Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22039-DB p. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 334 of 2025 In / And L.P.A. No. 187 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Principal Secretary, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Co- operative Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, Officiating from Administrative Building, Dhurwa, P.O. – Dhurwa, P.S. – Dhurwa, District – Ranchi, Jharkhand. 3. The Deputy Secretary, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Co- operative Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, Officiating from Administrative Building, Dhurwa, P.O. – Dhurwa, P.S. – Dhurwa, District – Ranchi, Jharkhand. 4. The Joint Secretary, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Co-operative Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, Officiating from Administrative Building, Dhurwa, P.O. – Dhurwa, P.S. – Dhurwa, District – Ranchi, Jharkhand. ... Respondent Nos. 1 to 4/Appellants Versus 1. Nand Kishore Gupta, son of Late Anganu Prasad Gupta, presently residing at Purandaha, Near Railway Crossing, P.O. – Deoghar, P.S. – Deoghar, District – Deoghar. ... Writ Petitioner/Respondent 2. The Accountant General, Jharkhand, Ranchi, officiating from the Office of the Accountant General, P.O. – Doranda, P.S. – Doranda, District – Ranchi. 3. The Accounts Officer, officiating from the Office of the Accountant General, Jharkhand, Ranchi, P.O. – Doranda, P.S. – Doranda, District – Ranchi. ... Respondents/Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellants: Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C – I For Respondents/Acct.Gen: Mr. Amit Kr Verma, Advocate --------- 02/Dated: 22.07.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22039-DB p. 2 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 281 days in filing the appeal against the judgment dated 05.03.2024 made by the learned Single Judge disposing of W.P. (S) No. 3764 of 2016. 3. On a perusal of the averments in the I.A., we are satisfied that the appellant has failed to disclose any sufficient cause for the inordinate delay of 281 days. The application, in substance, merely chronicles the acquisition of legal opinions, the collection of relevant records, and internal departmental procedures. It concludes with a bare assertion that the grounds of appeal were subsequently drafted and the present appeal preferred. Importantly, the appellant has made no endeavour to account for the specific time intervals consumed at each stage of these departmental processes. Delay is sought to be explained on the basis of routine bureaucratic procedures that could have been avoided or otherwise expedited. This is despite several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly not accepting such explanations as constituting sufficient cause. Therefore, even in this case, we cannot accept the explanation and condone the delay. 4. To be precise, paragraph 5 of the I.A. attributes the initial delay of nearly five months from the date of the impugned order, i.e., 05.03.2024, to the enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct during the General Elections, 2024, and the deputation of certain officers on election duty, on account of which no follow-up action could allegedly be taken. This explanation, however, does not Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22039-DB p. 3 withstand scrutiny. The General Elections to the 18th Lok Sabha were conducted between 19.04.2024 and 01.06.2024, with the results declared on 04.06.2024. Thus, even if the explanation is accepted in its entirety, it fails to account for the period after 04.06.2024. The application is completely silent as to what prevented the appellant-department from taking any steps thereafter, rendering the subsequent delay wholly unexplained. 5. Moving forward, paragraph 6 of the I.A. states that the impugned order dated 05.03.2024 was communicated to the department by the petitioner through an application dated 06.07.2024, whereafter the file was placed before the Under Secretary only on 13.08.2024. In effect, the appellant seeks to attribute the delay to the petitioner or the respondents’ counsel for not communicating the order earlier. Such an explanation is wholly untenable. It is not as if the impugned order was made without hearing the State’s Counsel or in the absence of the State Lawyer. It is also not the State’s case that it was unaware of the order. 6. It was equally open to, and indeed incumbent upon, the appellant- department to remain vigilant, diligently pursue the matter, and ascertain the outcome of the writ proceedings. Significantly, the application is conspicuously silent as to any step taken by the department during this period to inquire into the status of the case. Even otherwise, no explanation whatsoever has been furnished for the delay of more than one month between the receipt of the Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22039-DB p. 4 petitioner's application on 06.07.2024 and the placement of the file before the Under Secretary on 13.08.2024. 7. Thereafter, a combined reading of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the I.A. reveals that the file was forwarded to the departmental retainer on 30.08.2024 for preparation of the statement of facts but was placed back before the Under Secretary only on 07.10.2024. The application furnishes no explanation for this intervening period of more than five weeks, during which no discernible progress appears to have been made. It is difficult to comprehend how the preparation of a statement of facts in a matter of the present nature could reasonably require such an extended period. The unexplained stagnation of the file during this stage further reflects the absence of diligence on the part of the appellant in prosecuting the matter. 8. Lastly, paragraphs 14 and 15 of the I.A. state that the file was forwarded to the office of the concerned Law Officer on 28.10.2024 and that, owing to the Diwali vacation, the draft of the Letters Patent Appeal could not be prepared and filed within time. Even if this explanation is accepted at face value, it does not carry the matter any further. The application fails to explain why the appeal came to be filed only after nearly two months from the conclusion of the Diwali vacation. This substantial period of inaction remains wholly unexplained and cannot be justified on the basis of a brief intervening holiday. The State appears to be under the firm impression that even if the limitation has commenced, it stands Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22039-DB p. 5 interrupted by such subsequent holidays, long after the limitation period has expired. This is not correct. 9. Accordingly, what emerges from the above is that the delay is unsupported by any coherent or continuous explanatory chronology. The application merely catalogues routine departmental steps without addressing, even cursorily, why the matter remained dormant for such extended periods at the most material stages. There is casualness in drafting the IA. The averments, even if accepted at their face value, do not show sufficient cause. An applicant seeking the relief of condonation of delay must do more than narrate what eventually happened; it must also account for what did not happen. 10. The law is well settled that casual averments and formulaic bureaucratic explanations do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay of this magnitude. The mere recitation that files moved through proper channels, that legal opinion was sought and obtained, that service records were called for, and that the appeal was eventually prepared, cannot, without more, justify the exercise of discretion in favour of the appellants. 11. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22039-DB p. 6 of file movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does not constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology, particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is the Government or a wing thereof. 12. Moreover, in the recent past, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that the status of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial justice cannot override the bar of limitation. The Hon’ble Court further held that before adverting to the merits, the court must first assess the bona fides of the explanation offered; merits may be taken into aid only where the explanation and the opposition are evenly balanced. Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be excused as a matter of generosity. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22039-DB p. 7 casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. 15. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22039-DB p. 8 constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.” 16. In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed: “We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never-ending paraphernalia. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22039-DB p. 9 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed that such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 19. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown. Consequently, we dismiss this I.A., which seeks condonation of the delay in filing the accompanying appeal. 20. As a consequence, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do not survive and are disposed of. No costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) July 22, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Cp.2 Uploaded on 27.07.2026