2026:JHHC:22456-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI M.A. No. 244 of 2025 1. M/s. Hariom Super Infrastructural Developers (P) Ltd., having its registered office at 7th Floor, Anant Tower, Ratu Road, PO-Ratu Road, PS-Sukhdeonagar, District-Ranchi 2. Shrawan Kumar, Director of M/s. Hariom Super Infrastructural Developers (P) Ltd., S/o Sri Surendra Nath Dubey, R/o Anant Tower (7th Floor), Ratu Road, PO-Ratu Road, PS-Sukhdeonagar, District-Ranchi ... … Appellants Versus 1. M/s. Rungta Mines Limited, having its registered office at Rungta House, Chaibasa, PO-Chaibasa, PS-Chaibasa Sadar, District-West Singhbhum, represented through its authorized representative Sri Shiharan Das, S/o Sri T.C. Das, working as Assistant General Manager (Land), R/o Rajeshwar Enclave, Railway Station Road, PO-Chaibasa, PS-Chaibasa Sadar, District-West Singhbhum 2. Mr. Shyam Kishore Mahata, S/o Late Madan Mahata, R/o Village- Mahata Tola, PO-Bhojudih, PS-Chandan Kiyari, District-Bokaro ... … Respondents ----- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Appellants : Mr. A.K. Das, Sr. Advocate Mr. Shivam Utkarsh Sahay, Advocate For the Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocate Mr. Ankit Vishal, Advocate Mr. Vibhor Mayank, Advocate For the Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Aman Kumar, Advocate ----- Order No. 11 Dated: 29.07.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this commercial appeal is taken up for final disposal. 3. This appeal challenges the order dated 14.05.2025 passed by the District Judge-I, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa in Misc. Case No. 03 of 2024, whereby and whereunder the application for restoration of Revocation Case No. 01 of 2023 along with application seeking condonation of delay of 111 days in 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 2 instituting the same, came to be dismissed. There is some controversy as to whether the delay was 111 days or 151 days. Therefore, as a matter of abundant caution, we proceed on the premise that the delay was 151 days. 4. There is no dispute that respondent No. 1 herein (the original plaintiff) instituted an original suit at Chaibasa, which was transferred and renumbered as Original Suit No. 08 of 2020. According to the appellants, this suit was decreed ex parte on 25.06.2021. 5. The appellants claim that on coming to know of the ex parte decree, they filed an application under Order IX Rule-13 of C.P.C for setting aside the ex parte decree sometime in 2023. The appellants argued that there was no proper service upon them as contemplated by Order V Rule 9 of C.P.C. This restoration application is numbered as Revocation Case No. 01 of 2023. 6. On 22.07.2024, on account of the absence of the appellant and its counsel, Revocation Case No. 01 of 2023 was dismissed for default/non-prosecution. On 20.12.2024, the appellants filed an application seeking restoration of Revocation Case No. 01 of 2023 along with an application seeking condonation of delay of about five months in filing the same. 7. By the impugned order dated 14.05.2025, the application for condonation of delay and consequently, the accompanying application for restoration came to be dismissed. Hence, the present appeal. 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 3 8. In the application for restoration, it was noted that neither the appellant nor his counsel could be present on the appointed date, warranting dismissal of the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the C.P.C. on 22.07.2024, due to confusion arising from the transfer of records and the renumbering of proceedings between Jamshedpur and Chaibasa. The application states that on 16.02.2023, the Court at Jamshedpur transferred the proceedings to Chaibasa. However, upon inquiry, the appellants claimed they were informed that no records had been received until April 2023. The appellants also claimed that once the records were received pursuant to the transfer, the Court at Chaibasa would issue notices to the appellants. However, no notice was issued to the appellants. 9. The application for restoration further states that proper information about the transfer, registration, and dismissal of its original revocation application was obtained only on 11.11.2024 through the advocate who was conducting the appellants’ case related to execution of the decree made in O.S. No. 08 of 2020. 10. Soon thereafter, the appellants instructed their lawyer to file an appropriate application for restoration. For this purpose, certified copies had to be applied for, and upon obtaining the same, the restoration application was prepared and filed on 20.12.2024 after a delay of about five months. It was submitted that the delay for all these reasons constitutes sufficient cause. 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 4 11. Mr. A.K. Das, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, submitted that the delay was of only 111 days, but even if it is assumed that the delay was of 151 days or 5 months, still, sufficient cause was shown and the impugned order refusing to condone the delay and dismissing the restoration application warrants interference. 12. On the other hand, Mr Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the appellants have come to the Court with a false case. He referred to the order dated 06.06.2024 made in the proceedings for execution of the decree in Original Suit No. 08 of 2020 and submitted that this order clearly records that the appellants were aware of the transfer of the proceedings from Jamshedpur to Chaibasa. Therefore, the plea about not being aware, or some self- created confusion about transfer/re-transfer or numbering/correcting of page numbers, is false and, in any event, not sufficient cause to condone the delay. He pointed out that this was a commercial matter and therefore, there was no question of any liberal approach when it comes to condonation of delay. He pointed out that the timeline set out under the Commercial Courts Act must be strictly adhered to, and such laxity, coupled with false pleas, ought not to be countenanced. 13. Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that the decree in this case was not ex parte and the record shows that the appellants have throughout acted negligently and callously. He pointed out that 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 5 despite the respondents securing a decree on 25.06.2021, till date, the respondent no. 1 has not been able to secure the decretal amount or any part thereof. He therefore submitted that this appeal should be dismissed with cost. 14. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 15. In this appeal, we are concerned with the impugned order dated 14.05.2025 by which the appellants’ application for condonation of delay of 111 days or 151 days was dismissed because, according to the Commercial Court, no sufficient cause was shown. 16. We have perused the application seeking condonation of delay, which refers to a delay of about five months. We have also perused the response to this application and other pleadings on record. 17. We find that there was some confusion about the transfer of proceedings from Jamshedpur to Chaibasa. Although the appellants may be taken to have known about the transfer orders, there is nothing to contradict their statement that their enquiries revealed that no case papers had actually been received by the Chaibasa Court until April 2023. 18. There is some record about the case papers which were received from Jamshedpur to Chaibasa being resent to Jamshedpur for carrying out certain corrections, renumbering etc. There is also nothing to contradict the statement in paragraph-3 of the application for condonation of delay that the appellants or their representatives were informed that once 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 6 all the records are received, the Court at Chaibasa would issue notices to them. 19. The appellants have explained that they came to know of the dismissal of their revocation application only on 11.11.2024 through their counsel who was appearing for the appellants in the proceedings for execution of the decree in Original Suit No. 08 of 2020. 20. The order dated 06.06.2024, on which reliance was placed by Mr. Indrajit Sinha at the highest, suggests that the appellants were aware of the transfer order of the Jamshedpur Court transferring the matter to Chaibasa. The appellants did not seriously dispute knowledge of this order. However, the appellants pointed out that despite the transfer order dated 16.02.2023, the records were not immediately transferred to Chaibasa. Further, there is evidence that even after they were transferred to Chaibasa, they were again re-transferred for some time to Jamshedpur. Therefore, this is not a case of raising any false plea but rather the pleadings reflect the confusing situation post the transfer of proceedings. 21. The appellants’ case is that all these factors confused them, and as a result their representatives or their advocate could not attend the proceedings on the appointed date, which he had no knowledge of, leading to the dismissal of the application to set aside the ex parte decree for want of prosecution. The application also sets out how the appellants came to know about the dismissal and the filing of the 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 7 application for restoration after a delay of about five months. 22. In our judgment, all this constitutes sufficient cause. No doubt the appellant could have been more diligent. No doubt this is a case in which some lapses could be attributed to the appellant or their advocates. But all these must be considered in the context of the confusing situation referred to above. Besides, such lapses cannot be stretched to deny another opportunity if, overall, a sufficient case has been shown for the absence on the appointed day. 23. In the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 (7) SCC 123, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea or to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. The words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. 24. Since it is a commercial matter, we agree with Mr Indrajit 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 8 Sinha that normally, there is no question of liberal construction in such matters. Still, the opposite of liberal construction, in this context, would not mean an over-rigid construction. If sufficient cause is shown, then, only on the ground that there was a lapse or even some amount of lack of diligence, a delay of about 111 days or even 151 days cannot be refused to be condoned. Here, the appellants did not have much to gain by applying for restoration beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The appellants were, as it is, facing execution proceedings of the decree that the appellants have already suffered. 25. Therefore, upon and over all consideration of the facts and circumstances as borne out from the record, we are satisfied that a case has been made out for condonation of delay and restoring the restoration application, i.e. Misc. Case No. 03 of 2024. 26. At the same time, we are also inclined to accept Mr Indrajit Sinha’s contentions that the respondents should not be made to suffer for the lapses of the appellants. He pointed out that the decree in this case was made on 25.06.2021 and till date, the respondent no. 1 has not received any amount. He also pointed out the conduct of the appellants, which led to the passing of the decree. 27. In the case of N. Balakrishnan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, even while advocating a liberal approach, has held that while condoning the delay, the court should not 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 9 forget the opposite party altogether. It must be born in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss. 28. In this case, we had directed the appellants to deposit 50% of the decretal amount, which amount has now been deposited by the appellants before the executing court. Firstly, therefore, we direct that this amount shall continue to remain deposited before the executing court, though the same shall not be disbursed to the respondent no. 1 until the consideration and disposal of appellants’ Misc. Case No. 03 of 2024 and for a period of 15 days thereafter, should this application be dismissed. 29. In the meantime, if respondent no. 1 wishes to withdraw this amount by offering the bank guarantee, it is open to respondent no. 1 to apply to the executing court for such an order. Such application, if made, must be disposed of on its merits and in accordance with the law. 30. Secondly, we direct that the appellants herein, as a precondition for obtaining the benefits under this order, should pay to respondent no. 1 costs of Rs.50,000/- within two weeks from today, either directly or by depositing the same with the executing court. If the amount is deposited, the executing court will permit respondent no. 1 to withdraw the amount 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 10 unconditionally. If the amount is not deposited within two weeks from today, the appellants will not have the benefit of this order. 31. The above directions will sufficiently compensate the respondent for the prejudice it might suffer as a result of granting the appellants an additional opportunity to pursue their application for restoration. 32. This appeal is accordingly disposed of by making the following order: (a) The impugned order dated 14.05.2025 is set aside. (b) The delay in filing Misc. Case No. 03 of 2024 (restoration) is condoned and Misc. Case No. 03 of 2024 is restored to the file of the Commercial Court, Chaibasa. (c) The Commercial Court, Chaibasa will now dispose of Misc. Case No. 03 of 2024 as expeditiously as possible and in any event within three months from the parties filing an authenticated copy of this order. (d) The appellants must pay the respondent No. 1 costs of Rs. 50,000/- within two weeks, either directly or by depositing them before the executing court. If such amount is not paid or deposited within two weeks, then this appeal shall be deemed to have been dismissed without further reference to this Court with costs of Rs.50,000/-; (e) 50% of the decretal amount already deposited by the appellants before the executing court shall 2026:JHHC:22456-DB 11 remain deposited before the executing court. The executing court should invest the said amount and not disburse the same to the respondent no. 1 until the disposal of Misc. Case No. 03 of 2024 and for a period of 15 days thereafter, in case Misc. Case No. 03 of 2024 is dismissed. (f) The above direction will not prevent the respondent no. 1 from applying for withdrawal of the deposited amount by offering the bank guarantee. If such application is made, the executing court is directed to dispose of it in accordance with law and on its own merits expeditiously. (g) The observations made in this order are only in the context of condonation of delay, and none of the courts need be influenced by those observations while deciding Misc. Case No. 03 of 2024 or the execution proceedings. 33. The parties are directed to appear before the Commercial Court (District Judge) at Chaibasa and file an authenticated copy of this order on 10.08.2026 at 11:00 a.m. 34. I.As., if any, in this appeal, will not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) July 29, 2026 Manish/Ritesh A.F.R. Uploaded on 31.07.2026