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2026 DAILYLAW 2144 (KAR)

RAMESH. P v. K. JYOTHI

RFA/78/2026 · 2026-02-17

Sachin Shankar Magadum

body2026

Judgment text

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- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.78 OF 2026 BETWEEN: RAMESH P AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS SON OF LATE PONNUSWAMY N RESIDING AT NO.23, YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008 …APPELLANT (BY SRI.JOSHUA HUDSON SAMUEL, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. K.JYOTHI (SINCE DEAD NOW REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE) SMT.KOKILA AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS W/O LATE JYOTHI AT PORTION OF NO.17 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR, BENGALURU - 560 008 (NOW NOT RESIDING IN THE SAID PREMISES Digitally signed by CHAITHRA A Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 PURSUANT TO SALE DEED DATED 11.11.2021) 2. K.KUMARESHAN (SINCE DEAD NOW REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES) R.RAMANI W/O LATE KUMARESHAN K AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.17 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008 3. LAKSHMI K D/O LATE KUMARESHAN K AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.17 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008 4. DEEPA K D/O LATE KUMARESHAN K AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.17, YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008 5. K.YUVARAJAN S/O LATE KUMARESHAN K AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.17 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR, BENGALURU - 560 008. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 6. RAJA P AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS SON OF LATE PONNUSWAMY N RESIDING AT NO.23 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.A.KESHAV BHAT, ADVOCATE FOR C/R.5) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC., AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 10.10.2025 PASSED ON I.A.NO.1/2023 IN EX.PETITION NO.25012/2016 ON THE FILE OF XXVIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, (CCH-29), MAYO HALL, BENGALURU., DISMISSING THE I.A.NO.1/2023 FILED UNDER SEC.XLVII R/W ORDER XXI RULE 97 AND 101 R/W SECTION 151 OF CPC AND ETC. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM ORAL JUDGMENT The captioned Regular First Appeal is filed by the third party applicant assailing the order dated 10.10.2025 of the Executing Court passed on I.A.No.1/2023 filed under Section 47 read with Order XXI Rule 97 and 101 - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'CPC'). 2. Facts leading to the case are as under; The records disclose that the original decree holders, who are full brothers, had instituted four independent suits in the year 2004 against different tenants seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession of the respective tenanted premises. All the suits were decreed directing the tenants to vacate and hand over vacant possession. The tenants carried the matter in four separate appeals before this Court; the appeals came to be dismissed, affirming the decrees. Thereafter, the tenants approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing SLP No.14566/2016, which was dismissed on 21.09.2021, thereby lending finality to the decrees. Consequent upon the decrees attaining finality, separate execution petitions were initiated. The present appeal arises out of Execution - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 Petition No.25012/2016, which relates to the decree passed in O.S.No.15398/2004. 3. In the said execution proceedings, the present appellant entered appearance claiming to be third party and filed an application under Section 47 read with Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 and Section 151 of the CPC, seeking to resist execution. Their principal assertion was that Smt.Kokila, widow of late K.Jyothi Ram - one of the original decree holders, had, during the pendency of the execution proceedings, executed a registered sale deed dated 11.11.2021 conveying 50% undivided share in the schedule property in his favour. On the strength of the said alienation, he contended that the decree holders were not entitled to enforce the decree in respect of the entire property. The decree holders filed detailed objections. As rival title documents were produced, the Executing Court permitted the parties to adduce evidence. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Executing Court recorded a finding that the appellant had - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 purchased only an undivided 50% share from Smt.Kokila and that the decree was yet to be fully executed against all the tenants. The Executing Court accordingly rejected the application holding that a mere recital regarding transfer of an undivided share would not clothe the appellant with any right to obstruct execution of a decree that had attained finality. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that though the sale deed describes the property conveyed as an undivided 50% share, the schedule appended thereto demarcates a specific portion and that the appellant is in exclusive possession of the said portion. It is argued that the legal heirs of the other brother, namely late K.Kumareshan, cannot enforce the decree in respect of the entire property so as to prejudice the rights allegedly acquired by the appellant. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in Parvathibai vs. Dattatreya Janardhan Dhopeshwarkar1, it is submitted 1 ILR 1992 KAR 929 - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 that a transferee from one of the decree holders is entitled to maintain an application under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC and seek adjudication of his independent rights within execution proceedings. On that premise, it is urged that the Executing Court erred in rejecting the application without properly adjudicating the appellant's claim. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the decree holder would submit that the appellant is pendente lite purchaser, having acquired an undivided share during the pendency of the execution proceedings, and is therefore bound by the doctrine of lis pendens. It is contended that the alienation effected by Smt.Kokila does not confer upon the appellant any superior right to stall or obstruct execution of a decree, which has been confirmed up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the litigation commenced in the year 2004 and after protracted proceedings, has attained finality. Both the original decree holders have passed away and their legal representatives are merely seeking enforcement of the - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 decree. It is further contended that if the appellant's claim any independent title under the sale deed dated 11.11.2021, his remedy lies in instituting a properly constituted substantive suit and not in impeding the execution proceedings. 6. In the backdrop of the rival contentions and the material placed on record, the following points arise for consideration: (i) Whether the Executing Court was justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure? (ii) What order? Findings on Point No.(i):- 7. The material on record unmistakably discloses that the original plaintiffs have been embroiled in protracted litigation commencing from the year 2004. For more than two decades, the decree holders have been - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 pursuing their remedies to secure possession of the tenanted premises and the decrees have attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. We are now in the year 2026. At this distant point of time, when the decree holders are seeking to reap the fruits of a decree that has stood the test of appellate scrutiny, the appellant has entered the fray on the strength of a sale deed dated 11.11.2021, claiming an undivided half share in the property. In the considered view of this Court, the question of title set up by the appellant on the basis of the said sale deed cannot be adjudicated within the narrow compass of execution proceedings arising out of a decree for possession passed against tenants. 8. On a specific query put by this Court to the learned counsel for the appellant as to how a sale deed conveying an “undivided 50% share” could nevertheless contain specific boundaries demarcating a definite portion, no satisfactory explanation was forthcoming. This aspect assumes significance, for an undivided share in joint - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 property, by its very nature, does not translate into a demarcated and identifiable parcel unless there has been a lawful partition. 9. A careful perusal of the sale deed executed in favour of the appellant by the widow of one of the decree holders reveals that, though the recital speaks of transfer of an undivided 50% share, the schedule appended thereto describes the property with specific boundaries. This recital is inherently incongruous and is in direct derogation to law laid down by this that a joint family member cannot sell his/her undivided share by specifying boundaries. When the two original plaintiffs had jointly instituted suits seeking possession from four tenants in respect of the entire property, and when the decree for possession is joint and indivisible as against the tenants, a transferee from one co-owner cannot, at the stage of execution, carve out a defined portion and claim exclusive possession thereof. - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 10. Even assuming that the appellant has validly purchased the undivided half share of one of the decree holders under the registered sale deed dated 11.11.2021, he remain stranger to the family arrangement between the co-owners and stranger to the original tenancy proceedings. Such a purchaser of an undivided share steps into the shoes of the vendor only to the extent of the vendor’s right, title and interest. They cannot, however, resist enforcement of a decree for possession against the tenants, particularly when the decree is yet to be fully executed and possession has not been recovered from the tenants. 11. It is trite that until the decree holders secure actual possession from the tenants in execution of the decree, neither the original decree holders nor the appellant claiming under one of them can assert exclusive possession of any specific portion. The right of the appellant, if any, is inchoate and remains subject to the enforcement of the decree in its entirety. Only after - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 possession is secured from the tenants would a proper cause of action accrue to the appellant to work out his remedy in accordance with law be it by seeking partition or other appropriate relief in respect of the undivided 50% share claimed under the sale deed dated 11.11.2021. 12. The attempt of the appellant to invoke Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC to effectively seek an adjudication akin to a preliminary decree for partition within execution proceedings is wholly misconceived. Execution proceedings cannot be converted into a forum for resolving inter se disputes of title between co-owners or their transferees, particularly when the decree sought to be executed is one for possession against tenants whose tenancy stood terminated long ago. 13. There is yet another significant angle from which the appellant’s claim deserves to be examined. The appellant is admittedly purchaser pendente lite, having acquired an alleged undivided half share under a - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 registered sale deed dated 11.11.2021 during the pendency of the execution proceedings. Such a purchaser is squarely hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. A transferee pendente lite does not acquire any right superior to that of his vendor and takes the property subject to the result of the pending proceedings. The appellant, therefore, steps into the shoes of the widow of one of the decree holders and can claim no independent or higher right than what he herself could assert in law. 14. The scope and ambit of Order XXI Rule 97 CPC read with Section 47 CPC are well settled. Order XXI Rule 97 is intended to provide a remedy where resistance or obstruction to possession is offered by a person claiming an independent right in the property, adverse to or dehors the decree. Section 47 CPC mandates that all questions arising between the parties to the suit or their representatives, relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Executing Court and not by a separate suit. However, the - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 provision cannot be stretched to convert execution proceedings into a forum for adjudicating complicated questions of title between co-owners or their transferees, especially when such transferees claim only through one of the decree holders and not in their own independent right. 15. In the present case, the appellant has not set up an independent or adverse title as against the decree holders. On the contrary, he trace his claim through the widow of one of the original decree holders. Therefore, he is representative-in-interest of one of the decree holders and is bound by the decree in the same manner as his vendor. When the durable jural relationship between the original plaintiffs (landlords) and the original defendants (tenants) stood conclusively adjudicated in the suit for possession and the decree has attained finality at the hands of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the execution proceedings are confined to enforcement of that decree against the tenants. Both the original decree holders had - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 jointly sought possession, and their legal representatives are merely seeking to enforce the decree. 16. A purchaser pendente lite claiming through one of the decree holders cannot maintain a third-party application under Order XXI Rule 97 to obstruct execution of a decree which his own vendor was actively seeking to enforce. The remedy under Rule 97 is primarily intended for a stranger who asserts an independent right in resistance to delivery of possession. It is not available to a transferee, who derives title from one of the decree holders during the pendency of execution and seeks to interdict the decree itself. Such a course would defeat the very object of execution proceedings and undermine the finality attached to decrees. 17. More particularly, the appellant’s reliance on the specific boundaries mentioned in the sale deed does not advance their case. As already observed, what is conveyed under the document is only an undivided half share. In - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 law, an undivided share does not confer exclusive possession over any identified portion unless there is a partition by metes and bounds. The attempt to rely upon specific boundaries at the stage of execution, when possession has not yet been recovered from the tenants, is wholly misconceived. The appellant cannot, by virtue of such recitals, carve out a defined portion and resist delivery of possession pursuant to a decree that binds his vendor. 18. Execution proceedings cannot be permitted to be derailed by transferee pendente lite, who seeks to project intra-family or co-ownership disputes as a ground to stall enforcement of a decree for possession against tenants. If such objections are entertained, it would render decrees illusory and enable endless obstruction. The appellant’s rights, if any, are subject to the decree and can be worked out only after the decree holders secure possession in entirety. Thereafter, the appellant may pursue appropriate - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 remedies in accordance with law, such as seeking partition. 19. In the totality of circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the third-party application filed by the appellant under Order XXI Rule 97 read with Section 47 CPC is not maintainable. The appellant, being pendente lite purchaser claiming through one of the decree holders and not asserting any independent adverse title, has no locus to obstruct execution of a decree that has attained finality. The application is thus wholly misconceived and was rightly rejected by the Executing Court. 20. The further contention urged on behalf of the appellant that he is in exclusive possession of a specific portion equivalent to half share is equally misconceived and legally untenable. This assertion runs directly contrary to the foundational pleadings and relief sought by the original plaintiffs. The very suits instituted in the year - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 2004 were for declaration of title and recovery of possession from four tenants. The decree holders themselves were not in physical possession of the premises and had approached the Court seeking recovery of possession after termination of tenancy. The decree for possession was granted on that basis and has attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 21. When the original plaintiffs were admittedly not in possession and had to secure a decree for recovery of possession from tenants, the appellant, who claims only through the widow of one of the decree holders, cannot, during the pendency of execution proceedings, assert that he is in exclusive possession of a defined half portion. A transferee cannot claim a better or higher right than that of his vendor. If the vendor herself was not in possession and was prosecuting execution proceedings to recover possession from tenants, the appellant cannot, on the strength of a subsequent sale deed, project a case of settled or exclusive possession over any specific portion. - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 22. Moreover, what is conveyed under the sale deed is only an undivided half share. In law, an undivided share does not translate into possession of a specific demarcated portion unless there is a partition by metes and bounds. The plea of “exclusive possession of half share” is inherently inconsistent with the concept of joint ownership and wholly incompatible with the admitted fact that tenants are in occupation and execution proceedings are pending for recovery of possession. The appellant cannot simultaneously acknowledge that the property is under tenancy and yet claim exclusive possession of a defined portion thereof. 23. Such a contention also falls outside the permissible ambit of Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The scheme of Rule 97 CPC contemplates resistance or obstruction by a person claiming an independent right to possession in his own capacity. It does not envisage a situation where a pendente lite purchaser from one of the decree holders asserts a notional or constructive possession over an - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 undivided share, contrary to the decree itself. The appellant's plea neither discloses an independent adverse title nor establishes actual possession capable of being protected under the execution framework. 24. In that view of the matter, the contention that the appellant is in exclusive possession of a specific half share pending execution proceedings cannot be accepted. The plea is inconsistent with the decree for possession, contrary to the legal character of an undivided share and does not fit within the statutory scheme governing resistance to execution under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The said contention is therefore rejected. 25. Having regard to the above circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the Executing Court has rightly appreciated the scope of its jurisdiction and has correctly rejected the application filed by the appellant. The findings recorded do not suffer from any perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error warranting interference in - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 appeal. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in the “Affirmative.” CONCLUSIONS 26. At the same time, it requires to be clarified that the appellant, being transferee pendente lite from one of the decree holders, is not remediless in law. A purchaser from a decree holder during the pendency of execution does not acquire an independent right to obstruct execution; however, such purchaser is entitled to work out his remedies in accordance with law through the decree holder whose interest he has acquired. In other words, the transferee merely steps into the shoes of his vendor and can claim the benefit of the decree to the extent of the vendor’s right, but cannot impede or stall its enforcement. 27. Once the decree holders secure possession from the tenants in execution of the decree, the benefit of such recovery enures to the extent of the undivided share - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 conveyed under the sale deed dated 11.11.2021. The appellant, as purchaser of an undivided half share, would then be entitled to assert his derivative rights against the co-owners in appropriate proceedings known to law, such as by seeking partition and separate possession. His remedy, therefore, lies not in resisting execution under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, but in allowing the decree to be executed in its entirety and thereafter claiming through the decree holder whose interest he has purchased. 28. It is well settled that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the result of the litigation and cannot defeat the decree. However, the transferee is entitled to the fruits of the decree to the extent of the interest transferred, once possession is recovered. Thus, the appellant's lawful course is to support execution and not obstruct it. After possession is delivered in favour of the decree holders, the appellant may seek appropriate relief in respect of his undivided share, including partition and allotment of his share in accordance with law. - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:9600 RFA No. 78 of 2026 29. Therefore, while the third-party application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC., is not maintainable, it is made clear that the dismissal of the said application does not extinguish the appellant’s substantive rights, if any, flowing from the sale deed dated 11.11.2021. His right remain subject to the decree and can be worked out only after the decree is fully enforced. 30. Point No.(ii):- For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following; ORDER (i) The appeal is dismissed. (ii) It is made clear that the observations made by this Court shall be confined to the orders passed by this Court and observations made therein would not affect the appellant's right in pursuing his remedy strictly in accordance with law. SD/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE NBM List No.: 1 Sl No.: 8