Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22038-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 6080 of 2025 In / And L.P.A. No. 262 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Secondary, Water Resource Department, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Nepal House, Doranda, PO and PS Doranda, District Ranchi 834002. 2. The Under Secretary, Water Resource Department, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Nepal House, Doranda, PO and PS Doranda, District Ranchi 834002. 3. The Deputy Collector, Revenue Division, Water Resources Department, Jal Bhawan, Doranda, PO and PS Doranda, District Ranchi. 4. Canal Circle Officer, Hazaribagh Canal Circle, Office Jhilpar, PO Hazaribagh, PS Sadar (Hazaribagh), District Hazaribagh. ... Respondents/Appellants Versus 1. Baldev Saha, aged about 75 years, Son of late Prasad Saw, Resident of Beltu, P.O. Kandaber, P.S. - Keredari, District - Hazaribagh (Jharkhand). … Petitioner/Respondent 2. The Accountant General (A&E), Ranchi, Office of Accountant General Jharkhand, Doranda, PO and PS Doranda, District Ranchi. … Respondent/Respondent --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellants: Mr Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C.-I For the Respondents: Ms Risheeta Singh, Advocate Ms Richa Sanchita, Advocate 05/Dated: 22/07/2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 303 days in filing the appeal against the judgment dated 02.05.2024 made by the learned Single Judge disposing of W.P.(S) No. 4880 of 2022. 3. From a perusal of the averments in the I.A., we are satisfied that the appellants have failed to disclose any sufficient cause to Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22038-DB explain the inordinate delay. The application, in substance, merely charts the routine itinerary of files as they moved between the Deputy Secretary, the office of the learned Advocate General, a local advocate, and the Standing Counsel, without accounting, even cursorily, for the specific time consumed at each stage. Delay is sought to be explained by citing routine and mostly unverifiable bureaucratic procedures, even though time and again it has been held that they alone cannot constitute sufficient cause. 4. To be precise, paragraph 4 of the I.A. discloses that the impugned order was passed on 02.05.2024. Yet, it is stated to have been communicated to the Secretary, Water Resources Department only on 02.09.2024, after a lapse of nearly four months. The I.A. seeks to attribute this delay to the failure of the petitioner or the respondents’ counsel to communicate the order. Such an explanation is wholly untenable. It was equally open to, and indeed incumbent upon, the appellants-department to diligently pursue the matter and ascertain its outcome. The application is conspicuously silent as to any step taken by the department during this four- month period to inquire into the status of the writ petition. 5. Thereafter, paragraphs 5 to 8 of the I.A. disclose a series of internal transmissions, from the Deputy Secretary on 05.09.2024, to the learned Advocate General on 13.09.2024, culminating in advice to file the appeal on 18.09.2024, and receipt of the file back on 23.09.2024. These are, at best, routine departmental formalities and do not, by themselves, constitute an explanation for delay. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22038-DB 6. Moving forward, paragraph 9 of the I.A. states that the file was thereafter handed to a local advocate, one Prashant Kumar, "who kept the file for some time" an expression conspicuously devoid of any date or duration or plausible account for delay. The file was consequently sent to the office of Sr. S.C.-I only on 17.10.2024. The application offers no explanation as to precisely how much time was consumed at the hands of the first advocate, nor any accountability for the delay occasioned by his subsequent refusal. 7. Compounding this, paragraph 10 of the I.A. reveals that the file handed over to the Standing Counsel was thereafter "misplaced." The I.A. does not disclose when the misplacement came to light. It discloses no remedial step taken thereafter. Nor does it explain how a certified brief, entrusted to an advocate, came to be misplaced at all. It was only upon the department issuing reminder letters dated 16.12.2024 and 13.01.2025, themselves separated by a further unexplained month, that the matter was revived. This sequence discloses negligence at all levels coupled with a firm belief that the laws of limitation do not apply to the Government or its officials. 8. Paragraph 11 further states that grounds of appeal were finally prepared and sent to the department on 20.01.2025, forwarded to the competent authority for approval on 22.01.2025. Yet approval was accorded only on 25.02.2025, a further gap of over a month that remains unaccounted for. The I.A. is silent as to what occasioned this month-long deliberation over a mere approval. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22038-DB 9. A more serious infirmity emerges on comparing paragraphs 12 and 13 of the I.A. Paragraph 12 states that the competent authority granted approval only on 25.02.2025, with formalities for filing completed on 28.02.2025. Paragraph 13, however, states that the affidavit in support of the Memo of Appeal was sworn on 04.02.2025, a date that precedes the approval itself by three weeks. This internal inconsistency is not a trivial clerical slip; rather, it casts doubt on the veracity of the chronology set out in the application. The narrative prima facie does not seem to have been prepared without regard for the truth, but is based on the firm impression that this type of casual, unverifiable, and even false averment suffices for condonation of delay. 10. The other minor reasons are the marriage of the daughter of the Advocate's clerk on 06.03.2025, on account of which the clerk "remained busy" until 18.03.2025 or that the certified copy was applied for only on 19.03.2005. The second reason is strange, because the appellants, on their own showing, were already in possession of the order since 02.09.2024 and had grounds of appeal ready and approved by 25.02.2025. No explanation is forthcoming as to why the certified copy was not applied for at any earlier point. This delay in applying for the certified copy appears to be an afterthought rather than a genuine procedural necessity. 11. What emerges, cumulatively, is a chain of internal file movement, misplacement of records, unaccounted-for advocate-level delay, and departmental inaction. The application is marred by a want of Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22038-DB a plausible cause. It appears to be a mechanical and routine exercise undertaken to seek condonation as a matter of course, rather than on the basis of any genuine necessity. There are contradictions, and there is casualness in seeking condonation. The law is well settled that casual averments and formulaic bureaucratic explanations do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay of this magnitude. The mere recitation that files moved through proper channels, that a legal opinion was sought and obtained, that service records were called for, and that the appeal was eventually prepared cannot, without more, justify the exercise of discretion in favour of the appellants. 12. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates of file movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does not constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology, particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is the Government or a wing thereof. 13. Moreover, in the recent past, the Hon’ble SC in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22038-DB his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that the status of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial justice cannot override the bar of limitation. The Hon’ble Court further held that before adverting to the merits, the court must first assess the bona fides of the explanation offered; merits may be taken into aid only where the explanation and the opposition are evenly balanced. Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be excused as a matter of generosity. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in condoning delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22038-DB the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. 16. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed, “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.” 17. In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22038-DB cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never- ending paraphernalia. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:22038-DB and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 21. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown, and consequently, we dismiss this I.A., seeking condonation of the delay in filing the accompanying appeal. 22. As a consequence, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do not survive and are disposed of. No costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) July 22, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Cp.2 Uploaded on 27.07.2027.