2026:HHC:37771 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 518 of 2012 Reserved on: 19.08.2026 Date of Decision: 07.09.2026 State of H.P. ....Petitioner Versus Rajat Sharma & others .... Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehira, learned Additional Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr Diya Raj Singh, Advocate, for the respondents. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 17.07.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. IV, Una, District Una, H.P. (learned trial Court), vide which the respondents (accused 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2026:HHC:37771 before the learned trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 323 and 325 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Vivek Sharma (PW-1) had visited Bhatoli College on 10.10.2008 to take the mathematics examination of BCA final year. He was sitting beneath the tree located near the gate of the college premises. Sumit Sharma (PW-2) and Vikrant Parmar (PW-9) were also with him. Karan Vasudev, Rohan Sharma, and Rajat Sharma (the accused before the learned trial Court) came to the spot and enquired whether the informant wanted to beat them. The informant told them he would discuss the matter after the completion of the paper. However, the accused beat him with kicks and fist blows. The informant was rescued by Sumit Sharma and Vikrant Parmar. The informant sustained injury 3 2026:HHC:37771 to his nose. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW-7/A) was recorded at the police station. An application (Ext.PW-7/D) was made for the informant’s medical examination. Dr. K.D. Jassal (PW-6) examined the informant and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. He advised an X-ray. Dr O.P. Ram Deo (PW-5) went through the X-ray and found a fracture of the nasal bone. He issued the report (Ext.PW-5/A). Dr. K.D. Jassal also referred the informant to an eye surgeon. Dr S.K. Soni (PW-3) examined the informant and found injuries near the eye. The nature of the injury was simple. Dr. K.D. Jassal issued the final opinion (Ext.PW-6/A) stating that the nature of the injuries was grievous. An entry (Ext.PW-8/A) was recorded after the receipt of the medical opinion, and FIR (Ext. PW-7/B) was registered at the Police Station. HC Desh Raj (PW-7) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-7/C). He recorded the statements of witnesses. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court after the completion of the investigation.. 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Section 323 and 4 2026:HHC:37771 325 read with Section 34 of IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case. The informant, Vivek Sharma (PW-1), narrated the incident. Sumit Sharma (PW-2) and Vikrant Parmar (PW-9) are the eyewitnesses to the incident. Dr. S.K. Soni (PW-3), Dr. O.P Ram Deo (PW-5) and Dr. K.D. Jassal (PW-6) examined the informant/victim. Sanjeev Kumar (PW-4) took the X-rays. HC Desh Raj (PW-7) investigated the matter. Sukh Ram (PW-8) proved the entry in the daily diary. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They claimed that they were implicated in a false case, and that they did not know the informant. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. Learned trial Court held that Vikrant Parmar (PW- 9) did not support the prosecution case. The statements of the informant and Sumit Sharma (PW-2) contradicted each other on material aspects. The accused and the informant belonged to different factions, and the possibility of false implication 5 2026:HHC:37771 could not be ruled out. Hence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant's statement was corroborated by Sumit Sharma (PW-2) and the medical evidence. There was no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Minor contradictions were blown out of proportion to record the acquittal. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehira, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant and Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehira, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant's statement was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the statement of Sumit Sharma (PW-2). Enmity is a double-edged weapon, and it can furnish a motive for the 6 2026:HHC:37771 commission of a crime as well. Therefore, He prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the accused and the informant belonged to rival factions and the learned trial Court had rightly held that their testimonies were required to be seen with due care and caution. The informant's testimony was not corroborated by Vikrant Parmar (PW-9), who was stated to be present at the time of the incident. The statements of the informant and Sumit Sharma contradicted each other on material aspects, and the learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. This Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned trial Court, even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble 7 2026:HHC:37771 Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the 8 2026:HHC:37771 accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have 9 2026:HHC:37771 given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, 10 2026:HHC:37771 wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. The informant Vivek Sharma (PW-1) admitted in his cross-examination that the accused belong to NSUI, whereas he belongs to ABVP. Sumit Sharma (PW2) also admitted in his cross-examination that three groups, NSUI, ABVP and SFI were functioning in the college at the time of the incident.HC Des Raj (PW-7) admitted in his cross- examination that accused Rohan was the class representative of B. Com second year at the time of the incident, and he belonged to NSUI. He admitted that the incident had occurred because the accused believed that the informant was a member of ABVP. However, he had not carried out any investigation to determine whether the informant was a member of ABVP or not. The statement of these witnesses also support the inference drawn by the learned trial Court that the accused and the informant belong to different politically rival factions and the incident had taken place because of the ideological difference between the parties. 14. Informant and Sumit Sharma claimed that they had visited the College to take the paper of Mathematics, which was scheduled to be held at 02.00 p.m. However, the 11 2026:HHC:37771 date sheet was not collected by HC Dev Raj (PW-7) to demonstrate that the informant and Sumit Sharma had visited the college to take the paper. 15. The informant stated that he was sitting beneath the tree near the front gate and Sumit Sharma and Vikrant Parmar were with him. The place of incident is shown in the site plan (Ext.PW-7/C), inside the college premises. Sumit Sharma (PW-2) stated that he was sitting outside the gate at a distance of 20 feet at a place meant for sitting. Thus, the testimonies of the witnesses contradicted each other regarding the place where the informant and the witnesses were present. While the informant claimed that he was inside the gate in the premises of the college, Sumit stated that he was outside the gate at a distance of 20 feet. The discrepancy regarding the place of incident is intricately connected to the incident itself, and the benefit of the same has to be granted to the accused. 16. The informant, Vivek Sharma, stated that the accused came to him and started pushing him. When his friends enquired from the accused about the reason, and advised them to talk after the paper, the accused started 12 2026:HHC:37771 beating the informant. Sumit Sharma (PW2) stated that the accused came and enquired from the informant whether he wanted to talk. The informant replied that he would talk after the paper. The accused started beating the informant. The earliest version in the entry (Ext. PW7/A) mentions that the accused came and asked the informant whether he wanted to beat the accused. Therefore, three different versions of the genesis of the incident have been projected before the Court, which would make the genesis of the incident doubtful. 17. The informant admitted in his cross-examination that classes were functioning at a distance of 40 feet from the place of incident. He admitted that many students were moving around the main gate. Many student staff members crossed the place of incident, but nobody intervened. Sumit Sharma (PW2) stated in his cross-examination that many students were present in the canteen located at a distance of about 20 feet. He admitted that many students and staff members were present in the canteen. Many students had gathered on the spot. 15-20 police officials had also gathered on the spot. However, no person intervened. 13 2026:HHC:37771 18. The statements of these witnesses show that independent witnesses were present on the spot; however, the prosecution did not associate any independent witnesses and did not assign any reason for not doing so. Hence, the learned trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution version. 19. Vikrant Parmar (PW-9) did not support the prosecution case. He was permitted to be cross-examined, but he denied that the accused had given a beating to the informant in his presence. He contradicted the previous statement recorded by the police. Thus, his testimony does not advance the prosecution's version. 20. The informant stated that accused persons gave him beatings due to which his nose was fractured. He has not named any person who had inflicted the blow and had used the term accused persons. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pandurang vs. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216, that it is unsafe to rely upon the omnibus statement that the accused had committed the offence. It was observed: “Rasikabai says that the "accused" raised their axes and sticks and threatened her when she called out to them, but that again is an all-embracing statement 14 2026:HHC:37771 which we are not prepared to take literally in the absence of further particulars. People do not ordinarily act in unison like a Greek chorus, and, quite apart from dishonesty, this is a favourite device with witnesses who are either not mentally alert or are mentally lazy and are given to loose thinking. They are often apt to say "all" even when they only saw "some" because they are too lazy, mentally, to differentiate. Unless, therefore, a witness particularises when there are several accused, it is ordinarily unsafe to accept omnibus inclusions like this at their face value.” 21. Therefore, not much advantage can be derived by the prosecution from the use of the term accused persons. 22. Thus, the prosecution version was full of infirmities and the learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned trial Court even if another view is possible. 23. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 24. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish personal bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court, which shall be effective for six months 15 2026:HHC:37771 with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court 25. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any 26. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 07th September, 2026. (Ravinder)