( 2026:HHC:37396 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA CWP No. 6201 of 2023. Decided on : 3 rd September , 2026 Kapil Dev & Ors. ...Petitioners. Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents. Coram: Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioners: Mr. Karan Singh Parmar, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General with Mr. L.N. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge. Petitioners, after about 20 years of their superannuation as Assistant Engineers, seek quashing of an order dated 20th October, 2014, whereby the respondents declined to step up their pay at par with one Shri Kartar Singh Dhiman. 2. The case set up by the petitioners is that:- 2(i) Petitioners joined the respondent Public Works Department as Section Officers on 06.12.1966, 01.09.1970, 01.04.1965 and 06.02.1967, respectively. The post was later re-designated as Junior Engineer. Petitioners were promoted as Assistant Engineers in 1996, 2003, 1995, and 1996, respectively. 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) 2(ii) One Shri Kartar Singh joined service as Section Officer on 08.09.1970. He was promoted as Assistant Engineer on ad-hoc basis on 26.05.1981 and on regular basis with effect from 06.12.1997. Shri Kartar Singh was statedly drawing higher pay than the petitioners and one Shri Raj Kumar Sood. Shri Raj Kumar Sood instituted CWP No. 5826 of 2010 seeking to promote him to the post of Assistant Engineer with effect from the date of promotion of Shri Kartar Singh i.e. 26.05.1981 and also to bring his pay at par with the pay and allowances paid to Shri Kartar Singh. It appears that on account of decision rendered in CWP No. 1429 of 2008, the respondents considered the issue of seniority of Shri Raj Kumar Sood, and a notification dated 22.06.2011 was issued whereunder Shri Raj Kumar Sood was ordered to be promoted with effect from 31.01.2008 as Executive Engineer on regular basis, whereas Kartar Singh Dhiman, over which Raj Kumar Sood had claimed seniority, was shown to have been promoted as Executive Engineer with effect from 01.04.2008. Taking into consideration notification dated 22.06.2011 that was issued during pendency of CWP No. 5826 of 2010, the Court disposed of CWP No. 5826 of 2010 on 11.07.2011 with direction to the respondents to consider the case of Raj Kumar Sood and take final decision on his representation seeking stepping up of pay within the timelines indicated therein. 3 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) 2(iii). Pursuant to above, the respondents issued office order on 23.07.2012 observing that final seniority list of Assistant Engineer was circulated on 08.10.2010 in which Shri Raj Kumar Sood found place above Shri Kartar Singh Dhiman. Due to change in the seniority position, DPC for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) on regular basis was convened on 08.01.2011, 18.01.2011 and 08.02.2011. On the basis of recommendations of the DPC, Raj Kumar Sood was promoted as Executive Engineer with effect from 31.01.2008 whereas Kartar Singh Dhiman got the promotion with effect from 01.04.2008. Kartar Singh Dhiman retired as Executive Engineer (Civil) on ad-hoc basis on 31.12.2008, whereas Raj Kumar Sood retired as Assistant Engineer on 31.03.008. Since Raj Kumar Sood had not actually worked on the post of Executive Engineer, he was given notional promotion. Pay of Raj Kumar Sood was accordingly ordered to be stepped up at par with Kartar Singh Dhiman. 2(iv). Present petitioners instituted CWP No.1874 of 2014. This was disposed of on 28.03.2014 as under:- “It is represented by Mr. Chandranarayan Singh, Advocate that the present lis is squarely covered by the judgment rendered by this Court in CWP No. 5826 of 2010 titled as Raj Kumar Sud Vs. State of H.P. and others on 11.7.2011. 2. If it is so, the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioners, strictly in view of the principles laid down in 4 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) the judgment cited above. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the judgment in fact has been implemented vide order dated 23rd July, 2012, Annexure P-2. The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any. No order as to costs.” As the above judgment dated 28.03.2014 was not being implemented by the respondents, petitioners preferred Execution Petition No. 130 of 2014. During the pendency of the execution petition, consideration order was passed by the respondents on 20.10.2014 (Annexure P-6) rejecting the case of the petitioners, as under: “Whereas it is quite evident that the benefit of stepping up granted to him vide order dated 07.11.2012 is erroneous being not in consonance with the instructions of the Finance Department as well as the provision of FR & SR. Moreover,the similar benefit of stepping up granted to Shri Raj Kumar Sood has been withdrawn vide order dated 29.07.2013. The said review order dated 29.07.2023 has been found to be in order by the Hon’ble Court vide its judgment dated 10.07.2014 passed in COPC 481/2011 in CWP No. 5826/2010 titled Raj Kumar Sood vs. State of H.P. Now, therefore, the undersigned comes to the conclusion that the benefit of stepping up of pay granted to Shri Raj Kumar Sood vide order dated 23.07.2012 was given in violation of the Finance Department instructions as well as the provision of FR & SR and same has been withdrawn vide order dated 29.07.2013. Since, the order dated 23.07.2012 on the basis of which the petitioners are justifying their claims has been withdrawn, their 5 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) claim for seeking stepping of pay at par with the pay of Shri Kartar Singh Dhiman is not valid and sustainable. Therefore, their case is rejected being without merit.” In terms of the above order, the respondents vide order dated 29.07.2013 had withdrawn the stepping up of pay granted to Raj Kumar Sood under order dated 23.07.2012. The very foundation on the basis of which the petitioners had been staking their claim had been withdrawn by the respondents. Nine years’ later on 03.07.2023, petitioners instituted this writ petition seeking to quash rejection order dated 29.10.2014. 3. Heard and considered the case file. 4. From the pleadings in the reply, it appears that the relied- upon case of Raj Kumar Sood has not yet attained finality and the same is still pending adjudication in a Letters Patent Appeal. Be that as it may. On the basis of consideration order passed by the respondents on 20.10.2014 rejecting the case of petitioners, the Execution Petition No. 130 of 2014 , was disposed of on 22.12.2014 reserving liberty to the petitioners to seek appropriate remedy if still aggrieved. The order disposing of the execution petition goes as under: “Respondents have filed reply to this execution petition, in which, it is averred that the respondents have already complied 6 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) with the directions dated 28.03.2014, passed by this Court in CWP No.1874 of 2014, titled as T.N. Verma & Others versus State of Himachal Pradesh & others. 2. In the given circumstances, this execution petition is disposed of. However, the petitioners are at liberty to seek appropriate remedy, if still aggrieved.” 4(i). Petitioners have taken almost 10 years to assail the consideration order dated 20.10.2014. The substantive relief prayed for by them is as under: “i) That the order dated 20th October, 2014 may very kindly be quashed and set aside and respondents may be directed to fix the pay of the petitioners at par with their juniors Shri Kartar Singh Dhiman from the date when the anomaly has taken place with all consequential benefits. ii) That the respondents may be directed to fix the pay of the petitioners at par with their junior Shri Kartar Singh Dhiman in the cadre of Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer with all consequential benefits.” Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Union of India and others vs. Tarsem Singh2 to contend that not stepping up of pay at par with the junior employee is a continuing wrong, causing continuing injury, giving rise to distinct and separate cause of action, therefore, the petitioners' claim will survive despite there being delay and 22008 (8) SCC 648, 7 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) laches. The relevant para pressed into service of the aforesaid decision reads as under: “5. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” Reliance was also placed upon Shri Ganga Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others3. In the said case, petitioners’ request for grant of Assured Career Progression Scheme at par with that of junior incumbent was rejected on 12.02.2018. The petition was filed 3 years from the date of rejection of the claim. Furthermore, in the aforesaid case, there was no dispute that anomaly actually existed in the pay of the 3CWP No. 2483 of 2021 decided on 13.05.2026. 8 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) petitioner as compared to the pay of his junior. This fact was directly admitted by the concerned respondent department. In the given facts of the case, it was held that petitioner therein was entitled for stepping up of his pay at par with his junior. In the instant case, the respondents have not admitted existence of anomaly in the pay scale of the petitioners. Respondents’ stand is that the incumbent who has been alleged junior namely Sh. Kartar Chand Dhiman in fact belonged to reserve category whereas petitioners belonged to general category. Sh. Kartar Singh Dhiman was promoted as Assistant Engineer during 1981 on the basis of reservation and thereafter as Executive Engineer much prior to petitioners’ promotion as Assistant Engineers. Sh. Kartar Singh Dhiman thereafter became senior to the petitioners. Petitioners never raised any grievance to Kartar Singh Dhiman’s prior promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer. According to the respondents, Shri Kartar Singh Dhiman’s prior promotion took him to a separate cadre and separate post severing his links with the old cadre. Therefore, instant was not a case of pay anomaly as alleged by the petitioners. Admittedly petitioners have not prayed for rectification in the their seniority positions or claimed promotion prior in time than given to Shri Kartar Singh Dhiman. Further, petitioners' sole reliance for stepping 9 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) up of pay at par with that of their alleged junior, Shri Kartar Singh Dhiman, was based upon order dated 23.07.2012 passed by the respondents stepping up the pay of Shri Raj Kumar Sood. Though, this order dated 23.07.2012 was withdrawn by the respondents on 29.07.2013, it appears that the same is still under adjudication. Nonetheless, even if petitioners' claim vis-à-vis order dated 23.07.2012 is to be considered, then also it cannot be said that the respondents have admitted existence of anomaly in petitioners' pay which requires to be brought at par with that of Kartar Singh. The foundational facts on the basis of which Raj Kumar Sood was allowed parity of pay at par with Kartar Singh in the order dated 23.07.2012 are entirely different. Furthermore, Raj Kumar Sood had taken immediate recourse within proximity of the cause of action becoming available to him. 4(ii) The order passed on 22.12.2014 disposing of petitioners' Execution Petition No.130 of 2014 makes it evident that petitioners were aware about rejection of their case seeking parity of pay at par with that of Kartar Singh under order dated 20.10.2014. Liberty was also granted to the petitioners while disposing of execution petition to seek appropriate legal recourse against the consideration order dated 20.10.2014 passed by the respondents rejecting their case of parity of pay with that of Kartar 10 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) Singh. Yet, the petitioners did not take appropriate legal recourse at the relevant time. This writ petition was instituted by the petitioners on 03.07.2023 after about 10 years of rejection of their case and twenty years after their superannuation. Petitioners have offered virtually no explanation whatsoever for the delay and laches, in taking almost a decade to challenge the order dated 20.10.2014. In such circumstances, the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bichitrananda Behera Versus State of Orissa and others4 gets attracted. In the said decision, Hon’ble Apex Court held that delay and laches are vital in service matters and can be seen as acquiescence. Belated service related claim is to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. Laches can be based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. Acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction, which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the claimant therein had delayed pursuing his claim for over 12 years despite being aware of the appointment of another person to the same post of Physical Education Trainer (PET). This 4AIR 2023 SC 5064 11 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) prolonged inaction was held to amount to acquiescence, which effectively bars the claim because it implies consent through silence or failure to act. Hon’ble Apex Court explained that while laches refers to an unreasonable delay without active consent, both delay and laches serve the important purpose of preventing stale claims that disrupt settled rights and administrative decisions. In service matters, these doctrines were held to play crucial roles as they protect the stability and finality of administrative decisions. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- “21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court: “(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648: “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will 12 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (Emphasis supplied) (B) …………….. 21-23. …………….. Acquiescence 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.” (C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301: 36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it 13 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non- existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. xxx 38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action. 14 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would notapply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213). “12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911, p. 395 as follows: ‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most 15 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’ 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?” 39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, 16 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence. 40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.” 17 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) In Marinmoy Maity Versus Chanda Koley & Ors.5, Hon’ble Apex Court held that an applicant who approaches the Court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ Courts. Delay or laches is one of the factors, which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. Relevant portion from the decision is as under: - “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 5AIR 2024 SC 2717 18 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical recision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others. (2009) 1 SCC 768, has held to the following effect:- “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is 19 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84]. 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit also when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose." Reference can also be made to Managing Director Uttar Pardesh Power Corporation Limited and others vs. Ram Gopal6, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court held that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Fence sitters 6(2021) 13 SCC 225 20 ( 2026:HHC:37396 ) cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience. Delay defeats equity. The ratio of above decisions apply to the facts of the instant case. The claim of the petitioners at this belated stage suffers from unexplained delay, laches and acquiescence. For the foregoing discussion, this writ petition fails and is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. Jyotsna Rewal Dua Judge 3rd September, 2026. (jai)