2026:JHHC:21868-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No.135 of 2022 ----- - Ravi Ranjan Kumar, aged about 34 years, S/o Rajeshwar Roy, R/o village – Nawadih, Near Pani Tanki, P.O. – Nawadih, B – Polytechnic, P.S. – Dhanbad, District - Dhanbad. … … Appellant Versus Deepika Roy, aged about 25 years, W/o Ravi Ranjan Kumar, D/o Jagdish Prasad Roy, R/o village – Bhuli, ‘C’ Block, Quarter No.509, P.O. – Bhuli Nagar, P.S. – Bhuli, District – Dhanbad. … … Respondent P R E S E N T HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ….. For the Appellant : Mr. Mukesh Bihari Lal, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Anuj Kumar Trivedi, Advocate : Ms. Soniya Hansda, Advocate ….. C.A.V. on 03.07.2026 Pronounced on 23/07/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer: 1. The instant appeal has been filed challenging the legality and propriety of impugned judgment passed on 28.06.2022 and decree signed on 07.07.2022 by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad whereby and whereunder the Original Suit No.328 of 2019 filed by the appellant-husband under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce against his wife, has been dismissed. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case of the appellant-husband as narrated in the plaint, is that both parties are legally married couple whose marriage was solemnized on 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 2 16.04.2016 according to the Hindu Rites and Customs at the parental address of the defendant within the District of Dhanbad, (Jharkhand) and after their marriage both parties resided at Nawadih, Dhanbad, Jharkhand for only two months. Thereafter the respondent went to her Maika at Bhuli Nagar and stayed there for a long time for about two years. 3. It has further been stated that when he went to take her Bidai, she abused him and his parents used unparliamentary language and threatened him to implicate in false criminal case and also to commit suicide. 4. It has been stated that the respondent disobeyed her in-laws and she did not pay any respect to them. In March 2019, the respondent reached her matrimonial house with her relatives and started reviling and assaulting his parents and she left the house and since then they have been living separately. 5. The cause of action arose on 16.04.2016 when the marriage of the parties was performed and it also arose in the month of March 2019. 6. The appellant has prayed that by dissolving his marriage a decree of divorce may be granted in his favour against the respondent-wife. 7. After service of notice, the defendant-wife appeared in the court and filed her show-cause stating therein that she stayed for a long period and lastly, she lived there on 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 3 20.04.2019. 8. On 21.04.2019, when the respondent tried to motivate her husband/the plaintiff to leave illicit relation with another lady then he became furious and brutally assaulted her and her father-in-law and mother-in-law had also beaten her by dashing her on the earth and assaulted by stone on several parts of the body and snatched all her ornaments, and ousted her from her matrimonial house. 9. Thereafter she called her father and reported the matter to Dhanbad P.S and she was treated in PMCH, Dhanbad and since then she has been living separately in her Maika. 10. On the aforesaid grounds, the respondent has prayed to dismiss this suit. 11. The case proceeded for evidence during which the petitioner/appellant has produced and examined three witnesses including himself. 12. The respondent-wife has produced and examined altogether two witnesses including herself. 13. The learned Principal Judge, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, framed four issues for adjudication of the lis, which are as follows: - (i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? (ii) Whether the plaintiff has got a valid cause of 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 4 action for the suit? (iii) Whether the marriage of plaintiff and defendant is fit to be dissolved on the ground of cruelty, allegedly administered by the respondent? (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief claimed? 14. All the aforesaid issues were decided against the appellant-husband and in favour of respondent-wife and decreed the suit on contest. 15. The appellant-husband, being aggrieved with the judgment passed on 28.06.2022, has approached this Court by filing the present appeal. Submission made on behalf of the appellant-husband 16. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband has taken following grounds in assailing the impugned judgment: - (i) The impugned judgment dismissing the petition U/s 13 (1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act is not sustainable in the eye of law or in the facts and circumstances involved in this case and are, thus, liable to be set aside. (ii) It has been submitted by referring to the evidence of the appellant/petitioner that the ground of desertion has not been taken in the plaint but if the evidence of appellant-PW-1 will be taken into consideration, the 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 5 ground of desertion has been taken by taking the specific plea that the paternal house of the respondent wife is only at the distance of two kilometers but since the month of June, 2016 she was residing in the parental house and as such, the respondent is living separately. (iii) Thus, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad committed grave error in not taking into consideration that the wife (respondent) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than 2 years. (iv) The learned family court also erred in not taking into consideration that the behaviour of the respondent was cruel to the petitioner. (v) The learned family court has committed grave error in not considering the fact that the respondent herself deserted the petitioner which was proved by the evidence brought on record. (vi) The learned family court has also not considered that although the suit was filed in the year 2019 and judgment was passed in the month of June, 2022 and between that period also the respondent deserted the petitioner which also comes under the purview of cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act. 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 6 (vii) The learned Family Court ought to have appreciate the evidence on record that the respondent has committed cruelty against the petitioner. (viii) The impugned judgment suffers from the vices of non- consideration of materials on record and thus the same is vitiated in law. (ix) The learned Family Court has also failed to take into consideration that admittedly the parties are living separately since long and there is no chance of restoration of their matrimonial life. (x) The learned Family Court has committed serious illegality in not considering the fact that there is no chance of compromise amongst the parties, as such in the interest of justice, learned court below ought to have passed a judgment allowing the suit for declaration of the marriage of the appellant to be dissolved. (xi) The learned Family Court has committed serious illegality in not considering the fact that the allegation made by the respondent in her written statement that the appellant has illegal relationship with another lady has not been backed by any sort of evidence by the respondent. (xii) It has been submitted that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence produced on behalf of 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 7 petitioner / appellant and, thus, came to wrong conclusion. (xiii) The learned court below has also failed to take into consideration that admittedly the parties are living separately since long and the conduct of the respondent shows that the respondent does not want to join the appellant and hence there is no chance of restoration of their matrimonial life. 17. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, on the basis of aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, is perverse and requires interference. Submission made on behalf of respondent-wife 18. Learned counsel for the respondent has taken the following grounds in defending the impugned judgment: - (i) Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that learned Family Court has rightly held that the appellant is not entitled for the decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty because the appellant has failed to prove the allegation of cruelty against her. (ii) Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, defending the impugned order, has submitted that as per the plaint the appellant has sought divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion but the learned Family Court, after taking into consideration the evidences, has held that the entire allegations levelled in the plaint are not 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 8 correct and has rightly dismissed the suit. (iii) Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted in rebuttal of the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that even accepting the fact that the suit has been filed for dissolution of marriage for committing cruelty but the consideration has also been made by taking the element of desertion and even if consideration so made on the issue of desertion will be ignored, then also it cannot be said that the entire judgment will be vitiated in the eye of law. (iv) It has been submitted that the element of cruelty has not been proved as per the evident so recorded, as available in the trial court record and after taking into consideration the same, the learned Family Judge has found no element of cruelty and as such, it cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the impugned judgment. (v) It has been argued on behalf of respondent that she has never treated the appellant with cruelty rather evidences on record depict that it is the respondent who is sufferer. (vi) The appellant-husband has no valid cause of action and he is not entitled to get any relief as claimed by him. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife on the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 9 judgment requires no interference by this Court. Analysis 20. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant- husband as also learned counsel for the respondent-wife and perused the material available on record and the finding recorded in the impugned order. 21. It stands admitted upon the record that the petition for dissolution of marriage was instituted on the ground of cruelty, by way of an application under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In the course of deposition, the issue of desertion was also adverted to, and evidence was accordingly adduced thereon. Learned counsel for both parties advanced arguments before the Family Court. Upon consideration, however, the suit came to be dismissed, and the decision was rendered adverse to the petitioner/appellant-husband, against the said order the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant/husband. 22. It needs to refer herein that since appellate jurisdiction has been invoked herein, therefore, before entering into merit of the case, at this juncture it would be purposeful to discuss the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. 23. It needs to refer herein that under section 7 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Court shall have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Sub- ordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 10 force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature which are described in the explanation to section 7(1). 24. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts Act provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to the High Court "both on facts and on law". Therefore, section 19 of the Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in series of judgments. 25. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First Appeal can examine every question of law and fact which arises in the facts of the case and has powers to affirm, reverse or modify the judgment under question. In "Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi" (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court acting as the First Appellate Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well and the appellate Court therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire evidence and can come to its own conclusion. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being quoted as under: “It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising power as the first appellate court and hence it was open to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of the main matter and the appellate court can reappraise, 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 11 reappreciate and review the entire evidence--oral as well as documentary--and can come to its own conclusion.” 26. This Court, being the appellate court, thought it proper to consider the testimonies of the witnesses as available on record to appreciate as to whether the grounds of cruelty and desertion are available or not. 27. The appellant, in support of his case, has adduced three witnesses including himself. The relevant portion of the testimonies of the witnesses are mentioned as under :- PW-1 Ravi Ranjan Kumar is appellant himself. He has deposed in his examination-in-chief that after his marriage on 14.04.2016 his wife lived with him only for two months. After two months she left his house and without his permission she came to Bhuli at Quarters No. 509 along with her parents. He has further deposed that the respondent-wife is a quarrelsome lady and she misbehaved with his parents and on some occasions, she threatened him to commit suicide. He has further stated that the distance is only two kilometers between the houses of his father-in-law and the father-in-law of the respondent nevertheless, she has been living separately from the last two years, therefore, in future also there is no possibility of restoration of congenial and harmonious relation between them. He has further deposed that in the month of March 2019 the respondent reached his house with a relative and 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 12 started reviling and assaulting his parents and also put pressure on him to make a demand of partition of house from his father on his denial she left his house and went away and lodged some false criminal case against him with the allegation of unlawful demand of dowry etc. He has deposed that he has filed this case for divorcing his wife on the ground of cruelty and desertion for more than a period of two years. PW 2 Gayatri Rachna and PW 3 Rajeshwar Roy who are mother and father of the plaintiff/appellant have stated alike the plaintiff by deposing in their examination-in-chief that their son was married to the respondent Deepika Roy on 16.04.2016 and they lived together only for two months, thereafter she went to her Maika at Bhuli Nagar with her parents without giving information to in- laws house. They have further deposed that the respondent reached their house with her relatives and threatened them to implicate them in a false criminal case. The distance is two kilometers between their house and the house of respondent’s father. They have further stated that they have been living separately from two years. 28. The respondent-wife has also adduced two witnesses, including herself, in support of her case which are being dealt hereunder as :- 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 13 DW-1 Deepika Roy is respondent herself. She has deposed in her examination-in-chief that at the time of her marriage ceremony dated 16.04.2016 her father gave Rs. 5 lac in cash, Rs. 3 lac in kind and 2.4 lac in the shape of ornaments. After her marriage she went to her Sasural, but after some days of her marriage, she came to know that her husband is not a technician. He was a simple gym trainer. She also came to know that her husband has illicit affair with another lady Anuja Mehta. On her protest her husband started inflicting mental and physical torture and finally snatched her Stridhan and banished her from his house. He never paid her respect of wife and never paid any penny for her maintenance, though, he has monthly income of Rs.1,20,000/-, She has lastly stated that her husband has illicit relation with another lady, therefore, there is no iota of truth in the petition of divorce filed by her husband. DW-2, Asha Roy, the mother of the respondent, has deposed in terms consistent with the testimony of DW-1. 29. From the testimony, as referred hereinabove, it is evident that the appellant-husband has been examined as P.W.1 before the Family Court, who in his deposition has mainly taken the ground of bad behaviour of his wife toward him and his family members. He has deposed that the respondent-wife used to quarreling and pressurizing him for partition of house from his father. 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 14 30. From the aforesaid testimony of the appellant-husband it is evident that though cruelty has been pleaded by him in his petition, but no cogent evidence has been produced by him to prove the allegations. 31. The respondent-wife has been examined as DW-1 who has stated that after marriage, she came to know that her husband has illicit affair with another lady and on her protest her husband started inflicting mental and physical torture and finally snatched her Stridhan and banished her from his house. She has stated that the case has been filed by her husband against her is not true and her husband made false and concocted allegations against her. She has stated that the allegation levelled against her in the petition is false, concocted and are baseless. 32. The learned Principal Judge, from the statements of the witnesses so produced on behalf of the parties, has come to the conclusion that appellant has failed to prove the grounds of alleged cruelty and desertion pleaded by him in his petition. 33. From the testimony so recorded of the appellant- husband, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court has come to the conclusion that in the instant case, the petitioner/appellant has completely failed in proving the alleged cruelty and desertion. 34. In the context of the aforesaid factual aspect only 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 15 seminal issue has to be decide herein that “Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get divorce dissolving the marriage of the petitioner/appellant with OP/wife on ground of cruelty as also in the ground desertion which is testified in the deposition?”. 35. This Court is now adverting to the contention of learned counsel for the appellant wherein it has been contended that the evidence of cruelty and desertion has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 36. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel on the issue of perversity, needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under: 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 16 “24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. “Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe EncyclopedicEdn.) 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 17 Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” Issue of Cruelty 37. Herein, submission has also been made on behalf of the appellant-husband that the respondent-wife committed cruelty against him. 38. Now this Court is adverting to the issue of cruelty. It needs to refer herein the definition of ‘cruelty’ as has been defined by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Dr. N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326], wherein it has been held that the Court is to enquire as to whether the charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. 39. The cruelty has also been defined in the case of Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi [(1988) 1 SCC 105], wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition. 40. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 18 conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and degree.” 41. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty that it is important for the Court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which they attach importance.” 42. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty. 43. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of “lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was conducting cross-examination. The Hon’ble 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 19 Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”. 44. In Vijay Kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself. 45. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce. 46. “Cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human conduct and is always dependent on social strata or milieu to which parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 20 temperaments and emotions that are conditioned by their social status, reference be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288. 47. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 has observed that cruelty is evident where one spouse so treats other and manifests such feelings in other, as to cause reasonable apprehension in mind of other that it would be harmful or injurious to reside with other spouse and cruelty may be physical or mental. It has further been observed that staying together under the same roof is not a precondition for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty by his or her conduct even while he or she is not staying under the same roof. 48. In matrimonial relationship cruelty mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between spouses which embitters relationship. Sometimes it may take form of violence, or at times may just be an attitude or approach. Silence in some situations may also amount to cruelty reference be made to the case of Ravi Kumar v. Julmidevi, (2010) 4 SCC 476. 49. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vidhya Viswanathan v. Kartik Balakrishnan, (2014) 15 SCC 21 has specifically held that cruelty is to be determined on 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 21 whole facts of the case and the matrimonial relations between the spouses and the word ‘cruelty’ has not been defined and it has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the other. 50. For considering dissolution of marriage at instance of a spouse who alleges mental cruelty, result of such mental cruelty must be such that it is not possible to continue with matrimonial relationship reference may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742. 51. Further the word ‘cruelty’ is used relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778. 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 22 52. Further, in the case of Manish Tyagi v. Deepak Kumar, (2010) 4 SCC 339 the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically observed that to constitute ‘cruelty’, it is enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and below accepted norm that other spouse could not reasonable be expected to put up with it. Conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful of injurious to continue cohabitation with another spouse. Hence, it is not necessary to establish physical violence. Continued ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference may lead to inference of cruelty. 53. Thus, the word “cruelty” under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act has got no static connotation, and therefore, gives a very wide discretion to the Court to apply it liberally and contextually. What is cruelty in one case may not be the same for another and has to be applied from person to person while taking note of the attending circumstances. Harm or injury to health, reputation, the working-career or the like, would be important considerations in determining whether the conduct of the defending spouse amounts to cruelty. It has to be shown that the defending spouse has treated him with cruelty to cause reasonable apprehension in his/her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the contesting spouse. 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 23 54. Now reverting to the fact of the case it has been stated by the appellant/husband that the respondent/wife used to quarrel and the respondent never tried to live together and improve the relation as the distance between the houses of his father-in-law and the father-in-law of the respondent is only two kilometers nevertheless, she has been living separately from the last two years, therefore, in future also there is no possibility of restoration of congenial and harmonious relation between them. It has been further alleged that the respondent-wife is a quarrelsome lady and she misbehaved with his parents and on some occasions, she threatened him to commit suicide and as such, has committed mental cruelty upon him and his parents by giving threatening to implicate in false case and despite of his efforts not ready to live with him and depriving him for pleasure of conjugal life. 55. He has further deposed that in the month of March 2019 the respondent reached his house with a relative and started reviling and assaulting his parents and also put pressure on him to make a demand of partition of house from his father on his denial she left his house and went away and lodged some false criminal case against him with the allegation of unlawful demand of dowry etc. 56. He has deposed that he has filed this case for divorcing his wife on the ground of cruelty and desertion for more than a period of two years 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 24 57. Per contra the respondent/wife had stated in her testimony before the learned Family Court that after marriage, she came to know that her husband has illicit affair with another lady and on her protest her husband started inflicting mental and physical torture and finally snatched her Stridhan and banished her from his house. 58. Admittedly, the plea of cruelty has been raised by the appellant husband thus onus is upon him to prove the fact of cruelty caused upon him by the respondent/wife but after going through the material on record, it is evident that he has not brought on record any material to show that the respondent’s behaviour was cruel towards him and, thus, whatever allegation has been made by the appellant/petitioner regarding the alleged cruelty on behalf of respondent/wife could not be proved. 59. 59. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that the appellant husband has not produced any cogent evidence in regard to the cruelty which has been subjected to him by the respondent/wife as also he had not lodged any complainant regarding the alleged occurrence. 60. Further, the learned Family Court has finally observed that the allegations made by the petitioner regarding cruelty upon him by the respondent are too vague and general in nature and neither in pleading nor in his evidence petitioner has disclosed the date, time or the manner by which he was subjected to cruelties or harassment by the respondent. 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 25 61. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions on the issue of cruelty, is of considered view that the issue of cruelty as has been alleged by the appellant-husband against his wife could not be proved because no cogent evidence to that effect has been produced by the appellant and further since, the learned Principal Family Judge after appreciating the entire evidence had recorded its finding, therefore, it is considered view of this Court that the appellant/petitioner has failed to establish the element of perversity in the aforesaid finding of the learned Family Court. 62. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions on the issue of cruelty, is of considered view that the issue of cruelty as has been alleged by the appellant-husband against his wife could not be proved because no concrete evidence to that effect has been produced by the appellant. 63. Thus, as per the discussions made hereinabove and law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court which has also been referred herein above this Court has no reason to take different view that has been taken by the learned Family Court proving the ground of cruelty. Issue of desertion 64. Now coming to the issue of desertion, which has been taken note by the learned Family Court in the impugned judgment, though it has not been pleaded in the plaint but the appellant has raised this ground in his evidence. 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 26 65. Learned Principal Judge, taking into consideration the fact that since even otherwise there is no desertion on the part of respondent-wife as she in her evidence also has deposed that she is very keen and desirous to live and stay with her husband all through her life and perform her wifely duties. Thus, although the husband appellant had filed petition under sub-section (i-b) of Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 but no cogent evidence was led in this respect, as such the same was discarded by the learned family court. 66. It needs to refer herein that the word ‘desertion’ has been given in Explanation to Section 13 (1) wherein it has been stated that “the expression desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.” 67. It is pertinent to note that the word ‘desertion’, as has been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the Act, 1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wishes of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 27 cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly. 68. Rayden on Divorce, which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms: “Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.” 69. The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words: “In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases.” 70. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. 71. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 28 exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. 72. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a continuing offence. 73. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. 74. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary intention aforesaid. 75. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs. 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 29 Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of ‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. 76. The law consistently has been laid down by the Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. 77. At the outset, it is an admitted position that the plaintiff and the defendant are legally wedded spouses and that their marriage was solemnized on 16.04.2016 according to Hindu rites and customs. It is also not in dispute that the parties have been living separately for a considerable period. 78. The plaintiff examined himself as PW-1. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that after the marriage the defendant resided in the matrimonial home for only about 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 30 two months and thereafter left for her parental home without his permission. According to him, the defendant was quarrelsome in nature, misbehaved with his parents, and on several occasions threatened to commit suicide. 79. He further deposed that in March 2019 the defendant, accompanied by her relatives, came to the matrimonial home, abused and assaulted his parents, and demanded that he seek partition of the family property from his father. On his refusal, she allegedly left the matrimonial home and subsequently instituted false criminal proceedings alleging dowry demand. He asserted that the defendant had treated him with cruelty and had deserted him for more than two years. 80. PW-2, Smt. Gayatri Rachna, and PW-3, Shri Rajeshwar Roy, who are the mother and father of the plaintiff respectively, substantially corroborated the version of PW-1. They deposed that the defendant resided in the matrimonial home only for a short period and thereafter stayed at her parental house. They further stated that the defendant had threatened to implicate them in false criminal cases. 81. On the other hand, the defendant examined herself as DW-1. She deposed that at the time of marriage her parents had given substantial cash, articles, and ornaments. She further stated that after marriage she came to know that he was allegedly maintaining an illicit relationship with another woman. According to her, whenever she objected to such 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 31 conduct, she was subjected to physical and mental cruelty. She further deposed that she was assaulted by the plaintiff and his parents, her ornaments were taken away, and she was forcibly driven out of the matrimonial home. Thereafter, she lodged a complaint before the police and underwent medical treatment at PMCH, Dhanbad. She categorically denied that she had deserted the plaintiff of her own accord and stated that she was compelled to leave the matrimonial home due to the conduct of the plaintiff and his family members. 82. DW-2, Smt. Asha Roy, the mother of the defendant, fully supported the testimony of DW-1. 83. Thus, the evidence on record does not establish that the defendant voluntarily abandoned the matrimonial home with the intention of permanently terminating cohabitation. On the contrary, the defendant has consistently asserted that she was compelled to leave after being assaulted and driven out by the plaintiff/appellant and his parents. Her version has remained substantially consistent throughout the proceedings. 84. It is also evident from the impugned judgment wherein learned Family Court has observed that the alleged separation occurred in the year 2019 and the present suit was instituted in the same year and therefore, the statutory requirement of continuous desertion for a period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 32 the petition, as contemplated under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, has not been satisfied. 85. Therefore, the withdrawal from the society of the plaintiff-husband and the abandonment of the plaintiff- appellant by the defendant-wife, the respondent herein is not voluntarily rather in the compelling situation and ouster from her matrimonial house. The criminal case instituted by the defendant-wife against the plaintiff-husband further speaks about the absence of willful abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant as claimed by the plaintiff. 86. Further it needs to refer herein that the burden to prove cruelty and desertion squarely rested upon the plaintiff. In the opinion of this Court, the plaintiff has failed to discharge that burden by cogent, reliable, and convincing evidence. Mere matrimonial discord, exchange of allegations, or separate residence, without proof of the statutory ingredients, cannot by themselves constitute grounds for dissolution of marriage. 87. This Court, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove, is of the view that the appellant husband has not been able to prove the issue of desertion before the learned Family Court. As such, we have no reason to take a different view that has been taken by the learned Family Court. Conclusion. 88. This Court, on the basis of discussions made 2026:JHHC:21868-DB 33 hereinabove, is of the view that the judgment dated 28.06.2022 and decree signed on 07.07.2022 by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad whereby and whereunder the Original Suit No.328 of 2019 filed by the appellant-husband for a decree of divorce has been dismissed, requires no interference by this Court. 89. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed. 90. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I agree. (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Date : 23/07/2026 Birendra /A.F.R. Uploaded on 24/07/2026