APHC010317782024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] MONDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 5115 & 5116 of 2024 CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 5115 of 2024 Between: 1. .ANNAPU REDDY BALA VENKAT,, S/O A. SWAMANNA,AGE 31 YRS, R/O SAIBABPET,NANDIKOTKUR, CONTESTING CANDIDATE ON BEHALF JANASENA. FOR 136- NANDIKOTKUR A/C (SC), KURNOOL DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS STATION HOUSE OFFICER, MUCHUMARRI POLICE STATION, KURNOOL DISTRICT, REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF AP AT AMARAVATHI. 2. CH SHASI KALA, DEPUTY TAHSILDAR, PAGIDYALA, KURNOOL DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S): CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 5116/2024 Between: 1. ANNAPU REDDY BALA VENKAT, S/O A. SWAMANNA,AGE 31 YRS, R/O SAIBABPET,NANDIKOTKUR, CONTESTING CANDIDATE ON BEHALF JANASENA. FOR 136- NANDIKOTKUR A/C (SC), KURNOOL DISTRICT. 2 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS STATION HOUSE OFFICER, JUPADUBUNGLOW POLICE STATION, KURNOOL DISTRICT, REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF AP AT AMARAVATHI. 2. GOBBURI ANURADHA, DEPUTY TAHSILDAR, AMARAVTHI EXPRESS HIGH WAY, O/O DIST. COLLECTOR OFFICE, KURNOOL TOWN, KURNOOL DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. YARRAMSETTY VENKATESH Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following: COMMON ORDER: These two Criminal Petitions are heard and disposed of by way of this common order, as the facts and circumstances in these two cases are identical, but, of course, the Petitioners are same, albeit they arise out of two different cases. 2. The Criminal Petition have been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity „the Cr.P.C.,‟)/Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity „the BNSS‟) seeking to quash the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.1 in C.C.Nos.629 and 627 of 2020 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nandikotkur, registered for the alleged offence punishable under Section 188 3 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity „the I.P.C‟) and Section 32 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Act, 1861 (for brevity „the Act‟). 3. 3. The allegation against the petitioner in is that on 05.03.2019, at about 11:30 hours, at Thudicherla village within the jurisdiction of the Court, he, in utter disregard of the prohibitory orders duly promulgated under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861, which were in force during the General Elections, convened and participated in a roadshow and public assembly without obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority/Returning Officer. Such conduct amounts to a manifest violation of the Model Code of Conduct. Based on the report submitted, a case in Crime No. 59/2019 was registered for the offences punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 32 of the A.P. Police Act. The said acts constitute prima facie wilful disobedience of lawful orders promulgated by a public servant, thereby attracting penal consequences under the aforesaid provisions. 4. The facts and circumstances of the case in disclose that on 02.04.2019, at about 12:00 noon, at W. Prathakota village, within the limits of Muchumarri Police Station and within the jurisdiction of the Hon‟ble Court at Kurnool, the accused conducted a roadshow and organised a public meeting without obtaining prior permission from the competent authority, despite prohibitory orders being in force during the General Elections. It is further alleged that an unregistered vehicle was used for the said purpose without authorization. These acts were noticed by officials on election duty and were reported to the 4 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 police. Based on the said report, a case in Crime No. 28/2019 was registered for the offence punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, and upon completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 7. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is: “Whether the proceedings in C.C.Nos.627 and 629/2020 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nandikotkur, Kurnool District are liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟/Section 528 of „the BNSS‟?" 8. It is submitted that, as per the charge sheets, the alleged offences against the petitioner fall under Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ and Section 188 of „the I.P.C‟. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner neither called for nor organized any rally on 05.03.2019, and that any gathering which took place was due to supporters voluntarily assembling during the course of his election campaign. It is further submitted that a perusal of the complaint discloses no specific or distinct allegations attributing any overt act to the petitioner. According to learned counsel, the petitioner was merely interacting with members of the public in small groups during his campaign, and such 5 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 interaction cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed as conducting a roadshow or public meeting in violation of the law. 9. It is respectfully submitted that the invocation of Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ against the petitioner is wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable, inasmuch as the foundational ingredients required for the constitution of the said offence are conspicuously absent. A plain and contextual reading of Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ indicates that it contemplates the regulation of assemblies, processions, and public meetings, and presupposes the existence of a deliberate act of organizing, convening, or conducting such an assembly in contravention of a duly promulgated order of the competent authority. To attract the rigour of the said provision, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate, with cogent and specific material, that the accused had a determinative role in organizing or facilitating the alleged gathering. However, in the present case, a careful and scrupulous perusal of the complaint and the charge sheet does not disclose any such material implicating the petitioner in the organization or conduct of any roadshow or public meeting. The allegations, being vague, omnibus, and bereft of particulars, merely allude to the presence of a congregation of individuals during the course of electioneering activity, which, in the absence of any demonstrable nexus to the petitioner‟s volitional act, cannot be brought within the ambit of Section 32 of „the Act‟. Consequently, the continuation of 6 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 proceedings on such tenuous and unsubstantiated allegations would amount to a manifest abuse of the process of law. 10. It is respectfully submitted that the invocation of Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ against the petitioner is wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable, inasmuch as the foundational ingredients necessary to constitute the said offence are conspicuously absent. A plain and purposive interpretation of Section 32 reveals that it pertains to the regulation of assemblies, processions, and public meetings, and presupposes a deliberate and conscious act of organizing, convening, or conducting such an assembly in contravention of a duly promulgated order of the competent authority. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish, through cogent and credible material, that the accused had a determinative role in orchestrating or facilitating the alleged gathering so as to attract the rigour of the provision. 11. However, in the present case, a careful and scrupulous perusal of the complaint and the charge sheet does not disclose any material whatsoever to indicate that the petitioner either organized or conducted any roadshow or public meeting. The allegations, being vague, omnibus, and bereft of specific particulars, merely allude to the presence of a gathering during the course of electioneering activity, which, in the absence of any demonstrable nexus to the petitioner‟s volitional act, cannot be brought within the ambit of Section 32 of „the Act‟. In such circumstances, the continuation of criminal proceedings 7 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 against the petitioner, founded on such tenuous and unsubstantiated allegations, would amount to a clear abuse of the process of law. 12. It is to be noted that, in the present cases, no complaint as contemplated under Sections 190 and 200 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ has been filed by the competent public servant, and the proceedings are founded solely on a police report under Section 173 of „the Cr.P.C‟. In view of the statutory bar under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ the learned Magistrate was not legally empowered to take cognizance of the offence under Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ thereby vitiating the very cognizance in law. 13. It is further submitted that the invocation of Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ is equally unsustainable, as the material on record does not disclose any deliberate act on the part of the petitioner in organizing or conducting any assembly or procession in violation of a lawful order. The allegations are vague and omnibus, lacking any specific overt acts or credible material establishing the petitioner‟s role, and merely refer to a general gathering during election campaigning. In the absence of foundational facts and a demonstrable nexus to the alleged offence, the continuation of proceedings would amount to a manifest abuse of the process of law. 14. In this regard it is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.,1 wherein at paragraph Nos.28 & 29, it is held as under: 1 (2010) 9 SCC 567 8 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 “28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described in those sections. (Vide Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar [(1971) 3 SCC 329, Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat [(1971) 2 SCC 376, Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [(1996) 3 SCC 533 : State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 391 : K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy [(2005) 7 SCC 352 : and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370) 29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. [(1953) 1 SCC 637 and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1775 : this Court held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.” 15. Thus, in C. Muniappan supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ bars courts from taking cognizance of offences like Section 188 of „the IPC‟ unless there is a written complaint by the concerned public servant, in order to prevent frivolous or malicious prosecutions and to ensure adherence to the prescribed procedure. This bar cannot be circumvented by misdescribing the offence under other provisions, as the true nature of the offence determines the applicability of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C‟. 9 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 16. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar 2, at paragraph No.12 it is held as under: “12. According to Mr Jyoti Narayan, the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate to be adjudged, is the time when cognizance is actually taken under Section 190 of the Code and applying that test in the present case, it will be seen that there has been a breach of Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 of the Code. The proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is laid down by this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528 :. The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. Section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 195(1). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non- compliance with the provisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein.” 17. Therefore, in Govind Mehta supra, it is held that the legality of cognizance must be assessed at the time the Magistrate takes cognizance under Section 190 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and Section 195 operates as a limitation on such power. If there is non-compliance with Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ the Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the specified offences. 18. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh3, at paragraph No.6 it is held as under: “6. The object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences 2 (1971) 3 SCC 329 3 (1996) 3 SCC 533 10 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice demands absolute bar of private prosecution and that power be given to the court to lay complaint under Section 340 of the Code as per the procedure prescribed therein. In Patel Laljibhai case [(1971) 2 SCC 376 the main controversy was as to when the accused had become a party to the proceedings. However, after the Code came into force in 1974 replacing the earlier Code of 1898 it was omitted and so it is no longer of any relevance. It is seen that the appellants therein had filed a civil suit on the basis of a cheque dated 22-11-1963 and the civil suit had come to be dismissed on 30-1-1965. Thereafter, the private complaint was filed on 16-11-1965. In the light of those facts it was held that the respondent was a party to the proceedings in the suit and that, therefore, the private complaint was not maintainable.” 19. Ergo, in Surjit Singh supra, it is held that the provision aims to prevent private vendetta, protect the integrity of judicial proceedings, and avoid harassment or misuse of criminal process, especially in matters affecting public justice. Accordingly, in such cases, private prosecution is barred and only the court is empowered to initiate proceedings under Section 340 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ as illustrated in Patel Laljibhai case. 20. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh4, at paragraph No.2 held as under: “2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 IPC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the 4 (1998) 2 SCC 391 11 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC. The judgment of this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy [(1983) 4 SCC 240 on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the civil court and hence it was held that the court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195 CrPC.” 21. So, in Raj Singh supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ applies only at the stage of taking cognizance by the court and does not restrict the statutory power of the police to investigate an FIR disclosing a cognizable offence. However, after investigation, the court cannot take cognizance in view of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ unless a complaint is filed by the competent authority under Section 340 of „the Cr.P.C‟. 22. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy5, at paragraph Nos.3 & 4 held as under: “3. By the impugned order, the High Court of Madras quashed the prosecution of the respondents, which was launched under Sections 467, 468, 471, 472 and 477-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code (for short “IPC”) on the ground that the complaint was barred under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). Undisputedly, the forgery is said to have been committed before the document was filed. Earlier, there was diverse opinion of this Court as to whether protection of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC was available in relation to forgery committed prior to the filing of document or after its filing. A Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. MeenakshiMarwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 has categorically laid down in para 33 of the judgment that protection engrafted under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it had been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. This being the position, in our view, the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents on the ground that provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC were applicable. 4. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the respondents are entitled to claim 5 (2005) 7 SCC 352 12 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 protection under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, which enumerates the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC. It has been pointed out that according to the petition of complainant, the accused persons had falsely filed a complaint before the Deputy Registrar, Chits, who dismissed the matter finally. The said complaint was not dismissed by the Deputy Registrar on merits, but without any adjudication, inasmuch as there was no finding that the complainant had lodged a false complaint before the Deputy Registrar. The present complaint does not relate to falsity or otherwise of the complaint before the Deputy Registrar; rather according to the prosecution case, the accused persons are said to have forged the document. This being the position, in our view, the provisions of Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, shall have no application to the case in hand. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents.” 23. Accordingly, in K. Vengadachalam supra, it is held that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ applies only when forgery is committed after a document is produced in court; hence, it does not bar prosecution for forgery committed prior to its filing. Similarly, Section 195(1)(a) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ is inapplicable where the allegation is of forgery and not of filing a false complaint, and therefore, the High Court erred in quashing the prosecution. 24. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of W.B., 6 at paragraph No.12 held as under: “12. Section 195 CrPC, on which the question raised is grounded, provides, inter alia, that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned no prosecution for an offence under Section 182 can be taken cognizance of. It does not further provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence other distinct offences are committed, the Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well. The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public servant or public justice, and on the other hand, they may also constitute the offence of defamation or some other distinct offence. The section does not per se bar the cognizance by the Magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report 6 (1953) 1 SCC 637 13 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 has been made. It was however argued that if on the same facts an offence of which no cognizance can be taken under the provisions of Section 195 is disclosed and the same facts disclose another offence as well which is outside the purview of the section and prosecution for that other offence is taken cognizance of without the requirements of Section 195 having been fulfilled, then the provisions of that section would become nugatory and if such a course was permitted those provisions will stand defeated. It was further said that it is not permissible for the prosecution to ignore the provisions of this section by describing the offence as being punishable under some other section of the Penal Code.” 25. Thus, in Basir-Ul-Huq supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ mandates a written complaint by the concerned public servant for offences under Sections 172–188 of „the IPC‟, but it does not bar cognizance of other distinct offences arising from the same facts. However, its provisions cannot be circumvented by disguising an offence covered under Section 195 as a different offence to avoid the statutory bar. 26. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh7, wherein at paragraph Nos.15 & 16 it is held as under: “15. On a scrutiny of Section 195(1)(a), we are of the view that a successor in office of a public servant concerned will also fall within the ambit of the expression „public servant concerned‟. Any other view contrary to it will only create difficulties in certain situations. For example, in a case where a public servant concerned promulgates a preliminary order under Section 133, 145 or 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is transferred or retires or ceases to be in office on any account before a final order is passed, would it mean that the successor who is under the law to continue the same proceeding has no right to file a complaint if the preliminary order is disobeyed. The answer would be that the successor in office can file a complaint. In every such situation, one cannot expect the superior officer to whom the public servant is administratively subordinate to file a complaint against the wrongdoers disobeying either the preliminary order or the final order promulgated by the public servant concerned. 16. Therefore, in the light of the dictum laid down in Ajaib Singh [AIR 1968 SC 1422 we are of the view that the successor in office of the public servant gets into the same position of the public servant concerned and he is in law eligible to file a complaint against 7 (1994) 4 SCC 95 14 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 wrongdoers. To say in other words, the successor in office falls within the ambit of the expression „public servant concerned‟. The view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed.” 27. Consequently, in Mata Bhikh supra, it is held that a successor in office of a public servant is also covered within the expression “public servant concerned” under Section 195(1)(a) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and is competent to file a complaint. Therefore, the successor has the same legal authority as the original officer, and the contrary view of the High Court is unsustainable. 28. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy8, at paragraph No.8 it is held as under: “8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.” 29. Thus, in Hemareddy supra, it is held that where in the same transaction, offences both covered and not covered under Section 195(1)(b) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ are committed, they cannot be split up for separate prosecution. Accordingly, prosecution for offences outside Section 195(1)(b) cannot be sustained independently when they are inseparably connected with offences requiring a court complaint. 30. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh 9 , at paragraph No.5 it is held as under: 8 (1981) 2 SCC 185 91968 SCC OnLine SC 253 15 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 “5. The learned counsel next contends that the complaint could only be filed by the Magistrate before whom the original proceedings were taken. He says that according to Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint in respect of Sections 193, 195 and 211 IPC, can only be made by the Court in which the proceedings out of which the offences arose took place. We see no force in this contention. Section 559 enables a successor-in- office of a Magistrate to file a complaint. The relevant portion of Section 559 reads as follows: “559. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successor in office. (2) When there is any doubt as to who is the successor in office of any Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate in a Presidency town, and the District Magistrate outside such towns, shall determine by order in writing the Magistrate who shall, for the purposes of this Code or of any proceedings or order thereunder, be deemed to be the successor in office of such Magistrate.” This section was substituted for the original Section 559 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (18 of 1923). Since the amendment it has been held, and we think rightly, that a successor in office of a Magistrate can file a complaint under Section 476, CrPC, in respect of an offence under Section 195 IPC, committed before his predecessor. (See Behram v. Beparor [27 Cr LJ 776] Bara KanonManjhi v. GopiManjhi [AIR 1927 Pat 327] ; and In re SubramaniamChettiar [AIR 1957 Mad 442] . This section applies to all Magistrates and there is no reason why the plain terms of the section should be cut down to limit it, as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant, to Magistrates whose courts are permanent. It seems to us further clear that sub-section (2) has not the effect of limiting Section 559(1) Section 559(2) applies when there is a doubt as to who the successor is, and that doubt can be resolved in the manner laid down in sub-section (2). The sub-section does not mean, as contended by the learned counsel, that until a successor is determined under sub-section (2) there is no successor for the purposes of sub-section (1). If there is no doubt about who the successor is, then that person can exercise the powers under sub-section (1). We accordingly hold that the complaint was properly filed by Shri Joginder Singh “Karangarhia”, Magistrate.” 31. In light of the above, in Ajaib Singh supra, it is held that a successor Magistrate is competent to file a complaint under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ as Section 559 empowers a successor-in-office to exercise the powers and duties of the predecessor. Therefore, a complaint filed by a successor Magistrate is valid, and the contention that only the original Magistrate can file it has no merit. 16 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 32. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni10, wherein at para No.48, it is held as under: “48. Equally important to remember is that if in the course of the same transaction two separate offences are made out, for one of which Section 195 CrPC is not attracted, and it is not possible to split them up, the drill of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC must be followed. Thus, in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , this Court referred to a judgment of the Madras High Court (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy, In re [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955 Mad 237] ) and approved its ratio as follows : (Hemareddy case [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , SCC pp. 190-91, paras 7-8) “7. … In the third case, Somasundaram, J., has observed : (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy case [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955 Mad 237] , SCC OnLine Mad) „The main point on which Mr JayaramaAyyar appearing for the petitioner seeks to quash this committal is that on the facts an offence under Section 193 IPC is disclosed for which the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The first question which arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the complaint, an offence under Section 193 IPC is revealed. Section 193 reads as follows: “193. Punishment for false evidence.—Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” “Fabrication of false evidence” is defined in Section 192. The relevant portion of it is: “Whoever causes any circumstance to exist intending that such circumstance may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and that such circumstance may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding is said “to fabricate false evidence”.” The effect of the allegations in the complaint preferred by the complainant is that the petitioner has caused this will to come into existence intending that such will may cause the Judge before whom the suit is filed to form an opinion that the will is a genuine one and, therefore, his minor daughter is entitled to the property. The allegation, therefore, in the complaint will undoubtedly fall under Section 192 IPC. It will, therefore, amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC i.e. 10(2020) 20 SCC 1 17 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the judicial proceeding. There is no doubt that the facts disclosed will also amount to an offence under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. For prosecuting this petitioner for an offence under Sections 467 and 471, a complaint by the court may not be necessary as under Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint may be made only when it is committed by a party to any proceeding in any court. Mr JayaramaAyyar does not give up his contention that the petitioner, though he appears only a guardian of the minor girl, is still a party to the proceeding. But it is unnecessary to go into the question at the present moment and I reserve my opinion on the question whether the guardian can be a party to a proceeding or not, as this case can be disposed of on the other point viz. that when the allegations amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC, a complaint of court is necessary under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC and this cannot be evaded by prosecuting the accused for an offence for which a complaint of court is not necessary.‟ 8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.”” 33. Therefore, in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd., supra, it is held that where, in the same transaction, offences both attracting and not attracting Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ arise and are inseparable, the mandate of Section 195(1)(b) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ must be followed. Such requirement cannot be avoided by prosecuting the accused for other offences for which a court complaint is not required. 34. This Court in Kantamaneni Ravishankar v. State of A.P.,11 at para No.86 held as under: “86. Therefore, to register a crime against a person, who disobeyed the ordinance, there must be a complaint from public servant about the disobedience of ordinance. Hence, the very registration of crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. is contrary to the settled law laid down by the Apex Court and other High Courts 112020 SCC OnLine AP 726 18 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 (referred supra) and the police officer is incompetent to register a crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. on the complaint of any other person other than a public servant and any other person, who is authorized by pubic servant. Consequently, registration of crime against the petitioner is vitiated by irregularity.” 35. Thus, in Kantamaneni Ravishankar supra, it is held that registration of an offence under Section 188 of „the IPC‟ requires a complaint by the concerned public servant, and any FIR registered by police on a complaint from others is legally unsustainable and vitiated. 36. This Court, in Kollu Ravindra v. State of A.P12 has categorically held that a complaint invoking offences under Sections 172 to 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ must emanate from a “public servant” as envisaged under Sections 190 and 200 of „the Cr.P.C.‟ In the absence of such a statutory complaint, the learned Magistrate is divested of the competence to take cognizance of the alleged offence. The bar contained in Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ therefore, operates as a clear embargo on the assumption of cognizance based merely on a police report. 37. This Court, further also held in Kanakamedala Ravindra Kumar v. State of A.P 13 that when the allegations arise out of a single, indivisible transaction giving rise to multiple offences, one falling squarely within the ambit of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and another ostensibly outside its sweep, such offences, being inextricably interwoven, cannot be artificially segregated to bypass the statutory embargo. The Court has categorically held that mere deletion of Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ from the charge sheet does 12 2025 SCC OnLine AP 3870 13 Criminal Petition No: 987/2020 19 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 not efface the bar, for the factual substratum of the alleged act continues to be integrally connected with the disobedience of a promulgated order, thereby mandating a complaint by the competent public servant as required under Section 195(1)(a) of „the Cr.P.C.‟ 38. Further, as per Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ there is a bar for taking cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, both inclusive of, „the I.P.C.,‟ unless there is a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned. 39. In the instant case, there is no complaint by a public servant, though the FIR was registered for an alleged offence under Section 188 of „the I.P.C‟. The mandatory complaint, as contemplated under Section 195 read with Sections 190 and 200 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ has not been filed before the competent Magistrate. 40. Therefore, the proceedings in C.C.No.627 and 629 of 2020 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nandikotkur, Kurnool District, are liable to be interfered and quashed. 41. In the result, the Criminal Petitions are allowed. Accordingly, the proceedings in C.C.No.627 and 629 of 2020 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nandikotkur, Kurnool District, are quashed. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 23.03.2026 KMS 20 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 254 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.515 and 5116 of 2024 Date: 23.03.2026 KMS