2026:HHC:37196 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 492 of 2017 Reserved on: 25.8.2026 Date of Decision: 02.09.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Dilbag Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Sanjay Jaswal, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26.4.2017, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:37196 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Vijay Kumar (PW1) and Jitender Kumar (PW2) were riding a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-40C-0412 on 1.10.2015. A car bearing registration No. DL-1YD-6103 hit the motorcycle near Wonder World Hotel. The informant and Jitender Kumar sustained injuries. The driver of the car identified himself as Dilbag Singh (the accused). The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused and the high speed of the car. The injured were taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ex.PW6/A) was recorded at the Police Station. HC Pramodh Singh (PW6) went to the hospital for verification. He filed an application (Ex.PW6/B) for medical examination of the injured and obtained the MLCs (Ex. P2 and Ex. P4). HC Pramodh Singh (PW6) recorded the informant’s statement and sent it to the Police Station, where an FIR was 3 2026:HHC:37196 registered. HC Pramodh Singh (PW6) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW6/E). The photographs of the spot (Ex. P5 to Ex. P13) were taken. HC Pramodh Singh (PW6) seized the vehicle vide memo (Ex.PW4/A). The vehicle was mechanically examined, and no defect was found in it that could have led to the accident. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. Vijay Kumar (PW1) is the informant. Jitender Kumar (PW2) sustained injuries. Rajiv Kumar (PW3) is an eyewitness. Vijay Kumar (PW4) and HHC Yash Pal (PW5) witnessed the recoveries. HC Pramodh Singh (PW6) investigated the matter. Jai 4 2026:HHC:37196 Ram (PW7) proved that he had handed over the motorcycle to Vijay Kumar. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that he was driving the car bearing registration No. DL-1YD-6103, and that Vijay Kumar and Jitender Kumar were riding a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-40C-0412, and the motorcycle and car collided with each other. He stated that he was driving the car at the speed of 30-40 kilometres per hour. The motorcyclists were riding the motorcycle downhill. The witnesses deposed falsely to cover up the motorcyclist’s negligence. The accused claimed that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the police failed to associate any independent witness even though many persons had gathered at the spot. It was not disputed that the motorcycle was going downhill, whereas the car was going uphill. Hence, the plea taken by the accused that the motorcyclists were riding the motorcycle at high speed was probable. There were various discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses, which made 5 2026:HHC:37196 the prosecution’s version doubtful. HC Pramodh Singh (PW6) admitted that the position of the vehicles was altered on the spot before his arrival; therefore, much reliance cannot be placed upon the photographs and the site plan. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court had failed to appreciate the evidence on record. The statements of the informant and pillion rider proved that the accident occurred on the wrong side of the road. This was duly corroborated by the photographs and the site plan. Rajiv Kumar (PW3) also supported the statement of the injured. Learned Trial Court discarded the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses without any cogent reasons. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State, and Mr Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 6 2026:HHC:37196 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other in material particulars, and the learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the statements of prosecution witnesses. The site plan and the photographs show that the accident had occurred on the right side of the road for the car. Driving the car towards the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the accident, which showed the negligence of the accused. The learned Trial Court had highlighted the minor contradictions in the statements of witnesses to discard the prosecution case. Minor contradictions are bound to come with time and should not have been used to reject the prosecution version. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the statements of the witnesses that the accused was driving the car at a high speed are not sufficient to convict him in the absence of the evidence of the approximate speed of the vehicle. The Investigating 7 2026:HHC:37196 Officer admitted in his cross-examination that the position of the vehicle had changed before his arrival and the learned Trial Court had rightly refused to rely upon the site plan and the photographs. The plea taken by the accused was highly probable that he was going uphill and the speed of the vehicle was approximately 30-40 kilometres per hour. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while deciding the matter, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 8 2026:HHC:37196 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. 9 2026:HHC:37196 It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the 10 2026:HHC:37196 accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Informant Vijay Kumar (PW1) stated that the accident had occurred at 10.35 AM. HC Pramodh Singh (PW6) stated that he went to the hospital after receiving the 11 2026:HHC:37196 information and thereafter went to the spot. He stated in his cross-examination that he reached the spot at 12.00 noon and the traffic was moving. He admitted that the position of the vehicles was changed before taking the photographs. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that no reliance can be placed upon the photographs and the site plan. 15. A heavy reliance was placed upon the photographs (Ex. P12 and Ex. P13), wherein skid marks are visible, to submit that these skid marks show that the accident had taken place on the right side of the road. This submission will not help the prosecution. The site plan does not show that any skid marks were visible on the spot. The informant Vijay Kumar (PW1) and Jatinder Kumar (PW2) did not state that the car or the motorcycle had skidded. Therefore, the skid marks are not connected to the accident. 16. Informant Vijay Kumar stated that the accused was driving the car towards the wrong side of the road at a high speed. Jitender Kumar (PW2) stated that the car came at a high speed and hit the motorcycle on the wrong side of the road. Rajeev Kumar (PW3) stated that the car hit the motorcycle on 12 2026:HHC:37196 the wrong side at a high speed. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that the use of the term high speed is not sufficient to infer negligence without mentioning the proximate speed of the vehicle. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 17. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or 13 2026:HHC:37196 "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 18. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 19. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is 14 2026:HHC:37196 no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 20. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable because witnesses stated that he was driving the vehicle at high speed without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care. 21. The statements of the witnesses that the accused was negligent are also not sufficient. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 15 2026:HHC:37196 22. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn based on evidence led before the Court.” 23. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused. 24. The statements of witnesses that the car had hit the motorcycle on the wrong side of the road are not sufficient in the absence of any corroboration by the site plan and the photographs. Further, the witnesses have used the term wrong side without mentioning that the car was taken towards the right side, leaving sufficient space towards its left side, which is the statutory requirement. Rule 2 of the Rules of Road Regulation 1989 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. Therefore, it was necessary to prove on record that the accused was not driving the car towards the left side or as close to the left side as is 16 2026:HHC:37196 possible. In the absence of any such evidence, the accused cannot be held negligent. 25. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 26. No other point was urged. 27. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 28. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17 2026:HHC:37196 29. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 2nd September, 2026 (Chander)