5WP-16555-23.DOC Prajakta Vartak IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.16555 OF 2023 Ramu Laxman Pawde Decd. Thr. LR. ...Petitioner vs. The District Collector, Pune & Ors. ...Respondents _______ Mr. Nitin P. Deshpande with Mr. Santosh P. Kurade, for Petitioner. Ms. Neha Bhide, Govt. Pleader with Ms. Shruti D. Vyas, Addl. Govt. Pleader with Ms. M. S. Bane, AGP for the State. _______ CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI & AARTI SATHE, JJ. DATE: 8 JANUARY, 2026 P.C. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed praying for the following reliefs:- “A. this Hon’ble Court may, by an appropriate writ, order or direction, direct the Deputy Collector, Rehabilitation, Pune & Sub- Divisional Officer, Shirur, to process the Petitioner’s application and allot house alternate house a Plot No.73 out of Gat No.1181/2/1 at Wadav Bk, Gavthan, Tal. Shirur, Dist. Pune as prayed for, if the Petitioner is entitled to get alternate land as prayed for within a period of three weeks from the date of order of this Hon’ble Court.” 2. The petitioner claims to be a project affected person of the Chaskaman Irrigation Project, hence he was entitled to allotment of an alternate house. The petitioner states that he filed an application for allotment of an alternate house to the competent authority, which according to him, has not yet been processed. Hence, this petition is filed. It is, however, quite surprising to note that the alleged cause of action has arisen in the year 1987. The petitioner himself contends that p. 2 PRAJAKTA SAGAR VARTAK Digitally signed by PRAJAKTA SAGAR VARTAK Date: 2026.01.13 15:11:16 +0530 5WP-16555-23.DOC his predecessor was displaced and not the petitioner, as the acquisition pertained to the predecessor’s house. After a gap of about 35 years, the petitioner made an application for allotment of an alternate house stating that he has not received any house anywhere in the State. 3. We have perused the memo of the petition. The petitioner is pursuing such cause after a delay of about 35 years, and that too a cause of action, which according to the petitioner, had occurred to his predecessors, as clearly seen from the memo of the petition. The petitioner has also failed to provide any explanation for such gross delay and laches so as to persuade us to entertain this petition in respect of a cause of action which had arisen to the petitioner about 35 years ago. We are also not sure as to whether the petitioner was even a major at the time when the land acquisition took place. 4. In this view of the matter, as the petition being hopelessly barred by the principles of delay and laches, it cannot be entertained. The law in such context was considered by this Court in dismissing similar proceedings in Tatoba Rama Chavan (since deceased) through his legal heir Taramati Tatoba Chavan,v/s. Collector, Kolhapur District, Kolhapur & Ors. (Civil Writ Petition No. 3883 of 2022), which in our opinion, clearly becomes applicable. In Tatoba Rama Chavan (supra) the Court made following observations where the same cause of action of such dead claim was being pursued:- “8. The Petitioner in the present petition is blissfully silent on several basic requirements for her to maintain this petition. She has not made any averments as to whether any occupancy price was paid by the Petitioner's father and any other preconditions required for grant of land p. 3 5WP-16555-23.DOC were complied with. The process of acquisition is over in the year 1983 itself. In the absence of the same, coupled with the fact of no explanation for the delay, it cannot be said that the Petitioner as made out even a prima facie case. On the contrary, it appears on the face of it a dead/stale claim is sought to be revived by filing the present petition. 9. We have come across some proceedings where, as a matter of course, the petitioners whose land was acquired ages back like in the present case. It appears to be a tendency to approach this Court seeking orders that their belated representations be considered. We may observe that when such petitioners have no legal rights, they cannot invoke equity or sympathy that they are project affected persons. This more particularly as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writs although may be equitable jurisdiction, however, the same is on a foundation of an existing and a live claim on which a litigant may seek a relief on a grievance of infringement of any of his legal rights. If what is being canvassed by the petitioners is accepted, it would result in the Court acting contrary to the mandate of law in issuing directions to the Government to re-open dead cases and make allotment of lands irrespective of the statutory scheme under the enactment, which was prevalent at the relevant point of time and as noted by us above. In our considered opinion, a loud and clear message has to go to such litigants who in fact attempt to abuse the process of law to approach the Court in belated claims. The present case is one such classic example of such dead claim being pursued. The only consequence is that such petitions are required to be, at the threshold, kept away from crowding the Courts, as they are clearly an abuse of the process of law. 10. Thus, in our view, the present petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Petitioner has approached this Court after an inordinate delay of almost 38 years from the date of the land having being acquired. The petitioner has not bothered to explain the delay of almost 37 years in making an application in the year 2020 to enforce the award passed in the year 1983. Even if the year 1999, when the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1999, came into existence is considered, even then the petitioner's application dated 17th January 2020 seeking allotment of the land is filed after a period of more than 20 years and there is no explanation for the delay of 20 years. In our view, as the petition is filed after gross delay and laches and such a Petitioner, who slept over his/her rights for almost three decades, cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more so, when there is no averment in the petition explaining the delay. 11. In the case of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology & Mining, the Supreme Court have observed in para 6 as under: “6. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to p. 4 5WP-16555-23.DOC service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any ‘decision’ on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to ‘consider’. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to ‘consider’. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex- employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. 7. Every representation to the government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. …….. 8. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of ‘acknowledgment of a jural relationship’ to give rise to a fresh cause of action. ***** 10. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasize the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for ‘consideration’. If the representation is on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing ‘consideration’ of such claims.”” p. 5 5WP-16555-23.DOC 5. The petition is accordingly summarily dismissed. However, we refrain from imposing any costs. (AARTI SATHE, J.) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)