2026:HHC:37619 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 1320 of 2024 Reserved on: 21.08.2026 Decided on: 07.09.2026 Pratap Singh …. Petitioner Versus Ranjit Singh & Another …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Petitioner : Mr Janesh Gupta, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 : Mr Ajay Kumar Lahota, Advocate. For Respondent No.2/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition is directed against the order dated 14.12.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, CBI Court, Shimla (learned Revisional Court), vide which the order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Rural), District Shimla (learned Trial Court) dated 17.07.2023 was upheld. (The 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:37619 parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner/informant complained to the police that he and his brothers had occupied the ancestral house as per the family arrangement. The informant and his brothers constructed their houses near the ancestral house. Their courtyard was located adjacent to the ancestral house, which was jointly owned and possessed by the parties. The informant constructed a drain to discharge the water, which was covered by Ranjeet Singh. The water from the courtyard and rainwater seeped through the informant's house. Ranjeet Singh constructed iron stairs, which blocked the passage to the informant's house. The informant constructed a staircase to enter his house. However, Ranjeet Singh started tethering his cattle, which damaged the stairs. The informant was unable to reach his house. Ranjeet Singh put cow dung near his house, which created filth. The informant talked to Ranjeet Singh about his difficulties, but Ranjeet Singh was not ready to listen to the informant and used to abuse the informant. There was an apprehension of breach of peace. Hence, the matter 3 2026:HHC:37619 was reported to the police, who filed a complaint before the Learned Trial Court. 3. The Learned Court initiated the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). Report of the Tehsildar was called, and it was found that there was no apprehension or breach of peace, and the informant wanted to take possession by taking recourse to Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. The dispute was of a civil nature, and the informant had civil remedies available to him. Therefore, the learned Trial Court dropped the proceedings. 4. The informant filed a revision, which was decided by the learned Additional Session Judge-2, District Shimla, who held that the learned Trial Court was not justified in dropping the proceedings without allowing the parties to prove their case by leading evidence. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the learned Trial Court for a fresh decision as per the law. 5. The learned Trial Court recorded the statements and held that the parties were in joint possession. The iron stairs were located on the side of the land. There was no evidence that the informant was in possession two months before making the 4 2026:HHC:37619 complaint to the police. The dispute was regarding the movable property and not the immovable property. There was no apprehension of breach of peace. The informant had a remedy of approaching the Civil Court. Hence, the complaint was dismissed. 6. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the informant filed a revision which was decided by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, CBI Court, Shimla District, Shimla (the learned Revisional Court). The learned Revisional Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the informant was not proved to be in possession of the land 2 months before the institution of the complaint. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that the dispute pertained to movable property. Iron stairs were affixed to the land and formed part of the land. Therefore, they would fall within the definition of immovable property. The proceedings could have been initiated under Section 147 of the CrPC, but for that, the informant should have been in possession 3 months before the filing of the complaint. No fruitful purpose would be served by remanding the matter to the learned trial Court. Hence, the revision was dismissed. 5 2026:HHC:37619 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below, the informant has filed the present petition, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in holding that the iron staircase was not causing any hindrance to the ingress and egress to the informant's property. The respondent acted to grab a portion of the informant's property. He created a situation in which the informant's access to his house was blocked, and a nuisance was created. Actual breach of peace does not mean that there should be a scuffle or a physical fight. The likelihood of the breach of peace is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the learned Magistrate. The informant is entitled to use his property without any interference from any person. Section 145 of the CrPC does not contemplate actual dispossession. The acts of the respondent showed that the informant was dispossessed from the land. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned courts below be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Ajay Kumar Lahota, learned counsel for respondent no. 1, and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no. 2. 6 2026:HHC:37619 9. Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in dismissing the complaint. The material on record shows that access to the informant's house was blocked. Respondent no. 1 created a nuisance by putting cow dung near his house. The cattle damaged the stairs leading to the informant's house. The respondent no. 1 forcibly wants to dispossess the informant from the land. The informant has a right to protect his property and his person from unlawful threats. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgment and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 10. Mr Ajay Kumar Lahota, learned counsel for respondent no. 1, submitted that the learned Courts below have rightly held that necessary ingredients for attracting Section 145 of Cr.P.C. are not satisfied. There is no proof that the informant was in possession of the property 2 months before the filing of the complaint, and the learned Trial Court had no jurisdiction in the present matter. There is no necessity to exercise the inherent jurisdiction vested in the court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:37619 11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent no. 1/State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the material on record and there is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by them; hence he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 of CrPC) against an order dismissing the revision petition. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan Vs. In Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241, the High Court can intervene under Section 482 of CrPC (corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS) when there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed: “10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person — accused/complainant — can- not be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory juris- diction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or 8 2026:HHC:37619 the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence im- posed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and, in an appropriate case, even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of a criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by prom- ise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed, and public justice can be ensured only when the trial is conducted expeditiously. 11. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10], a three-judge Bench was to consider the scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 and Section 397(2) of the Code. This Court held that the bar on the power of revision was put to facilitate expedient disposal of the cases, but in Section 482, it is provided that nothing in the Code, which would include Section 397(2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. On a harmonious construction of the said two provi- sions on this behalf, it was held that though the High Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order, still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provi- sion for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In that case, when allegations of defamatory statements were published in the newspapers against the Law Minister, the State Government decided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under Section 500 IPC. After obtaining the sanction, on a complaint made by the public prosecutor, cognisance of 9 2026:HHC:37619 the commission of the offence by the appellant was taken to trial in the Sessions Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed the charges under Section 406. The Order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court. On a prelimi- nary objection raised on maintainability, this Court held that the power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section 397 or the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code. 12. In V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI [1980 Supp SCC 92: 1980 SCC (Cri) 695: (1980) 2 SCR 380] (SCR at p. 393), a four-judge Bench, by majority, held that sub-section (3) of Section 397, however, does not limit at all the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482. It merely curbs the re- visional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Court under Section 397(1) of the Code. In the Rajan Kumar Machananda case [1990 Supp SCC 132: 1990 SCC (Cri) 537], the case related to the release of a truck from attachment, obvi- ously on the filing of an interlocutory application. It was contended that there was a prohibition on the revision by operation of Section 397(2) of the Code. In that context, it was held that it was not reviewable under Section 482 in the exercise of inherent powers by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by provisions contained in Section 397(3), the revision is not maintainable. In the Dharampal case [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333], which related to the exercise of power to issue an order of attachment under Section 146 of the Code, it was held that the inherent power under Section 482 was prohib- ited. On the facts, in that case, it could be said that the learned Judges would be justified in holding that it was not revisable since it was a prohibitory interim order of attach- ment covered under Section 397(2) of the Code but the ob- servations of the learned Judges that the High Court had no power under Section 482 of the Code were not correct in view of the ratio of this Court in Madhu Limaye case [(1977) 4 SCC 10 2026:HHC:37619 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] as upheld in V.C. Shukla case [1980 Supp SCC 92: 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : (1980) 2 SCR 380] and also in view of our observations stated earlier. The ratio in the Deepti case [(1995) 5 SCC 751: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1020] is also not apposite to the facts in the present case. To the contrary, in that case, an application for discharge of the accused was filed in the Court of the Magistrate for an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The learned Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dis- missed the petition. In the revision at the instance of the ac- cused, on a wrong concession made by the counsel appearing for the State that the record did not contain allegations con- stituting the offence under Section 498-A, the High Court, without applying its mind, had discharged the accused. On appeal, this Court, after going through the record, noted that the concession made by the counsel was wrong. The record did contain the allegations to prove the charge under Section 498-A IPC. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, had committed an error of law in discharging the accused, leading to the miscarriage of justice. In that context, this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code. In view of the fact that the order of the High Court had led to the miscarriage of justice, this Court had set aside the order of the High Court and confirmed that of the Magistrate. 13. The ratio of the Simrikhia case [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] has no application to the facts in this case. Therein, on a private complaint filed under Sections 452 and 323 IPC, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, had taken cognisance of the offence. He transferred the case for inquiry under Section 202 of the Code to the Second-Class Magistrate, who, after examining the witnesses, issued a process to the accused. The High Court, exercising the power under Section 482, dis- missed the revision. But subsequently, on an application filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court corrected it. The question was whether the High Court was right in re- viewing its order. In that factual backdrop, this Court held that the High Court could not exercise inherent power for the 11 2026:HHC:37619 second time. The ratio therein, as stated above, has no appli- cation to the facts in this case. 14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that though the revision before the High Court under sub-section (1) of Sec- tion 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous super- intendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to mis- carriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the courts below. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for a decision on the merits after consideration of the evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case. Since the High Court has left the matter to be considered by the Magistrate, it would be inappropriate at this stage to go into that question. We have only considered the issue of power and jurisdiction of the High Court in the context of the revi- sional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 397(3) and the inherent powers. We do not find any justification warranting interference in the appeal.” 14. This position was reiterated in Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir, (2001) 8 SCC 522, wherein it was held: “…though the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is very wide, the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously, particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, or that a sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. It was further held, “Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the 12 2026:HHC:37619 High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code.” 15. A similar view was taken in Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation, (2005) 2 SCC 571, and it was held: “5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan [(1999) 6 SCC 326: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118] said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is a serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of the law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court.” 16. This position was reiterated in Shakuntala Devi v. Chamru Mahto, (2009) 3 SCC 310: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 8: 2009 SCC On- Line SC 292, wherein it was observed: - “24. It is well settled that the object of the introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 397 was to prevent a second revi- sion to avoid frivolous litigation, but, at the same time, the doors to the High Court to a litigant who had lost before the Sessions Judge were not completely closed, and in special cases, the bar under Section 397(3) could be lifted. In other words, the power of the High Court to entertain a petition under Section 482 was not subject to the prohibition under 13 2026:HHC:37619 sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code and was capable of being invoked in appropriate cases. Mr Sanyal's contention that there was a complete bar under Section 397(3) of the Code, debarring the High Court from entertaining an appli- cation under Section 482 thereof, does not, therefore, com- mend itself to us. 25. On the factual aspect, the Magistrate came to a finding that the appellants were entitled to possession of the dis- puted plot. It is true that while making such a declaration under Section 145(4) of the Code, the Magistrate could have also directed that the appellants be put in possession of the same. 26. The question which is now required to be considered is whether the High Court was right in quashing the order passed by the Magistrate, which was confirmed by the Ses- sions Judge, on the ground that the application made by the appellants under Section 145(6) of the Code was barred firstly by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and also by virtue of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 17. Delhi High Court also took a similar view in Surender Kumar Jain v. State, ILR (2012) 3 Del 99 and held: — “5. The issue regarding the filing of a petition before the High Court after having availed the first revision petition before the Court of Sessions has come up before the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly. While laying that section 397(3) Cr. P.C. laid the statutory bar to the second revision petition, the courts have held that the High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 82 (sic) Cr. P.C. as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. But that power was to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, particularly when the person approaching the High Court has already availed a remedy of first revision in the Sessions Court. This was not that in every case the person aggrieved by the order of the first revision court would have the right to be heard by the High Court to assail the same order which was the subject 14 2026:HHC:37619 matter of the revision before the Sessions Court. It all depends not only on the facts and circumstances of each case but also on whether the impugned order brought about a situation that is an abuse of the process of the court, there was a serious miscarriage of justice or the mandatory provisions of law were not complied with. The power could also be exercised by this Court if there was an apparent mistake committed by the revisional court. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limave v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551, State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwal, (1979) 2 SCC 305: AIR 1979 SC 87, Rai Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) 1980 Cri LJ 202, Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation (2005) 2 SCC 571.” 18. It is apparent from the judgments that the High Court has a limited jurisdiction, and it can rectify a serious miscarriage of justice or a breach of a mandatory provision of law while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS corresponding to Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 19. Section 145(4) of CrPC reads as under: The Magistrate shall then, without reference of the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute : Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, 15 2026:HHC:37619 or after that date and before the date of his order under sub- section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of this order under sub-section (1). 20. It is apparent from the perusal of the section that the person complaining of dispossession should have been dispossessed within 2 months before making the complaint. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.C. Patuck v. Fatima A. Kindasa, (1997) 5 SCC 334: 1997 SCC (Cri) 679 that where there was no evidence that the informant was in possession two months before filing the complaint, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction under Section 145 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 338: “9. It will be seen from the facts stated above that the order under Section 145(1) was passed by the learned Magistrate on 16-3-1993. The question is whether the Magistrate could have passed any order in favour of the petitioner under sub- section (4) of Section 145. Going by the main sub-clause (4) of Section 145, it is clear that the Magistrate could initially decide who was in possession as on the date when the order under Section 145(1) was passed on 16-3-1993. In cases where the proviso to the said sub-clause (4) applied, that is, if it appeared to the Magistrate that any party had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate might treat the party so dispossessed as if the said party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). In other words, if the conditions mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (4) were satisfied, the Magistrate could deem a person to be in possession as on 16 2026:HHC:37619 the date of the order under Section 145(1) notwithstanding the fact that he was not in fact in possession on that date, but lost possession earlier, within two months next before the order. In this case, unfortunately, there is no material to show that any report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate within the period contemplated by the proviso. On the other hand, the petitioner's admissions show that she lost possession much before the period mentioned in the said proviso.” 21. In the present case, the informant asserted in para 2 of the written statement filed before the learned trial Court that he was unable to cultivate his fields or visit his residence since 2018. He asserted in para 4 that the respondent had dumped cow dung in the backyard of the informant's kitchen and obstructed and created a nuisance since 2018. The respondents created several obstacles since 2018. 22. These averments clearly show that the informant was dispossessed in the year 2018. The police filed the complaint before the learned Trial Court on 14.05.2019, and the period of more than 2 months had elapsed since the date of dispossession. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly concluded that the necessary conditions for attracting Section 145 of the CrPC were not satisfied. 23. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while dismissing the complaint, and the learned 17 2026:HHC:37619 Revisional Court had rightly upheld the same. No interference is required with the judgment and order passed by the learned courts below while exercising the inherent jurisdiction of the court. 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 7th September, 2026 (Nikita)