2026:HHC:37531 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 263 of 2013 Reserved on: 22.8.2026 Date of Decision: 03.09.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Arun Kumar ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr N.K. Tomar, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.2.2013, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 29.1.2011 and order of sentence dated 23.2.2011, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajgarh, District Sirmaur (learned Trial Court) were set aside, and the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the charged offences. (The parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:37531 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 354, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant (name being withheld to protect her identity) was returning to her home on 26.8.2009, at about 02:30 PM. Accused Bablu was also walking with her. They were talking to each other. When they reached at a lonely place, the accused caught hold of the informant’s arm and behaved indecently. He tried to drag her towards the jungle. The informant extricated herself and ran towards her home. She narrated the incident to her mother. She and her mother waited for the informant’s father, who was away from home. However, he did not return, and the informant went to the Police Station with her mother and reported the matter to the police. The police registered the FIR (Ex.PW-1/A). HC Ranjeet Singh (PW-5) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW-5/A). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the 3 2026:HHC:37531 challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354, 341, and 506 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Informant (PW-1) narrated the incident. Informant’s mother (PW-2) was told about the incident. Constable Pritam Singh (PW-3) proved the certificate issued under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. R.S. Chauhan (PW-4) prepared the challan. HC Ranjeet Singh (PW-5) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that the informant had made a complaint against him to the police; the police investigated the matter, visited the spot, prepared the site plan, and recorded the statements of witnesses. He stated that a false case was made against him because of a water dispute. 4 2026:HHC:37531 6. The learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was credible, and there was nothing in her cross- examination to show that she was making a false statement. Minor discrepancies in the informant’s statement and her mother’s statement were not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. The delay was properly explained and could not have been used to discard the prosecution version. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: Conviction Sentence Section 341 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for ten days, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three days. Section 354 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹3,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. Section 506 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹3,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run 5 2026:HHC:37531 concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the relationship between the parties was strained, and the prosecution version was required to be seen with due care and caution. There were material discrepancies in the informant’s testimony. She was not medically examined, and there was no corroboration to her testimony. The incident had taken place on 26.8. 2009 at about 02:30 PM. The informant had visited Rajgarh on the next day to take the paper, but she had not reported the matter to the police on the next day. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that the delay was properly explained. The judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were not sustainable. Hence, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, and acquitted the accused of the charged offences. 6 2026:HHC:37531 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. Minor contradictions were blown out of proportion to acquit the accused. There was no reason to set aside the well- reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, and Mr N.K. Tomar, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Trial Court had convicted and sentenced the accused after passing a well-reasoned judgment. The learned Appellate Court reversed the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court without assigning any cogent reasons. The informant’s testimony was discarded because of minor contradictions, and such contradictions are bound to come with time. The delay was 7 2026:HHC:37531 properly explained, and the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused because of the delay. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr N.K. Tomar, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the informant’s testimony was not corroborated by any evidence. It was admitted that the relationship between the accused and the informant was strained. Hence, the evidence was required to be seen with utmost care and caution. There were various infirmities in the prosecution version, and the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. This Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the 8 2026:HHC:37531 Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is 9 2026:HHC:37531 hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 10 2026:HHC:37531 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11 2026:HHC:37531 15. The incident had occurred on 26.8.2009 at 02:30 PM. The matter was reported to the police on 28.8.2009 at about 02:45 PM. The informant stated that she could not report the matter to the police because she was waiting for her father to come, but he did not come. Her mother (PW-2) admitted in her cross-examination that she had accompanied the informant to Rajgarh because the informant had to take the test. She volunteered to say that she had narrated the incident to the Principal. She admitted that she had not visited the Police Station even though the school and police station are located in the same area. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the informant and her mother had visited Rajgarh on the next day of the incident, and they could have reported the matter to the police on the next day; however, they failed to do so. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the 12 2026:HHC:37531 crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-dated to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 16. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of 13 2026:HHC:37531 Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1].” 17. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176; (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed on page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve 14 2026:HHC:37531 the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 18. Therefore, the prosecution case is required to be seen with due care and caution because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police. 19. The informant admitted in her cross-examination that she had a dispute with the family of the accused over water and she was not on visiting terms to the house of the accused. Informant’s mother (PW-2) stated in her cross-examination that she had no dispute with the family of the accused over water, although she admitted that she was not on visiting terms with the house of the accused. The statements of the informant and her mother show that the relationship between the parties is strained. Hence, in these circumstances, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the testimonies of the witnesses are required to be seen with due care and caution. 20. The relationship between the accused and the informant was strained, which makes the prosecution case highly doubtful that the informant and the accused walked together for 15 2026:HHC:37531 about half an hour and they talked to each other. When the accused and the informant were not on friendly terms with each other, and they had a water dispute, the informant would not have walked with the accused and talked to him for half an hour. 21. The informant stated that the accused caught hold of her arm and tried to drag her towards the bushes. She tried to save herself, but the accused caught hold of her breast and forced himself. She stated in her cross-examination that the accused had not pushed her and her clothes were not torn. The accused had caught hold of her dupatta. She snatched the dupatta. She had not sustained any injury even though the accused had caught hold of her arm forcibly. The incident continued for 15–20 minutes. She admitted that usually people and vehicles move on the road. She had not told the police about catching hold of her breast. 22. The admission made by the informant in the cross- examination that she had not told the police about catching hold of her breast shows that she has improved upon her previous version, and that she cannot be called to be a reliable witness. The informant was not medically examined to corroborate her 16 2026:HHC:37531 version and to determine whether she had sustained any injuries in the incident. 23. The prosecution examined the informant’s mother (PW-2) to corroborate her testimony, but the incident was narrated to her when the informant’s mother made inquiries from the informant. Therefore, the statement will not fall within the purview of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down in Pratapsingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1970 SCC OnLine MP 67: ILR 1973 MP 682, that a statement made pursuant to an inquiry does not fall within the purview of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed at page 687: Section 6 of the Evidence Act, and some of the succeeding Sections, embody the rule of admission of evidence relating to what is commonly known as res gestae. They are in the nature of exceptions to the “hearsay” rule. [Section 6 permits proof of collateral statements which are so connected with the facts in issue as to form part of the same transaction. Whether the statement made by a witness was a part of the same transaction or not is to be considered in the light of the circumstances of each case. The principle is that it should be so intimately connected with the fact in issue as to be a spontaneous utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion or a spontaneous reaction thereof, there being no opportunity for deliberately fabricating the statement. In other words, the statement which is a part of res gestae does not narrate a past event, but it is the event itself speaking through a 17 2026:HHC:37531 person, thus excluding the possibility of any design behind it.] In Chhotka v. State, [AIR 1958 Cal 482], it was held that the requirement of Sec. (b) is that the statement must have been made contemporaneously with the act or immediately after it and not at such an interval of time as to make it a narrative of past events or to allow time for fabrication. We agree with this view. In the instant case, the statements of Mst. Mahadevi in question do not at all appear to be spontaneous, and appear to have been made some time after the incident in answer to a query. Sarfraj Beg (PW 1) testified that at about 10 or 10:15 P.M. that night he heard some row from his house, which is at a distance of about 400 yards from the house of appellant Pratap. He says that he went towards the house of Pratap, near which a large crowd had collected. On going inside the house, he found a dead body lying with fresh wounds from a sword. According to him, Mst. Mahadevi (PW 10), wife of the appellant Pratap, was there, and when she was questioned about the murder, she stated that her husband and brother had run away after committing the murder. As the statement was in answer to a query and was made after a lapse of some time after the murder, it cannot be treated either as spontaneous or as part of the transaction of the murder. If no one had asked her how it happened, perhaps she would not have made any statement at all. We, therefore, hold that the statement made by Mst. Mahadevi to Sarfraj Beg (PW 1) is not admissible in evidence under Sec. 6 and as such has got to be excluded from consideration. 24. Therefore, the statement made to the informant’s mother pursuant to the inquiry made by her cannot be admitted under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act to provide corroboration to the informant’s testimony. 18 2026:HHC:37531 25. There is no other evidence to corroborate the informant’s statement, and the learned Appellate Court had rightly refused to rely upon her testimony. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based upon the evidence on record, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused even if another view is possible. 26. No other point was urged. 27. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. The appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 28. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on 19 2026:HHC:37531 receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 29. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 3rd September, 2026 (Chander)