1 2026:HHC:37921 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No.    :   404 of 2026 Decided on     :    03.09.2026 Kuldeep Sood …Petitioner Versus Sandeep Sood and another …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh,  Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the petitioner      : Mr.   Kartik   Kumar   and   Ms. Drishti Sirswal, Advocates. For the respondents  : Nemo. Virender Singh, Judge (Oral) Petitioner­Kuldeep   Sood   has   filed   the   present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution  of India, against the order, dated 30.03.2026, passed by the learned Rent Controller, Court No. 1, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rent Controller’). 2. By way of order, dated 30.03.2026, the learned Rent Controller, has dismissed the application, filed under 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:37921 Order 1 Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’), moved by petitioner   Kuldeep   Sood,   in   the   Rent   Petition,   titled   as “Sandeep Sood Vs Dimple Malhotra”. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the lis, are, hereinafter, referred to, in the same manner, in which,   they   were   referred   to,   by   the   learned   Rent Controller. 4. Facts,   in   brief,   as   borne   out   from   the documents, annexed with the petition, necessary for the adjudication of the present  lis,  may  be summed up, as under: 4.1. Landlord­Sandeep Sood has filed the petition, under   Section   14   of   the   H.P.   Urban   Rent   Control   Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rent Control Act’), against respondent Dimple Malhotra.  By way of the said petition, landlord   Sandeep   Sood,   sought   the   eviction   of   tenant­ Dimple   Malhotra,   from   the   demised   premises,   on   the ground of non­payment of rent. 4.2 During the pendency of the said rent petition, an application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) read with Section 3 2026:HHC:37921 151 of CPC was filed by applicant Kuldeep Sood.  The said application,   was   filed   at   the   stage,   when   the   lis   was pending for arguments. 4.3 Applicant­Kuldeep Sood sought his impleadment as petitioner No. 2, on the ground, that he is also one of the co­owners of the property, which is the subject matter of the lis.  On the basis of his status as co­ sharer, he has asserted the fact that he has every right, title and interest in the subject matter of the lis and if he is impleaded as petitioner No. 2, in the said eviction petition, the controversy involved in the said lis, could be decided effectively. 4.4 The said application was rejected by the learned Rent Controller, vide order dated 30.03.2026. 5. Aggrieved from the said order, present petition has been filed before this Court. 6. The order, by virtue of which, the application of the   applicant,   was   rejected,   has   been   assailed,   on   the ground, that the learned Rent Controller has exceeded its jurisdiction,   while   dismissing   the   application,   as   the applicant is co­sharer of the subject matter of the lis.  The 4 2026:HHC:37921 order is stated to be perverse. According to the petitioner­ applicant,   the   learned   Rent   Controller   has   wrongly dismissed   the   application   as   the   litigation   is   at   the threshold. 7. According the the applicant, being co­sharer, he is necessary and proper party. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the petition. 8. Heard. 9. Copy of the rent petition, filed by landlord, has been annexed with the petition, as Annexure P­2. The landlord has asserted his ownership and possession over the   demised   premises   and   seeking   eviction   of   tenant Dimple Malhotra, whereas, applicant Kuldeep Sood, who has asserted himself to be the co­owner in the demised premises has filed a suit for declaration in the year 2023, seeking the following relief:­ “It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that the suit of the plaintiff may kindly be decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants with costs as follows:­ A) PRELIMINARY DECREE for partition of the share of the plaintiff and parties to the suit as recorded in the revenue   record   (i.e.   record­of­rights)   in   the   suit properties/buildings with attaches spaces comprised in Kharsa No. 184, 185, 189, 162, 163, 167, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167, situated in revenue Chak Nagar Parishad Rohru, Pratham Khasra No. 1417, 1423, 5 2026:HHC:37921 1424, 1443, 1444, 1446, 1447, 1414, 1413, 1451, 1428, 1452, 1442, 1460 situated in revenue Chak Nagar   Parishad   Rohru   Dawitiya,   Tehsil   Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. as shown in jamabandi/misal haqiyat for the year 2015­16, my be passed; B) A FINAL DECREE  be prepared in favour of the plaintiff and parties to the suit of the above detailed suit property   and   separate   possession   of   the   same   be delivered to them; C) Pass a decree to have a full and true account of all the   moneys   realized   by   defendants   No.   1   &   2   from different tenants; D) Directions to payment of the share of the plaintiff of money’s realized by the defendants 1 and 2; E) Interest on the money’s found due to the plaintiff by way of damages at 9 percent per annum or at any other equitable rate, from the date of demand; F) Interest from date of suit to date of payment at such rate as the ld. Court deems reasonable; G) A   decree   for   permanent   prohibitory   injunction restraining the defendants No. 1 & 2 from changing the nature of suit property/structures by raising constructions or   any   other   manner   whatsoever   which   amounts   to changing the nature of the suit property, creating third party   rights,   creating   charge,   lien   etc.,   over   the   suit property etc. either personally, through family members, agents,   representatives,   assignees   etc. and   also,   from taking/realizing   the   rent   executively   from   the   tenants (proforma defendants) unless the receiver is appointed by the Ld. Court for which separate application is being filed and at the same time proforma defendants/tenants also should not make payment of the rent to the defendants 1 and 2 till the appointment of receiver.” 10. The application of the applicant is totally silent about the fact, as to how he is proper and necessary party in the present lis, as H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, contains the definition of ‘landlord’ in Section 2(d) and as 6 2026:HHC:37921 per the provisions of the Rent Act, landlord can seek the eviction of the tenant, by moving the application before the Rent Controller. In the application, it is not the case of the applicant that he is entitled to receive the rent, in respect of any building or rented land. He is claiming himself to be the co­sharer. 11. Even otherwise, the present petition is also not maintainable   before   this   Court,   as   the   applicant   falls within the definition of any person, who is aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Controller, as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Rent Act, which reads as under:­ “24 (1)(b) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller, except the orders for the recovery of possession made by the   Controller   in   accordance   with   the   procedure prescribed   under   section   16,   may,   within   fifteen   days from the date of such order or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. (In computing the period of fifteen days, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded). 12. The   Rent   Controller   is   held   to   be  persona designata, and the Rent Controller does not fall within the definition of Civil Court, where the procedure is governed by   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   as   held   by   this   Court   in CMPMO No. 53 of 2025, in case titled as Jatinder Singh 7 2026:HHC:37921 Kukreja   versus   Narinder   Singh   Sood   and   another. Relevant   paragraphs   13   to   22   of   the   judgment,   are reproduced, as under:­ “13. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has used the term ‘in the Court of civil jurisdiction’ in Section 141 of the CPC. In view of the provisions of Section 141 of the CPC, now, the question, which requires to be determined, is about the fact, as to whether the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority   fall   within   the   definition   of   ‘Court   of   civil jurisdiction’ or not. 14. This question has been answered in negative, by the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, way back in the year 1949, in a case, titled as Pitman’s Shorthand   Academy   versus   B.   Lila   Ram   &   Sons, reported in AIR 1950 P&H 181. Relevant paras­17 to 21, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “17. The fact that there  are decisions  on both sides only goes to show that Judges, when confronted with the question whether a certain functionary is or is not a Court, consider   it   necessary   to   enquire   into   the matter and are not disposed to give a clear­ cut answer immediately. It follows that they have universally recognised the proposition that   a   judicial   officer,   e.   g.,   a   Senior Subordinate Judge, a District Magistrate or a   District   Judge   may   be   entrusted   with duties of a judicial or quasi­judicial­nature and yet while performing these duties he does not act as a Court. Whether this is so or not will depend on the circumstances of each particular case, namely, what was the intention   of   the   Legislature,   to   create   a Court or appoint a persona designata: what is the nature of the duties entrusted to him: what are his powers and what procedure does he follow : does he, when discharging these special duties, act in every way as a Court of law would act : does he satisfy all the tests usually applied to Courts of law ? 18. Once   it   is   conceded   that   the   Senior Subordinate Judge when acting as a Rent 8 2026:HHC:37921 Controller or the District Judge when acting as the "Appellate authority" may or may not be acting as a civil Court an enquiry into the matter  may  be undertaken   with  complete freedom from bias and untrammelled by the prepossession that a judicial officer always acts as a civil Court, no matter what duties he performs. 19. We   may   first   attempt   to   formulate   a definition of a civil Court, As far as I am aware no exhaustive definition of the term has   been   given   in   any   judicial pronouncement­English   or   Indian,   though various tests have been laid down whereby the true nature of a tribunal or authority may   be   determined. Broadly   speaking,   a Court is a place where justice is judicially administered. It is, however, clear that to say   this   much   is   not   enough. Further analysis of the authorities shows that there are   certain   ingredients   or   essential attributes of a Court of law without any of which the tribunal or the authority ceases to enjoy the dignity or character of a Court. It is   necessary,   for   instance,   that   judicial duties   be   entrusted   to   the   tribunal   by operation   of   law   and   not   by   voluntary submission by the parties to a dispute. An arbitrator, therefore, cannot be considered as a Court of law. Again, the tribunal must adjudicate   upon   civil   disputes. To adjudicate   means   to   give   a   definitive decision which is final until it is set aside or modified by an "Appellate Authority." It is not enough that the tribunal should give an opinion   or   act   in   an   advisory   capacity. Therefore, a Collector  acting under S. 18, Land Acquisition Act who acts merely in an advisory capacity cannot be looked upon as a Court. Civil disputes again mean disputes whose nature is justiciable i.e., where the law of the land recognises the wrong and provide   a   remedy. The   decision   of   non­ judicial disputes cannot be treated as the administration   of   justice. Again,   it   is   not enough that a Court of law should conduct its   proceedings   with   fairness   and impartiality. It must decide them according 9 2026:HHC:37921 to   the   law   of   the   land. It   must   not   be affected   by   ulterior   considerations   or matters   of   executive   policy. The   Privy Council   in   Shell   Co.,   Australia   Ltd.   v. Federal   Commr. of   Taxation,   1931   A.   C. 275: (100 L. J. P. C. 55), held that a Board of Revenue was not a Court because it has to   take   into   consideration   matters   of executive policy. In Manavala Goundan v. Kumarappa Reddy, 30 Mad. 326 (17 M. L. J. 313), a District Registrar was held not to be a Court because he did not administer justice   judicially. Again,   the   rules   of procedure   which   the   Court   of   law   must follow cannot be arbitrary. The procedure must be defined by statute or recognised by law. In the Municipal Corporation, Rangoon v. M. A. Shakur, 3 Rang. 560; (A. I. R. 1926 Rang. 25), a Full Bench of the Rengoon High Court   held   that   the   Chief   Justice   of   the Rangoon Small Cause Court acting under S. 14,   Rangoon   Municipal   Act   could   not   be said to act as a Court because he was free to disregard the procedure laid down by the Civil   Procedure   Code. The   Judge   was entitled under S. 14, Rangoon Municipal Act to   make   such   enquiry   as   he   deemed necessary,   and   this   departure   from   the ordinary rules of procedure as laid down by the   Civil   Procedure   Code   was   considered sufficient to take him out of the category of a Court of law. In Manager, Spring Mills v. Ambekar,   MANU/MH/0099/1947   :   A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 188: (I.L.R (1948) Bom. 863), the authority   acting   under   the   Payment   of Wages Act was held not to be a Court of law because (1) the procedure followed was not   the   procedure   prescribed   for   a   civil Court, and (2) the authority was treated as a special body set up to adjudicate upon civil rights and a distinction had been made between an application to the authority and a   suit   filed   in   a   civil   Court. Similarly,   in Sudagar   Choudhury   v.   Radha   Raman, MANU/BH/0171/1948:   A.I.R.   1949   Pat. 333,   it   was   held   that   the   District   Judge when   exercising   jurisdiction   under   S.   78, Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act 10 2026:HHC:37921 was not a Court because (1) the District. Judge acted as a revisional Court although ordinarily it had no such power in respect of the Panchayat, and (2) the procedure which he   could   follow   was   unfettered. For instance, he could dispense with the rules of evidence and legal practitioners were not allowed   to   appear   before   him. In   many cases   it   has   been   held   that   where   the Presiding Officer of the Court rather  than the Court is entrusted with special powers the Presiding Officer is to be looked upon as a persona, designata. 20. A   Court   of   law   may,   therefore,   be defined   as   a   tribunal   dealing   with   and adjudicating   upon   civil   disputes   by operation   of   law   in   a   judicial   manner untroubled   by   ulterior   considerations   or matters  of executive  policy  and  observing certain definite rules of procedure which are either defined by statute or recognised by practice. It may be that a tribunal falling under this definition may yet not be a Court of law, but from the above discussion it will be clear that if any of these attributes are missing the tribunal certainly falls short of being a Court of law. 21. Applying this test to the Controller and the   "Appellate   Authority"   appointed   under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act we find that in the first place that Act does not entrust the functions of a Controller to the Senior Subordinate Judge as such, nor does it   appoint   the   District   Judge   as   the "Appellate   Authority". The   Act  reserves   to the   Provincial   Government   the   power   of appointing   Controllers   and   "Appellate Authorities." Non­judicial officers or indeed non­officials   could   easily   have   been appointed   to   function   as   Controllers   and "Appellate Authorities" under the Act and in that case it could not have been said that the persons so appointed were civil Courts. It was by a subsequent notification that the Government appointed Senior  Sub Judges as Rent Controllers and the District Judges as   Appellate   Authorities."   In   the   second place, the procedure laid down is not the 11 2026:HHC:37921 procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code except in two or three respects e. g., power has been given to the Rent Controller and   the   "Appellate   Authority"   to   summon and examine witnesses. The orders made by the Controller or the 'Appellate Authority" can be enforced by a civil Court as if they were decrees of that Court. A modification of the principle of res judicata has also been introduced by the provisions of S. 14. None of   the   other   incidents   of   a   Court   of   law, however, obtain. The "Appellate Authority" in hearing an appeal from the decision of the Controller can make any further enquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Collector, and this contemplates even a private   enquiry,   should   the   "Appellate Authority"   consider   it   necessary. Such   a course would be wholly foreign to the duties of a Court of law. Again, it is to be noted that S. 15, sub­s. (4) makes a distinction between a Court of law and the Controller, for it says that the order of the Controller cannot be called in question in any Court of law. It is by itself sufficient to indicate that it was not the intention of the Legislature to create   a   Court   of   law   but   to   appoint   a persona designata who would be entrusted with certain specific functions. We thus find that many of the attributes of a Court of law are not to be found in the Controller or the "Appellate Authority". (self emphasis supplied) 15. The   proceedings   before   the   learned   Rent Controller are specialized quasi judicial processes, governed by Rent Control Act, aiming to regulate the relationship between the landlord and tenant, including the rent fixation and eviction. 16. As per the Rent Control Act, ‘Controller’ has been defined under Section 2 (c), in the following terms: “2. Definitions. ­ In   this   Act,   unless   the   context   otherwise requires, ­ (a) … … … 12 2026:HHC:37921 (b) … … … (c)   “Controller”   means   any   person   who   is appointed   by   the   State   Government   to perform the functions of the Controller under this Act.” 17. Meaning thereby, the Rent Controller is not a Court,  but,  persona  designata. Similarly, the Appellate Authority, as per Section 24 of the Rent Control Act is also persona designata, as has been held   in  Pitman’s   Shorthand   Academy’s   case (supra). 18. The   question,   with   regard   to   the applicability of the provisions of the CPC, again arose before a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana   High   Court,   in  Ram   Dass   versus Sukhdev   Kaur   and   another,  reported   in  AIR 1981 P&H 301,  wherein, it has been held that the Rent Controllers are not Courts stricto sensu and, as such, Section 141 of the CPC cannot be invoked. Relevant paras­3 to 5 and 8 of the said judgment, are reproduced, as under: 3. Now   to   appreciate   the   aforesaid   legal question what calls for pointed attention at the out­set is the very nature of the tribunal exercising   jurisdiction   under   the East Punjab   Urban   Rent   Restriction   Act, 1949(hereinafter   called   'the   Act'). Section 2(b) of the Act defining the word 'Controller' is in the following terms:­­ "Controller" means any person who is   appointed   by   the   State Government to perform the function of a Controller under this Act." It would be manifest from the above that a wide­ranging   power   is  given   to   the   State government   to   appoint   any   person   as   a 'Controller' under the Act. Again reference to Section   15(1)(a) empowering   the   State Government   to   appoint   the   Appellate Authority is instructive:­­ “The   State   Government   may,   by general   or   special   order,   by notification   confer   on   such   officers and authorities as they think fit, the 13 2026:HHC:37921 powers   of   Appellate   Authorities   for the purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as maybe specified in the order." This would again show the wide amplitude of   the   power   vested   in   the   State Government   to   name   the   Appellate Authorities under the Act. 4. I   may   point   out   that   considerable misapprehension and confusion sometimes arises   in   this   context   from   the   fact   that usually the powers of the Controller under the Act have been conferred on subordinate Judges   and   the   powers   of   Appellate Authority now are also specifically vested by notification in the District Judges. This fortuitous   circumstance,   however,   should not lead one to the error of assuming that there   by   the   controllers   or   the   Appellate authorities   became   Civil   courts   as   such. They   retain   their   essential   nature   as tribunals   or   person   designate   under   the special statute. It is instructive to remind oneself   that   under   a   sister   statue, namely, Haryana   Urban   (Control   of   Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 , the powers of the controllers   were   at   one   time   taken   away from the subordinate Judges and vested in the sub­Divisional Officers and similarly the Deputy Commissioners of the districts were made   the   Appellate   Authorities   by   a notification. By Section 15 , Clause (6) of the Haryana   urban   (Control   of   Rent   and Eviction)   Act,   1973,   the   financial commissioner   was   designated   by   the statute itself as the revisional Authority to the   exclusion   of   the   High   Court. Though there   is   recently   a   reversion   to   the   old practice,   the   above   circumstances   rightly highlight   the   fact   that   if   would   be misleading to assume that the controllers or the   Appellate   authorities   are   necessarily Civil Courts. 5. I deem it unnecessary to labour the point because within this jurisdiction, it has been settled   law   that   the   Controllers   and   the Appellate Authority under the Act are not 14 2026:HHC:37921 even   courts   and   are   indeed   persons designate. Way back it was authoritatively held   by   the   Full   Bench   in   Pitman's Shorthand   Academy   v.   B.   Lila   Ram   and Sons, AIR 1950 East Punj 181, as follows (at p. 188):­­ “.......With   great   respect,   therefore,   I must differ from the pronouncement of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court   and  it   is   clear   to   me   that   the intention   of   the   Legislature   was   to appoint   persona   designate   to   perform specific   duties   and it  was  further   the intention that these persons would not be   governed   by   the   ordinary   rules   of procedure, nor would their decisions be subject to appeal or revision in a Court of law, and I must, therefore, hold that the   Rent   controller   and   "Appellate Authority"   are   not   Courts   of   law subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P. C." Apart   from   the   afore   said   authoritative enunciation, reference is also called for to the provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of the Act, which are in the following terms:­­ “16. Power to summon and enforce attendance   of   witnesses.­­For   the purposes   of   this   Act,   an   Appellate Authority   or   a   Controller   appointed under the act shall have the same powers of summoning and enforcing the   attendance   of   witnesses   and compelling   the   production   of evidence   as  are  vested   in   a   Court under the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure, 1908." "17. Execution of Order.­­Every order made under Section 10, or 13, and every   order   passed   on   appeal under Section   15 shall   be   executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court." It would be thus manifest on principles also from the relevant statutory provisions that 15 2026:HHC:37921 the Civil Procedure Code as such does not govern the proceedings under the Act except to the limited extent provided for under Ss. 16 and 17 thereof. Even by applying these provisions most liberally one cannot bring in either expressly or by necessary implication the   rest   of   the   provisions   of   the   Civil Procedure Code. In particular it would be evident   that   the   specific   and   detailed provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure   Code   would   not,   therefore,   be applicable   proprio   vigore   to   the   rent jurisdiction. The   controllers   and   the Appellate   Authorities   being   persona designate are entitled to devise their own procedure within the confines prescribed by the Act itself. 6. … … … 7. … … … 8. In fairness to Mr. J. R. Mittal, it may be mentioned that he had first sought to place reliance on Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is in the following terms:­­ "Miscellaneous proceedings.­­The procedure provided   in   this   Code   in   regard   to   suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction." From the above it would be plain that the contention of the learned counsel is not well conceived. The   aforesaid   provision   makes the procedure applicable to proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. As has been already indicated above, it is well settled that   the   Rent   Controllers   are   not   Court stricto sensu, but are persona designate, as held by a string of judgments in this Court. Consequently section   141 of   the   Code   of Civil  Procedure   cannot  be invoked   in  this context.” (self emphasis supplied) 19. Had the intention of the Legislature been to make   the   procedure,   as   contained   in   the   CPC, applicable   to   the   proceedings,   under   the   Rent Control Act, before the Rent Controller, then, there 16 2026:HHC:37921 would   have   no   hesitation   for   the   Legislature   to apply the same, in clear terms, whereas, by way of Rule 12 of the Rent Control Rules, it has been provided that the Controller shall be guided by the principle of procedure, as laid down in the CPC. 20. The proforma of the petition, under Rule 3 and   sub­Rule   (3)   to   Rule   4   of   the   Rent   Control Rules,   has   been   prescribed,   which   has   been prescribed, keeping in view the legislative intent to decide the petition, in a summary manner. 21. The Rent Controller cannot proceed with the eviction petition, filed under Section 14 or Section 17 of the Rent Control Act, as per the procedure, prescribed under the CPC. The same is governed by Rule 5, which prescribes the verification, as per Order VI Rules 14 and 15 of the CPC.  Similarly, by way of Rules 14 and 15 of the Rent Control Rules, procedure for filing the appeal and revision, has been prescribed. 22. If the above Rules are seen, in the light of the provisions of the CPC, then, it can safely be held that the Legislature has provided a window, by way of Rule 12 of the Rent Control Rules, qua the   applicability   of   the   principle   of   procedure, which   shall   guide   the   Rent   Controller,   while deciding the eviction petition.” 13. Being guided by the above decision, if the facts and   circumstances   of   the   present   case   are   seen,   the application   under   Order   1   Rule   10(2)   CPC,   is   not maintainable, before  the learned Rent Controller.   Even otherwise, the pleadings on record are too short to clothe the applicant with the status of a ‘landlord’, as defined 17 2026:HHC:37921 under the Rent Act.   Consequently, the instant petition is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 14. No order as to costs. 15. Parties, through  their counsel, are directed to appear before the learned Rent Controller, on 24.09.2026, at 10.00 a.m. ( Virender Singh ) Judge 03rd September, 2026 (Pramod Kumar)