2026:JHHC:21663 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No. 332 of 2003 Dr. H.P. Narayan, son of late Udit Narayan, resident of Morabadi, Bariyatu Road, P.S. – Bariyatu, District – Ranchi … … Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi 3. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi 4. Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation Ranchi 5. Kuari Toppo, W/o late Baijnath Oraon, resident of Morabadi, P.S. – Bariyatu, District – Ranchi 6. Madho Oraon, son of Bhola Oraon, resident of village – Morabadi, P.S. – Bariyatu, District – Ranchi. … … Respondents With W.P.(C) No. 557 of 2003 Smt. Veena Narayan, wife of Dr. H.P. Narayan, resident of Morabadi, Bariyatu Road, P.S. – Bariyatu, District – Ranchi (substituted v.o.d. 23.01.2023) Dr. Hari Prakash Narayan, son of late Udit Narayan, resident of Morabadi, Bariatu Road, P.O. & P.S. – Bariatu, District Ranchi. … … Petitioner Versus 1. State of Jharkhand 2. Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi 3. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi 4. Special Officer, Ranchi 5. Kuari Toppo, W/o late Baijnath Oraon, resident of Morabadi, P.S. – Bariyatu, District – Ranchi 6. Madho Oraon, son of Bhola Oraon, resident of village – Morabadi, P.S. – Bariyatu, District - Ranchi 7. Sri Bishambhar Prasad Singh, son of late Bindeshwari Prasad Singh, resident of House No.16-9/III, Pratibimb, New Area, Morabadi, District – Ranchi 8. Smt. Kamna Singh, wife of Shri A.K. Singh, resident of Ramna Club Road, P.S. – Sadar, Muzaffarpur, presently residing at New Area Morabadi, P.S. – Bariyatu, District - Ranchi … … Respondents --- CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY --- For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate : Ms. Puja Agarwal, Advocate : Ms. Arushi Agarwal, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. T.N. Jha, Advocate 2026:JHHC:21663 2 For the State : Mrs. Shalini Shahdeo, AC to SC (L&C) I --- CAV on 12.03.2026 Pronounced on 22.07.2026 W.P.(C) No.332 of 2003 has been filed for the following reliefs: “1. That the instant writ application is for the issuance of a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the Revisional Order dated 26.11.2002, Appellate Order dated 31.10.1998 and the Original Order dated 1.3.97 (Annexures -10, 8 and 7 respectively) whereby and whereunder the Respondent Authorities have allowed the restoration application filed by the Respondent No. 5 Under Section 71 A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act (referred to in short as the Act') although, the lands in question are Chhaparbandi ever since 14.3.1943 and all along Chhaparbandi rent was realised and as such the provisions of the Act were not at all applicable, particularly when the restoration application filed by the Respondent No. 5 was itself not maintainable as she is neither the recorded tenant nor a legal heir or successor of the recorded tenant and as such no application for restoration was maintainable at all which was filed after almost 40 years and was therefore, hopelessly barred by limitation; as also for issuance of such other writ, order or direction as may appear just and proper for doing equitable justice to the petitioner.” 2. W.P.(C) No. 557 of 2003 has been filed for the following reliefs: “That the instant writ application is for the issuance of a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the Revisional Order dated 26.11.2002 (Annexure-4), Appellate order dated 31.10.1998 (Annexure-3) and the Original Order dated 1.3.97 (Annexure- 2) whereby and whereunder the Respondent Authorities have allowed the restoration application filed by the Respondent No. 5 Under Section 71 A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act (referred to in short as the Act) although, the lands in question are Chhaparbandi ever since 14.3.1943 and all along Chhaparbandi rent was realised and as such the provisions of the Act were not at all applicable, particularly when, the restoration application filed by the Respondent No. 5 was itself not maintainable as she is neither recorded tenant nor a legal heir or successor of the recorded tenant and as such no 2026:JHHC:21663 3 application for restoration was maintainable at all which was filed after almost 40 years and was therefore, hopelessly barred by limitation; as also for issuance of such other writ, order or direction as may appear just and proper for doing equitable justice to the petitioner.” Arguments of the Petitioner 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that both the writ petitions are identical in nature and they arise out of the same proceedings. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that only two points are involved in the present case: (a) The petition seeking restoration of land filed in the year 1983 was itself barred by limitation, inasmuch as the applicant seeking restoration remained dispossessed of the land for more than 30 years. (b) The nature of land has changed from rayati to chapparbandi. 5. He has submitted that the predecessor in interest of the petitioner acquired the land through sada hukumnama dated 14.03.1943 and the petitioner acquired the same through registered sale deed in the year 1978. Ultimately, mutation was carried out and rent receipt was issued indicating that it was a chhaparbandi rent receipt. 6. The learned counsel submits that the applicant remained dispossessed from the property and the application seeking restoration was filed stating that the owner of the property was of unsound mind during the period from 1976 to 1980 and taking advantage of this situation, the applicant and her family members were dispossessed. 7. The learned counsel has also submitted that the rent receipt showing that it was chhaparbandi itself reveals that the property was chhaparbandi, and therefore, Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act is not applicable to chhaparbandi land. The learned counsel has further submitted that these aspects of the matter have not been 2026:JHHC:21663 4 properly considered by the authorities, and therefore, the impugned order ultimately upholding the order of restoration is fit to be set aside. 8. Since the predecessor in interest of the petitioner acquired the land through sada hukumnama dated 14.03.1943, the applicants seeking restoration of land were dispossessed more than 40 years prior to filing the petition seeking restoration of land, the petition seeking restoration of land filed in the year 1983 was itself barred by limitation, 9. He has also submitted list of dates and written notes of argument the aforesaid points have been elaborated as under. A. Restoration Application under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act was filed by Respondent No. 5 in the year 1983 claiming that Respondent No. 5 had been dispossessed from the land in question between the year 1976-80 by the Petitioners taking advantage of the mental instability of her husband. B. Land in question in the last Revisional Survey Records-of- right was recorded in the name of Bhauwa Oraon and Most. Budhni belonging to ex-landlord, Jamadar Babu Harihar Singh. It is the case of the petitioners that the recorded raiyat surrendered the land in question in favour of the ex- landlord. The ex-landlord granted ‘Chhaparbandi settlement’ in favour of Sheikh Rahman Ali, son of Makbul Ali by way of Hukumnama dated 14.03.1943 after which Sheikh Rehman Ali continuously paid rent to the ex-landlord and thereafter, after vesting of the intermediary interest, rent was paid to the State. C. It is the case of the petitioners that Sheikh Rahman Ali sold 11 katha of the land-in-question by way of registered sale deed dated 09.06.1979 to the Petitioner after Permission from the competent authority under the Urban Land Ceiling (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Lands) Act, 1976 and the mutation was allowed in favour of the Petitioners as follows:- I. Veena Narayan (original writ petitioner in WPC No. 557 of 2003 in Mutation Case No. 765-R-27 of 1979-80 for fixation of Chhaparbandi rent. 2026:JHHC:21663 5 II. Dr. H.P. Narayan, petitioner of WPC No. 332 of 2003 in Mutation Case 673 R-27 of 1978-80 for fixation of Chhaparbandi rent. D. The following list of dates has been mentioned in the written submissions filed by the writ petitioners in both the cases: - List of Dates Land-in- question Plot No. 1123, Khata No. 77, Village Morabadi, Ranchi Revisional Survey Records-of- right 1.22 acres of Land in question in the last Revisional Survey Records-of-right was recorded in the name of Bhauwa Oraon and Most. Budhni belonging to ex- landlord Jamadar Babu Harihar Singh. Unregistered Hukumnama 14.03.1943 The recorded raiyat surrendered the land in question in favour of the ex- landlord. The ex-landlord granted Chhaparbandi settlement in favour of Sheikh Rahman Ali, son of Makbul Ali by way of Hukumnama dated 14.03.1943. Sheikh Rahman Ali paid Chhaparbandi rent to the ex- landlord. After vesting of the intermediary interest, the ex- landlord filed return showing receipt of Rent from Sheikh Rahman Ali. Register-II was also prepared in his name. Two Sale deeds dated 09.06.1979 Sheikh Rahman Ali sold 11 katha of the land-in- question by way of two sale deeds both deeds dated 09.06.1979 to each of the original writ petitioners of these two cases after Permission from the competent authority under the Urban Land Ceiling (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Lands) Act, 1976. Rent receipt in the name of Veena Narayan (Annexure-1 in WPC No. 557 of 2003 and Annexure -3 in W.P.C.No. 332 of 2003 @ Pg 27) Mutation with respect to land involved in WPC no 557 of 2003 in favour of the Petitioner was numbered as Mutation Case No. 673 R-27 of 1978-80 for fixation of Chhaparbandi rent; Mutation in favour of the original petitioner being WPC No. 332 of 2003 was numbered as Mutation Case No.765 R-27 of 1979-80 for fixation of Chhaparbandi rent. SAR Case No. An application under section 71–A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act was filed by respondent No. 5, Kuari 2026:JHHC:21663 6 62/1983-84 Oraon for restoration of the land on the ground that the recorded tenant Bhauwa Oraon had executed registered sale deed dated 9.12.1940 in favour of her father-in-law Harihar Oraon. Deposition of witnesses & Certificate by CO WPC NO. 557 of 2003 A show-cause was filed by the petitioner contending that the application for restoration was not maintainable for being barred by limitation and for that the land is a Chhaparbandi land. In order to prove that the land is Chhaparbandi in nature: • The Petitioner examined witnesses including the Halka Karamchari of the Circle office who proved Register-II and proved that Chhaparbandi rent was being paid by the petitioner. • The Petitioner produced Certificate issued by the concerned Circle Officer stating that the land is Chhaparbandi. WPC No. 332 of 2003 A show-cause was filed by the petitioner contending that the application for restoration was not maintainable for being barred by limitation and for that the land is a Chhaparbandi land. In order to prove that the land is Chhaparbandi in nature: • The Petitioner examined witnesses including the Circle officer who proved Register-II and proved that Chhaparbandi rent was being paid by the petitioner. • The Petitioner produced Certificate issued by the concerned Circle Officer stating that the land is Chhaparbandi. 29.09.1986 An order was passed in SAR Case No. 62/1983-84 allowing the restoration application. 16.12.1991 Order dated 29.09.1986 was challenged by the Petitioner in SAR Appeal No. 151 R-15/1986-87 on the Ground that the land in question is Chhaparbandi which has not been considered by the SAR Court. Case of the applicant of SAR Application was that, that the land is not Chapparbandi and has been recorded in the Khatiyan in the name of adivasis. Also, the land was never converted into Chhaparbandi either by the Khatiyani Raiyat or the purchaser. An order dated 16.12.1991 was passed in SAR Appeal, wherein it was observed that the reasoning given by the 2026:JHHC:21663 7 lower court was in a cursory manner that the claim of Chhaparbandi is not acceptable and does not meet the ends of justice. The matter was remanded back to the lower court for fresh examination in the light of the observation. Intervention of the respondent no.6 Respondent No. 6, Madho Oraon intervened in the matter claiming that he is the son of one of the recorded tenant, i.e. Most. Budhni and therefore the restoration of land should be granted in his favour. Madho Oraon asserted that Title Suit bearing TS No. 151/72 was instituted by the husband of the Respondent No. 5 against Respondent No. 6, wherein it was prayed that khas possession be delivered to the husband of the Respondent No. 5 after deciding the right, title and interest in his favour. The Title Suit was allowed vide judgment dated 16.06.1977. The Respondent No. 5 has claimed to have been dispossessed on 23.11.1971 by the Executing Court for execution of the judgment passed in partition suit bearing P.S No. 50/1967 filed by the Respondent No. 6. The schedule of Property in the Title suit was 0.77 acres of land on Khewat No. 2, Khata No. 77 Plot No. 1499 which is different from the land in question. A Title Appeal bearing Title Appeal No. 117/77 was also preferred against the judgment in TS No. 151/72, wherein it has been upheld that the land in question has been sold to the father-in-law of respondent No. 5 vide order dated 21.06.1978. The Petitioners were never made party in such civil suit or appeal and had no knowledge about the same. 01.03.1997 (Annexure- 2@ Pg 28) An order dated 01.03.1997 was passed in SAR Case No. 62/1983-84 after remand, in violation of the order dated 16.12.1991 passed in SAR Appeal No. 151 R- 15/1986-87. The claim of the Petitioner of the land being Chhaparbandi was not considered by the SAR Court. The date of dispossession was not proved by the Respondent No. 5 and the date of dispossession was assumed by the Special Officer, SAR Court to be between the year 1976 and 1980 on the mere assertion made by the Respondent No. 5. The order of restoration was passed without considering the submissions and assertions made by the Petitioner. 31.10.1998 (Annexure- 3) in WPC No. 557 of Three Appeals were preferred against the order dated 01.03.1997. Appeal preferred by the Petitioner was registered as SAR Appeal No. 76 R-15/1997-98. A common order was passed in appeals on 31.10.1998 2026:JHHC:21663 8 2003 and (Annexure- 8) in WPC No. 332 of 2003 wherein all the appeals were dismissed and restoration was allowed in favour of Respondent No. 5 on the ground that no valid documents regarding surrender of land and settlement of land through Sada Hukamnama were brought on record and also on the basis of judgement passed by the civil court in title suit. The findings given by the SAR Court regarding dispossession was simply accepted by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi without giving any finding of its own. SAR Revision Case No. 157/98 SAR Revision Case No. 158/98 WPC . No. 557 of 2003 SAR Revision Case No. 157/98 was filed by the Petitioner against the order dated 31.10.1998. In the SAR Revision Case, one Vishwambar Prasad Singh (Respondent No. 7) & Kamna Singh (Respondent No. 8) filed intervention application on the ground that they have purchased 6 kathas and 5 kathas of lands respectively from Smt. Veena Narayan. W.P.C. no. 332 of 2003 SAR Revision Case No. 158/98 was filed by the Petitioner against the order dated 31.10.1998. Written Argument was filed by the Petitioner in the SAR Revision Case annexing many documents with respect to the land in question including rent receipts granted by the ex-landlord to the predecessor in interest of the petitioner and subsequently by the state. 26.11.2002- (common order in both the writ petitions) (Annexure- 4) in WPC No. 557 of 2003 and (Annexure- 10) in WPC No. 332 of 2003 Order dated 26.11.2002 was passed in SAR Revision Case on the ground that no surrender deed was ever produced and the entire story of surrender and settlement was concocted to grab the land. The order of restoration was passed mechanically without even discussion of the date of dispossession of the Respondent No. 5. I. In the Counter Affidavit filed in W.P.(C) No. 557 of 2003 by the Respondent No. 7 & 8, the Respondent has further brought on record: i. Sada Hukumnama dated 14.03.1942-Annexure-A. 2026:JHHC:21663 9 ii. Rent Receipts granted in favour of SK Rehman Ali, predecessor in interest of the Petitioner-Annexure-A/1 to A/4. II. The Present Writ Petitions have been filed against the order dated 26.11.2002 passed in SAR Revision Case No. 157/1998 and 158/ 1998, wherein the revision preferred by the Petitioners have been rejected and the land has been directed to be restored in favour of Respondent No. 5. Submissions (i) Date of dispossession of Respondent No. 5 was not proved and the burden of proof lied on the person claiming restoration Restoration Application under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act was filed by Respondent No. 5 in the year 1983 claiming that Respondent No. 5 had been dispossessed from the land in question between the year 1976-80 by the Petitioner and others taking advantage of the mental instability of her husband. However, in the Counter affidavit filed by Respondent No. 5, the date of dispossession has been mentioned to be 1981-82. In T.S. No. 151/72, where the husband of Respondent No. 5 had filed a Title Suit against the Respondent No. 6 for recovery of khas possession after declaring the right, title and interest in his favour, the husband of the Respondent No. 5 has claimed to be dispossessed on 23.11.1971 by the Executing Court for execution of the judgment passed in partition suit bearing P.S No. 50/1967, filed by the Respondent No. 6. It is important to note that the date of possession/dispossession and also the mode of possession/dispossession have important bearing in the matter and the same has not been disclosed by the Respondent No. 5 in a proper manner. The date of dispossession was not proved by Respondent No. 5 and the date of dispossession was assumed by the Special Officer, SAR Court to be between the year 1976 and 1980 on the 2026:JHHC:21663 10 mere assertions made by Respondent No. 5 and the order dated 01.03.1997 was passed in SAR Case No. 62/1983-84 by the Special Officer, SAR Court for restoration of the land in question to Respondent No. 5. Further, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi also simply accepted the findings given by the SAR Court regarding dispossession without giving any finding of its own in the order dated 31.10.998 in SAR Appeal No. 76 R-15/1997-98. Further, the revisional authority while allowing the restoration gave no consideration to the date or manner of dispossession. The Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court in Lagni mundain v. State of Jharkhand & Ors. [ W.P.(C) No. 668 of 2018] has held that : “37… It is important to note that the date of possession/dispossession and also the mode of possession/dispossession have important bearing in the matter. In this connection, the previous orders passed in SAR cases for restoration of the land involved in this case filed by the vendor of applicant Arjun Munda and/or predecessor in interest of the vendor against or in favour of the petitioners/predecessor in interest of the petitioners and also the execution of such orders, if any, are also required to be considered. Although in the initial application as perused by this Court and also by the learned counsel for the parties, no specific statement has been made by Arjun Munda regarding the date and manner of dispossession but before the authorities much was argued by both the parties, but no clear finding has been recorded with regards to the date and manner of possession/dispossession of Arjun Munda from the disputed property. The records received from the office of the Commissioner reveals that the records which have been submitted before this Court by the respondent State were not produced for perusal and consideration as a result of which the Commissioner in the impugned order has straight away reached at the conclusion after recording the arguments of the respective parties without deliberating upon the points raised by the parties and without considering the judgements relied upon2025:JHHC:20479 by them in the revision petition and also during the course of arguments. The impugned order passed by the learned Commissioner is non speaking on many aspects of the matter, both factual and legal which 2026:JHHC:21663 11 has seriously prejudiced the cause of justice and hence the impugned order calls for interference.” It is further submitted that the burden of proof of the date of dispossession lies on the person claiming to recover possession. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.S. Nanji and Company v. Jatashankar Dossa & Ors.[ AIR 1961 SC 1474] has held that : “11…A person having the right to the possession of a property wrongfully taken from him by another can file a suit to recover the said specific moveable property or for compensation therefore within three years from the date when lie first learns in whose possession it is. Obviously where a person has a right to sue within three years from the date of his coming to know of a, certain fact, it is for him to prove that he had the knowledge of the said fact on a particular date, for the said fact would be within his peculiar knowledge. That apart, s. 3 of the Limitation Act makes it obligatory on a court to dismiss a suit barred by limitation, although limitation has not been set up as a defence, indicating thereby that it is the duty of a plaintiff to establish, at any rate prima facie, that the suit is within time. It is the obligation of the plaintiff to satisfy the court that his action is not barred by lapse of time: see Lalchand Marwari v. Mahanth Rampur Gir (1) and Rajah Sahib Perhlad Sein v. Maharajah Rajender Kishore Sing (2) . Looking from a different perspective, we arrive at the same result. Under the Evidence Act there is an essential distinction between the phrase "burden of proof" as a matter of law and pleading and as a matter of adducing evidence. Under s. 101 of the Evidence Act, the burden in the former sense is upon the party who comes to court to get a decision on the existence of certain facts which he asserts. That burden is constant throughout the trial; but the burden to prove in the sense of adducing evidence shifts from time to time having regard to the evidence adduced by one party or the other or the presumption of fact or law raised in favour of one or the other. In the present case the burden of proof in the former sense is certainly on the respondents. But the question is whether they have adduced evidence which had the effect of shifting the onus of proof to the appellant.” (ii) The Restoration Application has been filed beyond reasonable time. 2026:JHHC:21663 12 The restoration Case has been filed by the Respondent No. 5 in the year 1983 whereas the recorded raiyat surrendered the land in question in favour of the ex- landlord and the ex-landlord had settled the land in favour of the vendor of the Petitioner on 14.03.1943 who had further sold the land to the Petitioners vide sale deed dated 09.06.1979. The Restoration Application has been filed after lapse of almost 40 years. In the light of contentions made above, the following Judgments are being relied on: (a) Jai Mangal Oraon v Mira Nayak & Ors. [2000(5) SCC 141], para 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “16…Merely because Section 71A commence with the words If at any time .. it cannot be taken to mean that those power could be exercised without any point of time limit, as in this case after nearly about forty years unmindful of the rights of parties acquired in the meantime under the ordinary law and the Law of Limitation.” (b) Situ Sahu & Ors. v State of Jharkhand & Ors [2004(8) SCC 340] The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words "at any time" in section 71A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under Section 71A it would be futile to contend that the period of limitation under Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio- economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third 2026:JHHC:21663 13 party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay. …. 14…. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal, we are not satisfied that the Special officer exercised his powers under Section 71A within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of 40 years is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. ” (c) Fulchand Munda v State of Bihar & Ors [2008(14) SCC 774] The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “15…..That apart, although there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercising the power under Section 71A by the Deputy Commissioner, the party affected is called upon to approach the appropriate authority or the power has to be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner within a reasonable period of time. The gap of more than 50 years for challenging the transaction of 1922 cannot be said to be a reasonable time for exercising the power even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation.” (iii) The Land-in-question is Chapparbandi and Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act does not apply. The following documents are being relied upon to show that the land in question is Chapparbandi: Hukumnama dated 14.03.1943 (Annexure-A of the Counter Affidavit file by Respondent No. 7 & 8) granted Chhaparbandi Settlement to the Vendor of the Petitioner; And rent receipts were issued subsequently to the vendor of the Petitioner and thereafter to the Petitioner after purchase of the land vide sale deed dated 09.06.1979. 2026:JHHC:21663 14 The Full Bench of the Hon’ble Patna High Court in Most. Ugni Devi & Anr. v. Chowa Mahto & Ors.[ AIR 1968 Pat 302 (FB)] has upheld the judgment passed by the Subordinate Court wherein it was held that: “By virtue of sada hukumnama raiyati title cannot be conferred but a sada hukumnama coupled with rent receipts or even an oral settlement coupled with rent receipts would confer good title.” The Judgment passed in Ugni Devi has been relied by the Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court in Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Anr. v. Ramakant Roy & Ors. [ S.A No. 382 of 2018] has held that : “47. This Court is of the considered view that the learned 1st appellate court has not committed any perversity in holding that the plaintiffs had title over the suit property and the title has not been declared on the basis of Sada Hukumnama rather based on other materials on record establishing the nature of possession of Devrani Devi as a raiyat. The findings of the learned 1st appellate court is in consonance with the full bench judgement passed in the case of Mt.Ugni (supra) when seen particularly in the light of the judgement passed in the suit decided under section 87 of the CNT Act.” i. Rent receipt (Annexure-1) was issued in the name of the wife of the Petitioner for the same khata and Plot and the nature of the land is shown as “Chapparbandi”. ii. The Petitioner examined witnesses in SAR Case No.62/1983-84 including the Halka Karmchari who proved Register-II and proved that Chapparbandi rent was being paid by the petitioner. iii. Certificate issued by Circle Officer, Town Anchal, Ranchi stating that the Chapparbandi rent is being paid by the Petitioner. 2026:JHHC:21663 15 In the light of contentions made above, the following Judgments are being relied on: (a) Ashwini Kumar Roy. v State of Bihar [1988(36) BLJR 180] The Hon’ble High Court of Patna held that: “4..It cannot be disputed that if a land is Chhapparbandi, no proceeding under Section 71- A of the Act can be initiated for restoration of that land. If the land was Chhapparbandi, as alleged by the petitioner, it will be governed by the Transfer of Property Act and not by the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act.” (b) Anupama Roy v State of Bihar & Ors [2003 SCC Online Jhar 380] The Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand held that: “8. From the sale deed dated 29.5.1959 by which the petitioner purchased the land in question it appears that there is a recital in the deed that the land is chapperbandi and chapperbandi rent has been paid vide various chapperbandi receipts referred in the sale deed. In my opinion, therefore, the findings recorded by the appellate authority and the revisional authority is based on no evidence, rather, on extraneous considerations ignoring series of documents referred by the Special Officer in his order while recording a finding that the land was converted into chapperbandi in 1953. Arguments of the private respondent 10. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondent/the original applicant has opposed the prayer and submitted that the private respondent/the original applicant, has purchased the property by virtue of a registered sale deed of the year 1940 and remained in possession. He has submitted that since the property was already transferred by way of registered sale deed way back in 1940, there was no question of any surrender of property and subsequent settlement that too by sada hukumnama dated 14.03.1943. 11. The learned counsel has also submitted that the vendor of the petitioner had no right, title, interest and possession over the property, 2026:JHHC:21663 16 and therefore, no rent receipt in the name of vendor of the petitioner was produced before the authorities. The learned counsel submits that there is no question of the petition being barred by limitation inasmuch as the applicant and his family members were dispossessed sometimes during the period from 1976 to 1980. 12. He has submitted that there is no question of any chhaparbandi in agricultural land and chhaparbandi essentially means a house property and non-agricultural land, and under such circumstances, there is no question of issuance of rent receipt in connection with chhaparbandi property. 13. He has also submitted that a specific order was passed by this Court asking the petitioner to bring on record, the record of rights, showing that the property was chhaparbandi as per record of rights as argued by them, but no such affidavit/document has been filed by the writ petitioner. He submits that merely because the revenue authority has stated that the property was chhaparbandi, the same has no bearing in the matter. 14. The learned counsel has also submitted that under the provisions of Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, no period of limitation as such has been provided and the proviso to Section 71A provides that if the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of 6 months from the date of the order. 15. 15. The learned counsel has also submitted that it has further been provided that when the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building before coming into force of Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may notwithstanding any of the provisions of the Act, validates such transfer where the transferee, either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion thereof as the case may be, for equivalent value and pay adequate compensation. 2026:JHHC:21663 17 16. The learned counsel has submitted that there is no cogent material on record to show that the property was chhaparbandi and the plea that the property was chhaparbandi has been rejected by the learned authority. 17. He has submitted that there is no perversity in the impugned orders, and therefore, the same do not call for any interference. 18. The private respondent representing the original applicant has also filed written notes of argument in this case and has relied upon the following judgements: i. 1983 BLT (Rep.) 111 (Full Bench) [Amrendra Nath Dutta and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and others] paragraph 10, 11, 13, 65 and 66 ii. 1992 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 77 [Pandey Oraon Vs. Ram Chander Sahu and Ors.] Paragraph 6, 7 and 8. iii. 2023 (1) JBCJ 18 (SC) [Kamla Neti (dead) through Lrs. Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer & Ors.] paragraph 7.1 19. The learned counsel submits that for the purposes of claiming chhaparbandi, the actual structure should be standing over the property which is used for residential purpose. He submits that there is no such material on record to show that the property was chhaparbandi. For the aforesaid proposition, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgement reported in- (a) 1986 SCC OnLine Patna 153 [Murlidhar Gupta and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Others] paragraph 10; (b) 1989 SCC OnLine Patna 250 [Akhileshwar Prasad Srivastava & Ors. Vs. Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi & Ors.] paragraphs 15, 16 and 20; (c) 2006 SCC OnLine Jhar 1199 [Subhash Singh Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.] paragraph 13. Arguments of the State. 20. The learned counsel for the State has submitted that the impugned orders do not call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2026:JHHC:21663 18 Findings of this Court. 21. In both the writ petitions, the impugned order is the same. 22. The original order was passed by respondent no.4 under Section 71A of Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act whereby the land in question has been directed to be restored to Respondent no.5. The petitioner has lost in all the three courts. The petitioners [Dr. H.P. Narayan and Smt. Veena Narayan (now deceased)] have challenged the original order dated 01.03.1997, the appellate order dated 31.10.1998 and the revisional order dated 26.11.2002. 23. Initially an order of restoration of land in favour of respondent no.5 was passed on 29.09.1986 which was subject matter of appeal and the appellate court remanded the matter. The learned appellate court while remanding the matter for fresh consideration by S.A.R. Court vide order dated 26.12.1991, observed that the evidences have not been properly dealt with by the S.A.R. Court and it was not in dispute that if the land is chhaparbandi, no proceeding under Section 71 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act (CNT Act) could be initiated for restoration of land. The court observed that the SAR court had discarded the claim of chhaparbandi summarily and for the ends of justice, it was necessary that the claim of chhaparbandi character of the land should be examined minutely after giving opportunity to both the parties both oral and documentary. The court also observed that the Baijnath Oraon (husband of respondent no.5) had now recovered his normal state of mind. 24. Upon remand, the SAR court issued notice to both the parties and the fresh order reveals that the evidences were produced. The learned S.A.R. Court referred to the persons, whose oral evidences were recorded and observed that from the side of Veena Narayan, rent receipt of municipality pursuant to Mutation Case No.151 of 1979 and 537 of 1979 and the correction slip of 23.01.1980 pursuant to sale deed dated 30.03.1976 were produced. Additional written statement was filed by the petitioners on 09.08.1993 wherein they stated that the ex-zamindar had executed sada hukumnama converting the property involved in this case as chhaparbandi in favour of Sk. Rahman and it 2026:JHHC:21663 19 was Sk. Rahman, who sold the property in their favour through registered deed. The learned SAR court recorded that the petitioners claimed that prior to execution of registered sale deeds in the year 1979 in their favour, the property was converted into chhaparbandi. 25. The S.A.R. Court held in SAR Case No.62 of 1983-84 dated 01.03.1997 (impugned order) as under: - a. Once the property was already transferred by registered deed on 09.12.1940, there was no occasion to have any settlement by the ex-zamindar in favour of Sk. Rahman by sada hukumnama dated 14.03.1942. Further, the learned court has also recorded a finding that the property was already sold vide registered deed in the year 1940 by the recorded tenant, and therefore, there was no question of surrender of the land by recorded tenant in favour of ex-landlord or of any chhaparbandi settlement by the ex-landlord in favour of Sk. Rahman. b. When the property was transferred in favour of the petitioners at that point of time, the husband of the applicant Baijnnath Oraon was not in right state of mind and also recorded a finding that the petitioners had prepared forged documents to get the property, and therefore, the registered deeds, through which the petitioners are claiming to have purchased the property from Sk. Rahman, cannot be said to be valid document. c. The property was transferred in favour of the petitioners and others during the period from 1976 -1980 and the applicant seeking restoration of land was dispossessed from the property during this period and ultimately passed the order of restoration of land in favour of the applicant (respondent no.5). 26. So far as the appellate court is concerned, all the appeals which were filed by Madho Oraon, son of late Bhola Oraon, Dr. H.P. Narayan, Smt. Veena Narayan and Smt. Urmila Verma have been dismissed by common judgement dated 31.10.1998 (impugned) wherein it has been recorded as under: - 2026:JHHC:21663 20 I. The appellate court has recorded that the land in question stands recorded in Revisional Survey Record of Rights in the name of Bhauwa Oraon, son of Paio Oraon and Most. Budhni Orain, wife of Sonia Oraon each having equal share. II. Pursuant to order of remand, notices were issued and during course of hearing, Madho Oraon, son of Bhola Oraon filed an objection before the learned court praying to be impleaded as first party (applicant), but the learned SAR court vide order dated 04.11.1994, rejected the claim of Madho Oraon to be made the first party. Against which, Madho Oraon filed Appeal No.1 R - 15/95-96 before the Additional Collector, Ranchi. The Additional Collector, Ranchi vide order dated 28.06.1996 directed the SAR Officer to hear Madho Oraon and give an opportunity to prove his stand. Consequently, notice was issued to the applicant-Madho Oraon in compliance of the order. Case of Madho Oraon before appellate court III. It was the case of Madho Oraon that he, along with his brother Bodho Oraon, were the only surviving legal heirs of the recorded raiyats and Kuari Toppo (respondent no.5) was a stranger to the family of recorded raiyat and she had no legal right to claim restoration of land in question. It was his case that under Section 71A of CNT Act, only the legal heirs of the recorded raiyats are entitled for restoration of land. It was also asserted that Kuari Toppo or her husband or her father-in-law were never in possession of the land in question by virtue of alleged registered deed of sale dated 09.12.1940, which was never given effect to at any point of time, and therefore, she cannot claim restoration of land by virtue of the registered deed dated 09.12.1940. It was asserted that the land in question was required to be restored to Madho Oraon by the SAR Officer vide his order dated 29.04.1997 in SAR case no.220 of 1993-94, and as such, the subsequent proceeding for restoration of the same land by the applicant namely Kuari 2026:JHHC:21663 21 Toppo was not maintainable and the same was hit by the principles of res judicata. It was also argued by Madho Oraon that the other respondents claimed that the recorded tenant surrendered the land to the ex-landlord and the ex-landlord after the surrender got the land converted into chhaparbandi and made sada settlement in favour of Sk. Rahman and they had purchased the land from Sk. Rahman during the period from 1976-1980 by virtue of registered sale deed. It was argued by Madho Oraon that no document regarding surrender or chhaparbandi was filed and there was contravention of Sections 72 and 46 of the CNT Act and Section 71A of CNT Act was well applicable for restoration of land to Madho Oraon. Case of the petitioners before the appellate court IV. So far as the petitioners [Dr. H.P. Narayan and Smt. Veena Narayan] and another person namely Smt. Urmila Verma is concerned, they argued that the recorded tenant Bhauwa Oraon surrendered the land in question to the ex-landlord and on 14.03.1942, the ex-landlord settled the land in favour of Sk. Rahman Ali by sada hukumnama with chapparbandi right and permission of the Deputy Commissioner was not necessary at that point of time. V. It was also argued that the land was chapparbandi in nature and hence provision of Section 71A of CNT Act was not applicable and by virtue of the registered sale deed during the period from 1976-1980, Sk. Rahman sold the land to Dr. H.P. Narayan, Smt. Veena Narayan and Urmila Verma through registered sale deeds in the year 1976-1980 and they got their name mutated in the Circle Office and were paying rent to the State as well as municipality and receipts were granted. VI. It was also submitted by the aforesaid 3 purchasers of land from Sk. Rahman Ali that the Karamchari of town anchal brought Register II and gave evidence before the SAR Officer and chapparbandi entry along with mutation cases were 2026:JHHC:21663 22 proved and the restoration petition was filed after lapse of 40 years from the settlement date as such it was time barred. VII. It was asserted that as per Oraon customary law, the land cannot be restored to females and they had only limited ownership and the registered sale deed of the year 1940 executed in favour of Harihar Oraon, the father-in-law of Kuari Toppo was sham and was never acted upon and no rent receipt either by ex-landlord or by the State of Bihar was filed by Kuari Toppo. VIII. It was also argued that Madho Oraon was not the son of Most. Budhni and Madho Oraon and his brothers were imposters and strangers to the family. IX. It was also asserted that after obtaining permission by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi under Urban Land Ceiling Act, the vendor Sk. Rahman sold the land to the 3 persons by registered sale deeds and this permission was not considered by the SAR court. X. It was also asserted that Kuari Toppo did not depose herself or did not examine herself as witness and the learned SAR officer was wrong in not relying upon the return submitted by ex- landlord which clearly showed that the lands were chhaparbandi. Case of respondent no.5 before appellate court XI. On the other hand, it was the specific case of Kuari Toppo that the recorded tenant Bhauwa Oraon sold the land in question along with other lands to Harihar Oraon by virtue of registered sale deed dated 09.12.1940, who had one son namely Baijnath Oraon and Kuari Toppo is the wife of Baijnath Oraon. It was asserted that Baijnath Oraon was of unsound mind and his son was minor and as such restoration petition was filed by Kuari Toppo. XII. The right, title of Baijnath Oraon, the husband of Kuari Toppo was finally decided on 16.06.1977 in Title Suit No.151/35 of 72-75 in respect of land under Khata No.77 and delivery of 2026:JHHC:21663 23 possession of the land was given to Baijnath Oraon and in the title suit, the Deputy Commissioner was also a defendant. Title Appeal No.117 of 1977 was dismissed on 21.06.1978. XIII. It was submitted that the claim that land was chapparbandi was false and frivolous and the petition for restoration of land by Kuari Toppo was not barred by limitation as the settlement of land as claimed is based on sada patta and Budhni Oroan had already lost her case in civil court. Findings of appellate court. XIV. The learned appellate court recorded a finding that the petitioners could not explain whether the land in question has been surrendered or not, as such sada hukumnama dated 14.03.1942 could not be recognized, when the lands have been transferred by registered deed dated 09.12.1940 by the recorded tenant to Harihar Oraon, the father-in-law of the applicant seeking restoration and at that point of time, the required permission of the Deputy Commissioner was not necessary and on that basis of sale deed, rent receipts were issued to the father-in-law of the applicant. The learned appellate court also recorded that the case of Madho Oraon was not acceptable as his status as descendant of the recorded tenant was not accepted by the competent court in the title suit. XV. The court recorded a clear finding that the lands were purchased by father-in-law of the applicant in the year 1940 and by fraudulent method, the applicant was dispossessed taking advantage of unsound mind of her husband during the period from 1976-1980 and as such the possession of the purchasers of land during the period from 1976 to 1980 was in contravention of Section 46 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and the learned SAR court rightly passed the order for restoration of the land in favour of Kuari Toppo, the daughter-in-law of Harihar Oraon, who in turn was purchaser of the property vide sale deed dated 09.12.1940. 2026:JHHC:21663 24 XVI. 2026:JHHC:21663 24 XVI. The learned court ultimately recorded that the orders passed by the SAR court in Case No.220 of 1993-94 on 29.04.1997 had no relevance as the land involved in the said case was different from the case at hand and further the order dated 29.04.1997 was of a later date and the present impugned order was dated 01.03.1997. The court also recorded that no objection recorded under Urban Land Ceiling Act, has also no relevance in the case. Ultimately, the court recorded the following findings: “Considering the above facts and circumstances, and in absence of valid document regarding surrender of land in question by recorded tenant and also settlement of land through sada hukumnaa with chapparbandi rights dated 14.03.1942 by ex-landlord to Sk. Rahman and subsequent transfers does not give any right to consider on point of time-barred and it clearly contravenes the provisions of CNT Act. Moreso, the verdict given by civil court regarding right, title and interest of the land on the basis of registered deed dated 9.12.1940 in favour of Kuari Toppo. I do not find any reason to interfere with the orders dated 1.03.1997 passed by learned lower court and as such, the above three appeals are dismissed.” 27. The appellate order was challenged in revision before the learned Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi in S.A.R. Revision No.157 and 158 of 1998 which was also dismissed. The order reveals that Madho Oraon also filed revision and his case was numbered as Revision Case No.101/99. The revisional court recorded the following findings after recording and considering the case of the respective parties: - “I am of the view that since petitioners and interveners are claiming the land on the basis of Sada Hukurnama the petitioner of S. A. R. case no. 157/98 and 158/98 and interveners never produced any surrender deed even they have not disclosed date of surrender. Thus, the entire story of surrender and settlement is false and concocted only to grab the land of the raiyats who are member of Schedule Tribes. The claim of land being Chhaparbandi also was not proved by any document. There in 2026:JHHC:21663 25 C.Os report but he was not examined on oath and so his certificate is void ab-initio. Intervener has purchased the land when the case was still subjudice in the courts, what prevented them from not appearing in the lower court. And they have come before the Revision Court Straight away. So the land should be restored to the bonafide tenants. O.P. No. 2 Kuari Toppo (158/98 and 101/99) claims that since her husband Baijnath was not capable she was doing everything, Baijnath also died recently on 10.9.01 leaving behind 3 sons. The verdict dated 21.6.78 in T.S.No. 117/77, given by Civil Court regarding right title and interest of the land on the basis of registered deed dated 9.12.40 is in favour of Baijnath Oraon, (husband of Kuari Toppo). Thus, the disputed land is restored to O.P. No.2 i.e. Kuari Toppo.” 28. The 1st point raised by the petitioner is that the nature of land has changed from rayati to chapparbandi, and therefore, the petition seeking restoration of land under Section 71 A of CNT Act is not maintainable and 2nd point is that the petition seeking restoration of land was filed after expiry of 40 years from date of dispossession and hence the petition was barred by limitation. 29. The records of this case reveals that the land in question was purchased by the father-in-law of respondent no.5 by registered sale deed dated 09.12.1940. The case of the petitioner is that the recorded tenant surrendered the land in favour of ex-zamindar, who in turn settled the land with Sk. Rahman Ali by way of sada hukumnama on 14.03.1943 (unregistered) and the said settlement was chhaparbandi settlement. It was their case that since 14.03.1943, the property remained chhaparbandi and all along chhaparbandi rent was realized and as such the provision of CNT Act is not applicable and their vendor sold chhaparbandi land to them. It is also their case that chhaparbandi rent receipt was issued to the petitioner also after they purchased the property in the year 1978 by registered deed from Sk. Rahman Ali. It was also their case that at the time of vesting, ex- landlord filed return showing chhaparbandi rent from Sk. Rahman Ali in lieu of settlement of aforesaid properties and accordingly Register 2026:JHHC:21663 26 II was prepared showing payment of chhaparbandi rent and Sk. Rahman Ali continued in possession on payment of chhaparbandi rent to the State. 30. Since the petitioner claimed that in record of rights (register-II) the property was recorded as chhaparbandi, an order dated 01.07.2025 was passed by this Court directing the petitioner to bring on record the relevant Khatian from where it could be seen that the record of rights shows that the property was chhaparbandi. The said order reads as follows: “In view of the specific claim made on behalf of the petitioners that the land in question was recorded as Chhaparbandi land, learned counsel for the petitioners is directed to bring on record the relevant Khatiyan to show and it was entered as such in the Record of Rights. Put up these cases on 21.07.2025.” Thereafter, on 22.08.2025, the following order was passed: “Learned counsel for the petitioners prays for two weeks more time to comply the order dated 01.07.2025. Considering the said prayer, put up these cases under the same heading after two weeks.” On 12.01.2026, the following order was passed: “1. No supplementary affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners bringing on record the relevant Khatiyan suggesting that the land in question was recorded as Chhaparbandi. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that though a copy of the revisional survey record of rights has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the W.P. (C) No. 332 of 2003, however, the petitioners have not been able to obtain a copy of Khatiyan so as to suggest that the land in question was recorded as Chhaparbandi. Under the said circumstance, she prays for two weeks’ time to file an interlocutory application in this regard. 2026:JHHC:21663 27 3. Considering the said prayer, put up these cases under the same heading after two weeks.” On 09.03.2026, the following order was passed: “Learned counsel for the petitioner and private respondents are present. 2. With consent of the learned counsels appearing for the parties and by way of last indulgence, post these cases on 12th March, 2026 to be taken up as the 1st case at 02:15 p.m.” 31. No supplementary affidavit was filed to bring on record the Record of Rights showing that the land was recorded as chhaparbandi land. Even the Annexure - 1 does not reveal that the property was chhaparbandi. The petitioners have relied upon the report of the Circle Officer, but the same is of no consequences when the record of rights does not record the property as chhaparbandi as claimed by the petitioners. The report of the Circle Officer has been rejected by the learned courts/authorities by citing reasons. 32. Thus, the petitioners have completely failed to prove their case that the property was recorded as chhaparbandi in Records of Rights in Register II and were settled through sada hukumnama way back in 1942 by way of chhaparbandi settlement. Mere one rent receipt showing chhaparbandi rent in favour of the petitioners does not have any relevance if it was not backed by similar rent receipts showing chhaparbandi rent right from 1943 i.e. the date of issuance of sada hukumnama till the date of transfer of property in the names of the petitioners in the year 1978. 33. This Court has gone through the judgments passed by the initial court, appellate court as well as the revisional court, who have completely discarded the theory of the property being chhaparbandi by detailed judgments as quoted/discussed above. In such circumstances, the judgements cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no petition under Section 71A of the CNT Act can be filed once the property is chhaparbandi, are of no consequences as the petitioner has miserably failed to prove before the SAR Court, 2026:JHHC:21663 28 Appellate Court and the Revisional authority and also before this Court that the property involved in these cases were chhaparbandi. 34. This Court is sitting in writ jurisdiction, that too against 3 orders passed by 3 authorities, who have given concurrent findings rejecting the claim of the petitioner that the property was chhaparbandi and there being no perversity or illegality in appreciating the materials on record, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the point of limitation 35. It was the specific case of the applicant that her husband was mentally unstable during the period 1976 to 1980 and taking advantage of this, the registered deeds were executed and they were dispossessed. The petitioners had purchased the property vide registered deed of 1979. Even the courts have found that husband of the applicant was mentally unstable during the period 1976 to 1980 and recorded a finding that the applicant was dispossessed from the property in the year 1976-1980. In the 1st round, the appellate court while remanding the case before the SAR Court also observed that by now the husband of respondent no.5 has recovered from his unstable mental situation. Meaning thereby, it stands established from the records that the husband of the applicant was having unstable mental status during the period from 1976-1980, when they were dispossessed from the property. There are consistent findings recorded by the court that the applicants were dispossessed from the property during the period from 1976-1980. There is no cogent reason much less material on record to disturb this finding of fact in writ jurisdiction. The petitioners have completely failed to establish, as argued by them, that the applicants were dispossessed from the property by virtue of surrender and settlement by sada hukumnama (unregistered) in favour of the vendor of the petitioners way back in 1943. Rather, the father-in-law of respondent no.5 had purchased the property in the year 1940 by way of registered sale deed. Once the property was already sold, there was no question of any subsequent 2026:JHHC:21663 29 surrender and settlement after 1940, as discussed above, in the context of the claim of the land being ‘chhaparbandi’. Further, there is no materials on record to suggest that the vendor of the petitioners ever remained in possession of the property. Accordingly, the case of the petitioners that respondent no.5 was dispossessed from the property way back in the year 1943, that is prior to 30 years from the date of filing application seeking restoration of land in the year 1983 which is barred by limitation, is completely devoid of any merit. The applicant has clearly mentioned about the date and manner of dispossession which was within 8 years from the date of filing the application for restoration. The judgements cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the point of limitation does not help the petitioners in any manner whatsoever. The point raised by the petitioners that the application seeking restoration of land was barred by limitation is rejected. 36. It is important to note that the revisional court clearly recorded a finding that the vendor of the petitioners had no title over the property. The story of surrender by the recorded tenant in favour of Zamindar, and then settlement through sada hukumnama in favour of Sk. Rahman (vendor of the petitioner), was completely disbelieved. The Court clearly rejected the story of surrender and settlement and held it to be false and concocted only to grab the raiyati land of the applicant, who was the member of the Schedule Tribe. It was also held that the claim of land being chhaparbandi was also not proved by any document. The court further recorded that there is one C.O. report, but the Circle Officer was not examined on oath so his certificate was of no consequence. The title with respect to the suit property was already decided in Title Suit No. 151/72 and in Title Appeal No. 117/77 regarding right, title and interest on the basis of registered deed dated 09.12.1940 executed in favour of Baijnath Oraon, the husband of the applicant (respondent no.5 herein) and ultimately dismissed the revision. 37. The claim of Madho Oraon, has been completely rejected by well speaking order by learned appellate court. Against which, he filed 2026:JHHC:21663 30 separate revision numbered as Revision Case No.101 of 1999, and that was dismissed by the revisional court. Against the Revision Case No.101 of 1999, he has not preferred any writ petition before this Court. Otherwise also, the reason assigned by the court to reject his claim is well reasoned order. 38. This Court finds that all the three authorities have rightly dealt with every aspect of the matter and this Court is of the view that there is no perversity or illegality in the impugned orders when seen in the light of the two points as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 39. Hence, both the writ petitions are dismissed. 40. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed. (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Date of pronouncement:22.07.2026 Saurav/- Date of Uploading:23.07.2026