1 2026:HHC:36858-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CMPMO No. 213 of 2019 Reserved on : 5.8.2026 Decided on: 31.8.2026 uploaded on :31.8.2026 Prit Pal & others … Petitioners Versus Lal Chand & others …Respondents _____________________________ ______________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge Whether approved for reporting? ___________________________________________________ For the Petitioners: Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Janesh Gupta and Mr. Harshit Sharma, Advocates. For the Respondents : Mr. Mohinder Verma, Advocate, for respondents No. 1 to 5, 6(a) to 6(i), 7, 8, 9(a) to 9(c), 10 to 14, 15(a) and 16. Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Mr. Zharaick, Addl. AGs with Ms. Ranjna Patial, Dy. A.G., for respondents No. 17 and 18. Virender Singh, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 2.4.2019, passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge, Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. (hereinafter 2 2026:HHC:36858-DB referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in C.M.P. (RBT) No. 63-6 of 2018 and CMA (RBT) No. 64-6 of 2018 in Civil Suit No. 72/1 of 2015, titled as, ‘Prit Pal and another versus State of H.P. & others’. 2. By way of order dated 2.4.2019, the learned trial Court has allowed the application, under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, read with Section 151 CPC and arrayed respondents No. 1 to 16, as parties in the suit. 3. For the sake of convenience, parties to the lis are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court. 4. Brief facts, leading to filing of the present petition, as borne out from the record, may be summed up, as under: Plaintiffs Pritpal and Yashpal have filed the suit for declaration to the effect that plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land, as mentioned in para-3 of the plaint, and defendants are restrained from causing any type of interference, loss and injury and further from doing any such act, which, may cause any type of 3 2026:HHC:36858-DB prejudice to the rights, title and interest of the plaintiffs, over the same. 4.1 It is the case of the plaintiffs that they are permanent residents of Village Chabacha Kalan, P.O. Rauri, Tehsil Kasauli, Distt. Solan (H.P). The ancestors of the plaintiffs have been residing in the said village since the time immemorial. They are owners of agricultural land and other properties, situated in the Village Chabacha-Kalan, Tehsil Kasauli, Distt. Solan. 4.2 It is the further case of the plaintiffs that the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs i.e. late Sh Majanu etc. were estate right holders of Village Chabacha Kalan. They were owners of agricultural lands in the village and also, the land, which was shown or recorded as "Shamlat Deh Hasab Hissas Zail" in missal haqiyat, prepared in the year 1965 V.K. i.e. 1908-09, wherein, late Sh Majanu etc. have been shown to be owners of 1/5th share of the land, comprised in Khata No. 9, Khatauni No. 15, Khasra Kitta 13, measuring 274-5 bigha, as detailed in missal haqiyat Bandobast, Mauza Chabacha Kalan, Tehsil & Distt. Pinjore. 4 2026:HHC:36858-DB 4.3 As per the further case of the plaintiffs, the suit land was assessed to land revenue of Rs. 3/- Anna 9 and paise 2. Said land revenue was further distributed amongst the co-sharers/ owners, more specifically, as detailed in missal haqiyat. In the revenue records, in the column of ownership, the entry of the owners with defined share, has been shown and late Sh Majanu etc. have been shown to be owners in possession of 1/ 5th share, though owners of half share, in the column of possession, there is entry of Makbuza Malkaan. The predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs have been making payment of the land revenue regularly. The co- sharers were in separate possession of the suit land and had been using the same separately, as owners and as per their shares, no portion of the suit land was being used for common purposes, in any manner, whatsoever. 4.4 Thereafter, correction of the error in the shares, which is duly reflected in the jamabandi for the year 1923-24, and the revenue entries, with regard to the suit land, continued in the same manner, till 1956. On 4.6.1956, mutation No. 64 was sanctioned, whereby the 5 2026:HHC:36858-DB suit land has been mutated in favour of Nagar Panchayat Bhoj Kadon, whereby, Nagar Panchayat has been shown to be the owner of the suit land. The above mentioned mutation has been sanctioned, behind the back of the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs, in an arbitrary, unilateral, unfair and unjust manner. 4.5 It is the further case of the plaintiffs that no opportunity of being heard was granted, before sanctioning the mutation. After mutation No. 64 another mutation i.e mutation No. 81 has been sanctioned on 10.10.1957, which has also been sanctioned, behind the back of predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs, and the same is stated to be illegal, null and void. 4.6 According to the plaintiffs, transfer of ownership of the suit land from the name of predecessors-in- interest of the plaintiffs to Nagar Panchayat Bhoj Kadon and then to Punjab State, is wrong, illegal and void ab- initio and does not create any right, title or interest in favour of Nagar Panchayat or State of Punjab, as no owner including predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs 6 2026:HHC:36858-DB could be deprived from their property, without any legal order of competent authority and lawful procedure. After mutation No. 81, mutation No. 88, qua the portion of the suit land, has been sanctioned, on 8.8.1969, whereby name of Pardesh Sarkar has been incorporated, in the column of the ownership/ owners and name of Punjala State has been omitted. 4.7 According to the stand of the plaintiffs, on 8.7.1975, mutation No. 94 has been sanctioned, whereby portion of the suit land has been shown to have been vested in Sarkar Daulat Mandaar. This mutation has again been sanctioned behind the back of the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs. 4.8 It is the further case of the plaintiffs that on the basis of above mentioned wrong and illegal mutations, wrong revenue entries have been incorporated and at present, the State of HP, i.e. the defendants are being shown as owners of the suit land, more particularly, the land, detailed as Khata No. 33, Khatauni No. 39, Khasra No. 1, 7, 27, 65, 108, 130, 131, 137, 148, 150, 151, 156 min and 157 min, Kitta 13 measuring 90-8 bigha and 7 2026:HHC:36858-DB Khatauni No. 41, Khasra No. 157 min and Khasra No. 169 measuring 104-17 bigha i.e. totally measuring 195- 05 bigha, as detailed in the copy of jamabandi, for the year 2006-07, for Mauza Chabacha Kalan, Tehsil Kasauli, Distt. Solan, (hereinafter referred to as "the suit land"). The revenue entries, in favour of the defendants have been incorporated, in a wrong and illegal manner and as such, do not create any right, title or interest, in favour of the defendants-State of H.P. It has been asserted that the plaintiffs and proforma defendant Nos. 4 & 5 are owners in possession of the suit land to the extent of half share and are in possession of the same on spot. 4.9 It is the further case of the plaintiffs that after amendment in HP Village Common Land (V&U) Act, it has made it clear that in case, the shares have been defined in the revenue record and there is entry of Makbuza Malkaan, such entry will have effect that the land is in individual cultivation possession to the extent of share and the same cannot be vested in Nagar Panchayat and thereafter, in favour of State. 8 2026:HHC:36858-DB 4.10 Controverting the entries, with regard to possession of the State over the suit land, relief, as claimed in the suit has been sought. 5. When, put to notice, the suit has been contested by defendants No. 1 to 3 by filing written statement, in which, preliminary objections have been taken, that the suit is not maintainable; plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit, as in the mutation No. 81, dated 10.10.1957; name of the plaintiff has not been depicted in the revenue record, and the Forest Department of the State is in the exclusive possession of the suit land; plaintiffs are estopped from filing the suit, on account of their acts and conduct; the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit; the suit of the plaintiffs is barred by limitation; the suit of the plaintiffs has not been valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction; and the jurisdiction of the Court is barred by Section 171(2) of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, and Sections 101, 112 and 115 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. 9 2026:HHC:36858-DB 5.1 On merits, the suit of the plaintiffs has been contested, on the ground, that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit, as defendants No. 1 to 3 are in ownership and possession of the forest land. Supporting the mutations, which are being challenged by the plaintiffs, it has been asserted that mutation No. 64 dated 4-06-1956 has been effected by orders of District Collector Patiala, vide order No 1381, dated 14.06.1955 and implemented vide rapat No. 504 dated 11.09.1955 and then, legally incorporated in the jamabandi for the year 1955-56, for the suit land. 6. When, the lis was pending for PWs, at that time, 16 persons, residents of village Chabacha Kalan,P.O. Rouri, Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. have moved an application, under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, in the above titled case, on the ground, that they are inhabitants of village Chabacha, P.O. Rouri, Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan, H.P., since their forefathers’ time and they are also estate holders in the same village, as such, they are having interest over the suit land, being Shamlat deh. 10 2026:HHC:36858-DB 7. 10 2026:HHC:36858-DB 7. According to the applicants, earlier civil suit No. 196/1 of 87/86 titled as, "Shri Tula Ram and Others versus State of HP and Others" was filed and father of the present plaintiffs Harnam Singh, present Proforma defendant No. 5 was arrayed as plaintiff No. 3 in that suit. Palak Ram (deceased), father of present applicant Nos. 1 to 3 was impleaded as defendant No. 4; applicant No. 6 was impleaded as defendant No. 3; and Chet Ram (deceased), father of present applicant No. 4 was impleaded as defendant No. 5, in the earlier suit. The said suit was dismissed on 17.07.1992 by the learned Sub Judge First Class, Kandaghat Camp at Solan H.P. The dismissal of the said suit was upheld by this Court, by way of RSA No. 53 of 1993, vide order dated 6.11.1992. 8. It is the further case of the applicants that the plaintiffs have not impleaded them knowingly and deliberately and have not come with clean hands before this Court, whereas, they are the necessary parties for the just and proper decision of the case, as they are having interest over the suit land. 11 2026:HHC:36858-DB 9. It has also been prayed, in the application, that no loss or prejudice will be caused to the plaintiffs and their impleadment would avoid multiplicity of the litigation, between the parties. 10. The application is duly supported by the affidavit of applicant No. 7 Hans Raj. 11. The said application has been contested by the plaintiffs, by denying the stand, as taken in the application. However, factum of earlier litigation has not been disputed. According to the plaintiffs, they were not party to the earlier litigation, and any adjudication made therein, does not cast any cloud upon their right, title and interest. Hence, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 12. Apart from this, one Tek Chand, S/o Mathu Ram, R/o Chabacha Kalan, Post Office Rouri, Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. has filed application, under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, with the same prayer. 13. According to him, he has filed the suit for declaration and injunction, against the State of H.P., with regard to the suit land. He has sought his 12 2026:HHC:36858-DB impleadment, on the ground, that the plaintiffs, have filed the collusive suit, in connivance with proforma defendant, by concealing the true and material facts. The proforma defendants have earlier filed the suit against the state of H.P., alongwith present applicant, and other tenants of the suit land. The said suit was dismissed and the dismissal was upheld by this Court, in Regular Second Appeal. 14. Asserting the fact that the applicant is in actual ownership and possession of the land bearing khasra No. 156 min and khasra No. 150, alongwith other land, which was allotted to the applicant, a prayer has been made to allow the application. 15. The said application has also been contested by the plaintiffs by submitting that they are seeking their rights in the Shamlat land as per their share and defendants have no right, title and interest over the same. 16. The learned trial Court has allowed the application, vide order dated 2.4.2019, and the applicants were ordered to be impleaded as defendants. 13 2026:HHC:36858-DB The said order has been challenged before this Court, by way of the present petition. 17. The order, by virtue of which, applications under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, have been allowed, has been assailed, on the ground, that the learned trial Court has not taken into consideration, the controversy, involved in the present case, and the applicants were impleaded, mainly, on the basis of averments, as made in the application. 18. According to the petitioners, no reasons have been assigned, as to how, the applicants are necessary parties, to the suit. The stand taken in the plaint, as well as, in the written statement, has been considered by the learned trial Court and both the applications have been allowed. 19. On the basis of grounds of appeal, Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate, appearing for the petitioners, has prayed that the present petition may kindly be allowed, by setting aside the order dated 2.4.2019, passed by the learned trial Court, in applications, under 14 2026:HHC:36858-DB Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, and both the applications may kindly be dismissed with costs. 20. Per contra, Mr. Mohinder Verma, Advocate, appearing for respondents No. 1 to 5, 6(a) to 6(i), 7, 8, 9(a) to 9(c), 10 to 14, 15(a) and 16 has supported the order, passed by the learned trial Court, and pointed out that the learned trial Court has taken into consideration the material, as available on the record, has rightly concluded that the applicants are necessary and proper parties and the said decision cannot be interfered with by this Court, that too, under the limited jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is confined only to examine whether the learned trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction, vested in it, properly or has wrongly exercised the same. 21. Before interfering with the order passed by the learned trial Court, it is incumbent upon this Court to record its satisfaction that the findings, so recorded, by the learned trial Court are perverse. 22. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another 15 2026:HHC:36858-DB Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni 16 2026:HHC:36858-DB Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: 17 2026:HHC:36858-DB "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court 18 2026:HHC:36858-DB to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re- appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact- finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in 19 2026:HHC:36858-DB substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition 20 2026:HHC:36858-DB Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, 21 2026:HHC:36858-DB howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re- appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact- finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed.” 23. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:- “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon 22 2026:HHC:36858-DB it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala).” 24. Perusal of the record shows that in the application, under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, a specific stand has been taken by the applicants that Civil Suit No. 196/1of 87/86, titled as, ‘Tula Ram and others versus State of H.P. and others’ was filed, in which, father of the present plaintiff Harnam Singh and present proforma defendant No. 5, was arrayed as plaintiff No. 3, in that suit. It has specially been averred, in the application, that the said suit was pertaining to the same land. All these facts have been pleaded in para-3 of the plaint. In reply to para-3 of the plaint, averments regarding the litigation is stated to be the matter of record. 25. Merely because the plaintiffs were not parties to the earlier litigation, does not permit them to assert their independent right. The very basis of the suit, filed by the plaintiffs, is the fact that their predecessors-in-interest were the estate right holders of village Chabacha Kalan. 23 2026:HHC:36858-DB They are not asserting their independent right. The earlier suit was dismissed, and this material fact has not been mentioned, in the plaint. 26. Considering the stand of the applicants that they are inhabitants of village Chabacha Kalan and also, the estate holders of the same village, the same clothed them as necessary and proper parties. From their stand, it has transpired that they are interested to deny the title of the plaintiffs, as alleged in the suit. When, a person, who has denied or is interested in denying the status of the plaintiffs, falls within the definition of ‘necessary and property party’. 27. If the facts and circumstances of the present case are seen in the light of decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Razia Begum versus Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & others, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 886, then the learned trial Court has rightly allowed the application. Relevant paragraph-13 of the judgment is reproduced as under: “13. As a result of these considerations, we have arrived at the following conclusions:- 24 2026:HHC:36858-DB (1) That the question of addition of parties under r. 10 of 0.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the court, but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view. of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case; but in some cases, it may raise controversies as to the power of the court, in contra distinction to its inherent jurisdiction, or, in other words, of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in s. 115 of the Code; (2)That in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (3)Where the subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the court is of the opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy ; (4)The cases contemplated in the last proposition have to be determined in accordance with the statutory provisions of ss. 42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act ; (5)In cases covered by those statutory provisions the court is not bound to grant the declaration prayed for, on a mere admission of the claim by the defendant, if the court has reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from the admission; 25 2026:HHC:36858-DB (6)The result of a declaratory decree on the question of status such as in controversy in the instant case affects not only the parties actually before the court but generations to come, and, in view of that consideration, the rule of I present interest' as evolved by case law relating to disputes about property does not apply with full force; and (7)The rule laid down in s. 43 of the Specific Relief Act is not exactly a rule of res judicata. It is narrower in one sense and wider in another.” 28. The primary object of the provisions under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC is to ensure that all the necessary and proper parties are brought, before this Court, so that the dispute can be adjudicated completely and effectively. 27. Judging the facts and circumstances of the Razia Begum’s case (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has taken into consideration all the relevant facts and properly exercised the jurisdiction, vested in it, and by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the findings, so recorded by the learned trial Court, fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’. 28. The learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the plaintiffs, could not point out as to how the order, 26 2026:HHC:36858-DB passed by the learned trial Court is required to be interfered with, by this Court, that too, exercising the limited jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 29. With these observations, the present petition is dismissed. 30. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations, are confined, only, to the disposal of the present application. 31. The pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. 32. The parties to the lis, through their respective counsel, are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 7.9.2025. 33. Record be sent back. (Virender Singh) 31.8.2026 Judge Kalpana