available to the accused to pay the amount. The complaint was filed before the expiry of 15 days available to the accused, and it was premature. Hence, the learned trial Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned appellate Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it was premature. There is a presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act regarding the service of a registered letter, 6 2026:HHC:38852 sent to a correct address. The accused claimed that he had not received the notice, but he did not produce any evidence to prove this fact. The accused had 15 days to pay the amount to the complainant, which he failed to do. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Ms Deepmala Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Rajesh Verma, learned counsel for the respondent. 10. Ms Deepmala Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned appellate Court erred in dismissing the complaint. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC that the notice was sent to the correct address. Therefore, there is a presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act that the notice was duly served upon the accused. The accused could have paid the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice from the Court, as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007 (6) SCC 555. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be 7 2026:HHC:38852 allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside 11. Mr Rajesh Verma, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the learned appellate Court had rightly held that presumption of service can be drawn after the expiry of 30 days from the date of issuance of the notice. The accused had 15 days available to him to pay the amount, but the complaint was presented before the expiry of 15 days. Therefore, the learned appellate Court had rightly held that the complaint was premature. The learned appellate Court had taken a reasonable view, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned appellate Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of 8 2026:HHC:38852 acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. 9 2026:HHC:38852 The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 10 2026:HHC:38852 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 14. The complainant asserted in his complaint that he had issued a notice to the accused on 11.07.2017. He has not produced on record any acknowledgement to prove the service 11 2026:HHC:38852 of notice upon the accused. He has not examined the postman, who had delivered the notice to the accused. The learned trial Court proceeded on the basis that the notice is presumed to be served under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 689: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 834: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1174 that where a notice was sent by registered post acknowledge due, the presumption of service of notice can be raised within a reasonable time and 30 days must be held to be sufficient for service of notice. It was observed at page 699: “23. Thirty days ordinarily must be held to be sufficient for service of notice. In fact, when the service of notice is sought to be effected by speed post, ordinarily, the service takes place within a few days. Even under Order 5 Rule 9(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a summons is presumed to be served if it does not come back within thirty days. In a situation of this nature, there was no occasion for the Court to hold that service of notice could not be effected within a period of thirty days.” 15. The Jharkhand High Court held in Manoj Kumar Nag v. State of Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine Jhar 458 that when there is no evidence regarding the service, the presumption regarding the delivery of the notice can be made after thirty days of the issuance of the notice. It was observed: 12 2026:HHC:38852 “22. This Court finds that there is no material on record regarding the service of legal notice dated 03.03.2008 dispatched by registry on 04.03.2008 upon the petitioner, and it is not the case of the complainant that the legal notice was returned unserved or returned for any other reason. This Court is also of the considered view that a presumption regarding service of notice sent through registered cover can be drawn only upon expiry of 30 days from the date of dispatch of notice, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2008) 13 SCC 689 (Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Sah). In the said judgment, the notice was sent through speed post, and although the actual date of service of notice was not known, the Complainant proceeded on the basis that the same was served within a reasonable period. It was held that if the presumption of notice within the reasonable period is raised, the deemed service at best can be taken to be 30 days from the date of its issuance and the accused was required to make payment in terms of the said notice within 15 days thereafter and the complaint petition therefore could have been filed after expiry of 15 days given to the accused for payment of money after receipt of notice.” 16. A similar view was taken in Anil Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 410, wherein it was observed: “18. Coming to the facts of the present case, the notice having been sent on 19.09.2012, if the presumption of service of notice within a reasonable time is raised, shall be deemed to have been served, at best, within a period of 30 days from the date of issuance thereof, i.e. 19.09.2012. The applicant was required to make payment in terms of the said notice within 15 days thereafter, i.e. on or about 3.11.2012. The complaint, therefore, should have been filed by 03.12.12. Admittedly, the complaint was filed on 19.11.2012, and therefore, at this stage, it cannot be said that no 13 2026:HHC:38852 proceedings under Section 138 of the Act could be drawn against the applicant.” 17. Madhya Pradesh High Court has also taken a similar view in Vishal Gupta vs. Kishan Batham (04.08.2023 - MPHC): MANU/MP/2098/2023, wherein it was observed: “11. Thus, the learned Trial Court committed no mistake in holding that in the absence of any proof of service of notice on a particular day to the accused, it would be deemed to be served on the 30th day of the dispatch of notice.” 18. This position was reiterated in Damodar Mallick vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. (08.01.2024 - JHRHC): MANU/JH/0024/2024 wherein it was observed: “9. It is crystal clear from plain reading of Section 138 of the N.I. Act that the drawer of a cheque, if it fails to make the payment of the amount of the cheque to the payee within 15 days of the receipt of the demand notice, then the cognisance of the offence can be taken by a learned Judicial Magistrate for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The question arises what if, there is no document to suggest that the demand notice in writing given by the complainant-opposite party No. 2 has been served upon the drawer of the cheque, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of the Subodh S. Salaskar vs. Jayprakash M. Shah & Another reported in MANU/SC/3298/2008 : (2008) 13 SCC 689 and which principle of law has been reiterated by this Court in the case of Md. Siraj vs. State of Jharkhand & Another passed in Cr.M.P. No. 1677 of 2022 dated 21st of November, 2023; that the law is well settled that in case there is no material to suggest that such demand notice was ever served upon drawer of the cheque or any material that 14 2026:HHC:38852 such demand notice has returned unserved within the period of 30 days from the date of the issue of such notice, such demand notice is deemed to have been served on expiry of the period of 30 days from the date of issue of such notice and the cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be taken if the drawer of the cheque fails to pay the amount as per the cheque within 15 days of such deemed service of notice. So considering the claim of the complainant that the notice was sent on 15.05.2019 and the complaint was filed on 14.06.2019 without any material to suggest that during that period the petitioner had received notice of demand and 15 days have elapsed after receipt of such notice of demand on or before 14.06.2019, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the complaint is pre-mature, hence, the cognizance is bad in law.” 19. A similar view was taken by this Court in HDFC Bank v. Reena Cr MP(M) No. 1634 of 2024 decided on 09.09.2024. 20. In the present case, the notice was sent on 11.07.2017, and would be deemed to have been served on 10.08.2017. Thereafter, a period of 15 days was available to the accused for the payment of the money mentioned in the notice. However, the complaint was filed on 08.08.2017, much before the period of 15 days available to the accused. Therefore, the learned appellate Court had rightly held that the complaint was premature. 21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gajanand Burange v. Laxmi Chand Goyal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 15 2026:HHC:38852 1711, that no action can be taken on a premature complaint, and the same is liable to be dismissed. It was observed: 5. The issue which is raised in this appeal is no longer res integra and is covered by a three-judge bench decision of this Court in Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey (2014) 10 SCC 713. Two issues were formulated for decision before the three-judge Bench, which were: “1.1. (i) Can cognisance of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 be taken on the basis of a complaint filed before the expiry of the period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required to be served upon the drawer of the cheque in terms of Section 138(c) of the Act aforementioned? And, 1.2. (ii) If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, can the complainant be permitted to present the complaint again, notwithstanding the fact that the period of one month stipulated under Section 142(b) for the filing of such a complaint has expired?” 6. The first issue was resolved by paragraph 35 of the judgment, which is extracted below: “35. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the Code defines “complaint. According to this definition, a complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognisance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which 16 2026:HHC:38852 the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eyes of the law. It is not a question of prematurity of the complaint, where it is filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on him; it is no complaint at all under the law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the court from taking cognisance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eyes of the law, obviously, no cognisance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such a complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque.” 7. In the present case, while the notice was received by the appellant on 8 November 2005, the complaint was filed before the period of fifteen days was complete. The complaint could have been filed only after 23 November 2005, but was filed on 22 November 2005. In view of the legal bar which is created by Section 142 of the NI Act, as explained in the three-judge Bench decision of this Court, taking of cognisance by the Court was contrary to the law and the complaint was not maintainable before the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the date of its receipt by the appellant.” 22. It was submitted that the notice is deemed to have been served and the accused could have made the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the summons from the Court as 17 2026:HHC:38852 per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in C.C.Allavi Haji (supra). This submission will not help the appellant, because the learned appellate Court never held that the notice was not served upon the accused, but it was held that the complaint was filed before the expiry of 15 days available to the accused. Therefore, it was premature. The judgment of CC Allavi Haji (supra) will apply when the accused claims that he had not received the notice. Thus, the cited judgment will not help the appellant. 23. In view of the above, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while setting aside the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court, and no interference is required with the judgment of the learned appellate Court. 24. Consequently, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. 25. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court, which 18 2026:HHC:38852 shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 26. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any 27. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 11th September,2026 (Ravinder)