Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2026:HHC:37376 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 553 of 2026
Reserved on: 26.08.2026
Date of Decision: 02.09.2026
Prem Dutt
....Petitioner
Versus
Ranjeet Singh & another
.... Respondent
Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the petitioner : M/s. Madhurika Shekhon Verma, Advocate, through Video conference and Geeta, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Nemo
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The revision petition has been filed against the orders dated 17.08.2026 20.08.2026, passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kandaghat, District Solan,
1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
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2026:HHC:37376 H.P. (learned trial Court), vide which an application for cancellation of non-bailable warrants of arrest and grant of regular bail was rejected and the petitioner was remanded to judicial custody. It has been asserted that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered before the learned trial Court and filed an application for granting regular bail. However, learned trial Court dismissed the application and remanded the petitioner to judicial custody. Hence, the present petition.
2.
The learned trial Court has dismissed the bail application, and the maintainability of a revision against an
order dismissing a bail application was doubtful. Hence,
learned counsel for the petitioner was heard on the maintainability.
3.
Ms Madhurika Sekhon Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that an order refusing bail is a final
order and a revision petition is maintainable against such an
order. She relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath & others vs. State of Haryana & others, 1977 4 SCC 137 and State vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate Appeal (Crl. ) 575- 576 of 2004, decided on 05.05.2004 in support of her submission.
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2026:HHC:37376
4.
I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
5.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137: 1977 SCC (Cri) 585: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 226 that an order granting bail is an interlocutory order against which no revision lies. It was observed at page 142:
6. Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of Section 397 against the historical background of these
facts. Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code may be extracted thus:
“The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.” The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term
“interlocutory order” as appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term “interlocutory order” is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary,
“interlocutory” has been defined as an order other than a final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the
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2026:HHC:37376 term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that
order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory orders so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.” (Emphasis supplied)
6. It was laid down by the Gujarat High Court in Kaushikbhai Balubhai Bavarva v. State of Gujarat 2017 SCC Online Gujarat 2607 that an order granting or refusing bail is an interlocutory order and no revisional jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of such orders. It was observed:
14. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 2 SCC 271, thus:
“It cannot be doubted that the grant or refusal of a bail application is essentially an interlocutory order. There is no finality to such an order for an application for bail can always be
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2026:HHC:37376 renewed from time to time…………………… There is no finality attached to an order of a Designated Court granting or refusing bail. Such application for bail can always be renewed from time to time. That being so, the contention advanced on behalf of the Government that the impugned orders refusing to grant bail were not interlocutory and therefore appealable cannot be accepted.”
15. Relying on the above decision, the Bombay High Court in the case of Mohan alias Mannu Basantani v. State of Maharashtra, 1989 Mah. L.R. 1556 ruled as follows:
“The order granting or refusing bail is an interlocutory order and in view of sub-section (2) of Section 397 the revisional powers could not be exercised in respect of such interlocutory order.”
16.
Similarly, the Bombay High Court in the case of The State of Maharashtra v. Namdeo Raoji, (1991) 1 Mah LR 379, held that orders of bail are essentially interlocutory orders and the revision is barred under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. The above decisions support the contention that an order granting or refusing bail is an interlocutory one, and the reason is that the application for grant of bail can be renewed from time to time. 7. The judgment of NMT Joy Immaculate (supra) does not deal with the bail petition and will not assist the Court in determining the maintainability of the present petition. 8. Thus, the present revision is not maintainable against an application for refusing bail, and the present petition is dismissed as not maintainable. 6
2026:HHC:37376
9. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending application(s), if any. 10. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
02nd September, 2026. (Ravinder)