2026:HHC:37195 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 200 of 2013 Reserved on: 22.8.2026 Date of Decision: 02.09.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Roshan Lal & ors. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr Manoj Thakur, Advocate. For the complainant : Mr Surya Chauhan, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgement dated 26.11.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Cass, Court No.2, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 342 and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:37195 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 342 and 504 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Savita Devi (PW1) was sweeping her courtyard on 29.11.2009, at about 10.45 AM. Her children, Aman Kumar (PW2) and Anjali, were also present in the home. Accused Reeta Devi came to the courtyard of the informant wearing shoes and climbed on the informant’s chulah. The informant objected, and Reeta started abusing the informant and her children. Accused Roshan Lal, Vinit Kumar and Ravi Kumar also came to the spot and started beating the informant and her son. The informant went inside the room with her children. Accused Vinit Kumar bolted the door. The informant shouted for help, and Kamla Devi (PW3) opened the door. The informant reported the matter to the police. The police recorded an entry (Ex.PW5/A). HC Rajinder Singh (PW7) went to the spot for verification of the information. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ex.PW1/A) and sent it to the Police 3 2026:HHC:37195 Station, where FIR (Ex.PW5/B) was registered. He filed an application (Ex.PW6/A) for the informant’s medical examination. Dr. Priyanka Verma (PW6) examined the informant, Savita Devi, and Aman Kumar and found that they had sustained multiple injuries. He referred them to the Radiologist for expert opinion. The X-rays were taken, but no fracture was detected. Hence, the nature of the injury was stated to be simple, which could be caused by fist and kick blows. MLCs (Ex.PW6/A and Ex.PW6/B) were issued. HC Rajinder Singh visited the spot, prepared the site plan (Ex.PW7/A) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 342, 323 and 504 read with Section 34 of IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Informant Savita Devi (PW1), her son Aman Kumar 4 2026:HHC:37195 (PW2) and Kamla Devi (PW3) narrated the incident. Rikhi Ram (PW4) took the X-rays. Inspector Ram Singh (PW5) signed the FIR. Dr Priyanka Verma (PW6) medically examined the victim. HC Rajinder Singh (PW7) investigated the matter. Constable Suresh Kumar (PW8) proved the entry in the daily diary. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They stated that witnesses deposed against them because of enmity. They claimed that they were innocent. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that Kamla Devi claimed that two women were with her; however, the prosecution did not examine them. The incident had taken place in a large village, but no independent witness was associated. The informant admitted that her mother-in-law was residing in the house, but she was not produced. The parties had a land dispute with each other, and the prosecution evidence was required to be seen with due care and caution. The medical evidence did not corroborate the informant’s testimony. The ingredients of Section 504 of the 5 2026:HHC:37195 IPC were not satisfied. The Medical Officer did not notice any external injury on the informant’s body, which also made the prosecution case doubtful. The accused were entitled to the benefit of doubt in these circumstances. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The prosecution witnesses corroborated the statements of each other. The informant’s testimony that her door was bolted from outside was corroborated by the statement of Kamla Devi. Any defect in the investigation cannot result in the acquittal of the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State, Mr Manoj Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, and Mr Surya Chauhan, learned counsel for the informant. 6 2026:HHC:37195 9. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other in material particulars. Enmity is a double-edged weapon, and it can furnish motive for the commission of the crime. The learned Trial Court erred in highlighting minor contradictions which were bound to come with the passage of time. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Surya Chauhan, learned counsel for the informant, adopted the submissions of Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant-State and prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside 11. Mr Manoj Thakur, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars. The Medical Officer did not find any injury on the informant’s body, and the learned Trial Court was justified in 7 2026:HHC:37195 doubting the prosecution case. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the 8 2026:HHC:37195 golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt 9 2026:HHC:37195 should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate 10 2026:HHC:37195 the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The informant specifically stated in her statement (Ex.PW1/A) that she was sweeping her floor when accused Reeta Devi came to her courtyard and climbed on her chulah while wearing shoes. This version was changed in court. Savita Devi (PW1) stated that she was preparing food when the accused Reeta Devi entered the courtyard with the shows. She objected, and the accused started abusing. Aman Kumar (PW2) stated that the informant was preparing food when Reeta Devi came and 11 2026:HHC:37195 went near the chullah while wearing the shoes. The informant objected, and the accused started abusing. Accused Roshan Lal came and started beating the informant. Thus, it is apparent from the statements of these witnesses that they have changed the genesis of the incident, which would make the prosecution case highly suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Dhirendra Kumar, (1997) 1 SCC 93: 1997 SCC (Cri) 54 that when the prosecution projects a different case during the Trial, its case becomes suspect. It was observed: “11. It was very emphatically contended by Shri Gambhir that as in the first information report (FIR), there is no mention of the dying declaration, we should discard the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 regarding the dying declaration, because of what has been pointed out by this Court in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 815: 1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026] We do not, however, agree with Shri Gambhir, for the reason that what was observed in Ram Kumar case [(1975) 3 SCC 815: 1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026] after noting the broad facts, was that material omission in the FIR would cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case, despite the general law being that statements made in the FIR can be used to corroborate or contradict its maker. This view owes its origin to the thinking that if there be a material departure in the prosecution case as unfolded in the FIR, which would be so if material facts not mentioned in the FIR are deposed to by prosecution witnesses in the court, the same would cause a dent to the edifice on which the prosecution case is built, as the substratum of the prosecution case then gets altered. The prosecution cannot project two entirely different versions 12 2026:HHC:37195 of a case. This is entirely different from thinking that some omission in the FIR would require disbelieving the witnesses who depose about the fact not mentioned in the FIR. Evidence of witnesses has to be tested for its strength or weakness. While doing so, if the fact deposed be a material part of the prosecution case, about which, however, no mention was made in the FIR, the same would be borne in mind while deciding about the credibility of the evidence given by the witness in question.” 16. The informant stated that she had sustained injuries on her head, right hand finger and other parts of her body. Her finger was fractured. Dr Priyanka Verma (PW6) examined the informant and found that there was no visible injury on her body. She referred the informant to the radiologist, but no fracture was detected. Thus, the medical evidence does not corroborate the informant’s version that she was beaten by the accused. 17. The informant stated that she and her children went inside the room and the accused bolted the door. She stated in her cross-examination that she was bolted in the room of Ram Pal and not in the room in her possession. Kamla Devi (PW3) stated in her cross examination that she had opened the door of the informant’s room and not the door of the room of Ram Pal. Therefore, the statements of these two witnesses do not 13 2026:HHC:37195 corroborate each other that the informant and her children were bolted inside the room. 18. The informant admitted in her cross-examination that the doors were interlinked with each other. The front portion of the two doors shows that it was possible to move from one room to another and come out of the second door, even if one door is bolted. This would make the informant’s version highly doubtful that she was bolted in a room. 19. The informant admitted that there is a dispute between the parties related to the land. The learned Trial Court has rightly held that the enmity between the parties can furnish a motive for the commission of the crime as well as for false implication. Therefore, the prosecution evidence was required to be seen with due care and caution. 20. The informant and Aman Kumar stated that the accused had abused them. They have not given any particulars of the abuse. The ingredients of Section 504 of IPC were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, as under: - “29. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person 14 2026:HHC:37195 insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy, cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace, and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant. 30. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section504, IPCif it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case, and there cannot be a general proposition that no one 15 2026:HHC:37195 commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. InKing Emperorv.Chunnibhai Dayabhai,(1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, pointed out that: — “To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C., it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.” (emphasis supplied) 31. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant. 32. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably be said to have been disclosed, but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section504of theIPCis that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to an intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.” 16 2026:HHC:37195 21. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 that mere abuse is not sufficient to attract Section 504 of IPC. It was observed at page 217: - 21. Section 504 IPC came up for consideration before this Court inFiona Shrikhandev.State of Maharashtra[Fiona Shrikhande v.State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715]. In the said case, this Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which need to be present before proceeding to try a case. The Court held that in the said case, the order issuing process was challenged by filing a criminal revision. This Court held that at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In para 11, the following principles have been laid down: (SCC pp. 48-49) “11. We are, in this case, concerned only with the question as to whether, on a reading of the complaint, a prima facie case has been made out or not to issue process by the Magistrate. The law as regards the issuance of process in criminal cases is well settled. At the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, and it is not the province of the Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely limited in the sense that the Magistrate, at this stage, is expected to examine prima facie the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint. The Magistrate is not expected to embark upon a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, but only to consider the inherent probabilities 17 2026:HHC:37195 apparent on the statement made in the complaint. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507], this Court held that once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion in forming an opinion that there is ground for proceeding, it is not for the Higher Courts to substitute their own discretion for that of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has to decide the question purely from the point of view of the complaint, without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have.” 22. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court has noticed the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which are to the following effect: (Fiona Shrikhande case[Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715], SCC p. 49) “13. Section 504 IPC comprises the following ingredients, viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults, intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause a breach of the public peace, or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult, and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.” 23. In another judgment, i.e.Manik Taneja v State of Karnataka[Manik Taneja v.State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132], this Court has again occasion 18 2026:HHC:37195 to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506. In the above case, a case was registered for the offence under Sections 353 and 506 IPC. After noticing Section 503, which defines criminal intimidation, this Court laid down the following in paras 11 and 12 : (SCC pp. 427-28) “11.*** A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. 12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with the intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent, causing obstruction in the discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public, and 19 2026:HHC:37195 the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract the ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.” In the above case, the allegation was that the appellant had abused the complainant. The Court held that the mere fact that the allegation that the accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506 IPC. 24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the appellant, with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him, and when some neighbours arrived there, the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation, taking on its face value, does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as have been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715]. 22. This position was reiterated in B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 275, wherein it was observed: “19. For appreciating the necessary ingredients required to substantiate a charge under Section 504, IPC, a reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court inFiona Shrikhandev. State of Maharashtra (2013) 14 SCC 44, wherein the Court discussed the 20 2026:HHC:37195 essential ingredients of Section 504, IPC. The Court held as follows: — “13. Section 504 IPC comprises the following ingredients, viz.(a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults, intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause a breach of the public peace, or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult, and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section504IPC.” 14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate concludes, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section504IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section504IPC.” (emphasis supplied) 21 2026:HHC:37195 20. Thus, upon reading the complaint as a whole, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult made by the accused to the complainant to provoke the latter to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, then only the act complained of would fall within the ambit of Section 504, IPC. The law does not mandate that the complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking him/her to commit a breach of peace or any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which the offending words are used, the person to whom they are addressed, the time, and the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504, IPC. 21. Further, this Court in the case ofMohammad Wajidv.State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951, while discussing Section 504, IPC, propounded the test for considering the circumstances wherein abusive language takes the form and shape of an intentional insult and held thus: — “28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been 22 2026:HHC:37195 subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy, cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace, and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant. 29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section504, IPCif it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case, and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant.” (emphasis supplied) 22. Needless to say, mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Furthermore, it would be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and provoked did not actually break the peace or commit any offence. 23. Section 504, IPC, consists of two parts. Firstly, the actus reus is the intentional insult that gives rise to the provocation. Secondly, mens rea,i.e., the intention or knowledge on the part of the accused that such intentional provocation is likely to cause the person insulted to break public peace or commit any other offence. The animus nocendi in Section 504, IPC is that the 23 2026:HHC:37195 accused should ‘intentionally insult’ the other person with the intention or knowledge that the provocation caused by such insult is likely to result in the commission of a breach of public peace or any other offence by the person who has been so insulted. The offence is said to be complete once the accused person makes an ‘intentional insult’ with the aforesaid mens rea. Hence, intention or knowledge on the part of the accused person that his actions of making an ‘intentional insult’ have the potential to provoke the person insulted is sine qua non for the commission of the offence under Section 504, IPC. 24. The natural corollary of the above discussion is that if the accused does not intend to give provocation, the offence is not made out. An insult without an ‘intention to insult’ is not punishable under Section 504, IPC. Further, ‘intentional insult’ must be of such a degree that it has the potential to provoke a reasonable person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. 25.It is trite that whether the person provoked further commits an illegal act or not is immaterial to draw the conclusion of culpability under Section 504, IPC. The ‘intentional insult’ and provocation must be so proximate and close that the accused has either the intention or the knowledge that the intentional insult made by him is likely to cause the provoked person to break public peace or commit some other offence. However, what would be the nature of ‘intentional insult’ causing provocation, to draw culpability under Section 504, IPC, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The test to be applied to determine if the intentional insult made by the accused is sufficient to cause provocation is that of a reasonable person,i.e., if the insult is sufficient to provoke any reasonable person to break the peace or commit any other offence, only then the accused will be liable for the offence under Section 504, IPC.” 23. In the present case, the informant’s statement does not show that the abuse was of such a nature as would provoke 24 2026:HHC:37195 her to commit the breach of peace, and the essential ingredient of the commission of the offence punishable under Section 504 of IPC was not satisfied. 24. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution's case because of all these infirmities. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 25. No other point was urged. 26. Consequently, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 27. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed 25 2026:HHC:37195 against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 2nd September, 2026 (Chander)