2026:HHC:10486 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 135 of 2026 Reserved on: 1.4.2026 Date of Decision: 7.4.2026. Sukha …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Naresh Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 34 of 2025, dated 4.6.2025, registered at Police Station Swarghat, District Bilaspur, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 331(4), 305, 111(2)(b) and 238 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhitta, 2023 (BNS). 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. 15 FIRs were registered against the petitioner, and the petitioner is on bail in 13 FIRs. The 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:10486 provisions of Section 111 of BNS are not attracted to the present case, and no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. The petitioner is ready and willing to furnish bail bonds to the satisfaction of this Court and abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that Sher Singh informed the police on 4.6.2025, at about 9.27 AM, that a theft had taken place in his house. The police went to the spot where the informant filed a written application stating that the lock of his almirah was broken, the articles were lying scattered, and gold and silver jewellery worth ₹25,000/- to ₹30,000/-was missing. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police checked CCTV footage and found a motorcycle carrying two persons moving suspiciously. The police arrested the petitioner and his brother Bunty in FIR No. 43 of 2025. The petitioner revealed during the interrogation that he had committed the theft in the present case. The police obtained the footprints of the petitioner and Bunty and sent them to RFSL, Mandi. The petitioner identified 3 2026:HHC:10486 the place where he had stopped the motorcycle, thrown empty boxes of jewellery, and committed theft. Some of the jewellery was recovered in another case, out of which the informant’s wife and son identified two silver anklets, three silver necklaces and two silver rings as belonging to them. The report of RFSL, Mandi mentioned that the footprint impression could not be compared with the Plaster of Paris (POP) cast. The call detail record showed the petitioner’s location near the place of the incident. 15 FIRs have been registered against the petitioner. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 28.11.2025. The matter is listed for consideration on charge on 22.4.2026. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence if released on bail. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. I have heard Mr Naresh Sharma, learned counsel representing the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Naresh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. There is nothing to connect him to the commission of the crime. The police have filed the charge sheet, 4 2026:HHC:10486 and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was involved in the commission of a similar offence earlier, and the likelihood of the petitioner committing the offence if released on bail cannot be ruled out. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. InGudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also 5 2026:HHC:10486 pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of 6 2026:HHC:10486 the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and 7 2026:HHC:10486 an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and 8 2026:HHC:10486 (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the 9 2026:HHC:10486 gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The status report shows that the police had recovered the jewellery from the petitioner in another FIR. The informant’s wife and the son identified two silver anklets, three silver necklaces, and two silver rings as belonging to them. Section 119 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) provides that a man in possession of the stolen goods soon after the theft can be presumed to be a thief or the receiver of the stolen property unless he can account for his possession. Therefore, prima facie, the recovery of the stolen articles from the petitioner shows that he had committed the theft after committing house trespass. 10 2026:HHC:10486 12. The petition mentions that 15 FIRs have been registered against the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents while granting bail in Champa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899 and held that the criminal antecedents would disentitle an accused from the concession of bail, especially when an FIR was registered against the accused related to the commission of a similar offence. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi vs State of H.P., decided on 27.11.2025. Therefore, the relevance of criminal antecedents cannot be ignored. The petitioner’s criminal antecedents would support the submission made on behalf of the State that the petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar crime if released on bail. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to the concession of bail at this stage. 13. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 11 2026:HHC:10486 14. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 7th April, 2026 (Chander)