Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2026:HHC:37192 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1070 of 2026 Reserved on: 27.08.2026 Date of Decision: 02.09.2026
Sunil Kumar
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner
: Mr Ashok Kumar, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 131 of 2024, dated 04.09.2024, registered at Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 22 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner has been falsely implicated. He has not committed any offence. The police have filed the charge-sheet before the court, and no fruitful
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:37192 purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police received secret information on 03.09.2024, at about 05.24 p.m., that Sunil Kumar, the present petitioner, was selling intoxicating capsules. A huge quantity of capsules could be recovered by searching the petitioner. The information was credible, and any delay in procuring the search warrant would have led to the destruction of the capsules. Hence, the police reduced the information to writing and sent it to the Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Paonta Sahib, H.P. The Police went to the spot and apprehended the petitioner, who identified himself as Sunil Kumar. The police joined Inderpal as an independent witness and searched the backpack being carried by the petitioner. The police recovered 2400 capsules of Tramadol from the backpack. The petitioner could not produce any document for possessing the capsules. The police arrested the petitioner and seized the capsules. The petitioner named Sharafat Ali as the person who had handed over the capsules to
3 2026:HHC:37192 him. The police also arrested Sharafat Ali. The capsules were sent to the FSL, and as per the report of analysis, they were found to be a sample of Tramadol.
The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court. Statements of 14 witnesses out of 22 witnesses cited by the prosecution have been recorded, and statements of four witnesses are yet to be recorded. The matter was listed on 12.08.2026 and 13.08.2026 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The petitioner has remained in custody for about two years. The police have filed the charge-sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found in
4 2026:HHC:37192 possession of commercial quantity of Tramadol, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56.
In Gudikantis Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
5 2026:HHC:37192 (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, based on evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail.
The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
6 2026:HHC:37192 accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case.
While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
7 2026:HHC:37192 mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
8 2026:HHC:37192 Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35.
While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
9 2026:HHC:37192 who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The learned trial Court has held in its order dated 24.04.2026 that the petitioner was found in possession of commercial quantity of Tramadol. However, it has not been mentioned how the learned trial Court had concluded that the quantity was commercial. The status report is conspicuously silent regarding the total quantity of Tramadol in the capsules even though it mentions that each capsule contained 50 mg of Tramadol. Even the report of analysis quoted by the police in the status report also does not mention the quantity of Tramadol found by the laboratory in each capsule after the analysis. Thus, the quantity of Tramadol in 2400 capsules was 1,20,000 mg or 120 grams. The Central Government has notified 250 grams of Tramadol as the commercial quantity. Therefore, the petitioner was found in possession of less than the commercial quantity, and the conclusion of the learned Trial Court that the petitioner
10 2026:HHC:37192 was found in possession of commercial quantity of Tramadol cannot be accepted. 12. The status report shows that the petitioner was arrested on 04.09.2024.
The prosecution has not completed the evidence in the present case, and 14 witnesses are yet to be examined. Considering the quantity of Tramadol found in possession of the petitioner, the petitioner has undergone a substantial part of the imprisonment that can be awarded to him, and his further detention is not justified. 13. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his furnishing personal bond in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever. (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the
11 2026:HHC:37192 SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 14. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 15. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. 16. A copy of this
order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Model Central Jail Nahan, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
17.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla) 2nd September, 2026.
Judge (Ravinder)
Digitally signed by RAVINDER KUMAR DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA, Phone=35ecb6f93c6891a7dae90f163e34d7ecaa420b13af1363204ab0e0f5c87077 dc, PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh, SERIALNUMBER=f6cc63c55495d14ce1f8623eacdb6cb9ef2c553803537a2f53c4ee 637cbebaff, CN=RAVINDER KUMAR Reason: I am the author of this document Location: Date: 2026-09-02 14:11:37 RAVINDER KUMAR