- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ REVIEW PETITION NO. 159 OF 2026 BETWEEN: M/S AROGYA YOGA (R) A PARTNERSHIP FIRM REGISTERED UNDER THE INDIAN PARTNERSHIP ACT 1932, HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO. 5, MAHABHODI ROAD, SARASWATHIPURAM, MYSURU-570 009. REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER …PETITIONER (BY SRI. R.S. RAVI., SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI. AKARSH KUMAR GOWDA.,ADVOCATE) AND: 1. KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD, CAUVERY BHAVAN, KEMPEGOWDA ROAD, BENGALURU-560 009. REP BY ITS COMMISSIONER. 2. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD, SARASWATHIPURAM, MYSURU DIVISION, MYSURU-570 009. 3. THE ASSISTANT REVENUE OFFICER, KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD, SARASWATHIPURAM, MYSURU DIVISION, MYSURU-570 009. ® Digitally signed by SHWETHA RAGHAVENDRA Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 4. THE SENIOR SUB-REGISTRAR, MYSURU NORTH, RAMAKRISHNANAGAR, MYSURU-570 022. 5. ST. JOHNS EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY, HOOTAGALLI, MYSURU-HUNSUR ROAD, MYSURU-570 REP BY ITS SECRETARY. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. H L PRADEEP KUMAR.,ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R3; SRI. MOHAMMED JAFFAR SHAH., AGA FOR R4; SRI. ABUBAKAR SHAFI., ADVOCATE FOR R5) THIS REVIEW PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION.114 R/W ORDER 47 RULE 1 OF CPC 1908, PRAYING TO REVIEW THE ORDER DATED 26.02.2026 MADE IN WP NO.24903/2022 PASSED BY THIS HONBLE COURT, THEREBY RESTORING THE SAID WRIT PETITION FOR FRESH CONSIDERATION OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MODIFY THE ORDER IN WP NO.24903/2022 BY GRANTING THE RELIEF SOUGHT THEREIN AND ETC. THIS REVIEW PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ ORAL ORDER 1. The petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Review the order dated 06.02.2026 made in W.P.No. 24903/2022 passed by this Hon’ble Court, thereby restoring the said Writ Petition for fresh consideration or in the alternative modify the order - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 in WP. No. 24903/2022 by granting the relief sought therein; b) To grant such other relief/reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case in the interest of justice. 2. The present review petition seeks review of the order dated 26.02.2026 passed in W.P. No.24903/2022. 2.1. The submissions of Sri R.S. Ravi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioner, are threefold. 2.2. Firstly, it is contended that the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner is a conditional sale deed and, upon its execution and registration, the rights, title and interest in the property stood transferred in favour of the petitioner in terms of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is submitted that once such transfer had taken effect, the sale deed could not have been unilaterally cancelled by the respondent. The contention is that any cancellation of a registered conveyance affecting vested rights in immovable property could only be effected in accordance with law and not by a unilateral act of the respondent. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 2.3. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited and Others -v- S.N.Raj Kumar and Another1, more particularly para 9, 10, 11, 15 and 17 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 9. The matters were heard by the learned Single Judge who allowed the writ petitions vide common judgment dated 16-7-2010 [ABC India Ltd. v. A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corpn. Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine AP 1198 : (2010) 6 An LT 142] accepting the plea of the respondents, namely, once the sale deeds were executed, the appellant Corporation was denuded of any power to cancel the allotments or to make demand of 50% amount of the prevailing market value of the plots. The appellant Corporation, feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, preferred writ appeals before the Division Bench, which have also been dismissed vide the impugned judgment [A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corpn. v. S.N. Raj Kumar, 2013 SCC OnLine AP 920 disposed in terms of A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corpn. v. K. Kausar Jan, 2012 SCC OnLine AP 1133] , thereby affirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge [ABC India Ltd. v. A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corpn. Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine AP 1198 : (2010) 6 An LT 142] . Not satisfied with this outcome, the present appeals are preferred. 10. In a nutshell, reasoning of the High Court is that the allotment was made to the respondents followed by agreements of sale and thereafter sale deeds were also executed by the appellant Corporation conveying right, title and interest absolutely, to the respondents. When the contract is concluded and regular sale deed is executed between the vendor and 1 (2018) 6 SCC 410, - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 vendee in respect of an immovable property, it cannot be said that the dispute arises in the realm of a statutory contract or non-statutory contract. The dispute is not with regard to the contract. It is in effect the question of title which is sought to be nullified by the appellant Corporation unilaterally based on conditions of allotment and the same is not permissible in law. 11. It was further held that the appellant Corporation offered industrial plots and the respondents/entrepreneurs gave counter-offer which was accepted by it. At that stage, the conditions of offer, counter-offer and acceptance found expression in the allotment letter (acceptance of offer subject to conditions) and in the agreement of sale (contract of sale) in terms of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). This ultimately resulted in the conclusion of contract by way of execution of the sale deed by vendor in favour of the vendee. Once the contract is concluded, the allotment conditions or covenants of agreement of sale ordinarily cannot be enforced having regard to the various provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, Contract Act, 1872, the Registration Act, 1908 and the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which constitute the Civil Code of India and govern the transfer of immovable property from one person to another. The allotment letter or the sale agreement does not survive once the contract is concluded on execution of the registered sale deed resulting in alienation, conveyance, assignment and transfer of title. 15. We do not find any merit in any of the aforesaid arguments. In the first instance, it needs to be emphasised that there is no such condition of completion of construction within a period of two years in the sale deed. Such a condition was only in the allotment letter. However, after the said allotment, the appellant Corporation not only received entire consideration but executed the sale deeds as well. In the sale deeds no such condition was stipulated. Therefore, the High Court is right in holding that after the sale of the property by the - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 appellant Corporation to the respondents, whereby the respondents acquired absolute marketable title to the property, the appellant Corporation had no right to insist on the conditions mentioned in the allotment letter, which cease to have any effect after the execution of the sale deed. 17. Section 55 of the Act deals with rights and liabilities of buyer and seller. As per this provision, when the buyer discharges obligations and seller passes/conveys the ownership of the property, the contract is concluded. Thereafter, the liabilities, obligations and rights, if any, between the buyer and seller would be governed by other provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act, on the execution of the sale deed. The seller cannot unilaterally cancel the conveyance or sale. 2.4. By relying on S.N.Raj Kumar learned Senior Counsel submits that once a registered sale deed has been executed and title has passed to the purchaser, all antecedent conditions contained in the allotment letter or the agreement preceding the sale merge into and stand superseded by the conveyance. He submits that the rights and obligations of the parties thereafter are governed by the sale deed and the applicable provisions of law relating to transfer of immovable property. It is his contention that the vendor, having conveyed title and interest in the property through a registered instrument, is divested of any authority to unilaterally annul, cancel or - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 revoke the conveyance on the basis of conditions contained in the allotment letter or any alleged breach thereof. Therefore, according to him, the respondent could not have cancelled the sale deed in question by a unilateral act, and if at all the respondent was aggrieved by any alleged breach of conditions, the remedy available was only to seek appropriate relief before a competent civil forum in accordance with law. 2.5. Learned Senior Counsel therefore submits that the finding recorded in the order sought to be reviewed, insofar as it proceeds on the basis that the respondent was entitled to cancel the sale deed and resume the property, is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in S.N. Raj Kumar and consequently warrants reconsideration in exercise of review jurisdiction. 2.6. Secondly, learned Senior Counsel submits that where a transferee is a bona fide purchaser and is not shown to have committed any fraud, misrepresentation, suppression of facts or other wrongdoing in securing the transfer, the Court - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 ought not ordinarily to direct cancellation of the sale deed. It is his submission that a purchaser who has acted bona fide, paid valuable consideration and acquired title through a registered conveyance cannot be deprived of such rights for reasons attributable to the transferor or on account of inter se disputes concerning the transfer. According to him, the equities in such circumstances are required to be balanced in favour of protecting the rights of an innocent transferee, particularly when there is no finding that the transferee had participated in or had knowledge of any illegality affecting the transaction. 2.7. He therefore contends that, in the absence of any finding regarding fraud, collusion or other culpable conduct on the part of the petitioner, the direction for cancellation of the sale deed causes serious prejudice to a bona fide purchaser and consequently calls for reconsideration in review. 2.8. In this regard he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in ITC Limited -v- State - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 of Uttar Pradesh and Others2, more particularly para 107.1 and 107.2 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 107.1. If the transferee had acted bona fide and was blameless, it may be possible to save the transfer but that again would depend upon the answer to the further question as to whether public interest has suffered or will suffer as a consequence of the violation of the regulations: (i) If public interest has neither suffered, nor is likely to suffer, on account of the violation, then the transfer may be allowed to stand as then the violation will be a mere technical procedural irregularity without adverse effects. (ii) On the other hand, if the violation of the regulations leaves or is likely to leave an everlasting adverse effect or impact on public interest (as for example when it results in environmental degradation or results in a loss which is not reimbursable), public interest should prevail and the transfer should be rescinded or cancelled. (iii) But where the consequence of the violation is merely a short-recovery of the consideration, the transfer may be saved by giving the transferee an opportunity to make good the shortfall in consideration. 107.2. The aforesaid exercise may seem to be cumbersome, but is absolutely necessary to protect the sanctity of contracts and transfers. If the Government or its instrumentalities are seen to be frequently resiling from duly concluded solemn transfers, the confidence of the public and international community in the functioning of the Government will be shaken. To save the credibility of the Government and its instrumentalities, an effort should always be made to save the concluded transactions/transfers wherever possible, provided (i) that it will not prejudice the public interest, or cause loss to public exchequer or lead to public mischief, and (ii) that the transferee is blameless and had no part to play in the violation of the regulation. 2 2011 7 SCC 493 - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 2.9. By relying on ITC Limited learned Senior Counsel submits that the Hon'ble Apex Court has recognised the principle that concluded transfers ought not to be lightly disturbed where the transferee has acted bona fide and is free from blame. He submits that the determinative considerations are whether the transferee had any role in the alleged violation and whether the continuation of the transfer would result in prejudice to public interest, loss to the public exchequer or any other public mischief. 2.10. It is his contention that the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and there is neither any allegation nor any finding that the petitioner had participated in, contributed to or was aware of any alleged irregularity in the transaction. He submits that the petitioner is therefore a blameless transferee within the meaning of the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in ITC Limited. - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 2.11. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the order sought to be reviewed does not record any finding that continuation of the transfer in favour of the petitioner would result in any irreversible prejudice to public interest, loss to the public exchequer or any other adverse consequence of such magnitude as would warrant rescission of a concluded transfer. According to him, even assuming there had been any irregularity in the process leading to the transfer, the same would not, in the facts of the present case, justify cancellation of the sale deed insofar as the petitioner is concerned. 2.12. On the aforesaid basis, he contends that the principles laid down in ITC Limited required the Court to consider whether the petitioner was a bona fide and blameless transferee and whether any overriding public interest necessitated cancellation of the transfer. According to him, the non-consideration of these aspects constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record warranting exercise of review jurisdiction. - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 2.13. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel submits that even assuming that the allotment and the consequential sale deed were liable to be cancelled pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, such cancellation ought to have been effected within the period prescribed under law. In this regard, he places reliance on Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a period of three years for a suit seeking cancellation or setting aside of an instrument or decree or for rescission of a contract, the period commencing from the date on which the facts entitling the party to seek such relief first become known. Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: Article 59 To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract Three years When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him. - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 2.14. By relying upon Article 59 of the Limitation Act, learned Senior Counsel submits that the order directing cancellation of the allotment and sale deed was passed by this Court on 02.08.2014 and, therefore, any action for cancellation or rescission ought to have been initiated within a period of three years therefrom. According to him, the respondent, having taken action only in the year 2020, sought to effectuate the cancellation well beyond the prescribed period of limitation. 2.15. It is his submission that the law of limitation applies equally to the respondent and that rights which have accrued in favour of the petitioner pursuant to a registered sale deed cannot be defeated by belated action taken beyond the statutory period. He contends that once the period prescribed under Article 59 had expired, the respondent could not have resorted to cancellation proceedings on the basis of the order dated 02.08.2014. 2.16. On the aforesaid basis, learned Senior Counsel submits that the action taken by the respondent in the year 2020 was ex facie - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 barred by limitation and, consequently, the finding recorded in the order sought to be reviewed, insofar as it upholds or proceeds on the validity of such action, requires reconsideration in exercise of review jurisdiction. 3. Heard Sri.R.S.Ravi, learned Senior Counsel for Sri.Akarsh Kumar Gowda, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri.H.L.Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 3, Sri.Mohammed Jaffar Shah, learned AGA for respondent No.4 and Sri.Abubakar Shafi, learned counsel for respondent No.5. Perused papers. 4. The submissions of Sri R.S. Ravi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioner, are required to be examined in the backdrop of the well- settled principles governing the exercise of review jurisdiction. The power of review is a limited power. It is not intended to enable a party to seek a rehearing of the matter on merits or to persuade the Court to take a different view on the very same material which was available at the time when the original judgment was rendered. Unless there is an error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 new and important matter or evidence which, despite due diligence, could not be produced earlier, or any other analogous ground recognised in law, a review petition is not maintainable. A review proceeding cannot be equated to an original hearing of the matter, nor can it be treated as an appeal in disguise. 5. It is well settled that a review would lie only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced at the time when the order was passed, or on any other analogous ground. The review jurisdiction does not permit a rehearing of the matter merely because another view is possible or because a party believes that the decision rendered is erroneous. 6. An error apparent on the face of the record must be an error which is self-evident and does not require a long-drawn process of reasoning to establish it. Where two views are possible and the Court has adopted one such view, the same cannot be characterised as an error apparent merely because - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 the review petitioner canvasses an alternative interpretation. A review Court is not expected to sit in appeal over its own judgment and reassess the correctness of the conclusions arrived at therein. 7. Equally, a review petition cannot be founded on the repetition of arguments which were available at the time of the original hearing and were either expressly considered or are deemed to have been considered while rendering the judgment. If the contention urged requires a re-appreciation of the factual matrix, reconsideration of the evidence on record, or a re-examination of legal principles already applied, the remedy of the aggrieved party lies elsewhere and not in a review proceeding. 8. In the present case, all the three contentions urged by the review petitioner are founded on legal submissions and judicial precedents which were specifically urged before the Court at the time of hearing of the writ petition. Thus, what is required to be examined is not whether another view is possible on the merits of the controversy, but whether the judgment dated 26.02.2026 suffers from any patent error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference in review jurisdiction. It is in the - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 aforesaid limited framework that the contentions urged on behalf of the review petitioner are required to be considered. 9. The second contention urged by learned Senior Counsel is founded upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in ITC Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others. The submission is that the petitioner is a bona fide transferee who has not been attributed with any fraud, misrepresentation or other culpable conduct and that, therefore, the transfer in his favour ought to have been protected. It is contended that the rights acquired by a blameless transferee under a concluded transaction ought not to be defeated unless overriding public interest so demands. 10. At the outset, it is required to be noticed that the aforesaid judgment in ITC Limited was not cited for the first time in the present review proceedings. The said decision had been specifically relied upon and extensively addressed at the time of hearing of the writ petition. The applicability and effect of the principles laid down therein were considered by this Court while rendering the judgment sought to be reviewed. Merely because the petitioner seeks to - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 place a different emphasis on certain observations contained therein would not furnish a ground for review. 11. More importantly, the factual foundation on which the judgment in ITC Limited proceeded is materially distinct from the facts arising in the present case. In the present matter, the cancellation of the allotment and the consequential cancellation of the rights claimed by the petitioner did not emanate from an independent administrative decision of the Karnataka Housing Board. The same was the direct consequence of judicial directions issued by a Co- ordinate Bench of this Court. The said directions were subjected to appellate scrutiny before the Division Bench and were thereafter carried to the Hon'ble Apex Court. The orders passed by the Co- ordinate Bench came to be affirmed at every stage and thereby attained finality. 12. Once the issue relating to the validity of the allotment stood concluded by judicial pronouncements inter partes, the respondent- authorities were left with no discretion in the matter. Their obligation was merely to implement and give effect to the judicial directions which had attained - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 finality. The respondent-authorities could neither ignore nor sit in appeal over the said directions. Therefore, the action taken by the respondent cannot be viewed as an independent exercise of power capable of being tested on the anvil of equitable considerations applicable to ordinary transfers. The rights claimed by the petitioner necessarily remained subject to the consequences flowing from the judicial orders passed in the earlier proceedings. 13. The reliance placed on the concept of a bona fide transferee is therefore of little assistance to the petitioner in the peculiar facts of the present case. Even assuming that the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser and had acted without any mala fides, the rights claimed by him cannot override the binding effect of judicial determinations which have attained finality between the parties. Acceptance of the contention of the petitioner would effectively require this Court, in review jurisdiction, to revisit and dilute the effect of orders passed by a Co-ordinate Bench, affirmed by the Division Bench and further upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Such an exercise is wholly impermissible. - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 14. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the contention founded upon the decision in ITC Limited does not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record. The same amounts to nothing more than a request for reconsideration of an issue already considered and decided. The second contention is accordingly rejected. 15. The third contention relates to the applicability of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The submission of learned Senior Counsel is that the order directing cancellation of the allotment had been passed on 02.08.2014 and, therefore, any action resulting in cancellation of the sale deed ought to have been taken within a period of three years therefrom. It is contended that the action taken in the year 2020 is consequently barred by limitation. 16. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid submission. The reliance placed on Article 59 proceeds on a fundamental misconception as regards both the nature of the proceedings and the scope of the said provision. Article 59 prescribes a period of limitation for institution of a suit seeking cancellation or setting aside of an instrument or decree or for rescission of a contract. The provision regulates the - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 remedy available before a competent Court. It does not create a substantive embargo upon the implementation of judicial directions which have attained finality. 17. The scheme of the Limitation Act is to prescribe the period within which a litigant must approach a Court or other adjudicatory forum. The consequence of expiry of limitation is ordinarily the extinguishment of the remedy and not the extinction of the underlying right, except in situations specifically provided by statute. The Limitation Act does not operate as a restriction upon an authority carrying out a direction issued by a competent Court. Thus, the premise that the respondent was required to initiate independent proceedings for cancellation within three years is itself misconceived. 18. In the present case, the Karnataka Housing Board was not seeking cancellation of the sale deed on the basis of an independent cause of action arising in its favour. The cancellation was effected as a consequence of and in implementation of the directions issued by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. Those directions were thereafter affirmed by the Division Bench and approved by the Hon'ble Apex - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 Court. Once the issue attained finality through the judicial process, the implementation thereof cannot be equated with the institution of a suit governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act. 19. If the contention of the petitioner were to be accepted, it would lead to the anomalous consequence that a judicial direction, though affirmed by superior Courts and having attained finality, could become incapable of implementation merely on account of lapse of time. Such an interpretation would run contrary to settled principles governing the enforcement and implementation of judicial orders. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that Article 59 has no application whatsoever to the facts of the present case. The third contention is accordingly rejected. 20. Coming to the first contention, learned Senior Counsel submits that the document executed in favour of the petitioner was a conditional sale deed which effected a transfer in presenti and that, upon execution of the said document, title stood vested in the petitioner. It is contended that once title had so vested, the Karnataka Housing Board could not have unilaterally cancelled the sale deed and any - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 challenge thereto could only have been pursued before a competent civil court. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited and Others v. S.N. Raj Kumar and Another. 21. This contention also does not merit acceptance. The issue relating to the nature and effect of the conditional sale deed was specifically raised and considered at the time of disposal of the writ petition. The judgment sought to be reviewed has dealt with the said contention and recorded reasons for rejecting the same. What the petitioner now seeks is a reappreciation of the very same contention on merits. Such an exercise falls outside the scope of review jurisdiction. 22. Even otherwise, the contention overlooks the peculiar factual and legal position arising in the present case. The sale deed relied upon by the petitioner was not an unconditional conveyance divorced from the allotment. The rights claimed thereunder were intrinsically connected with and flowed from the allotment made by the Karnataka Housing Board. The validity of that allotment itself became the - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 subject matter of challenge and ultimately stood annulled pursuant to judicial orders which have attained finality. 23. The cancellation of the allotment was not the result of any unilateral administrative decision taken by the Karnataka Housing Board in disregard of the sale deed. Rather, it was the consequence of judicial adjudication culminating in orders passed by a Co- ordinate Bench of this Court, affirmed by the Division Bench and thereafter approved by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Once such orders attained finality, the respondent-authorities were bound to implement the same. The petitioner cannot seek to rely upon the conditional sale deed in isolation and contend that the rights flowing therefrom survive unaffected by those judicial determinations. 24. The reliance placed on S.N. Raj Kumar is also misplaced. The said decision dealt with a situation where the vendor sought to unilaterally cancel a completed conveyance despite having transferred title under a registered sale deed. In the present case, the cancellation is not traceable to an independent unilateral exercise undertaken by the Karnataka Housing Board. The cancellation is merely - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27313 RP No. 159 of 2026 consequential to and in implementation of binding judicial orders which have attained finality inter partes. The ratio laid down in S.N. Raj Kumar, therefore, has no application to the peculiar facts of the present case. 25. This Court is therefore satisfied that none of the contentions advanced by the review petitioner discloses any error apparent on the face of the record. The submissions urged are, in essence, an attempt to secure a rehearing on issues which were available at the time of the original proceedings, were in fact urged, and were considered by this Court while rendering the judgment under review. Such an exercise is impermissible in a review jurisdiction. 26. For all the aforesaid reasons, no ground warranting exercise of review jurisdiction is made out. The review petition is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- (SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE LN, List No.: 2 Sl No.: 4