2026:HHC:37769 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 217 of 2014 Reserved on: 24.08.2026 Date of Decision: 07.09.2026. Yashwant Singh ...Petitioner Versus The State of H.P. ..Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Anubhav Chopra, Advocate. For the Respondent/ State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 07.07.2014, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 30.05.2011 and order of sentence dated 02.06.20211, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:37769 Class, Court No.1, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant, Amar Singh (PW-1), was driving an Alto car bearing registration No. HP62- 0108. Johra Bai (PW-2) was travelling in the car. The car reached Mehli at about 04.45 p.m. A Mahindra pickup bearing registration No. HP 63-2704 came from Junga Road at a high speed. The pickup hit two cars bearing registration Nos. HP 14B- 0900 and HP03A-3114 parked on Meheli curve and proceeded towards Malyana at a high speed. The informant stopped his car, but the pickup hit the informant’s car. The driver of the pickup sped away from the spot. The informant sustained injuries. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry was recorded in the police station. ASI Nanak Ram (PW-10) went to the spot for 3 2026:HHC:37769 verification. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW- 1/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW-8/A) was registered. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-10/A). He seized the car bearing registration Nos. HP62-0108, HP-03A- 3114 and HP-14-0900 vide memos (Ext.PW-1/B, Ext. PW-9/A, and Ext.PW-10/B). He filed an application for conducting the informant’s medical examination. Dr Shalini (PW-11) conducted the informant’s medical examination and found a fracture of the nasal bone. She stated that the injury was grievous in nature. ASI Nanak Ram (PW-10) seized the pickup bearing registration No. HP63-2704 along with the documents vide memo (Ext. PW- 4/A). HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW-12) examined the vehicles bearing registration Nos. HP-63-2704 and HP-62-0108 and found that there was no mechanical defect in them, which could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW12/A and Ext. PW- 12/B). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court. 3. Learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences 4 2026:HHC:37769 punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of IPC and 187 of M.V Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses to prove its case. Amar Singh (PW-1) is the informant. Johra Bai (PW-2) was the occupant of the vehicle. Constable Sanjeev Kumar (PW-3) took the photographs. Ashok Kumar (PW-4), Shiv Kumar (PW- 7), and Ramesh (PW-15) witnessed the recoveries. Sanjeev Thakur (PW-5) was told about the accident. Dr Sushma Mohkaik (PW-6) is the radiologist, who went through the X-ray. ASI Dahram Pal (PW-8) signed the F.I.R. Devinder Singh (PW-9) did not support the prosecution case. ASI Nanank Ram (PW-10) investigated the matter. Dr Shalini (PW-11) conducted the medical examination of the informant. HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW- 12) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. HC Suresh Kumar (PW-13) carried the rukka to the police station. Sunil Kumar (PW-14) is the owner of the vehicle bearing registration No. HP 03A-3114. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that Shiv Kumar was the owner of the pickup bearing registration No. 5 2026:HHC:37769 HP63-2704, and he had employed the accused as a driver. He admitted that he was driving the pickup on 28.10.2008. He denied that he had caused the accident. He admitted that the pick-up was seized by the police. He stated that when he reached Mehli Chowk with the pick-up, he found that the vehicles were parked on both sides of the road. He wanted to go to Malyana when an Alto car came at a high speed and hit his car. He examined Subhash Shandil (DW-1) to prove his defence. 6. The learned trial Court held that the accused had not disputed that he was driving the pickup at the time of the accident. Subhash Shandil (DW-1) also stated that the accused was driving the pickup at the time of the accident. Therefore, identification of the accused as the driver of the vehicle was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The informant's statement was duly corroborated by Johra Bai (PW-2) and Sunil Kumar (PW-14). The defence taken by the accused that the Alto car had hit the pickup at a high speed was not proved. The accused had hit not only the informant’s vehicle but two stationary vehicles parked on the road, which clearly proved his negligence. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: 6 2026:HHC:37769 Section(s) Sentences 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, to pay a fine of ₹1000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment of 15 days. 337 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, to pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment of 15 days. 338 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, to pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment of 15 days. 187 of IPC The accused was sentenced to pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment of 15 days. It was ordered that all the sentences shall run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the pickup on the date of the incident. Subhash Shandil (DW-1) stated that it was Diwali and there was a huge rush. Hence, the accused was supposed to take care while driving the vehicle. The car being driven by the 7 2026:HHC:37769 informant was towards its own side, whereas the pickup being driven by the accused was towards the wrong side. The failure to associate independent witnesses was not fatal to the prosecution case. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the identification of the accused was not proper. The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of CrPC was read to his detriment. The informant and his wife were interested witnesses. They could not understand the direction in which the offending vehicle was moving. No independent witness was examined even though the incident had occurred on Mehli Chowk on Diwali. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehira, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 8 2026:HHC:37769 10. Mr Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove the identity of the accused. The statements of the witnesses failed to establish the negligence of the accused. Use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to infer negligence. Learned Courts below had not extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Gagan Kumar vs. State of HP 2025 HHC 37720, in support of his submission. 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC that he was driving the pickup. Therefore, the identity of the accused as the driver of the pickup was never in dispute. The accused was entering the main road from the road junction, and it was his duty to slow down. However, he failed to do so and hit two cars parked on the road, which clearly showed negligence. This Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding 9 2026:HHC:37769 the revision. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, 10 2026:HHC:37769 direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 11 2026:HHC:37769 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own 12 2026:HHC:37769 conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, 13 2026:HHC:37769 (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 15. The accused examined Subhash Shandil (DW-1), who stated that a pick-up bearing registration No. HP-63-2704, came from Junga. The driver had signalled the indicator for going towards Malyana when a Maruti car came from Malyana and hit the pickup. He admitted in his cross-examination that 14 2026:HHC:37769 the accused was driving the vehicle and the pickup had hit two vehicles parked on the road. The accused also admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC that he was driving the pickup at the time of the accident. He stated that he was driving the pickup towards Mehli Chowk. He was to go towards Malyana. An Alto car hit him at a high speed. This statement also shows that the accused never disputed that he was driving the Mahindra pickup on the date of the accident. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742: “51. That brings us to the question of whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads: “313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.” 15 2026:HHC:37769 Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730, this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: “Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination 16 2026:HHC:37769 under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied) Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub- section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub- section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.” 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244: 27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only 17 2026:HHC:37769 a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23) “23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961 negates both these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one, as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post- mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the 18 2026:HHC:37769 exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (emphasis supplied) 17. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: - “52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.” 18. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was 19 2026:HHC:37769 held at page 761: - 24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court, in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933, held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him. 25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27) “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” 20 2026:HHC:37769 In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions would indicate that the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution. 26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved, and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.” 19. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the Mahindra Pickup at the time of the accident. 20. Site plan (Ext.PW10/A) shows that the Alto car was proceeding on the main highway, whereas the pickup being driven by the accused was approaching from the road junction. 21. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations in exercising the power conferred under Section 118 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Rule 8 of the Regulations 21 2026:HHC:37769 provides that the driver of the motor vehicle shall slow down when approaching a road intersection, a road junction, a pedestrian crossing or a road corner, and shall not enter any such intersection, junction or crossing until he has become aware that he may do so without endangering the safety of persons thereon. Rule 9 provides that the driver of a motor vehicle shall, on entering a road intersection, at which traffic is not being regulated, if the road entered is a main road, designated as such, give way to the vehicles proceeding along that road, and in any other case, give way to all traffic approaching the intersection on his right-hand side. 22. A combined reading of these two Rules shows that a driver of a motor vehicle is supposed to take precautions before entering the junction. He is to give way to the vehicles moving on his right side, and he cannot enter the main road if his entry was likely to endanger any person. The Alto car was coming from the right side of the pickup coming from the road junction. Hence, the accused could not have entered the main road when his entry was likely to endanger the safety of the vehicles moving on the main road, and he was to give way to the Alto car. However, he failed to give way to the Alto car, and his entry 22 2026:HHC:37769 endangered the safety of the Alto Car. The accused's failure to adhere to the rules of the road led to the accident, and learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was in breach of his statutory duties. 23. The statement of Subhash Shandil (DW-1) that the driver of the car could not control it is not supported by the site plan and the photographs, wherein the Alto car is shown on the extreme left side of the road, which suggests that the accident had occurred on the left side of the road for the Alto car and the right side of the road for Mahindra pickup. 24. Rule 2 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width 23 2026:HHC:37769 of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 25. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were bloodstain marks and a V-shaped slipper of the deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map, Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road. 26. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured and by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who 24 2026:HHC:37769 state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 27. In Shakila Khader v. Nausheer Cama, (1975) 4 SCC 122: 1975 SCC (Cri) 379: 1975 SCC OnLine SC 103, the car went to the right side of the road, hit the parapet and turned turtle. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the driver was negligent. It was observed at page 126: “6. The facts in the case speak eloquently about what should have happened. The main criterion for deciding whether the driving that led to the accident was rash and negligent is not only the speed but also the width of the road, the density of the traffic, and the attempt, as in this case, to overtake the other vehicles, resulting in going to the wrong side of the road and being responsible for the accident. Even if the accident took place in the twinkling of an eye, it is not difficult for the eyewitness to notice a car overtaking other vehicles and going to the wrong side of the road and hitting a vehicle travelling on that side of the road. The criterion adopted by the learned Judge for assessing the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and rejecting them is thoroughly unjustifiable. There may be cases where it is difficult to be clear or specific in giving details as to the cause of the accident, but this is not one such case. The reference by the learned Judge about the slight damage to the electric post and the conclusion drawn therefrom that the car could not have been going at a high speed is not correct, as we shall show later. His further observation that the fact that the car travelled another 45 feet and hit against the parapet wall and turned turtle showed that the car must have been travelling at an extremely high speed but there is a little blue paint on the pole and a faint gray 25 2026:HHC:37769 stain on the parapet wall is self-contradictory unless we are to infer that the learned Judge implied that the one or the other is not true. He does not so hold. There can be no doubt about the car having hit the electric post and the parapet wall. That and the fact of its overturning would establish the rash and negligent driving. A car driven normally and travelling behind a bus does not go to the opposite side of the road, hit an electric post and parapet wall, and turn turtle. The car apparently stopped only because it turned turtle. It did not hit the electric post or the parapet wall full tilt; if it did, it would have stopped at one of those points. We should remember that the collision with the scooter and pushing it back would have considerably reduced the speed of the car. Even so, it travelled farther. The slight damage to the electric post and the parapet wall is because the car hit them sideways. Nobody has suggested that they were brought into existence for this case. The car would probably not have stopped but for turning turtle, and it should have been travelling quite fast before it could overturn, as the learned Judge himself realises. There is only one conclusion possible on the facts of this case, and that is that the accused came over to the wrong side of the road and was responsible for the accident, and that is clearly a rash and negligent act in the condition of the road and the condition of the traffic.” 28. The accused breached the Rules of the Road Regulations, which was the proximate cause of the accident. 29. The informant Amar Singh (PW-1) stated that he was driving the Alto car bearing registration No. HP-62-0108 on 28.10.2008. When the car reached at Mehli, a Mahindra pickup came from Junga and hit two vehicles that were parked on the road. The driver of the Mahindra pickup turned his vehicle 26 2026:HHC:37769 towards the right side. The informant stopped the car towards the left. However, the Mahindra pickup hit the car. The car moved back. The driver fled away from the spot. He sustained injuries in the accident. He admitted in his cross-examination that it is not possible for a driver coming from Junga to see the vehicles moving on the road. He admitted that the vehicles were parked on both sides of the road. He admitted that the road was narrow. 30. The admission made by the witness in the cross- examination shows that it was not possible for the driver of a vehicle coming from a junction on the main road to see the traffic moving on the road. Therefore, it was all the more necessary for the accused to take care while approaching the junction. 31. Johra Bai (PW-2) corroborated the informant's version. She stated that she was travelling in the Alto car. A pickup hit the car at a high speed. The driver of the pickup was driving it in a zigzag manner, and the informant had parked the car towards the roadside. The driver of the Pickup sped away towards Malyana after the accident. She admitted that it was not 27 2026:HHC:37769 possible to see a vehicle moving on Mehli Road. She volunteered to say that she could see the pickup when it had reached the main road. She admitted that a person would have to go towards the hillside to go towards Malyana. 32. The cross-examination of this witness also does not absolve the accused of liability. She specifically stated that a person going towards Malyana has to drive towards the hillside, whereas the accident in the present case had taken place towards the valley side. Hence, her statement corroborates the photographs and the side plan that the accident had occurred on the right side of the road. 33. It was submitted that the informant and Johra Bai (PW-2) are the interested witnesses as they are related to each other. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadayappan v. State, (2019) 9 SCC 257: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 843: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 610 that a related witness is not interested and the interested witness is the one who wants to secure the conviction of the accused. It was observed at page 260: “13. Criminal law jurisprudence makes a clear distinction between a related and interested witness. A witness can- 28 2026:HHC:37769 not be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. The witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. [See: Sudhakar v. State [Sudhakar v. State, (2018) 5 SCC 435: (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 777].]” 34. In the present case, the cross-examination of the informant or Johra Bai does not show that they are interested in securing the conviction of the accused, and they cannot be called interested because they happened to be the victim of the accident or related to each other. 35. Sunil Kumar (PW-14) stated that he had parked his car bearing registration No. HP03A-3114 on the spot. A Maruti Wagon R was also parked on the spot. A Mahindra Pickup No. HP-63-2704 came from Junga and hit his vehicle and the Wagon R. The pickup went towards Malyana at a high speed. It hit a vehicle coming from Malyana. His vehicle had suffered damage in the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that he came to know of the accident after hearing the noise. He admitted that a vehicle has to go uphill to approach the main road. He had not seen the pickup hitting the Alto car and came to know of the accident subsequently. 29 2026:HHC:37769 36. The statement of this witness proves that the Mahindra pickup had hit two stationary vehicles. The accused had no reason to hit the stationary vehicle, and learned Courts below had rightly held that he was negligent. 37. Dr Shalini (PW-11) examined the informant and found that he had sustained grievous injury. Since the injury was caused in the accident because of the negligence of the accused, the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC. The accused failed to carry the injured to the hospital, and he is liable under Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 38. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: 30 2026:HHC:37769 “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences for the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to 31 2026:HHC:37769 have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 39. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 40. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: 32 2026:HHC:37769 “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 41. The judgment of Gagan Kumar (supra) cannot be followed in view of the binding precedent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 42. Learned trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and pay a fine of ₹1000/ with default sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC, simple imprisonment for one month and pay a fine of ₹500/- with default sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of the IPC and simple imprisonment for one month and pay a fine of ₹500/- with default sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 338 of the IPC. The sentences imposed by the learned trial Court cannot be said to be 33 2026:HHC:37769 excessive, considering that a deterrent sentence has to be imposed to deter the drivers of the motor vehicle from causing the accident. Therefore, no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court. 43. No other point was urged. 44. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed. 45. The present revision petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending application(s), if any. 46. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 07th September, 2026 (ravinder)