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2026 DAILYLAW 22237 (AP)

M/s. Shubham Infra v. Smt. Kolventy Kaveri Lakshmi Bai

CRP/1631/2025 · 2026-03-31

Ravi Cheemalapati

body2026

Judgment text

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APHC010343162025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH PRESENT:THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1631/2025 Between: 1. M/S. SHUBHAM INFRA, REP BY ITS PARTNER KASULU, S/O.LATE CHINNABBAYI AGED 72 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.66 2-65, SRI RAM NAGAR, MALKAPURAM, VISAKHAPATNAM 1. SMT KOLVENTY KAVERI LAKSHMI BAI, W/O.LATE K. SUNDAR RAO, AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS, R/O.D.NO.50 SASTRY LAYOUT, NEAR LOVE DALE SCHOOL SEETHAMMADHARA, VISAKHAPATNAM 2. SMT SHARAD RANA, W/O.RANJODH SINGH RANA, AGED 68 YEARS, R/O.H.NO.59, GOLDEN HOMES, VIDHAN SABHA ROAD, SHANKAR NAGAR, KHAMARDIH, SHANKAR NAGAR, BINDRAWANGARH, RAIP Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,praying that in the circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein,the High Court may be pleased toThe above named petitioner begs to present this Memora Civil Revision Petition to this Honble Court, against the Order dated 18.06.2025 in lA No. 1314 of 2025 in OS No.201 of 2024 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam, IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying tha in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1631/2025 M/S. SHUBHAM INFRA, REP BY ITS PARTNER KASULU, S/O.LATE CHINNABBAYI AGED 72 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.66 65, SRI RAM NAGAR, MALKAPURAM, VISAKHAPATNAM ...PETITIONER AND SMT KOLVENTY KAVERI LAKSHMI BAI, W/O.LATE K. SUNDAR RAO, AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS, R/O.D.NO.50-52-15/18, SASTRY LAYOUT, NEAR LOVE DALE SCHOOL SEETHAMMADHARA, VISAKHAPATNAM-530011. SMT SHARAD RANA, W/O.RANJODH SINGH RANA, AGED 68 YEARS, R/O.H.NO.59, GOLDEN HOMES, VIDHAN SABHA ROAD, SHANKAR NAGAR, KHAMARDIH, SHANKAR NAGAR, BINDRAWANGARH, RAIPUR, CHATTISGARH-492007. ...RESPONDENT(S): Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,praying that in the circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein,the High Court may be pleased toThe above named petitioner begs to present this Memora Civil Revision Petition to this Honble Court, against the Order dated 18.06.2025 in lA No. 1314 of 2025 in OS No.201 of 2024 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam, Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3332] THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI M/S. SHUBHAM INFRA, REP BY ITS PARTNER CHALAPKA KASULU, S/O.LATE CHINNABBAYI AGED 72 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.66- 65, SRI RAM NAGAR, MALKAPURAM, VISAKHAPATNAM-530011. ...PETITIONER SMT KOLVENTY KAVERI LAKSHMI BAI, W/O.LATE K. SUNDAR RAO, 15/18, BALAYYA SASTRY LAYOUT, NEAR LOVE DALE SCHOOL SMT SHARAD RANA, W/O.RANJODH SINGH RANA, AGED 68 YEARS, R/O.H.NO.59, GOLDEN HOMES, VIDHAN SABHA ROAD, SHANKAR NAGAR, KHAMARDIH, SHANKAR NAGAR, 492007. ...RESPONDENT(S): Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,praying that in the circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein,the High Court may be pleased toThe above named petitioner begs to present this Memorandum of Civil Revision Petition to this Honble Court, against the Order dated 18.06.2025 in lA No. 1314 of 2025 in OS No.201 of 2024 on the file of the t in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 2 may be pleased to stay all further proceedings in O.S.No.201/2024 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam, IA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to stay the operation of orders Dt. 18-06-2025 i IA.No.1314/2025 in in OS.No.201 of 2024, on the file of the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam, pending disposal of the above revision petition in the interest of justice. Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. G RAMA GOPAL Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. G V S MEHAR KUMAR 2. BANDA SAI SAMPATH KUMAR RESERVED ON 09.03.2026 PRONOUNCED ON 01.04.2026 UPLOADED ON 07.04.2026 RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 3 ORDER This Civil Revision Petition is filed questioning the legality and correctness of the order dated 18.06.2025 passed in I.A.No.1314 of 2025 in O.S.No.201 of 2024 by the learned Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam. 2. The petitioner is respondent no.1/plaintiff, respondent no.1 is the petitioner/third party and respondent no.2 is the respondent no.2/defendant in I.A.No. 1314 of 2025 in O.S.No.201 of 2024 on the file of the Court of the learned Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam. 3. In the suit filed by the Revision Petitioner in O.S.No.201 of 2024 for specific performance of agreement of sale against respondent no.2/ defendant, the respondent no.1/third party to the suit filed petition vide I.A.No.1314 of 2025 under Order-1, Rule-10 of Code of Civil Procedure seeking permission of this Court to come on record as defendant no.2, contending that he is the absolute owner of the property covered under the specific performance suit and the defendant has no right and title over the plaint schedule property, which originally was purchased by maternal grandmother of respondent no.1 under registered sale deed and later executed Will bequeathing the said property to respondent no.1. The plaintiff resisted the said claim by filing counter contending that respondent no.1 being a third party to the suit contract of sale, cannot be permitted to come RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 4 on record, since the same would alter the character and scope of the present suit and he is neither a necessary nor a proper party for specific performance suit. The learned trial Judge, upon hearing the counsel for the parties and perusing the material available on record, allowed the petition. The said order has been assailed in this Civil Revision Petition. 4. Heard Sri G.Rama Gopal, learned counsel for the revision petitioner/ plaintiff, Sri G.V.S.Mehar Kumar, learned counsel for respondent no.1/third party/proposed defendant no.2 and Sri B.Sai Sampath Kumar, learned counsel for respondent no.2/defendant no.2. 5. Sri G.Ram Goal, learned counsel for the revision petitioner while reiterating the contents of the counter filed before the trial Court and grounds of revision petition would contend that the petitioner being a third party to the agreement to sell is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit for specific performance. He would further contend that addition of a third party to the suit would convert the suit into a different character which can never be permitted and the revision petitioner being dominus litus cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not seek any relief, however, the trial court upon erroneous view of the matter passed the impugned order permitting a third party to come on record as one of the defendants thereby RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 5 changed the character of the suit. Accordingly, prayed to allow the Civil Revision Petition setting aside the orders impugned. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal & others1. 6. On the other hand, Sri G.V.S.Mehar Kumar, learned counsel for respondent no.1/proposed defendant, while reiterating the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the petition before the trial Court would contend that the petitioner, who claims title over the property, is a proper and necessary party to the suit for effective adjudication of the lis as to whether the defendant to the suit is entitled to execute any agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. He would further contend that addition of the respondent no.1 as defendant to the suit would avoid multiplicity of litigation and hence she is a necessary party to the suit and the learned trial Judge upon analyzing the facts and circumstances of the case in proper perspective rightly allowed the petition and the same does not deserve interference of this Court. The Civil Revision Petition being meritless deserves dismissal. Accordingly, prayed to dismiss the Civil Revision Petition. 1. 2005(6) SCC 733 RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 6 7. Perused the material available on record and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 8. In a suit filed for specific performance, the respondent no.1, who is a third party to the suit agreement of sale filed petition to come on record as one of the defendants on the ground that she is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and that the defendant to the suit cannot execute agreement of sale since has no right and title over the plaint schedule property. 9. In the decision in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal & others relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner (supra 1), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus: “7. [Ed.: Para 7 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./78/2005 dated 5-9-2005.] In our view, a bare reading of this provision, namely, second part of Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (2) CPC would clearly show that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract or if they are dead, their legal representatives as also a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are — (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. 13. From the aforesaid discussion, it is pellucid that necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the court or that RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 7 there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before the court would be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person. 17 [Ed.: Para 17 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./78/2005 dated 5-9-2005.] . It is difficult to conceive that while deciding the question as to who is in possession of the contracted property, it would be open to the court to decide the question of possession of a third party or a stranger as first the lis to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondent 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against Respondents 2 and 3. Secondly in that case, whoever asserts his independent possession of the contracted property has to be added in the suit, then this process may continue without a final decision of the suit. Apart from that, the intervener must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. In Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd. [(1956) 1 All ER 273 : (1956) 1 QB 357 : (1956) 2 WLR 372] it has been held that a person is legally interested in the answers to the controversies only if he can satisfy the court that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally. 20.[Ed.: Para 20 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./78/2005 dated 5-9-2005.] It was also argued on behalf of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 that to avoid multiplicity of suits it would be appropriate to join Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 as party-defendants as the question relating to the possession of the suit property would be finally and effectively settled. In view of our discussions made hereinabove, this argument also which weighed with the two courts below has no substance. In view of the discussions made hereinearlier, the two tests by which a person who is seeking addition in a pending suit for specific performance of the contract for sale must be satisfied. As stated hereinearlier, first, there must be a right to the same relief against a party relating to the same subject-matter involved in the proceedings for specific performance of contract for sale, and secondly, it would not be possible for the court to pass effective decree or order in the absence of such a party. If we apply these two tests in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be evident that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 cannot satisfy the above two tests for determining the question whether a stranger/third party is entitled to be added under Order 1 Rule 10 RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 8 CPC only on the ground that if the decree for specific performance of the contract for sale is passed in absence of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11, their possession over the contracted property can be disturbed or they can be dispossessed from the contracted property in execution of the decree for specific performance of the contract for sale obtained by the appellant against Respondents 2 and 3. Such being the position, in our view, it was not open to the High Court or the trial court to join other cause of action in the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, and therefore, the two courts below acted illegally and without jurisdiction in allowing the application for addition of parties in the pending suit for specific performance of contract for sale filed at the instance of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11. The learned counsel for Respondents 1 and 4 to 11, however, urged that since the two courts below had exercised their jurisdiction in allowing the application for addition of parties, it was not open to this Court to interfere with such order of the High Court as well as of the trial court. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for Respondents 1 and 4 to 11. As discussed hereinearlier, it is open to the Court to interfere with the order if it is held that two courts below had acted without jurisdiction or acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of their jurisdiction in the matter of allowing the application for addition of parties filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. The question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added has direct interest in the controversy involved in the suit. Can it be said that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 had any direct interest in the subject-matter of the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale? In our view Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 had no direct interest in the suit for specific performance because they are not parties to the contract nor do they claim any interest from the parties to the litigation. One more aspect may be considered in this connection. It is that the jurisdiction of the court to add an applicant shall arise only when the court finds that such applicant is either a necessary party or a proper party.” 10. The above observations make it clear that a purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 9 11. In Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.)2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus: “13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed : (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12) ‘9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [[1951] A.C. 737 (HL)] (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D) […]’ ---xxx--- 14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi case [(2005) 6 SCC 733] is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced.” (Emphasis supplied) 2.(2007) 10 SCC 82. RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 10 22. This Court in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417, explained the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC. In the unique facts which existed therein, there was a likelihood that the appellant would secure a right/interest in the suit property if the suit for specific performance instituted by the respondent against the Airport Authority of India was dismissed. It was held, that in such a factual circumstance and such being the right asserted by the appellant, it cannot be made a party to the suit for specific performance. While holding so, it was observed that although the general rule is that the plaintiff, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and seek relief, yet this rule of impleadment would be subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) wherein courts are vested with the discretion to strike out or add parties to a suit depending on whether their impleadment is deemed necessary or proper. It was held that, even in suits for specific performance, a court may, at any stage of the proceedings, implead a person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 23. In Mumbai International Airport (supra), this Court explained the import of the expressions “necessary party” and “proper party” as thus: “14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party : (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.” RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 11 (Emphasis supplied) 24. It is limpid in the aforesaid observation that if a party is found to either a necessary or proper party, the court would have the jurisdiction to implead him, even against the wishes of the plaintiff concerned. In Mumbai International Airport (supra) another pertinent question that arose was whether there existed any conflict between the three-judge bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733 and the decision of a two-judge bench in Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.), (2007) 10 SCC 82. 28. This Court in Mumbai International Airport (supra) was also of the view that different situations require the application of different facets of Order I Rule 10(2) and consequently, held that there was no conflict between the decisions of this Court in Kasturi (supra) and Sumtibai (supra). It was reiterated that that Order I Rule 10(2) CPC did not pertain to the ‘right’ of a non-party to be impleaded as a party but deals with the ‘judicial discretion’ of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of the proceeding. In exercising this judicial discretion, courts must act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice. 29. It was observed that the court may exercise discretion in impleading a person who is a ‘proper party’ upon an application by a non-party to the suit for specific performance. If the court is of the view that the impleadment of such a proper party will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may either refuse to implead such person or order for his impleadment on certain conditions. However, even otherwise, the court would not be precluded from impleading a ‘proper party’ unconditionally in its discretion. The relevant observations rendered in Mumbai International Airport (supra) read thus: “24.4 If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bona fides, etc., the court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non-party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party and the court finds him to be a proper party, the court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the scope of the specific performance suit; or the court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if D claiming to be a co- owner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of P representing that he is the co-owner with half-share, and P RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 12 files a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half-share, the court may permit the other co- owner who contends that D has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the defendant vendor to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other co-owner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject- matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit only the issues relating to specific performance, that is, whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced. 25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party. (Emphasis supplied)” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport ((2010) 7 SCC 417) was also of the view that different situations require the application of different facets of Order I Rule 10(2) and consequently, held that there was no conflict between the decisions in Kasturi (supra) and Sumtibai . 13. The observations made in Sumtibai (supra 2) would clearly shows that Kasturi case [(2005) 6 SCC 733] is clearly distinguishable and it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 13 be impleaded in that suit and if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. Further, to take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced. 14. Now coming to the facts of the case on hand, the specific contention of respondent no.1 is that she is absolute owner of the property being the bequest under a will executed by his maternal grandmother. It further discloses that respondent no.1 had also filed a suit vide O.S.No.119 of 2025 against the defendant and M/s. Rana Constructions for cancellation of sale deeds in relation to some other property. Therefore, as the petitioner could plead a semblance of right over the subject property claiming title adverse to the claim of a vendor of the suit agreement of sale, she can be a proper party to the suit for specific performance. 15. The learned trial Judge had rightly allowed the petition and the same does not suffer from any legal infirmity and hence does not require any interference of this Court. The Civil Revision Petition being meritless deserves dismissal. RC,J CRP No.1631 of 2025 14 16. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. ___________________________ JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI 1ST April, 2026. RR