1 2026:CGHC:23966-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 869 of 2024 Komaldas Dahre S/o Vijaydas Dahre Aged About 18 Years R/o Village Junwani Jangle, Police Station Singhanpuri Jungle, District - Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Sahaspur Lohara, District - Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent (Cause Title taken from Case Information System) ________________________________________________________ For Appellant : Mr. Amit Kumar, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Saumya Rai, Deputy Govt. Advocate ________________________________________________________ Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 16.06.2026 1. Heard Mr. Amit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Saumya Rai, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent. 2. It has been stated by learned State Counsel that notice has been served upon PW-2, mother of the victim on 28.06.2024 itself. 3. Today, though the matter is listed for hearing on I.A. No. 01 of 2024, which is an application for suspension of sentence and ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 grant of bail to the appellant, however, considering the fact that the appellant is in jail since 01.10.2023 and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is heard finally. 4. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘CrPC’) questioning the impugned judgment dated 02.04.2024 passed by the Special Judge, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Kabirdham (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case No. 521/2023, whereby the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant with a direction to run all the sentences concurrently in the following manner : CONVICTION SENTENCE U/s 363 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 03 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 01 month. U/s 366 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 05 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 02 months. U/s 376(3) of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 06 months U/s 6 of the POCSO Act Rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 06 months 5. The prosecution case in brief is that on 20.09.2023, the victim's father informed the police station that his daughter, a student of class IX at Bhoramdev Residential Girls' Ashram, Maharajpur, had 3 come to Gajedabari 22 days ago to celebrate Rakshabandhan festival. Due to ill health, she stayed at home. On 18.09.2023 at 9:00 pm, he went to sleep after having dinner with his wife and children. His daughter, the victim, was sleeping on a separate cot with her grandmother. On 19.09.2023 at 04:00 am when he woke up, he saw that his daughter victim aged 13 years 03 months was not at home, on enquiring around there was no trace of his daughter, some unknown person has lured away his daughter. On the information of the father of the victim crime number 212/2023 was registered against the unknown person under section 363 IPC in the police station and first information (Ex.P-17) was recorded and a site map (Ex.P-08) of the incident spot was drawn. 6. On 28.09.2023, the victim was recovered from the possession of the accused and recovery panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P-06, and after obtaining consent from the victim and her mother, the victim and the undergarments worn by her were sent to Community Health Centre Sahaspur Lohara vide Ex.P-12) for examination. The victim was sent to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate First Class Kawardha vide Ex.P-13 for recording her statement under Section 164 CrPC. The accused was arrested and arrest memo was prepared vide Ex.P-09 and the accused and the undergarments worn by him were sent to Community Health Centre Sahaspur Lohara for examination. The reports (Ex.P-11 & 12) was received. An application (Ex.P-02) was sent to the Headmaster of Government Primary School, Gajaidbari for production of the 4 mutation register related to the victim and a certified copy of the mutation register (Ex.P-03C) was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P- 04 and the original register was handed over to the concerned Headmaster on supurdnama vide Ex.P-05. The sealed packets brought from the hospital under the possession of constables Manoj and Deepa Rai, in which the undergarment of the accused (Ex.P- 07) and the slide and undergarment of the victim (Ex.P-08) respectively were seized, the seized clothes and slides were sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur vide Ex.P-14 whose acknowledgement is Ex.P-15 and report received therefrom is marked as Ex.P-16. After further investigation, charge sheet was presented against the accused under sections 363, 366, 376 (2) (d), 376 (3) IPC and section 06 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 before the Court of Special Judge, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Kabirdham (C.G.) on 23.11.2023. 7. After the charges were framed against the accused and read out and explained to him under sections 363, 366, 376 (2) (d), 376 (3) of the IPC and section 6 of the POCSO Act, the accused rejected the charges and sought trial. 8. In support of its case, the prosecution has recorded the statements of the victim (PW-01), the victim's mother (PW-02), the victim's father (PW-03), Head Teacher Samaruram (PW-04), the victim's cousin (PW-05), Dr. Purushottam Bandhe (PW-06), Head Constable Ramsiya Kanwar (PW-07), Sub-Inspector Mahendra Jaisingh (PW- 5 08), Dr. Pushpa Kharsan (PW-09), Assistant Sub-Inspector Doman Banjare (PW-10). Under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused did not produce any evidence in his defence, stating that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated. 9. The trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral and documentary evidences available on record, by the impugned judgment dated 02.04.2024 convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner mentioned in the 04th paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC has been preferred by him calling in question the impugned judgment. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution and has wrongly convicted the appellant. The prosecution failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The statement of the victim is full of conjectures and surmises and are highly unreliable. The age of the victim has not been proved and no ossification test for determining the age has been done and even her parents have not supported the prosecution case regarding age of the victim, which makes the whole case of prosecution doubtful. Hence, the conviction is liable to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State/respondent submitted that the appellant has committed a heinous crime of rape against minor girl, aged about 13 years and 03 months and 6 the same has been duly proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the judgment of conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court is just and proper warranting no interference. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 13. The first question for consideration before this Court would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident, the victim was minor ? 14. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 15. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows : “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). 7 The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if 8 considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a 9 victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW- PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 10 16. In this regard, the father of the victim (PW-03) stated that at the time of the incident, the age of his daughter victim was 13 years 03 months and in cross-examination, he rejected the suggestion that in his community, the age of a child in Class 1 is 08-09 years, he had got her daughter's age written by guessing, her daughter's age is 20-21 years and she is studying in class 12th, the witness has voluntarily stated that he has all the papers of her daughter's age and her age is 13 years 03 months. 17. As per the statement of Sub-Inspector Mahendra Jaisingh (PW- 08), on 09.11.2023, he had seized the mutation register regarding the date of birth of the victim from the possession of Headmaster Samaru Ram. Corroborating the statement of this witness, Samaru Ram (PW-04) on being asked for the admission/rejection register related to the victim by the Police Station S. Lohara, said that the admission/rejection register maintained in the normal course of the school in which the date of birth of the victim was mentioned as 13.06.2010 and the date of admission in class 1st as 27.06.2015, he certified his signature on the part A of the certified copy Ex.P 03-C. In the cross-examination, witness Samaru Ram has accepted that the entry in the admission/rejection register is not in his handwriting and the name of the victim has been tampered with on page No.19 of the register. 18. It is noteworthy that the certified copy of Dakhil Kharij Register Ex.P-03-C is a document maintained by a public servant in the 11 normal course of school while discharging his public duty. In which, at the time of admission of a child in the school, his date of birth, date of admission, class in which admission has been taken and the name and signature of the person by whom admission has been done are recorded. Dakhil Kharij Register Ex.P-03 has been originally produced in the trial Court by the Headmaster of the school. In the said situation, the Dakhil Kharij Register is a relevant document under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act and cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that the prosecution has not recorded the statement of the writer of the register. The school register is a certified document maintained in the official order and is highly trusted. 19. Now, if we consider the point of erasure and overwriting in the Dakhil Kharij Register, though Head Reader Samaru Ram (PW- 04) has admitted in cross-examination that there is erasure regarding the date of birth of the victim, however, a perusal of register Ex.P 03-C does not show any such erasure. In the same register, the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 13.06.2010, according to which the age of the victim on the date of incident i.e. 18.09.2023 is 13 years and 03 months, which corroborates the statement of the father of the victim. In cross-examination, the father of the victim has also denied the fact that he had not only recorded the age of the victim by guesswork but has also clarified that he has all the documents regarding the date of birth which strengthens the case of the prosecution. 12 20. The victim (PW-01) has stated that she is studying in class 9th. In such a situation, in view of the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is not possible to produce the first category document, i.e., the certificate of matriculation. Hence, the prosecution has produced the second category document, i.e., the Dakhil Kharij Register of admission of the victim in class 1st, which is in the category of valid document. No other substantial evidence has been produced by the defence to refute the date of birth of the victim. Therefore, on the basis of Dakhil Kharij Register Ex.P-03 presented by the prosecution and the statement of the father of the victim, the prosecution has been successful in proving that the age of the victim was 16 at the time of the incident. We hereby affirmed the said finding. 21. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363 of the IPC ? 22. The appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 363 of the IPC, which is punishable for kidnapping. Kidnapping has been defined under Section 359 of the IPC. According to Section 359 of the IPC, kidnapping is of two kinds: kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Section 361 of the IPC defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship which states as under:- “361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.-Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a 13 male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.” 23. The object of Section 359 of the IPC is at least as much to protect children of tender age from being abducted or seduced for improper purposes, as for the the protection of the rights of parents and guardians having the lawful charge or custody of minors or insane persons. Section 361 has four ingredients:- (1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind. (2) Such minor must be under sixteen years of age, if a male, or under eighteen years or age, if a female. (3) The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind. (4) Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian. So far as kidnapping a minor girl from lawful guardianship is concerned, the ingredients are : (i) that the girl was under 18 years of age; (ii) such minor was in the keeping of a lawful guardian, and (iii) the accused took or induced such person to leave out of such keeping and such taking was done without the consent of the lawful guardian. 14 24. The Supreme Court while considering the object of Section 361 of the IPC in the matter of S.Varadarajan v. State of Madras1, took the view that if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so and held that if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking, it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian and held as under:- “It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. If evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. But that part falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to “taking”.” 25. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of ingredients of offence under Section 361 of the IPC which is punishable under Section 363 of the IPC & as well as principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of S.Varadarajan (supra), it is evident that while the victim had gone out of her for nature’s call, the accused forcefully took her on his motorcycle and thereafter 1 AIR 1965 SC 942 15 took her to Andhra Pradesh in train without the permission of her legal guardian. As such, we are of the considered view that the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 363 of the IPC. 26. The next question for consideration before us is whether the appellant has committed rape on minor victim ? 27. It has been stated by the victim (PW-01) while the accused used to come to her village, then only she met him. She further stated that one evening, when she left the house to use the bathroom, the accused was outside and he forcibly took her on his motorcycle. He took her to Bhainsbod, from there they went by pickup to the railway station and then took her by train to Andhra Pradesh. In Andhra Pradesh, where she don't know the exact location, she started living in a room with the accused and her parents. She further stated that the accused used to come home drunk, scold her, abuse her and force her to do wrong things and have physical relations with her everyday. When she refused, he used to beat her. She also stated that the accused used to tell her that one day he would marry her, but she used to refuse to marry him. In her cross-examination, the victim has specifically denied the suggestion that the accused had not done anything wrong with her forcefully. 28. Although the doctor Dr. Pushpa Kharsan (PW-09) has not given any opinion regarding sexual assault and further that FSL report 16 (Ex.P-16) is also found to be negative, however, on the one hand the statement of the victim on this point has remained unshakeable and on the other hand the doctor on examination has found the hymen of the victim to be torn which shows that physical relations have been established with the victim, which has not been challenged by the defence, it is also clear that the evidence of the doctor is not conclusive evidence but an opinion. 29. Rape has been defined in Section 375 of the IPC as follows : “375. Rape.-- A man is said to commit "rape" if he-- (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions: First. Against her will. 17 Secondly. Without her consent. Thirdly. With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly. With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly. With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly. With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly. When she is unable to communicate consent. Explanation 1. For the purposes of this section, "vagina" shall also include labia majora. Explanation 2. Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. 18 Exception 1. A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2. Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.” 30. On the basis of the complete uncontroversial statement of the victim (PW-1) in the cross-examination regarding the accused having physical relations with her, the uncontroversial statement of the victim (PW-1), the victim's mother (PW-2), father (PW-3), brother (PW-5) and Investigation Officer Doman Banjare (PW-10) regarding the recovery of the victim from the possession of the accused and the conclusion reached that the victim was 13 years of age at the time of the incident and the consent of a child below 18 years of age has no significance in law, the prosecution has been successful in proving that the accused committed rape on the victim against her will and without her consent. 31. 31. On the basis of the uncontroversial, irrefutable and reliable statement of the victim (PW-01) and other evidence, it is proved that the accused seduced the victim, established a love affair, kidnapped the victim, established physical relationship and committed penetrative sexual assault. In the above circumstances, Section 29 of the POCSO Act is attracted, which is as follows - "29 Presumption as to certain offences Where a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit an offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of this Act, the Special Court shall presume 19 that such person has committed, abetted or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be, unless the contrary is proved." 32. In view of the above provision, after the prosecution discharged the preliminary proof part, the onus was on the defence to prove that the accused had not committed penetrative sexual assault on the victim, which was not discharged by the accused. The defence has also not taken any defence that the accused was incapable of sexual intercourse. In the said situation, an adverse presumption arises against the accused under Section 29 of POCSO Act. Moreover, in the above circumstances, it is also presumed under Section 30 of POCSO Act that the accused, in a culpable mental state, despite knowing the fact that the victim was only 13 years of age, lured the victim into marriage and committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on her and raped her repeatedly. 33. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 366 of the IPC ? 34. The appellant has also been convicted for offence under Section 366 of the IPC which states as under: - “366. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit 20 intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable as aforesaid.” 35. In order to constitute offence under Section 366 of the IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused induced the complainant woman or compelled by force to go from any place, that such inducement was by deceitful means, that such abduction took place with the intent that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse and / or that the accused knew it to be likely that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse as a result of her abduction. Mere abduction does not bring an accused under the ambit of this penal provision. So far as charge under Section 366 of the IPC is concerned, mere finding that a woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the accused abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. 21 36. 21 36. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mohammed Yousuff alias Moula and another v. State of Karnataka2 pointing out the essential ingredients required to be proved by the prosecution for bringing a case under Section 366 of the IPC, relying upon the decision rendered in the matter of Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra3, has clearly held that in order to constitute an offence under Section 366 of the IPC, besides proving the factum of abduction, the prosecution has to prove that the said abduction was for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 366 of the IPC, and observed as under: - “8. Chapter XVI of IPC contains offences against the human body. Section 366, which is the pertinent provision, is contained within this Chapter. Kidnapping/abduction simpliciter is defined under Section 359 and maximum punishment for the same extends up to seven years and fine as provided under Section 363. However, if the kidnapping is done with an intent of begging, to murder, for ransom, to induce women to marry, to have illicit intercourse stricter punishments are provided from Section 363A to Section 369. 9. Section 366 clearly states that whoever kidnaps/abducts any woman with the intent that she may be compelled or knowing that she will be compelled, to either get her married or forced/seduced to have illicit intercourse they shall be punished with imprisonment of up to ten years 2 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1118 3 (2018) 6 SCC 664 22 and fine. The aforesaid Section requires the prosecution not only to lead evidence to prove kidnapping simpliciter, but also requires them to lead evidence to portray the abovementioned specific intention of the kidnapper. Therefore, in order to constitute an offence under Section 366, besides proving the factum of the abduction, the prosecution has to prove that the said abduction was for one of the purposes mentioned in the section. In this case at hand the prosecution was also required to prove that there was compulsion on the part of the accused persons to get the victim married. [See Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 664].” 37. In the instant case, as the offence of sexual assault has been found proved by the prosecution which satisfies the requirement of Section 366 of the IPC, we are of the considered view that the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 366 of the IPC. 38. In the case of Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573, the Supreme Court observed and held that that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. 39. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, {(2019) 11 SCC 575}, it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held 23 that sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted by court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. 40. In the case of Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, {(2018) 18 SCC 34}, the Supreme Court observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. 41. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases (supra) to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the victim. They are found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the victim can be sustained. 42. The view taken by the learned trial Court that the appellant is the author of the crime is a pure finding of fact based on evidence available on record and as such, we are of the opinion that in the present case, the only view possible was the one taken by the learned trial Court. 24 43. From the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has been successful in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has not committed any legal or factual error in arriving at the finding with regard to the guilt of the appellant/convict. 44. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 45. The appellant/convict is stated to be in jail. He shall serve out the sentence awarded by the trial Court by means of the impugned judgment and order dated 02.04.2024. 46. Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and action, if any. 47. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing jail sentence, to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra