2026:HHC:36925 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No.  : 222 of 2025 Decided on    : 27.08.2026 Narinder Kumar Seth …Petitioner Versus Jagjeet Kaur & Anr. …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner : Mr.Deepak   Gupta,   Senior Advocate,   with   Ms.   Yashika Thakur, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr.Dibender Ghosh, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge (Oral) Petitioner­Narinder   Kumar   Seth   has   filed   the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 28.03.2025, passed by the Court   of   learned   Additional   District   Judge   (CBI   Court) Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as ‘the first appellate Court’), in CMA No. 696 of 2024, in Civil Appeal No. 107­S/6 of 2024, titled as “Narinder Kumar Seth Vs Jagjeet Kaur & Ors.”. 2. By way of order dated 28.03.2025, the learned first appellate Court has dismissed the application under 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:36925 Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, read with Section 151 CPC, preferred by   the   petitioner,   who   had   filed   the   appeal,   before   the learned   first   appellate   Court,   against   the   judgment   and decree, dated 10.04.2024, passed by learned Senior Civil Judge,   Court   No.   1,   Shimla,   District   Shimla,   H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in Civil Suit No. 97­1 of 2014, titled as “Sarup Singh (deceased) through LRs. Vs Dharmender Kumar Seth & Anr.”. 3. By   way   of   the   judgment   and   decree   dated 10.04.2024, the learned trial Court has decreed the suit of the respondents, for permanent prohibitory injunction, by granting the following relief:­ “29. As a sequel to my findings on issue numbers 1 & 2,   the   suit   of   the   plaintiff   is   decreed   with   cost.     The objections filed to the report of local commissioner  are dismissed.   The defendants are hereby restrained from interfering over the suit land comprised in Khewat No. 37/35,   Khatauni   No.   42/41,   Khasra   No.   1219/1088, measuring 24­43 Sq. meters situated at Up­Mohal Upper Kaithu, Shimla­3, H.P. and they are directed to hand over the   vacant   possession   of   Khasra   No.   1219/1/1088/1 measuring 01­75 Sq. Mrts and 1219/1088/2 measuring 12­04 Sq. Mtrs as per report of the local commissioner Ext. CW1/A.  The report of local commissioner shall form the part of decree.   Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. File after its due completion be consigned to records.” 4. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present  lis,  are,   hereinafter   referred   to,   in   the   same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court. 3 2026:HHC:36925 5. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petition, before this Court, as borne out from the record, may be summed up, as under:­ 5.1 The   plaintiff   has   filed   a   suit   for   permanent prohibitory   and   mandatory   injunction,   regarding   land comprising  Khewat   No.   37/35,   Khatauni   No.   42/41, Khasra   No.   1219/1088,   measuring   24­43   Sq. meters situated   at   Up­Mohal   Upper   Kaithu,   Shimla­3,   H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’). 5.2 The suit has been filed, on the ground, that the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land and defendants are strangers to the suit land. However, the defendants   being   hoteliers   by   profession   and   very influential persons, threatened to encroach upon the suit land, by taking advantage of old age of the predecessor­in­ interest of the plaintiffs. They want to raise platform of ironsheet   and   girders,   for   placing   the   water   tanks   etc. After the demarcation, water tanks were removed with the intervention of M.C. Authorities. 6. When put to notice, the suit has been contested by the defendants and according to the defendants, they have not interfered with the suit land, in any manner. 4 2026:HHC:36925 7. After framing the issues on 25.08.2015, parties were directed to lead evidence. 8. During   the   pendency   of   the   lis,   local commissioner was appointed and objections filed by the defendants, against the report of local commissioner were dismissed and the suit has been decreed, as prayed for. 9. Aggrieved from the said judgment and decree, defendant   Narinder   Kumar   Seth,   has   filed   the   appeal before the learned first appellate Court, and along with the appeal,   application   under   Order   6   Rule   17   read   with Section 151 CPC has been moved. 10. By way of the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, read with Section 151 CPC, the defendant, wanted to   add   preliminary   objection,   in   para   6   of   the   written statement, which is reproduced as under:­ “6. That the plaintiff has not approached this Hon’ble Court with clean hands and has suppressed various facts from this Hon’ble Court. It has not been disclosed by the plaintiff   that   the   suit   property   comprises   of   staircase which goes to the tenanted premises in the third floor of building   namely   Olmutz   Villa   which   is   owned   by   the plaintiff. The said staircase is part and parcel of the tenanted premises and is being put to use by the defence since the time when the tenancy was created by late Sh. Sarup  Singh. Not only  this, Sh. Srup  Singh had also granted a right to the defendant to repair the staircase, as it   was   very   risky   for   the   defendant   and   his   family members   to   use   the   said   stairs. It   was   with   the permission of Sh. Sarup Singh that the staircase were repaired by the defendant. The said staircase cannot be ordered to be demolished in view of the fact that it would 5 2026:HHC:36925 ultimately   amount   to   ousting   the   possession   of   the defendant from the tenanted premises as it is only the staircase available to the defendant for using it as an approach   to   the   tenanted   premises. The   suit   has intentionally been filed by the plaintiff with a malafide intentions and oblique motive to force the defendant to vacate   the   tenanted   premises   in   Olmutz   Villa   without disclosing the aforesaid essential facts that the staircase upon the suit land is existing since the time immemorial, more specifically, from the date of creation of tenancy in favour of the defendant by late Sh. Sarup Singh. The suit, as such, is liable to be dismissed.” 11. The   said   amendment   has   been   stated   to   be necessary, in order to arrive at just and fair conclusion. According to him, the said amendment could not be raised earlier despite exercise of due diligence and is being made bonafidely in view of the wrong findings, arrived at by the Court below without there being any issue qua the same. 12. This   application   has   been   contested   by   the plaintiffs. 13. The learned first appellate Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, has dismissed the said application, vide order dated 28.03.2025. 14. The  said   order  has  been   assailed  before  this Court, by way of the present petition. 15. The   defendant   is   before   this   Court,   under Article   227   of   the   Constitution   of   India. The   scope   of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 6 2026:HHC:36925 has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “K. Valarmathi & Ors. Versus Kumaresan, 2025 INSC   606”. Relevant   para   9   of   the   judgment,   is reproduced, as under: “Essence   of   the   power   under   Article   227   being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy under   the   Civil   Procedure   Code,   1908. For   example, existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the Code   operates   as   a   near   total   bar   to   exercise   of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.” 16. In  a recent decision in “Nandi Infrastructure Corridor   Enterprises   Ltd.   &   Anr. Versus   B.   Gurappa Naidu & Ors., 2026 INSC 434”, the scope of interference has again been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:­ “35. In   short,   the   principles   laid   down   in   the   above matters is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not   to   be   exercised   unless   there   has   been   an   (a) unwarranted   assumption   of   jurisdiction,   not   vested   in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable   refusal   to   exercise   jurisdiction   vested   in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh   the   evidence   or   facts   upon   which   the determination   under   challenge   is   based. Supervisory 7 2026:HHC:36925 jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.” 17. Being guided by the above decisions, now, this Court   would   proceed   further,   to   determine   whether   the findings, of learned first appellate Court, while dismissing the application, vide order dated 28.03.2025, are suffering from   perversity,   or   the   same   has   been   passed   by   the learned first appellate Court, in violation to the jurisdiction vested in it, or the learned first appellate Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. 18. The term “perverse” has no where been defined, however,   the   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in   ‘Arulvelu   and Another   Versus   State   represented   by   the   Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court   Cases   206,   has   discussed   the   term   “perverse”. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:­ “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The  trial  court  very  minutely  examined   the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The   trial   court's   analysis   of   evidence   also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on 8 2026:HHC:36925 no   evidence   or   evidence   which   is   thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well   settled   that,   in   an   appeal   against   acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others,   this   Court   observed   that   the   expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence   itself. In Triveni   Rubber   &   Plastics   v. Collector   of   Central   Excise,   Cochin,   the   Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence   or   that   they   are   so   perverse   that   no reasonable   person   would   have   arrived   at   those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against   the   evidence. In   Godfrey   v.   Godfrey,   the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 9 2026:HHC:36925 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman   Dictionary   of   Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English ­ 1998 Edition Perverse:   Law   (of   a   verdict)   against   the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse:   Purposely   deviating   from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked   or   wayward;   stubborn;   cross   or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the   weight   of   evidence   but   is   altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal  unless  the same is found to be perverse. In   the   present   case,   the   High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: 10 2026:HHC:36925 "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained   between   the   decisions   which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision   is   arrived   at   on   no   evidence   or evidence   which   is   thoroughly   unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is   some   evidence   on   record   which   is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever   compendious   it   may   be,   the conclusions   would   not   be   treated   as perverse   and   the   findings   would   not   be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer­cum­ Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath &   Sons   &   Others   1992,   this   Court   observed   as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points   on   which   the   challenge   to   the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion,   the   High   Court   was   in   error   in constituting   itself   into   a   court   of   appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re­appreciate the primary or perceptive   facts   which   were   otherwise within   the   domain   of   the   fact­finding authority   under   the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise   in   recording   secondary   or inferential   facts   based   on   primary   facts found   by   the   statutory   authorities. But what   was   assailed   in   review   was,   in substance,   the   correctness   ­   as distinguished from the legal permissibility ­ of   the   primary   or   perceptive   facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a 11 2026:HHC:36925 finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding   relevant   material   or   by   taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to   suffer   from   the   vice   of   irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 19. Similar   view   has   again   been   taken   by   the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:­ “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking   into   consideration   irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if  it is “against  the weight  of evidence”,  or  if  the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the   basis   of   no   evidence   or   thoroughly   unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered   with. (Vide: Rajinder   Kumar   Kindra   v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala).” 20. Being guided by the above decisions, now, this Court would proceed further to ascertain the fact whether the learned first appellate Court, has wrongly dismissed the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. 12 2026:HHC:36925 21. Admittedly, the said application has been filed when the decree has been passed against the defendants. The application has been moved, after the conclusion of the trial and along with the first appeal, before the learned first   appellate   Court. As   per   the   application,   necessity arose for filing the application is that during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned trial Court, a local commissioner was appointed and against the report of local commissioner, the defendants have filed the objections to the demarcation report and also raised the plea that the defendant is tenant in the third floor of the building, owned by the plaintiffs and at the time of induction as tenant in the said floor, there were old Kachha stairs on the spot. Due to the said reason, it was not possible to use the stairs with   ease   and   there   always   remained   apprehensions   of falling down from the said stairs. Except the said stairs, there is no access to the said floor, which is in occupation and tenancy of the defendants. On the persistent request of   the   predecessor­in­interest   of   the   defendants,   the predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiffs, Sh. Sarup Singh, had permitted the defendants to repair the stairs. 13 2026:HHC:36925 22. On   the   above   grounds,   the   amendment   has been sought. 23. As   stated   above,   this   application   has   been contested by the plaintiffs. 24. The learned first appellate Court has held, while dismissing the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, that the objections to the report of local commissioner are not the part of the written statement. Admittedly, the local commissioner was appointed on 12.12.2019, and written statement has already been filed. 25. In the present case, it seems that by way of the amendment, the defendants want to nullify the findings of the learned trial Court, on the basis of which, the suit of the plaintiffs have been decreed. 26. In the present case, the issues were framed by the learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of both the   parties   and   thereafter,   the   parties   to   the   lis   have adduced the evidence; local commissioner has submitted his report, the objections were filed, which were considered by   the   learned   trial   Court   and   after   rejecting   those objections,   suit   of   the   plaintiffs   was   decreed. In   such situation,   when   the   defendants   could   have   moved   the 14 2026:HHC:36925 application for amendment, before the learned trial Court, however, he remained silent till the decision of the case and thereafter, filed the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. 27. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the   findings,   so   recorded   by   the   learned   first   appellate Court, fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’, which require   interference   of   this   Court. The   learned   first appellate Court, while passing the order dated 28.03.2025, has   not   exceeded   the   jurisdiction,   vested   in   it. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. 28. Any   of   the   observations,   made   hereinabove, shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations are confined, only to the disposal of the present petition. 29. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed of. 30. The   parties   to   the   lis   are   directed   to   appear before the learned trial Court on 21.09.2026 at 10:00 am. (Virender Singh) 27th August, 2026 Judge (Pramod Kumar)