1 2026:CGHC:24148 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 596 of 2026 Jitendra Kumar Singh S/o Late Brijbhushan Singh Aged About 56 Years Occupation- Service, R/o Village Manpur, Tahsil And, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Parshulal S/o Buchhunlal Lala Aged About 35 Years Occupation- Agriculture, R/o Village Bhaiyathan Police Station Tahsil Bhaiyathan, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Jagdish Verma S/o Bramhdev Verma Aged About 35 Years Occupation- Agriculture, R/o Village Bhaiyathan, Police Station And Tahsil Bhaiyathan, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Umesh Sinha S/o Ramnarayan Lala Aged About 32 Years Occupation- Agriculture, R/o Village Rajpur, Tahsil Rajpur, District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Awadhesh Sinha S/o Ramnarayan Lala Aged About 30 Years Occupation- Agriculture, R/o Village Rajpur, Tahsil Rajpur, District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Akhilesh Pratap Singh S/o Awadheshwari Pratap Singh Aged About 40 SUMIT KUMAR Digitally signed by SUMIT KUMAR Date: 2026.06.18 10:58:04 +0530 2 Years Occupation- Agriculture, R/o Village Bhaiyathan, Police Station And Tahsil Bhaiyathan, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 6 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector Surajpur, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Advocate For Respondent No.6 : Ms. Richa Sahu, Panel Lawyer for the State (Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.) Order on Board 16/06/2026 1. Heard. 2. Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 04.04.2026 passed by the learned Second District Judge, Surajpur (C.G.) in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 05/2026, whereby the miscellaneous appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 09.02.2026 passed by learned First Civil Judge, Senior Division, Surajpur in Civil Suit No. 75-A/2019 has been affirmed. 3. The subject matter in brief is that the petitioner, who is the plaintiff before the learned trial Court, he is prosecuting a suit for declaration of his title, partition and permanent injunction over the suit property of Schedule A, B, and C annexed with the plaint. It is pleaded in the plaint by the plaintiff that the suit property of Schedule-A was the self- 3 acquired property of one Bhukhanlal, who died prior to 1954. After his death, the names of his legal heirs were mutated in the revenue records. The son of Bhukhanlal, namely Buchunlal, sold the suit property of Schedule-B through a registered sale deed dated 10.06.1965 to the father of the plaintiff and since then, he is in possession of the suit property of Schedule-B after getting his name mutated in the revenue records. It is also pleaded that a civil litigation was traveled up to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in which an order has been passed with respect to the partition of 1.79 acres of land in favor of the father of the plaintiff. In execution of the order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the father of the plaintiff had filed an application for partition before the Tahsildar, Surajpur in which an order of mutation has been passed on 18.05.1989 over the subject land of Khasra No. 931 and 930 total area 0.157 Hectare and also directed for partition of the said land. The father of the plaintiff later died on 09.03.2001. The defendants have again filed an application on 25.04.2014 before the Tahsildar, Bhaiyathan, seeking the partition and mutation of their names over the suit property of Schedule-A. The Tahsildar, Bhaiyathan passed an order for mutation of the names of the defendants without there being any proper partition. The first appeal against this order was dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bhaiyathan and against which a second appeal has been filed before the Commissioner, Surguja Division, which is pending. In between that the defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 alienated the land of Khasra No. 932/4 area 0.51 hectare to the defendant No. 5 through a registered sale deed dated 07.07.2015. Challenging this alienation made by defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 and claiming the title over the suit 4 property by virtue of the order dated 18.05.1989 passed by the Tahsildar, the plaintiff has filed the suit for declaration of title, partition and permanent injunction. In the suit, the plaintiff has also filed an application for the grant of a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. The learned trial Court vide its order dated 09.02.2026, after hearing the parties, rejected the application filed by the plaintiff holding that there is no prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury found in favor of the plaintiff. While considering the case of the plaintiff, the learned trial Court has observed that an order was passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court directing the parties to get their share divided and the father of the plaintiff is entitled for partition of his purchase land of 1.79 Acre. It has also been observed that in the proceedings initiated by the father of the plaintiff, a land of 0.157 Hectare was given to him in his share with respect the land Khasra No. 931 and 930. At present, the defendant No. 5 has purchased the land of Khasra No. 932/4 and started construction over there. The learned trial Court has also found that when the plaintiff has satisfied with the 0.157 Hectare of land of Khasra No. 931 and 930, he has no right to again claim its title over the land of Khasra No. 932/4. The order dated 09.02.2026 was challenged by the plaintiff before the learned Appellate Court by filing his miscellaneous appeal and the miscellaneous appeal filed by the plaintiff has also been dismissed vide order dated 04.04.2026 which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there was a renumbering of the land in the year 1994–1995 by which the land of 5 Khasra No. 980 has been renumbered as Khasra No. 932. He would further submit that presently the defendants encroaching over the land of the plaintiff. In fact the original number of land of the Khasra No. 932 is 980 and the land of the plaintiff is also one of the part of that Khasra No. 980, therefore, the defendants can not claim their right over the land of the plaintiff. The defendant No.5 is raising construction over the subject land in which the plaintiff has his right and if the defendants are succeeded in raising construction, the very nature of the property would be changed, and therefore, during the pendency of the suit, the subject property may be protected by changing its nature, therefore, he has filed his application for temporary injunction which has been erroneously rejected by the learned Courts below. He would also submit that by adding the other land of Khasra No. 932/4, the defendant No.5 is claiming the property of the plaintiff which should be restrained. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the petition. 6. From perusal of the documents annexed with the petition, it would reveal that undisputedly an order has been passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur by which the 1.79 Acres of the land was given to the father of the plaintiff and it is also directed that he was entitled for partition and mutation of the said land. When the father of the plaintiff has filed an application before the Tehsildar, Surajpur, it was ordered on 18.05.1989 (Annexure P-3) and the name of the father of the plaintiff was ordered to be mutated over Khasra No. 931 and 930 total area 0.157 Hectare. The petitioner has filed the renumbering 6 schedule (Annexure - P/7) in which it has been mentioned that the land of old Khasra No. 980 is being renumbered as Khasra No. 932. He said renumbering is of the year 1994–1995, whereas the father of the petitioner has already been ordered for mutation of the land of 0.157 Hectare in the year 1989 much prior to the renumbering of the said land and the land of Khasra No. 931 and 930 was ordered in favour of the father of the petitioner. The claim of the plaintiff is that the defendant No. 2, 3 and 4 have sold the land of Khasra No. 932/4 to the defendant No. 5 and the defendant No.5 by encroaching upon the land of the plaintiff, raising construction over there is purely a disputed question of fact as to whether the land of the plaintiff is actually been encroached or encroaching by the defendant No.5 or not or whether the land of the plaintiff is the part of the land of old Khasra No. 980 or not. What transpires from the orders of the learned trial Court as well as of the Appellate Court that the father of the plaintiff was given the land of Khasra No. 931 and 930 total area 0.157 hectare in pursuance of the order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur, and therefore, even if the land of Khasra No. 932/4 area 0.51 hectare was sold by the defendant No. 2, 3 and 4, the plaintiff can not raise any objection on it. 7. The grounds raised by the petitioner is the question of fact which are to be decided by the leading evidence of the parties with respect to their respective pleadings. While invoking the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere or consider the actual dispute between the parties. 8. With respect to the scope of interference under the jurisdiction of Article 7 227 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil” 2010 (8) SCC 329 held that: “40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala @ Bharucha (deceased) through Lrs. & others vs. Phiroz N. Bhatena and others etc. reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141, wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior Court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this `limited extent' the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see para 18, page 149- 150). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447. The decision in Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh (supra) and Nagendra Nath (supra) discussed above. 41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another vs. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576. In paragraph 9, page 579 of the report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law and justice. 42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in the case of Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and another, reported in AIR 1968 SC 222, (see para 5 page 222-234 of the report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan and others reported in (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh (supra) about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand and others reported in (1972) 1 SCC 898. 43. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai 8 (supra) this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (para 19, page 668 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi Nath and others [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In paragraph 38, sub-paragraph (4) at page 695 of the report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out: "38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) xxx xxx (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or 9 revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution 10 Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. 11 (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 9. In the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC 181, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the 12 inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.” 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and also in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, this Court does not find any merit in the present writ petition. 11. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) JUDGE Sumit