2026:HHC:37956-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No.4812 of 2021 and connected matters. Reserved on:19.08.2026 Decided on: 08.09.2026 (Uploaded on 08.09.2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. CWP No. 4812 of 2021 Jagdish Thakur …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. CWP No. 4813 of 2021 Ajay Justa …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. CWP No. 4814 of 2021 Om Prakash Sharma …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. CWP No. 4815 of 2021 Jai Gopal Rajta …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. CWP No. 5099 of 2021 Sunil Mahanta …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 2026:HHC:37956-DB 6. CWP No. 5100 of 2021 Rajesh Rajta …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. CWP No. 5102 of 2021 Harshwardhan Chauhan …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. CWP No. 5113 of 2021 Puran Chand Kalta …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. CWP No. 5114 of 2021 Sandeep Chauhan …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10. CWP No. 5115 of 2021 Khamesh Chand Beakta …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11. CWP No. 6291 of 2021 Lokinder Singh Raitka …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 2026:HHC:37956-DB Coram Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Tejasvi Dogra and Mr. Ravinder Singh Chandel, Advocate, in the respective writ petitions. For the Respondents: Mr.Anup Rattan, Advocate General with Mr. L.N. Sharma, Additional Advocate General and Ms. Seema Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for the respondents-State, in all the writ petitions. Mr. Ajay Sharma, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate, for respondents No. 4 & 5 in CWPs No. 4812 to 4815 of 2021. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge These writ petitions involving common questions of law and facts, were connected and were accordingly being listed together. For convenience, reference hereinafter has been made to facts from lead case, CWP No. 4812 of 2021 (Jagdish Thakur versus State of H.P. and others) 2. The case 2(i) Petitioner is a transporter and owns two buses. In the year 2012, petitioner was granted route permit as 1Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes. 4 2026:HHC:37956-DB under:- “i) One Single Trip (1ST) from Shimla-Theog-Sharontha- Rohru-Larot. (Total route distance= 176 Km approximately). ii) One ST (1ST) from Larot-Rohru-Sharontha-Theog- Shimla (Total route distance= 176 Km approximately).” In the year 2018, petitioner applied to the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), District Shimla for modification of route permit from his existing route. Petitioner’s application was considered by RTA Shimla in its meeting convened on 11.06.2018 under the Chairmanship of the Director Transport, Himachal Pradesh and was allowed under Item No. 2 (A) at Serial No. 4 of RTA meeting dated 11.06.2018 in following terms:- Sr. No . Name of Bus owner Bus No Present Route Modificat ion Desired After modification Variation in route in KM Decision of RTA Curtailment Addition/ Extension 4 Sh. Jagdish Thakur, S/o Sh. Rajender Singh, Vill. Patinal, PO Mahog, Tehsil Theog, Distt. Shimla. HP HP 63B- 1453 & HP63B -0862 Larot- Rohru- Sharontha -Theog- Shimla=1st Larot- Rohru- Theog- Shimla via Hatkoti, Jubbal=1st Kharapathar to Rohru via tikkar RR=58 KM (approx.) Kharapathar to Rohru vial Jubbal NH=32 KM (approx.) Variation Approx 26 KM (Curtailmen t Sh. Jagdish Thakur owner of bus present before the RTA, Heard. The Case was examined by RTA U/S 80(3) of MV Act 1988 and decided to allow the modificatio n of present route as proposed in larger interest of public, subject to adjustment of timings with existing bus operator's, production / verification of distance certificates, payment of 5 2026:HHC:37956-DB outstandin g dues and completion of all codal formalities. The RTA further directed that in case of curtailment in present route, the owner of bus shall submit the undertakin g that "there is alternate bus service "on the curtailed route. In view of above decision, route permit was issued to the petitioner on 18.01.2019 as under: - “i) One ST (1ST) from Shimla-Theog-Jubbal-Hatkoti- Rohru-Larot (Total Route Distance= 156 Km approximately). ii) One ST (1ST) from Larot-Rohru-Hatkoti-Jubbal-Theog- Shimla (Total Route Distance= 156 Km approximately).” Petitioner has been plying his buses on the above-mentioned modified permitted route. 2(ii) A dispute arose in Ajay Parihar versus State of H.P. and Ors2, pertaining to grant of route permits by the Regional Transport Officer Dharamshala, District Kangra. While deciding this writ petition, Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court made certain strong general observations regarding illegal exercise of power in issuance 2 CWP No. 7295 of 2012 decided on 18.05.2016 6 2026:HHC:37956-DB of permits, taking advantage of ‘permit raj’ by the Regional Transport Officers that “this Court must have predominance and pre-eminence over action of such authorities”. Though the controversy was related to action and procedure followed by the Regional Transport Officer Dharamshala, but general observations requiring actions by the concerned authorities were made as under: - “Taking advantage of the Permit Raj, the issuance of permits has plummet to that level where the Regional Transport Officers (RTOs) are ruling the roost. It is, therefore, high time that this court must have predominance and pre-eminence over the action of such authorities. 2 to 6………………. 7. It is further not in dispute that not only the applications for grant of route permit were considered suo motu, but thereafter these permits were also granted in favour of private operators. Therefore, the moot question that arises for consideration is as to whether Regional Transport Authority or any one of its officers was competent to have devised such a procedure which otherwise is not contemplated under the Rules. 8. The procedure regulating the conduct of business of State Transport Authorities and the Regional Transport Authorities is provided under Rule 60 of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’) which reads thus…………………………………….. 9. It is evident from a bare perusal of sub rule (2) of Rule 60 that the Secretary concerned of the authority 7 2026:HHC:37956-DB shall issue to each member of the Regional Transport Authority a copy of the agenda ten day’s before the actual date of the meeting at which it is to be considered and thereafter further procedure regarding the mode and manner in which the business is to be conducted has been contemplated. 10. It is more than settled that an action to be taken in a particular manner as provided by a statute, must be taken, done or performed in the manner prescribed or not at all. More than eighty years back, the Hon’ble Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad Vs King Emperor, (AIR 1936, PC 253) held that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the things must be done in that way or not at all and this has been approved and further expanded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments……………………………… 11. Unfortunately these principles have been violated in wholesome in the case in hand, whereby Regional Transport Authority has arbitrarily indulged in dolling out route permits. Such flagrant abuse and misuse of power cannot be countenanced. As a matter of fact, the Regional Transport Authority was not even conferred or even vested with any discretionary power and was thus required to have strictly adhered to the procedure as prescribed in the Rules. 12. Therefore, when an action is taken in furtherance of explicit power given by a statute, the legitimacy of invoking such power shall depend entirely upon the extent of achieving net and objective for which the statute enables the exercise of such power. 13. It is more than settled that law cannot be administered with an evil eye or with an unequal 8 2026:HHC:37956-DB hand or for an oblique or unworthy performance and the arms of this court will be long enough to reach out and strike down such a view with a heavy hand. 14. The Regional Transport Authority, more particularly, the Regional Transport Officer could not have abused his/their power and trust under the camouflage of performance of their public duty and thereby in an arbitrary and illegal manner allotted route permits, that too by receiving suo motu applications in utter disregard and gross violation of the procedure contemplated under the Rules. 15. It needs to be reiterated that public offices, both big and small, are sacred trusts. Such offices are meant for use and not abuse and in case repositories of such offices surpass the rule, then the law is not that powerless and would step in to quash such arbitrary orders. 16. Respondent No.4, being a creation of statute, is admittedly a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and cannot, therefore, act like a private individual, who is free to act in a manner whatsoever he likes, unless it is interdicted or prohibited by law. It is settled that the State and its instrumentalities have to act strictly within the four corners of law and all its activities are government by Rules, regulations and instructions. It is more than settled that whenever a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, then the same must be done in that manner or not at all. 17…………………………… 18. From the discussion above, it is manifest that the entire procedure as adopted by the respondents stands vitiated on account of not following the mandatory procedure as prescribed under the Rules. 9 2026:HHC:37956-DB Absence of power apart, such exercise of the respondents is fraught with danger of being activated by extraneous considerations. The action of the respondents, to say the least, is totally arbitrary 19. In ordinary circumstances, this court would have cancelled all the route permits, but since petitioner too supposedly is a beneficiary of such grant in the past (as observed earlier by this court vide its order dated 15.11.2012), this court instead directs respondent No.4 to re-invite the applications for grant of route permits strictly as per procedure prescribed under the Rules within a period of four weeks from today. Till that time, arrangement as continuing as on date shall be continued. No other point urged. With these observations, petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh for onwards circulation to State Transport Authority as also all the Regional Transport Authorities and to ensure that henceforth all the route permits are granted strictly in accordance with law.” 2(iii) At this stage itself, it will be in place to also take note of Sachin Dogar versus State of H.P. and others3, wherein Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court observed that there was no provision under the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 (the MV Act in short) and Rules framed thereunder to indicate that Regional Transport Authority could review its own order. The power of review has to be 3 CWP No. 7496 of 2014 decided on 12.12.2014 10 2026:HHC:37956-DB specifically provided, it cannot be exercised by implication; Once the decision has been taken to renew/regularize a permit, the same cannot be reviewed. The judgment is as under: - “A decision was taken by the RTA on 27.5.2014 vide item No. 4 to renew/regularize the permit of the petitioner. The RTA reviewed the decision dated 27.5.2014. The petitioner was informed vide Annexure R-1 dated 4.10.2014 that since the decision dated 8.5.2014 has been reviewed on 8.9.2014, the petitioner may apply for alternative route. 2. Mr. Ramesh Thakur, learned Asstt. Advocate General, has failed to point out any provision under the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules framed thereunder to indicate that the RTA could review his own order. 3. The power of review has to be specifically provided. It cannot be exercised by implication. Once the decision has been taken to renew/regularize the permit on 8.5.2014, the same could not be reviewed and that too in an arbitrary manner 4. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Order dated 4.10.2014 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to issue route permit to the petitioner as per decision dated 27.5.2014 within one week from today. CMP No. 19420 of 2014. 5. The applicant is not a necessary party. Consequently, the application is dismissed in view of the judgment rendered in CWP No. 7496 of 2014.” 11 2026:HHC:37956-DB 2(iv) Contempt petition bearing COPC No.130 of 2019 (Virender Singh & Anr Vs. B.C. Badalia and Ors) was instituted in Ajay Parihar2. The allegations of contempuous action, inter alia, revolved around the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority, Shimla dated 11.06.2018 and 03.01.2019 whereunder variation/extension was granted in Stage Carriage Permits. The relief clause of the contempt petition was as under:- “It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the present contempt petition may very kindly be allowed and directions as deemed fit, apart from being prayed herein-below, may very kindly be issued:- (a) Respondents/contemnors may very kindly be summoned, prosecuted and punished suitably in accordance with law, to upkeep the majesty of law in high esteem. Respondents/contemnors may very kindly be given audience only when proceedings, vide Annexures P-3 and P-4, dated 11.06.2018 and 03.01.2019, respectively, are withdrawn, being contrary to the judgment of this Hon’ble Court, Annexure P-1, and the provisions of the Act and Rules. (b) That agenda circulated with respect to meeting dated 03.01.2019 may very kindly be summoned from the respondents as despite best efforts, petitioners could not lay their hands on the same…….” Though the meetings dated 11.06.2018 and 03.01.2019 were not the specific subject matter of Ajay 12 2026:HHC:37956-DB Parihar2, but the petitioners (in the contempt petition) alleged modifications of route permits allowed under these proceedings to be in breach of directions issued in Ajay Parihar2. Incidentally, it was in terms of decisions taken in these meetings that Stage Carriage Route Permit granted to the petitioner was modified, pursuant to which the modified route permit was issued to the petitioner on 18.01.2019. 2(iv)(a) Respondents-State filed reply to the contempt petition, pleading that petitioners (therein) had the remedy of preferring appeal under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 against the route permits granted (modified) by the RTA in its proceedings dated 11.06.2018 and 03.01.2019; That the petitioners (therein) had not exercised alternate statutory remedy of appeal against the route permits/modified route permits sanctioned in the aforesaid proceedings, but instead chose to institute the contempt petition. 2(iv)(b) The contempt petition was listed on 12.09.2019, when learned Advocate General admitted oversight on part of State officials in issuance of route permits. However, further submission was made that there being no power to review the orders issuing the route permits, the State Government was handicapped, the route permits, therefore, 13 2026:HHC:37956-DB cannot be reviewed. Hon'ble Single Judge taking note of the admitted irregularity and illegality in the procedure adopted by the State officials, permitted them to review all proceedings, “under the order of the Court”. Additionally, compliance was also sought by the next date of hearing. The order passed on 12.09.2019 goes as under: - “Learned Advocate General, on instructions, candidly admits that there has been an oversight on the part of the officers of the State in issuance of permits. However, since there is no power of review these orders, therefore, the State is handicapped. Admittedly, there is irregularity/illegality in the procedure adopted by the officers of the State, therefore, they are permitted to review all such proceedings under the order of the Court and report compliance by the next date of hearing. However, it is made clear that such proceedings shall be reviewed strictly in accordance with law, so as to bring them in conformity with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules. The personal presence of the officer present in the Court is dispensed with till further orders. List on 14.11.2019.” 2(iv)(c) On 17.10.2019, present petitioner moved an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code read with Sections 11 & 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act for impleading him as intervener in COPC No. 130 of 2019. Petitioner aimed to justify the modification allowed by 14 2026:HHC:37956-DB the respondents on 11.06.2018 in his route permit. This application was dismissed on 01.11.2019 with the observation that contempt is between Court and the contemnor; Third party does not have any right to intervene in such proceedings. Applicant was reserved liberty to avail remedy as available to him in law for the redressal of his grievance. Order dated 01.11.2019 is extracted hereinafter:- “AlI these applications have been filed for impleading the applicants as interveners in the instant petition. It is more than settled that the contempt is between the Court and the alleged contemnor and no third party has any right to intervene in such proceedings. Therefore, all these applications are dismissed with liberty reserved to the applicants therein to avail remedy, as may be available to them, under the law for redressal of their grievances. COPC No. 130/2019 List on the date already fixed.” Present petitioner did not assail the orders dated 12.09.2019 and 01.11.2019 passed in the contempt petition. None of the parties to the contempt petition assailed these orders. The orders became final. 2(iv)(d) Pursuant to the order dated 12.09.2019, passed in COPC No. 130 of 2019, power of review given under the Court order was exercised by the Regional Transport Authority, Shimla. The review meeting was held on 15 2026:HHC:37956-DB 02.11.2019. The review meeting was specifically convened, ‘in compliance to the order dated 12.09.2019 passed in Contempt Petition No. 130 of 2019 to review the decisions of RTA taken in its meetings held on 11.06.2018 and 03.01.2019 in modification cases of Stage Carriage Route Permits of private stage carriage buses’. The review meeting convened on 02.11.2019 by the RTA Shimla reviewed its decisions taken in the previously held meetings of RTA Shimla on 11.06.2018 and 03.01.2019. In case of the present petitioner, the review was as under:- Sr No Name of Bus owner Bus No Present Route Modification Desired After modification Variation in route in KM Previous Decision of RTA Decision of RTA in review meeting. Curtailment Addition/Extension 4 Sh. Jagdish Thakur, S/o Sh. Rajender Singh, Vill. Patinal, PO Mahog, Tehsil Theog, Distt. Shimla. HP HP 63B- 1453 & HP63B- 0862 Larot- Rohru- Sharontha- Theog- Shimla=1st Larot-Rohru- Theog- Shimla via Hatkoti, Jubbal=1st Kharapathar to Rohru via tikkar RR=58 KM (approx.) Kharapathar to Rohru vial Jubbal NH=32 KM (approx.) Variation Approx 26 KM (Curtailment Sh. Jagdish Thakur owner of bus present before the RTA, Heard. The Case was examined by RTA U/S 80(3) of MV Act 1988 and decided to allow the modification of present route as proposed in larger interest of public, subject to adjustment of timings with existing bus operator's, production/ verification of distance certificates, payment of outstanding dues and completion of all codal formalities. The RTA further directed that in case of curtailment in present route, the owner of bus shall Applicant Representative present. Heard. The RTA after hearing the applicant & going through all facts and records found that the earlier calculation adopted for variation of 24 Kms to satisfy the provisions of Section 80(3) of Motor Vehicle Act 1988 is not in order because the extension of 32 Kms (appox) has been granted in this case, therefore modification allowed in respect of bus in question is hereby withdrawn as rejected. The RTA also directed Secretary RTA to issue notice to the owner of bus to surrender the modified permit/ time table and also to obtain actual stage carriage permit 16 2026:HHC:37956-DB submit the undertaking that "there is alternate bus service "on the curtailed route. within a period of 15 days positively. The RTA Shimla in its review meeting convened on 02.11.2019, withdrew the modification allowed by it in petitioner’s route permit under previously convened RTA meeting dated 11.06.2018. 2(iv)(e) The status report about the proceedings conducted in review meeting held on 02.11.2019 was placed on record of Contempt Petition No. 130 of 2019. Vide order dated 13.08.2021, passed in the contempt petition, Hon'ble Court directed the respondents to implement the decision taken in the special review meeting convened on 02.11.2019. The order dated 13.08.2021 reads as under: - “It is rather shocking that the respondents have not chosen to implement the directions issued by this Court on 12.9.2019, despite there being no stay order from this Court or any other court of law, which led to convening of special review meeting on 2.11.2019, whereby the RTA reviewed all modifications keeping in view the instructions earlier issued by Director Transport vide letter No.1079158 dated 4.6.2019 as is evident from the compliance affidavit filed by Capt. J.M. Pathania, the then Director Transport, Himachal Pradesh, relevant portion 17 2026:HHC:37956-DB whereof reads as under:- The decision taken in the above meetings is as under: - That so far as the local buses modifications are concerned these cases were placed in the Review meeting held on 2.11.2019 and total 37 of modifications were allowed by RTA in its meeting held on 11.6.2018 and 3.1.2019. After going through the detail of route permits it has been decided by the RTA not to withdraw the modification so allowed by RTA in its meeting in earlier modifications of Local Routes, because, as all such modifications so allowed falls under the purview of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Therefore, the respondents are directed to implement decision taken in the special review meeting on 2.11.2019, as aforesaid, forthwith. List on 03.09.2021, when fresh status report be filed.” 2(iv)(f) Pursuant to the above mandate of the Hon'ble Court, the respondents in furtherance of the decision taken in the special review meeting, set down to implement it and issued an office letter on 19.08.2021 informing the petitioner about the review meeting convened on 02.11.2019 by RTA, Shimla and the specific decision taken Sr. No Total Number of modifications allowed by RTA in its meetings held on 11.6.2018 and 3.1.2019 Total number of modifications rejected by RTA in its review meeting held on 2.11.2019 101 53 18 2026:HHC:37956-DB therein reviewing the route permit Larot-Rohru-Theog- Shimla via Hatkoti, Jubbal = 1ST as according to the respondents the earlier calculation adopted for variation of 25 KMs did not satisfy the requirement of provision of Section 83 of the MV Act. The modification in the route permit allowed to the petitioner in terms of RTA meeting held on 11.06.2018 was withdrawn and rejected. The aforesaid office letter also conveyed to the petitioner that report regarding the decisions taken in the review meeting held on 02.11.2019 was placed before the Court in COPC 130 of 2019 and the same was accepted by the Court on 13.08.2021 with directions to the respondents to implement the decisions taken in Special Review Meeting. Petitioner was accordingly directed to ply his bus on his previous route i.e. Larot-Rohru-Sharontha-Theog-Shimla = 1ST w.e.f. 01.09.2021. 2(v) Feeling aggrieved, petitioner instituted this writ petition on 23.08.2021 seeking quashing of office letters/notices dated 19.08.2021 (Annexure P-10 colly). Petitioner also seeks quashing of proceedings of Special Review Meeting convened by RTA Shimla on 02.11.2019 and to allow him to continue to ply his bus(s) on the modified routes in terms of proceedings of meeting of RTA 19 2026:HHC:37956-DB Shimla held on 11.06.2018. Petitioner also seeks a direction that order dated 12.09.2019 passed in COPC No. 130 of 2019 be declared inoperative so far as review of RTA Shimla proceedings dated 11.06.2018 and 03.01.2019 are concerned. The substantive reliefs prayed for by the petitioner are as under: “i) That impugned notices dated 19.08.2021 (Annexure P-10 Colly) may be quashed and set aside; ii) That proceedings of RTA Shimla meeting dated 02.11.2019 (Annexure P-9) qua the petitioner be quashed and set aside and the petitioner may be allowed to continue plying the buss) on the modified routes (Annexure P-2) in accordance with law; iii) That notifications dated 04.06.2019 (Annexure P-11) and 16.09.2019 (Annexures P-13) may also be quashed and set aside; iv) That the directions as contained in order dated 12.09.2019 (Annexure P-5) passed in COPC No. 130 of 2019 may be declared to be inoperative so far as review of RTA Shimla proceedings dated 11.06.2018 and 03.01.2019 are concerned” Pursuant to the interim order dated 26.08.2021, petitioner was permitted to ply the bus on the permitted route vide Annexure P-2 i.e. in terms of proceedings of meeting of RTA Shimla convened on 11.06.2018. 20 2026:HHC:37956-DB 3. Submissions 3(i) Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has been at pains to submit during spread out hearings conducted in these matters that petitioner is not seeking directions to pass orders different (contrary) to the order passed on 12.09.2019 in COPC No.130 of 2019. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner was granted liberty by the Hon'ble Single Judge in terms of order passed on 01.11.2019 in COPC No. 130 of 2019 to avail remedy as may be available to him in law for the redressal of his grievances; That petitioner has right in law to seek independent remedy against the decisions of the respondents as conveyed on 19.08.2021 (Annexure P-10) withdrawing/ cancelling the modification in route permit allowed to him under RTA meeting dated 11.06.2018; That petitioner is aggrieved by the decision taken in the Special Review Meeting convened on 02.11.2019, which led to the issuance of impugned orders/notices to the petitioner. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon following paragraph of Shiv Dev Singh and 21 2026:HHC:37956-DB Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others4 to urge that despite passing of orders and directions in the contempt petition from time to time, this Court is not precluded from examining the grievance of the petitioner raised in this writ petition when petitioner was neither a party to Ajay Parihar2 nor in COPC No. 130 of 2019:- “10. The other contention of Mr Gopal Singh pertains to the second order of Khosla, J., which, in effect, reviews his prior order. Learned counsel contends that Article 226 of the Constitution does not confer any power on the High Court to review its own order and, therefore, the second order of Khosla, J., was without jurisdiction. It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Here the previous order of Khosla, J., affected the interests of persons who were not made parties to the proceeding before him. It was at their instance and for giving them a hearing that Khosla, J., entertained the second petition. In doing so, he merely did what the principles of natural justice required him to do. It is said that the respondents before us had no right to apply for review because they were not parties to the previous proceedings. As we have already pointed out, it is precisely because they were not made parties to the previous proceedings, though their interests were sought to be affected by the decision of the High Court, that 4 AIR 1963 SC 1909 22 2026:HHC:37956-DB the second application was entertained by Khosla, J.” Reliance was also placed upon J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others5 to submit that decision taken by the respondents in the review meeting convened on 02.11.2019 and the consequently issued impugned orders had given a cause of action to the petitioner, which he is entitled to raise in this writ petition and to seek adjudication thereof:- “6. The question then is whether the Division Bench was right in setting aside the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to redraw the seniority list. It is contended by Mr S.K. Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that unless the learned Judge goes into the correctness of the decision taken by the Government in preparation of the seniority list in the light of the law laid down by three Benches, the learned Judge cannot come to a conclusion whether or not the respondent had wilfully or deliberately disobeyed the orders of the Court as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. Therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court necessarily has to go into the merits of that question. We do not find that the contention is well founded. It is seen that, admittedly, the respondents had prepared the seniority list on 02.07.1991. Subsequently promotions came to be made. The question is whether seniority list is open to review in the contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is 5 (1996) 6 SCC 291 23 2026:HHC:37956-DB seen that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the Division Bench has exercised the power under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance being a judgment or order of the Single Judge; the Division Bench corrected the mistake committed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, it may not be necessary for the State to file an appeal in this Court against the judgment of the learned Single Judge when the matter was already seized of the Division Bench.” Prithawi Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhan and others6 was also cited, to urge that while exercising Contempt jurisdiction, the Court cannot take upon itself power to decide original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order:- 6 (2004) 7 SCC261 24 2026:HHC:37956-DB “5. While dealing with an application for contempt, the court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take a view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in K.G. Derasari v. Union of India7. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party , who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher court. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. Though strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the State of Bihar on a three-Judge Bench decision in Niaz Mohd. v. State of Haryana8 we find that the same has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case the question arose about the impossibility to obey the order. If that was the stand of the State, the least it could have done was to assail correctness of the judgment before the higher court. The State took diametrically opposite stands before this Court. One was that there was no specific direction to do anything in particular and, second was what was required to be done has been done. If what was to be done has been done, it cannot certainly be said that there was 7 (2010)10 SCC 496: 2002 SCC (L&S) 756 8 (1994)6 SCC 332 25 2026:HHC:37956-DB impossibility to carry out the orders. In any event, the High Court has not recorded a finding that the direction given earlier was impossible to be carried out or that the direction given has been complied with. 8. If any party concerned is aggrieved by the order which in its opinion is wrong or against rules or its implementation is neither practicable nor feasible, it should always either approach the court that passed the order or invoke jurisdiction of the appellate court. Rightness or wrongness of the order cannot be urged in contempt proceedings. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt the court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance with which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration. It shall deal with the application in its proper perspective in accordance with law afresh. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion regarding acceptability or otherwise of the application for initiation of contempt proceedings.” Pohla Singh alias Pohla Ram (D) by LRs and others Vs. State of Punjab and others9 was quoted 9 (2004)6 SCC 126 26 2026:HHC:37956-DB wherein second writ petition filed by the appellants for recall of decision passed in earlier writ petition, in which they were not parties, but the decision adversely affected the interest of appellants, was held maintainable:- 18.1 In this petition Gurcharan Singh son of Dhanna Singh was arrayed as Respondent No.4 and the judgment shows that the petition was contested only by the said respondent. If a decision rendered in a writ petition adversely affects the interest of a third person who was not impleaded as party in the writ petition, it is always open to him to ask for recall of the judgment which has been rendered without affording any opportunity of hearing to him. An identical question has been examined by a Constitution Bench in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab10. Here in a writ petition filed by A for cancellation of the order of allotment passed by the Director of Rehabilitation in favour of B, the High Court cancelled the order in favour of B though he was not a party to the writ proceedings. Subsequently, B filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for impleading him as a party to A’s writ petition and rehearing the whole matter. The High Court allowed the writ petition. It was held by this Court that the second writ petition filed by B was maintainable and the High Court had not acted without jurisdiction in reviewing its previous order at the instance of B, who was not a party to the previous proceedings. It was further held that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to 10 AIR 1963 SC 1909 27 2026:HHC:37956-DB prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave or palpable errors committed by it. In entertaining B’s petition, the High Court thereby did what the principles of natural justice required it to do. 19. The recourse taken to the second writ petition by the allottees, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal as their basic grievance was that though they were in possession since 1962 i.e. for nearly 18 years, but the order declaring the land as surplus had been set aside in a writ petition, wherein they were not impleaded as parties. In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the allottees was rightly allowed by the learned Single Judge. 20. Against the aforesaid decision of the leaned Single Judge, Gurbachan Singh son of Dhanna Singh preferred Letters Patent Appeal which was allowed by the Full Bench of the High Court and the said decision is subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. As discussed earlier, the view taken by the Full Bench is not correct. The learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition of the allottees has also observed in the order that if permissible the question as to whether the land could be declared surplus or not may be determined in any proceedings that may be competent under law and also whether on account of retrospective operation of section 51A of the Act respondent no.4 was entitled to ask for setting aside of the orders declaring his land as surplus where the question as to whether the appellants had acquired an indefeasible right which cannot be taken away even by retrospective amendment of the Act shall also be gone into. The allottees did not challenge this part of the order by filing any Letters Patent Appeal. However, having regard to the view taken by us and to avoid any 28 2026:HHC:37956-DB scope for further litigation and to do complete justice between the parties, we set aside the said direction of the learned Single Judge and also the judgment and order dated 9.1.1980 passed in the writ petition filed by Dhanna Singh. 21. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs and the impugned judgment and order rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court on 4.6.1999 and also the judgment and order dated 9.1.1980 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 3213 of 1968 are set aside.” 3(ii) Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, inter alia, submitted that petitioners’ prayer arise out of the directions issued by the Court in COPC No. 130 of 2029. Petitioners have specifically prayed for setting aside of the orders/ directions issued in orders passed in COPC No. 130 of 2019. The relief prayed for by the petitioners cannot be granted to them in these writ petitions. Learned Additional Advocate General defending the impugned notices/orders submitted that the same had been issued in keeping with the directions issued and orders passed in COPC No. 130 of 2019. 4. Consideration Howsoever, guardedly learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would like this Court to tread in this matter, the stark reality is that Special Review Meeting was convened by the respondents on 02.11.2019 pursuant to 29 2026:HHC:37956-DB the specific mandate of the order dated 12.09.2019 passed by the Hon'ble Court in COPC No.130 of 2019. In fact, Hon'ble Single Judge was made aware of the objection of the respondents that they were not vested with the power to review the modified route permits; That they cannot review the route permits modified by them in the RTA meetings convened on 11.06.2018 and 03.01.2019; That no such power to review the modifications already allowed, is vested with them under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is also true that this legal position was already settled by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Sachin Dogar3 holding that power of review has to be specifically provided, it cannot be exercised by implication. Nonetheless, after noticing this legal position and objection of the State that “….Howsoever since there is no power of review these orders, therefore, the State is handicapped…….” and also taking note of the admission of the State that there was illegality and irregularity in the procedure adopted by the State officials, Hon'ble Single Judge by judicial order, permitted the respondents to review all such proceedings and directed to report compliance by the next date of hearing “………therefore, they are permitted to review all such proceedings under the order of the Court and report 30 2026:HHC:37956-DB compliance by the next date of hearing…….” . Armed with this order and the direction so issued therein, fortified with the power given by the Court under judicial order to review all such proceedings, the respondents convened Special Review Meeting on 02.11.2019 wherein decision was taken, inter alia, to cancel/withdraw modification in route permit allowed to the petitioner by the RTA in its meeting convened on 11.06.2018 so as to bring it in conformity with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules. The decisions so taken in the meeting convened on 02.11.2019 were placed before the Hon’ble Single Judge in the ongoing proceedings of COPC No. 130 of 2019. In the order passed in the contempt petition on 13.08.2021, the Court took strong exception to the respondents’ not implementing the directions of the Court issued on 12.09.2019 pursuant to which RTA had reviewed the modifications in the special review meeting convened on 02.11.2019, yet the follow up action had not been taken. Hon’ble Court directed the respondents to implement the decisions taken in the aforesaid special review meeting. It is in furtherance of this mandate of the Court that impugned office communications were issued by the respondents, with which petitioner is aggrieved of. 31 2026:HHC:37956-DB The tone and tenor of the pleadings in the writ petition is that Hon'ble Single Judge could not have passed such order on 12.09.2019 in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. That such order was beyond the jurisdiction vested in the Court in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. Reliance in support of this contention was placed upon the decisions extracted earlier. Though during hearing of the case, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner strived to be guarded in his submissions to project that petitioner is not seeking passing of any order contrary to the order dated 12.09.2019 or interpretation of the aforesaid order; That petitioner has independent right to assail the action of the respondents in cancelling the modification of his route permit. Howsoever attractive these submissions may look on the surface, the foundation of the impugned action of the respondents lies in the order dated 12.09.2019 passed in COPC No. 130 of 2019. The actions taken by the respondents pursuant to the aforesaid order by convening Special Review Meeting of RTA Shimla on 02.11.2019 were also approved and accepted by the Hon'ble Single Judge in the subsequent order passed in the contempt petition on 13.08.2021 in COPC No. 130 of 2019. It is not the case of the petitioner that he has availed any remedy against the 32 2026:HHC:37956-DB aforesaid orders in accordance with law. In Midnapore Peoples’ & Others Vs. Chunilal Nanda & Others11, Hon'ble Apex Court, after noticing several precedents in timeline with regard to appeals against orders passed in contempt proceedings, summarized the principles as under: - “11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarized thus:- I. An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of ’jurisdiction to punish for contempt’ and therefore, not appealable under section 19 of CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or 11 (2006)5 SCC 399 33 2026:HHC:37956-DB decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases). The first point is answered accordingly.” As per principle No.V, in case an issue is decided or a direction is issued relating to merits of the dispute between the parties in contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Order in question is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal, if available, or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, therefore, had remedy against the orders dated 12.09.2019 and 13.08.2021, which he has not availed. Petitioner is very well aware that the entire exercise has been carried out and impugned orders have been issued by the respondents pursuant to the orders dated 12.09.2019 and 13.08.2021 passed in COPC No. 130 of 2019. It is for this reason, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Shiv Dev Singh4, J.S. Parihar5, 34 2026:HHC:37956-DB Prithawi Nath Ram6, Pohla Singh alias Pohla Ram7 and Midnapore Peoples’8, to contend that it was beyond the scope of exercise of jurisdiction in contempt matter to have passed such order. These are also the basic pleading and foundation of the writ petition. Some relevant pleadings are extracted hereinafter:- “10………..The contempt petitioners, prima facie, lay challenge to fresh RTA proceedings of a different RTAs in contempt proceedings which is not permissible under the law.” “11. The Single Judge, surprisingly, passed orders in contempt proceeding (COPC 130 of 2019), as quoted above, whereby he virtually supplemented the directions passed in CWP No. 7295 of 2012 to the extent that firstly, the petitioners in contempt petition were allowed to raise some cause which had arisen after the decision of the Court claimed to have been violated and secondly, the learned Single Judge authorised the review of the decisions of RTA Shimla taken in the meetings / proceedings dated 11.06.2018 and 13.01.2019 which could not have been allowed in view of the Division Bench decision referred above (Annexure P-4). In contempt petition, virtually, new relief has been given which was not the operative part of the judgment alleged to have been violated…….” “15…..It is submitted here that firstly, as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, the respondent No. 2 is not empowered under the relevant Act and Rules to impart such instructions and/or directions by which the scope and effect of the provisions is enhanced/enlarged. Secondly, the directions were to review the previous proceedings even though the word used was "scrutinize'. The import of the operative part was that earlier held proceedings be 'reviewed and modified in light of the Act, Rules and the observations made by the Hon'ble Single Judge in contempt proceedings referred above. 35 2026:HHC:37956-DB As submitted above, the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules do not permit for a review of the proceedings by the RTA. This position was settled by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court (referred above). Therefore, the letter containing the directions was issued by the respondent No. 2 by exceeding his jurisdiction and the directions contained therein were contrary to and in violation of the provisions of the Act. Powers to issue directions, if any, are given to the State Transport Authority (STA) under Section 68(4) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 whereunder it can impart directions/instructions to RTAs on specific matters. It may be noted here that the decisions of ATAs as per the scheme of the Act are subject to the 2021 orders passed by the Appellate Authority (State Transport Appellate Tribunal) under Section 89 of the Act.” “17. That respondent No. 2 submitted its reply to COPC No. 274 of 2019 (referred above) on behalf of itself and Secretary (Transport) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. The stand taken was that it would not be possible to review the proceedings of all RTAs held since the year 2016 as that would disturb the whole timing schedule of running the private as well as State Transport Undertaking stage carriage buses plying in the State. Respondent therein also made reference to the judgment dated 12.12.2014 (Annexure P-4) of Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court passed in CWP 7496 of 2014 wherein it was categorically held that the Statute does not provide for the provision for review by RTA of its own decisions. However, the learned Single Judge ignored the previously passed binding judgment while passing the impugned order dated 12.09.2019 directing the RTAs to review specific proceedings under court orders, though the same was brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Single Judge.” 36 2026:HHC:37956-DB “19. That though in consequence to permission granted by Hon'ble Single Judge in COPC No. 130 of 2019 (referred above) the decision to review RTA proceedings of RTA Shimla was taken way back on 02.11.2019, but, factually, in consequence thereto no notice, whatsoever, was given to the petitioner of such decision. However, the proceedings of RTA Shimla dated 02.11.2019 were placed on the record of COPC No. 130 of 2019 as pointed out above. Moreover, on account of Covid-19 pandemic, when most of the time the petitioner was not able to ply bus on the permitted routes, there was no intentional delay or laches on the part of the petitioner to approach this Hon'ble Court by way of filing the present writ petition. Moreover, the petitioner is alleging violation of statutory provisions and lack of power of review under the statute in the present case, therefore, there would be no question of delay and laches in challenging the impugned decision dated 02.11.2019 (Annexure P-9) and Notices dated 19.08.2021 (Annexure P-10 Colly) relating to the route permit of the petitioner.” “21……..It appears that contempt proceedings were sought to be initiated by some unsatisfied transporters itself by giving fragmented and incomplete information to the Hon'ble Court in contempt proceedings. a Moreover, as pointed out above, technically speaking, there is no violation of the specific direction issued by the Hon'ble Court, particularly as claimed in COPC No. 130 of 2019. The petitioners of COPC No. 130 of 2019 are unreasonably using the contempt jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court for the purpose of arm twisting of the authorities so that such authorities are compelled to do something which may go beyond the scope and power 37 2026:HHC:37956-DB given under the scheme of the Act and the Rules applicable in the case in hand to such authorities. Further, the Hon'ble Single Judge exercising the power of contempt to punish for violation of the directions could not have issued directions which would amount to enlarging the scope of the operative part of the judgment in writ petition, which is claimed to have been violated. In other words, no new directions could be given by the Court in contempt proceedings which were not there in the original order/judgment claimed to have been violated, particularly, when law declared by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court clearly points out that there cannot be review of the orders already passed by the RTAs. Hon'ble Single Bench was bound by such declaration of law and for this reason also could not have given direction against the scheme of the Act. Any action in consequence to such impermissible direction of Hon'ble Single Judge is liable to be set aside in the present proceedings.” “24. That feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Hon'ble Court, for issuance of appropriate writ directions and appropriate orders, inter alia, on the following grounds: - A. That the provisions of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 do not provide for a review of its - decisions by RTA constituted under the said Act. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court has declared the law in this regard. Hon'ble Single Bench is bound by the declaration of law made by Hon'ble division Bench and in view of this situation no direction could have been given by Hon'ble Single Bench in Contempt Petition COPC No. 130 of 2019 on 12.09.2019 (Annexure P-5) and therefore, the consequential action taken by RTA Shimla in its meeting dated 02.11.2019 (Annexure P-9) is liable to be quashed and set aside being illegal. B. That in contempt proceedings in COPC No 130 of 2019 the Hon'ble Single Judge could not have 38 2026:HHC:37956-DB given fresh directions which were not contained in the original judgment / order claimed to have been violated. In fact, the direction given by Hon'ble Single Judge on 12.09.2019 (Annexure P- 5) amounts to giving fresh directions relating to review of RTA proceedings which direction was not there in the original order dated 18.05.2016 passed in CWP No.7295 of 2016 which is claimed to have been violated by the petitioners in COPC No. 130 of 2019.” “D. That the petitioner and other similarly situated persons had bona fide attempted to get themselves impleaded as intervenors in the contempt proceedings COPC No. 130 of 2019 so that proper assistance could have been rendered to the Hon'ble Single Bench with regard to the matter in controversy. However, their such applications were dismissed as pointed out above. In such a situation the petitioner has bona fide attempted to exhaust all remedies available to him and there is no alternative other approaching this Hon'ble Court under its extra ordinary writ jurisdiction. “E. That the impugned Notices dated 19.08.2021 (Annexure P-10 (Colly)) have been issued by respondent No 3 in compliance to the directions issued by the Hon'ble Single Bench in COPC No. 130 of 2019 and in compliance to the review proceedings of RTA Shimla held on 02.11.2019. In view of above submissions and grounds, since Hon'ble Single Judge could not have issued directions in COPC No. 130 of 2019 dated 12.09.2019 (Annexure P-5) and consequently, no review proceedings of RTA Shimla could have been held on 02.11.2019, therefore, the impugned notices dated 19.08.2021 (Annexure P- 10) are liable to be quashed and set aside being the consequence of illegal review proceedings of RTA Shimla held on 02.11.2019.” “F. That the order dated 12.09.2019 (Annexure P- 5) passed by Hon'ble Single Judge in COPC No. 130 of 2019 is liable to be declared as inoperative and not binding in view of the binding precedent on the issue by law declared by the Hon'ble Division Bench as brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Single Judge by way of pleadings in COPC no. 130 of 2019 and connected COPC No. 274 of 2019.” 39 2026:HHC:37956-DB The above pleadings loudly and clearly partake the character of appeal against the orders passed in COPC No. 130 of 2019 in the guise of writ petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India. Petitioner seeks quashing of proceedings of RTA Shimla meeting dated 02.11.2019, which the Hon’ble Court vide order dated 13.08.2021 passed in COPC No.130 of 2019 directed the respondents to implement. Petitioner also seeks to declare directions issued in order dated 12.09.2019 passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge in COPC No. 130 of 2019 as inoperative. Granting the reliefs as prayed for by the petitioner would amount to judicial impropriety in the face of orders passed in COPC No. 130 of 2019. 5. For the forgoing discussion, the relief prayed for by the petitioners cannot be granted to them in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ petitions fail. The same are accordingly dismissed. It is for the petitioners to seek appropriate remedy in accordance with law for the redressal of their grievances. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also to stand disposed of. Jyotsna Rewal Dua September 08, 2026 Judge R.Atal